Introduction:
Narrative and the Emotions

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A Look behind Us

Seventy-five years ago, a scholar seeking a starting point on narrative and the emotions, the joint subject of this two-part special issue, might have consulted colleagues in psychology and literature departments for a reading list. Quite likely the scholar would have been reminded by those colleagues of the canonical works representing several decades’ worth of fruitful collaboration between their disciplines: literary theorist I. A. Richards’s *Principles of Literary Criticism* (1926a) and psychologist John Dewey’s *Art as Experience* (2005 [1934]). Not yet discouraged by the prohibitions of W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley’s *Sewanee Review* essay, “The Affective Fallacy,” which disparaged work on the elicitation of emotion as “affective relativism” (1954 [1946]: 27); not yet converted to the emergent New Critical canon, which put narrative (especially those lengthy engines of sentimental response, novels) in the shade; not yet fully adopting modern theories of form in preference to older Romantic theories of the imagination (Dissanayake 1992: 142–47); not yet interpellated as either a scientist or a literary intellectual, incapable of communicating across the divide severing the “Two Cultures” (Snow 1956, 1959): our scholar would have every reason to believe that a science of the emotions, including the study of physiological responses, could contribute to an understanding of aesthetic experience. The notion that analysis of the feelings provoked and invited
by reading (and creating) narrative could illuminate the workings of mental activity would have seemed to our colleagues of seventy-five years ago a reasonable proposition; that the formal elements of plot arouse the emotions (in tragedy, of fear and pity) would have been axiomatic for them and their predecessors (Aristotle 1997: XIV, 85–101).

In the work of I. A. Richards (1926a: 91), our scholar could read: “a theory of feeling, or emotion, of attitudes and desires, of the affective-volitional aspect of mental activity, is required at all points of our analysis.” Far from banishing emotions from discussions of literature, Richards elevates them as “signs of attitudes” (132) and gives them a central place in theories of art (for Richards addresses literature, not limited to poetry or literary narrative, as one of the arts). In his definition of attitudes (which emotions signify), Richards’s indebtedness to the psychology of his day can be discerned: attitudes, he writes, are “imaginal and incipient activities or tendencies to action” (112). These action tendencies matter to literary criticism because “all the most valuable effects of poetry” can be described in terms of “the resolution, inter-animation, and balancing of impulses,” as for instance in Aristotle’s definition of tragedy (113). Though it is in his discussion of rhythm and meter that Richards speaks the language of neural settings and stimuli most fluently (139), his understanding of literary narrative also has a neurological basis. For Richards, artistic communication, when efficacious and deepened by the receivers’ “attitudes” (179) makes “permanent modifications in the structure of the mind” (132). Richards tacitly prefers poetry and shorter forms where coherence can be apprehended, as the emphases in his teaching and writing show. This does not rule out an application of Richards’s account of reading to narrative, but the novel is conspicuously absent from Principles of Literary Criticism (Dames 2007: 248–53).

Richards’s work on principles of literary criticism, published in the International Library of Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method, indicates a tradition of interdisciplinary collaboration and conversation that had been established by an earlier generation of Victorian and turn-

1. The long and rich tradition of work on the emotions in the arts generally and in literary arts specifically is beyond the scope of this introduction. Needless to say, any contemporary theorizing of impact that sets out its stall without exhibits from Aristotle, Plato, Horace, Longinus, Herder, Lessing, Goethe, Kant, the Romantics on estrangement and the sublime, Hume and Smith on sympathy, Brecht and Shklovsky, among others, risks privileging the recent over the ancient or traditional for no good reason beyond convenience. For convenience’s sake, then, I refer the reader to Neal Oxenhandler 1988 for a selective history of literary emotion, to Sternberg 1999, 2003a, 2003b, and 2009 for pointed critiques of cognitive poetics’ omissions of their learned precursors, and to my own survey, “Literary Career of Empathy” (Keen 2007: 37–64), as starting places.
of-the-twentieth-century aestheticians. Examples would be Vernon Lee (1884, 1913), who was also a novelist, and late Victorian scientific writers who were also men of letters, such as G. H. Lewes (1855, 1859–60). Among the questions posed and investigated by Victorian thinkers were those about novelists’ efforts to stimulate development of novel-readers’ sympathetic imagination (Haight 1968), about the nature of story-telling invention and its impact on readers’ feelings (Dallas 1856; Kreilkamp 2005), about physiological responses to reading (Bain 1859; Elfenbein 2006), about empathy and Einfühlung (Lee 1913), and the malleability of the reading mind, especially as regards readers’ morals (Masson 1859; Hutton 1887; Trollope 1883). Good guides to the overlap in Victorians’ interest in aesthetics and novel theories on the one hand, and psychology and physiology on the other hand, can be found in the work of Rick Rylance (2000) and Nicholas Dames (2007). The growth of therapeutic psychology during and after World War I—including but not limited to Freudian psychoanalysis—had established a relationship between the narrative expression of emotionally charged experience and restoration of health, resting on a theory of emotions as suppressed impulses that could burst forth in a return of the repressed (Freud 1963 [1916–1917]). This reinforced psychology’s faith in meliorism, even in face of the catastrophic psychic damage inflicted by the Great War, vividly documented in verse and prose.

Even though many modernist writers expressed skepticism about the healing powers of literature, preferring to pursue aesthetics of fragmentation, alienation and anti-closure, their contemporaries in psychology remained convinced of the efficacy of narrative in restoring psychic and social equilibrium. Writing after World War I, Richards (1926a: 44) himself still held high hopes that psychology could sort out good or valuable experiences from bad and correct society’s “obsolete moral principles” (57). The mechanism by which human beings pass unaware “from a chaotic to a better organized state,” was according to Richards “through the influence of other minds,” and he named literature and the arts as “the chief means by which these influences are diffused” (ibid.). In another work of 1926, he argued that poetry was “capable of saving us” and “a perfectly possible means of overcoming chaos” (1926b: 82). Clearly he was underestimating

2. For empirical verification of the link between improved health and expressive writing about traumatic experiences, see James W. Pennebaker’s Opening Up: The Healing Power of Expressing Emotion (1997a). His book summarizes twenty-five years’ worth of empirical results in narrative psychology, particularly regarding the health benefits of expressive writing. As an offshoot of this work, Pennebaker’s psychology lab has created a method for analyzing “the rate at which authors/speakers use positive or negative emotion words” in “emails, speeches, poems, or transcribed daily speech.” See the LIWC at www.liwc.net/ (accessed April 22, 2009).
the threat posed by fascism, though he would later apply his Basic English work to improved international communication on behalf of world peace (Richards 1947). In *Principles of Literary Criticism*, Richards does consider the risks of bad art and the seductive appeal of cinema, but he does not anticipate the baleful uses to which emotionality would be made in short order in an era of mass media and fascism (see also Febvre 1941). Undisturbed by the negative possibilities of emotional arousal, Richards offers a view of reading as healthful and improving: “Everybody knows the feeling of freedom, of relief, of increased competence and sanity, that follows any reading in which more than usual order and coherence has been given to our responses. We seem to feel that our command of life, our insight into it and our discrimination of its possibilities, is enhanced, even for situations having little or nothing to do with the subject of the reading” (Richards 1926a: 235). If this sentiment reminds the twenty-first-century reader of some of the claims of contemporary literary cognitivism, it is salutary to note that Richards himself was repeating the commonplaces of Victorian defenses of (literary) reading. Our colleague of seventy-five years back would have found in Richards a not unfamiliar, hopeful expression of the powers of literary reading to renovate and elevate the emotions, but would have sought in vain for a thorough account of its operations.

John Dewey’s *Art as Experience* contrasts with Richards’s preference for short forms. Dewey emphasizes the long duration of aesthetic experiences of narrative and drama, as well as their formal complexity. These complement his contention that emotions are not compact, simple entities: they unfold in time. In Dewey, our scholar could read: “emotions are qualities, when they are significant, of a complex experience that moves and changes” (2005 [1934]: 43). *Experience* is of course Dewey’s keyword. Deweyan experience is expressed in plays and novels and is defined thus: “The experience is of material fraught with suspense and moving toward its own consummation through a connected series of varied incidents” (44). This definition throws emphasis on longer narrative forms, though ordinary experiences can also have “esthetic character” (ibid.). Drama and fiction elicit aesthetic emotions, not as discrete things bearing labels (“Joy, sorrow, hope, fear, anger, curiosity” [ibid.: 43]), but as a unifying, “moving and cementing force” (ibid.: 44) that operates temporally. “The intimate nature of emotion,” writes Dewey, manifests itself “in the experience of one watching a play on the stage or reading a novel” (43). Emotion “attends the development of a plot; and a plot requires . . . a space, wherein to develop

3. Richards spent the war years at Harvard, moving there in 1939 and staying until 1974 (Storer 2004).
and time in which to unfold. Experience is emotional but there are no separate things called emotion in it” (ibid.). Our early-twentieth-century scholar might well recognize patterns and structures described by Dewey as belonging to the dynamics of narrative, but in any case, he could not miss Dewey’s assertion that emotional reactions “enter into the settlement of every situation, whatever its dominant nature, in which there are uncertainty and suspense” (45). Like Richards, Dewey emphasizes resolution as a goal of the unifying aesthetic experience and invests closure with importance: “the interaction [of self and object] constitutes the total experience that is had, and the close which completes it is the institution of a felt harmony” (ibid.). As in Richards’s theorizing, Dewey’s emphasis appears to fall on the experiencing or reading/viewing self.

Yet the makers of art objects are not entirely eclipsed in Dewey, as they often seem to be in Richards. Not identical but closely related to natural emotions, the feelings generated by the deeds of writers prompt recognition and change in the recipients who experience them. Dewey’s account of aesthetic emotion emphasizes transmission, communication, and transformation, not always pertaining to a stable subject. From the maker, for whom “expression is the clarification of turbid emotion” (80), Dewey inadvertently slides to the recipient, whose response to the expressive material and self-recognition induces transformation: “as they know themselves they are transfigured” (ibid.). The elisions of agency in Dewey’s phrasing raise questions: where does the transaction shift to the receiver, and how is the reader/viewer “transfigured” by self-recognition? Emotion and human agent seem to exist in a potent analogous relation, where “turbid emotion” receives clarification through expression and the responsive receiver gains a transfiguring self-recognition. For Dewey, “esthetic emotion is native emotion transformed through the objective material to which it has committed its development and consummation” (82), not “cut off by a chasm from . . . natural emotional experiences” (81). This phrasing endows emotion itself with agency and words (objective material) with transformative power, but in general Dewey returns to a human maker, at least implicitly, at the start of the expressive chain of events. Both in its creation and in its apprehension, Dewey insists, an act of expression constituting an artwork is “a construction in time, not an instantaneous emission” (62). This implies a constructor, albeit a preternaturally powerful one. When he considers the various constructors of artworks, Dewey especially notes how poets and novelists possess the double advantage of working with language, which is

4. For a critique of Dewey’s emphasis on unity and a defense of the fragmentary or ruptured in aesthetics, see the pragmatist aesthetics of Richard Shusterman 2000.
both referential and charged with affect. Writers work with words, characterized as “loaded dice” and “material . . . charged with meanings” (253). Writers build up expressions to which aesthetic emotions readily adhere (79).

Though language is an advantageous tool for writers, its powers do not extend to precise definition of emotions in Dewey’s account. Dewey dismisses as unfeasible the scientific or philosophical definition of specific emotions even as he honors fictional world-making as an art of selection and arrangement that can do what scientific descriptive terminology can.

Emotion researchers generally accept that cultural and linguistic contexts can alter the naming, typology, valuation, and overt acknowledgment of particular emotions. They differ on practically everything else: the universality of specific human emotions or their cultural determination; the physiological elements and functions involved in (variably labeled) affect(s), emotion, the emotions, emotion systems, feelings, and moods; the relation of emotions to rationality and/or cognition; the respective roles of instinctual response and cognitive appraisal; the temporal duration of an emotion (as opposed to longer-lasting moods, dispositions, or temperament); and in their taxonomies of “primary,” “core,” or “basic” emotions (“joy, trust, fear, surprise, sadness, disgust, anger, and anticipation” [Plutchik 1980]) and blends resulting in complex emotions (“optimism, love, submission, awe, disappointment, remorse, contempt, and aggressiveness”). For a good introduction to psychological theories of the emotions and research methods used to study them today, see Oatley et al. 2006. To see how dramatically the naming, enumeration, and classification of the emotions differ across and within disciplines, as Griffiths 1997 details, consult the alternative definitions in Elster 1999, Evans 2001, Forgas 2000, Goldie 2001, Kagan 2007, Lewis et al. 2008, Nussbaum 2001, Oatley 1992, and Panksepp 1998. The best practice for clarity’s sake when writing about the emotions is to declare one’s assumptions. These are mine: 1) emotions arise from human beings’ mammalian endowment, and basic emotions can be observed across species and cultures; 2) emotional responses are prompted by both bodily cues and cognitive appraisals, a perceptual theory (Prinz 2004) that explains the different stages of empathy better than a purely cognitive approach; 3) cognitive appraisals (judgments, evaluations, or thoughts) are often involved in emotions (Frijda 1986, 2006) but are not required for all emotional responses, such as homeostatic feelings responding to bodily states (Craig 2002) and responses to all non-referential elements and patterns encountered in language and other media; 4) emotions are more changeable than relatively durable dispositions or temperaments (Kagan and Snidman 2004); 5) emotional experience plays a profound role in human development and behavior (Bowby 1969–80); 6) human evolution has been shaped by the emotional interactions of people, especially children and caregivers (Hrdy 1999, 2007); 7) age, gender (and aspects of identity), experience, individual memory, and the surrounding culture inflect emotional experience (Tsai 1999); 8) as for a list of emotions, I accept Ekman’s (1992) list of core emotions observable from fleeting facial expressions: anger, sadness, fear, surprise, disgust, contempt, and happiness (Paul Ekman’s cross-cultural fieldwork on facial expressions of emotions supports Darwin’s [1998 (1872, 1889)] contention that humans and animals share basic emotions showing in bodily expressions); 9) I also accept as complex emotions, besides those in Plutchik listed above, moral sentiments (empathy and compassion) and social emotions (shame, embarrassment, envy, guilt and hatred as well as the positive calm and amae, or comfort in belonging [Doi 1981]). For a more expansive list in the context of emotion systems (the motivational, approach and avoidance, arousal and quiescence systems governing adaptive behavior), see Schulkin (2004: 20). These are my views, not invariably those of the contributors to this special issue.
not achieve: “poet and novelist have an immense advantage over even an expert psychologist in dealing with an emotion. For the former build up a concrete situation and permit it to evoke emotional response. Instead of a description of an emotion in intellectual and symbolic terms, the artist ‘does the deed that breeds’ the emotion” (70, original emphasis). For Dewey, the cognitive and the affective consequences of literary composition and reception are by no means segregated, but he has little to offer when it comes to theorizing precisely how the deed that breeds is done, either in the writer or the reader. Thus our scholar of seventy-five years ago would have had her work cut out for her in breaking down and extending the inspirational accounts of aesthetic emotion (available in psychology and literary studies) to include specific processes, identifiable techniques, or predictable effects of formal choices on readers or viewers.

Where We Are Now

Recognition of a time in the past when scholars of literature and psychology readily conversed with one another about narrative aesthetics need not render us nostalgic, for these scientists and critics worked without the advantages of the precise vocabulary, analytic techniques, and technological advances that make interdisciplinary conversations about narrative and the emotions possible today. Yet they did possess a singular enabling condition, the late Victorian assumption that psychologists and literary theorists had something valuable to say to one another, even, as in the case of Alexander Bain, E. S. Dallas, Émile Hennequin, and G. H. Lewes, by contributing to both fields or drawing on physiological experiments to discuss narrative aesthetics (Dames 2004). Today we shout across a ravine, never certain that those on the other side can—or want to—hear our invitations, decode our queries, or respond in language that we can comprehend. The interdisciplinarity that is our condition in the contemporary academy can result in miscommunication if we do not find strategies for discussing common interests that lead to mutual understanding; indeed, the demands of cross-disciplinary conversation should be frankly acknowledged. Today’s efflorescence of interest in the emotions occurs in many disciplines: beyond the psychologists and philosophers mentioned so far, emotion researchers can be found among neuroscientists, evolutionary biologists, legal theorists, anthropologists, historians, sociologists, medical educators, linguists, and computer scientists, among others. The breadth of disciplinary home bases for research into the emotions has not invariably been recognized, but the upswell of scholarly and scientific interest in the emotions has prompted its labeling as “The Affective Turn” (Clough and Halley 2007).
The name for the present trend mirrors an earlier period’s cognitive turn; it does not quite recognize the relevance of the narrative turn and theorizing of narrativity to its concerns (Kreiswirth 2005). Indeed, it is not clear that most of the emotion researchers involved in the affective turn are even alert to the work of others outside their fields.

In practice, disciplinary specialization and fragmentation have as often impeded communication about emotion research, or even awareness of work in neighboring fields, as they have stimulated cross-disciplinary conversation. Thus philosophers can write about empathy and sympathy without reference to a single contribution from literary studies (Stueber 2008). Social theorists of affect can attribute prior explorations of the emotions to work “conducted predominantly in queer theory” (Hardt 2007: ix), an important, but surely not singular field of investigation. Historians show alertness to developments in neighboring anthropology and sociology, but not to the social psychology that is the main target of anthropology’s own argumentation about the emotions (Lewis and Stearns 1998; Rosenswein 2002). Alternatively, subjects traditionally of interest to humanists, including “cognitive, emotional, and spiritual functions, including lying, being in love, and believing in God” are the target of research in cognitive neuroscience (McCabe and Castel 2008: 344). Applications of fMRI findings, despite the known limitations in these investigative techniques (Nicholson 2006), are often vaunted in the popular press and by leading humanists. So, for instance, novelists and philosophers both refer excitedly to developments in neuroscience. A. S. Byatt (2006) effuses: “Thought is material, according to neuroscience. I think of it in terms of Sir Charles Sherrington’s description of the waking brain, the ‘head-mass’ as ‘an enchanted loom where millions of flashing shuttles weave a dissolving pattern, always a meaningful pattern, though never an abiding one. . . .’ The pleasure Donne offers our bodies is the pleasure of extreme activity of the brain.” Patricia Churchland (2002: 3) advocates for neurophilosophy, arguing that it will soon be impossible to do philosophy without recourse to evidence from neuroscience. Enthusiasts for neuroscience rarely explore the reflections of their fellow humanists and professionals (Pustilnik 2009; Illes and Racine 2005) on the limitations of this research or the dangers of its application.

The multicolored brain scans produced by fMRI studies have an especially strong effect on the credulous; one report of several studies by cognitive scientists concludes “brain images are influential because they provide a physical basis for abstract cognitive processes, appealing to people’s affinity for reductionistic explanations of cognitive phenomena” (McCabe and Castel 2008: 343). The cautions from neuroscientists themselves about
what it might mean to read the human brain (Cacioppo et al. 2003) are not often heeded by those who apply the headline versions of neuroscientific findings to their home fields. More common is extrapolation of broad significance from precise and limited neuroscientific studies, as in this recent philosophical claim about aesthetics: “advances in affective neuroscience, especially psychoneuroimmunology, suggest that beauty experiences boost the immune system and, therefore, enhance the healing process . . . the persistence of beauty throughout the ages and its prevalence in various cultures may be due to its healing capacity, something known intuitively by many people but needing the sophisticated studies and technology of neuroscience to explain its impact on the body” (Vaillancourt et al. 2007: 217).

The verification of humanists’ intuitions by reference to scientists’ sophisticated technology may induce skepticism as frequently as it persuades, but as McCabe and Castel’s (2008: 349) study of brain image illustration suggests, a colorful picture representing brain activity “associated with cognitive processes influenced ratings of the scientific merit of the reported research” compared with “identical articles including no image, a bar graph, or a topographical map.” The effect was produced even by “fictional articles that included errors in the scientific reasoning.” Given these concerns, readers of this two-part special issue of Poetics Today should not be surprised by its lack of illustrations of emotion areas and narrative-processing areas in human brains. Its gathering of contributions from experts in narrative and the emotions already poses challenges to reductionist solutions by proffering an array of assumptions, methodologies, arguments, and key terms that resist simplification to a single picture.

This two-part special issue tackles the cross-disciplinary communication challenge by calling upon experts in a variety of fields—aesthetics, neurobiology, literary theory, evolutionary psychology, literary history, gender studies, discourse processing, social and developmental psychology, and stylistics, among others—to reconsider the interactions of narrative and the emotions. With this special issue, Poetics Today extends work it has already begun in various earlier publications. These include groups of essays with bearing on narrative impact, such as How Literature Enters Life (Andringa and Schreier 2004); an important sequence of individual articles, gatherings of essays, and book reviews advancing and evaluating the claims of cognitive poetics; and essays addressing the affective dimension of testi-

6. For examples of individual essays, see articles by Bruhn, Gleason, Baker, and Sklar in Poetics Today 30:3 (2009) and earlier articles, such as Hernadi 2002; for a gathering of essays and responses, see Poetics Today 24:2 (2003); for critiques, see Sternberg 2003a, 2003b; for examples of book reviews, see Freeman 2005 and Abbott 2006.
monial literature (Alkalay-Gut 2005; Kraft 2006). This issue builds upon each of these areas, with contributions on testimonial writing from Els Andringa (on letters written by exiles from Nazi-occupied Europe), on recent cognitive theories from Blakey Vermeule (applying and evaluating William Flesch’s *Comeuppance: Costly Signaling, Altruistic Punishment, and other Biological Components of Fiction* [2007]), and on narrative impact from David Miall (on emotions and narrative response). It also offers fresh theorizing from Ellen Dissanayake (on proto-aesthetic endowments of human beings), from psychologist Darcia Narvaez (on Triune ethics as it relates to moral education), from Rita Felski (on the role of affect in critical and theoretical narratives of the recent past), and from Fritz Breithaupt (on the spirit of the “excuse”—an alternative to Flesch’s altruistic punishing—as an origin of narrative). Miranda Burgess, Mary-Catherine Harrison, and Suzanne Keen add historical and contextual examinations of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century texts, while Jane Thrailkill examines a contemporary writer (Ian McEwan) who is well aware of recent developments in neuroscience. As the diversity of interests in this list suggests, an important task for future work will be to extract an array of central terms from various scholarly traditions, so that we may begin to discuss, evaluate, and interrelate disparate approaches. By placing their contributions in conversation with one another, *Narrative and the Emotions* gives scholars from an array of disciplines the opportunity to participate together in a timely reorientation of the field.

Each participant brings a reasoned contribution to a conversation about the role of affect, broadly construed, in the products of narrativity. Rather than restaging a debate between cognitivist and literary critical understandings, this collection of essays seeks to reorient our collective understanding of emotion and narrativity’s operation in narrative texts, readers, and authors. What happens when we scrutinize narrative and the emotions in light of ancient and modern rhetoric, the age-old poetics of impact, empirical evidence of literary response, current cognitive, developmental, and social psychology, or recent neuroscience? In cognitive science, commitments to artificial intelligence, information processing, and theories of computation have often precluded discussion of the emotions, or recast them as rational judgments. The strain of packaging affect within cognitivism has already produced reactions such as new groupings of “affective scientists,” and can be seen in the citation of developmental, social, and evolutionary psychology in the work of prominent literary cognitivists such as Patrick Colm Hogan. That the narrative turn and the affective turn have coincided in the past several decades encourages a promising alternative, explored in the essays collected here. It involves re-centering the
discussion of emotions (and narrative) in relevant subdisciplines of psychology, rather than automatically foregrounding the claims of cognitivism. Though I return later in this essay to the background, describing the affective (re)turn to research in the emotions in psychology, philosophy, and literary theory (since my imagined departure point of seventy-five years ago), I turn now to orient readers to the contents of the two-part special issue of Poetics Today.

Theoretical Explorations of Narrative and the Emotions

The collection contains five theoretical essays on emotion and narrative, each representing a distinct perspective and taking an interest in a different temporal, developmental, or theoretical circumstance. Ellen Dissanayake is one of the most prominent theorists of aesthetics in an emerging school of thought that attends to evolutionary and developmental psychology and neuroscience. Her interdisciplinary articles and books, including Homo Aestheticus (1992), explore the arts as evolved human behaviors. She contributes a theoretical article, “Prelinguistic and Preliterate Substrates of Literary Narrative,” focusing on the infant/mother interaction. In it Dissanayake argues that some nonverbal, emotional, and aesthetic aspects of literary narrative (and other arts) originated in an adaptive social context in the human evolutionary past. Synthesizing findings from developmental psychology, ethology, evolutionary psychology and neuroscience, Dissanayake’s essay describes five “proto”-aesthetic devices that universally inhere in mother/infant interactions and form substrates of human emotional responsiveness to narrative. She argues that what mothers do in their engagements with infants—simplifying, repeating, exaggerating, and elaborating their facial expressions, utterances, and body movements to express affinity—constitute four of the five proto-aesthetic devices. A fifth device is added when older infants are surprised by mothers who manipulate the baby’s expectations. Together, these five devices attract, sustain, and shape or manipulate the baby’s attention and response to the mother’s affinitive message. Dissanayake sees in these proto-aesthetic devices the basis of artists’ employment of strategies attracting, shaping, and sustaining the attention and response of an audience.

Between underlying human dispositions and predictable outcomes in the form of response to narrative lies a great gulf, often bridged in educational psychology by hopeful constructions of the impact of didactic tales on children. Psychologist Darcia Narvaez studies moral cognition, moral development, and moral character education. Character education is often taught in American primary and middle schools (ages five–fifteen) by
means of stories illustrating core values, with the aim of shaping children’s values and behavior, as well as supporting academic success. Evidence-based assessment of these programs has revealed gains in academic performance, but not the desired improvements in behavior, attitudes, and values (Institute of Education Sciences 2006). Why don’t didactic moral tales work the way adults intend them to, and what do they do instead? Pursuing these questions, Narvaez’s 2001 work challenges the pedagogical assumptions of a common didactic mode of contemporary character education by demonstrating that young children are typically unable to extract the intended moral lessons from moral stories. Having shown the failings of a didactic use of stories, Narvaez remains committed to advancing the cultivation of mature moral functioning in children. Her theoretical contribution to this issue, “The Ethics of Neurobiological Narratives,” argues that an individual’s experience-constructed bio-emotional landscape influences the narratives that shape that person’s life, and that emotion and narrative both have roles to play in cultivating societies that can peacefully coexist. To this end, Narvaez advances the claims of Triune ethics theory, which draws on evolutionary neurobiology, virtue ethics, and human sciences to illustrate three basic neurobiological narratives, Security, Engagement, and Imagination: each of these can be primed through culturally sanctioned moral narratives to orient an individual’s disposition toward mature moral functioning and peaceful coexistence with others.

That narratives have the potential to transmit not just shared positive values but also disciplinary models of social control (including hierarchies, norms, and discriminating standards) on the societies that share them has been a commonplace of contemporary theory since at least Foucault. The trick is to get at hidden meanings not on the surface as obviously as on a bibliography of titles narrating deeds of friendship or compassion; this unveiling is an old stand-by of critical practice. As Paul Ricoeur argues in *Freud and Philosophy* (1970), three masters (Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud) modeled methods of unmasking, demystifying and exposing the real, as distinct from the apparent. The methods of suspicious reading have encouraged a stance of skepticism and cool rationality in critics who carry out investigations to reveal repressed or hidden meanings. However, as Rita Felski writes in the essay presented in the issue, “There is much discussion of literary criticism’s antipathy toward emotion, but little acknowledgment of criticism’s own affective registers.” The author of the aesthetic manifesto *Uses of Literature* (2008), a neo-phenomenological investigation of aesthetic experiences such as recognition, enchantment, and shock, Felski contributes “Suspicious Minds,” a part of a larger project on the hermeneutics of suspicion. She scrutinizes recent critical practice, proposing that
suspicious reading is a form of affective orientation toward texts. Suspicious readings, Felski argues, establish causal connections, assign responsibility, and attribute guilt; each of these actions has its own emotional satisfactions and narrative pleasures. Having “largely relinquished affirmative or utopian projects of world-building in favor of the rhetoric of rupture, subversion, and critique,” in Felski’s words, suspicious reading often assigns remarkable powers to the texts it endows with agency.

Standing accused, revealed in complicity or responsibility, could serve as a primal scene of the text’s position in contemporary critical practice. The investigator triumphs over both the narrative and its maker in a power-play that reveals hidden intentions over the faint protests of the text (As Prufrock says, “That is not what I meant at all . . .”). Fritz Breithaupt’s “The Birth of Narrative out of the Spirit of the Excuse: A Speculation” provides a counternarrative to this master story of accusation. In making the excuse, the narrator of events denies or modifies responsibility for the narrated happenings, transforming accounts of chains of causality into person-centered tales that solicit empathy from the listener or recipient. As a consequence, Breithaupt argues, the inherent structure of excuse transforms the implicit anger driving accusation into other emotions (interest, fellow-feeling, compassion) and makes “my side of the story” the real story. The excuse turns events that first look like motivated actions into misconstrued reactions. It founds narrative itself in an act that calls upon the auditor or reader’s role-taking imagination. Fritz Breithaupt is a contemporary theorist of literary empathy, author among other works of Kulturen der Empathie (2009). He turns his attention in this essay to the origins of “Homo Narrativus,” as he calls his next book project. Connecting narrative theory with cultural studies and evolutionary biology, Breithaupt’s essay conjectures that the art of narrative itself originated in the making of excuses.

Blakey Vermeule, author of the recent book Why Do We Care about Literary Characters? (2010), offers an alternative theory of narrative origins, in “A Comeuppance Theory of Narrative and the Emotions.” She argues that storytellers play a regulative role in the system of reciprocal altruism, as “super-altruists” whose narrations reward the just and punish malefactors on behalf of the whole audience. Vermeule’s essay engages with William Flesch’s Comeuppance: Costly Signaling, Altruistic Punishment, and Other Biological Components of Fiction (2007), which draws on evolutionary game theory. Vermeule tests the logic of Flesch’s argument by reading George Eliot’s Middlemarch (1872) as a revenge narrative. Indeed, Eliot is ordinarily credited with the promulgation of a theory of novel-reading that emphasizes the cultivation of readers’ sympathetic imagination. Yet Vermeule suggests
that Eliot satisfies a less elevated kind of readerly appetite and shows the thematic and structural function of narrative punishment in *Middlemarch*. Vermeule’s examination of Eliot also raises issues about the way that narrative connects with emotions, thus illuminating the structure of narrative itself. For Vermeule, the storyteller enjoys a high-status but high-risk position in the human group, unleashing “roiling emotions” in recipients as they eagerly track fictional characters’ (and one another’s) cooperation and defection.

**Narrativity, Mode, and Impact**

This special issue, “Narrative and the Emotions,” presents essays examining the impact of modes of narrative evoking emotional responses. Building on Jeroen Vandaele’s essay “Narrative Humor,” published in a recent issue of *Poetics Today* (31.4), “Narrative and the Emotions” examines literary fiction and narratives inviting transportation into other (possible) worlds. Vandaele’s theory of narrative humor draws out the differences between humor and narrative and investigates how both phenomena interact. Vandaele argues that humor is narrative when it creates or exploits incongruity and superiority relations between the agents of narrative texts: authors, narrators, characters, and readers or audiences. Out of these relational incongruities different forms of narrative humor emerge, which Vandaele relates to labels such as metanarrative humor, comical narrative suspense, and comical narrative surprise, comical character, comical action logic, and outcomes of readers’ pleasures at happy endings. David S. Miall, an authority on empirical aesthetics (Miall 2006), studies the processes activated by the emotions during the reading of literary texts (as opposed to documents such as technical reports or journalism): some of the responses concerned occur within 500 milliseconds of reading the textual prompt. Miall’s contribution, “Emotions and the Structuring of Narrative Response,” examines the role emotional response plays in cognitive processing, including the making of inferences, invocation of autobiographical memories, empathetic connections to characters, and anticipation of plot events. He suggests that an inherent narrativity of the emotions shapes our understandings even when the agents are inanimate objects, by promoting our habit of anthropomorphizing. Miall’s work is resolutely focused on the sequence of emotional response to literary reading, not on effects observed afterward, nor on the production of new interpretations, and surveys related to studies of Evoked Response Potentials (ERPs).
This two-part special issue, Narrative and the Emotions, presents a group of essays characterized by historical and contextual concerns. Though the contributors do broach theoretical questions about how narrative relates to emotion, the questions are embedded in readings of texts, which range from novels to narrative paintings to verse to private letters. Each essay treats works situated in particular genres or historical moments, and while some make general claims (such as Mary-Catherine Harrison’s about modes of narration that help readers to overcome biases), they trace specific impacts on readers or devices employed by individual authors. Though not all of these writers would consider themselves literary cognitivists, those who do practice a contextual cognitivism, attentive to both the cultural frameworks and historical particulars that shape and govern the expression and reception of schemas and other products of embodied minds. They investigate emotion, affect, narrative empathy, and the role of empiricism in the literary history of narrative forms and genres, from the Romantic period to the contemporary moment. Although cultural forms elicit the core emotions of narrativity through manipulation of universals, the combinations and expressions of these universal strategies are culture-specific (sometimes recognized as genres) and they have literary histories. These essays highlight period-specific awareness of the affective theories of the day.

Miranda Burgess is the author of *British Fiction and the Production of Social Order, 1740–1830* (2000), which explores the uses of genre change in developing theories of British society and British nationhood. Her work explores the intersections of the history and theory of genre, physical mobility, media, and feeling. Her contribution to this issue offers a cultural historical description of the emergence of aesthetic experience understood as movement. “On Being Moved: Sympathy, Mobility, and Narrative Form” focuses on the activation, transformation, and potential or actual physical mobilization of the reader. Burgess’s essay explores the relationship between emotion, understood as a subjective experience of feeling, and affect, an intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another. She derives this definition of *affect* from philosopher Brian Massumi (2002), who in turn relies on Baruch Spinoza’s account of the body’s capacity to affect and be affected. Burgess argues that the roots of the emotion–affect distinction lie in Romantic anxieties about the growing potential for global affective circulation: feelings and bodies in motion. Burgess explores the implications of an historical context in which transportation had become more rapid, permitting literal movement of people and new opportunities to be moved on behalf of or
about others. She directs attention to narrative form as a way of rethinking the global flow of feeling, with an emphasis on the recent theoretical conjunction among reading, ethical subjectivity, and conceptions of global citizenship or action.

How experiences of narrative empathy might alter readers’ attitudes toward other people, or even elicit helping behavior from readers, concerns the authors of a subgroup of essays, Mary-Catherine Harrison, Suzanne Keen, and Els Andringa. Mary-Catherine Harrison, a Victorianist, draws on social psychology to study how reading practices shape subsequent ethical commitments of readers. Her article, “How Narrative Relationships Overcome Empathic Bias: Elizabeth Gaskell’s Empathy across Difference,” theorizes narrative empathy’s capacity to circumvent the similarity or in-group bias, which, according to social psychology (e.g., Billig and Tajfel 1973), diminishes emotional responsiveness to members of out-groups. Positively speaking, emotional responsiveness is enhanced by similarity and influences helping behavior (Davis 1996: 145–46). The boundary between in-groups and out-groups can be shifted toward greater inclusiveness in circumstances that elicit favorable feelings, but markers of difference so minor as dissimilar dress can increase bias (Dovidio et al. 1995).

Novel-reading has often been described as a method to stimulate empathy, cultivate sympathy, and encourage altruism (Keen 2007: x, 63–64, 105). Using as a case study Elizabeth Gaskell’s Victorian novel, *Mary Barton* (1848), Harrison argues that nineteenth-century social-problem fiction thematizes and demonstrates how empathy can reach across barriers of class difference, despite the similarity bias of readers. According to Harrison, middle-class authors such as Gaskell use perspectival mobility and the evocation of feeling to model empathy and circumvent similarity bias through the foregrounding and manipulation of narrative perspective.

Gaskell herself would have recognized the terms sympathy, compassion, and fellow feeling, but not empathy, a late-nineteenth-century entrant to psychological discourse (as a translation of *Einfühlung*). A contextualist approach to sources and influences is bound by a stricter standard of historical evidence than psychoanalytic theorizing about authors who wrote before Freud. Thus it becomes relevant to wonder what narrative artists knew about the emotion theories of their own day. My interests in narrative empathy have been broached in *Empathy and the Novel* (2007; see also Keen 2006, 2008). My contribution is part of a book exploring Thomas Hardy’s knowledge of and influence by late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century psychology and neurology. “Empathetic Hardy: Bounded, Ambassadorial, and Broadcast Strategies of Narrative Empathy” argues that Thomas Hardy’s work demonstrates engagement with the full range of empathetic narra-
tive strategies—from a moral sentimentalism’s fellow-feeling for sufferers to the authorial projection of sensation onto inanimate objects (*Einfühlung*) theorized by late-nineteenth-century German aesthetics. Hardy himself, it emerges, used the term *altruism* to describe his exercise of imaginative role-taking, or putting himself in another’s shoes. For Hardy the exercise of empathy for sufferers, animals, members of outgroups, and for unconscious universal motive forces aimed to nudge evolution in a meliorating direction.

Els Andringa brings a background in poetics and cognitive psychology to her essays in empirical literary studies. Prior work relevant to the subject of this gathering includes an essay on the effects of narrative distance on readers’ emotional involvement (Andringa 1996) and the coedited special issue of *Poetics Today*, “How Literature Enters Life” (Andringa and Schreier 2004). Her contribution focuses on direct and immediate appeals for sympathy and assistance embedded in nonfiction—letters from exiles. Her “Poetics of Emotion in Times of Agony: Letters from Exile, 1933–1940” explores the expression and presentation of highly emotional experience in the private letters of writers and intellectuals (such as Joseph Roth, Arnold Zweig, and Walter Benjamin) who fled the Nazis in the 1930s. Her analysis of these affecting texts, written by skilled literary authors, shows the repertoire of devices and strategies used to express emotional experiences and realize the writers’ communicative intentions—from conveying intense emotional experiences, to appealing for direct assistance, to transforming experience into a drama for the recipient.

Jane F. Thrailkill is the author of *Affecting Fictions: Mind, Body, and Emotion in American Literary Realism* (2007). Her book draws on cognitive psychology and neuroscience to illuminate literary representations of pity, fear, nervousness, pleasure, and wonder; in it, Thrailkill argues that nineteenth-century readers would have taken for granted that narrative engages the feelings. Her contribution to this issue, “Ian McEwan’s Neurological Novel,” focuses on a contemporary British novelist who has explicitly combined his knowledge of medical neuroscience with the philosophical worldmaking that informs his early fiction (for instance, *Atonement* [2001] and *Enduring Love* [1997]). Her essay examines the author’s novel *Saturday* (2005) to show how McEwan adds a neurobiological element to the blend of consciousness, narrative, and emotion that interest him and literary cognitivists. Thrailkill discusses McEwan’s representation of what damaged brains reveal about embodied human beings’ perceptions, a project enhanced by his casting of a neurosurgeon as his protagonist. Informed by McEwan’s reading in psychology and neuroscience, his novel *Saturday* bridges the division between the humanities and the sciences of mind in
favor of a cautious collaboration based on a shared empiricism, the biological rootedness of storytelling, and the centrality of feeling to thinking.

Altogether, the essays in this two-part special issue of Poetics Today contribute to a cultural theory and history of the emotions embedded in, evoked by, and altered through narrative in various forms. The issue attends to genres as affect-producing templates; to readers’ dispositions and their responses; to authors’ introspective testimony and the evidence of literary history; to universal human qualities and to culturally-specific expressions of emotions; to narrative techniques and style, in theory and in action; to the arts of persuasion and the evidence of their impact; to affect as an element of cognition; and to the evidence of actual historical readers and writers as feeling co-creators of narrative experience.

The Affective (Re)turn

The focus on aspects of emotion recurring through the essays described above testifies to the widespread influence of the affective turn on literary studies and fields that address narrative impact, moral development, and the evolutionary origins of story. As I have been arguing, however, the affective turn marks not so much a new departure but a return to questions that early-twentieth-century aesthetics (and, again, earlier traditions) had opened without resolving. The next section of this essay shows what happened after the science and philosophy of aesthetics turned away from the study of emotion in the first place, eventually provoking an affective re(turn). This is of course not an isolated phenomenon. Meir Sternberg (2003a, 2003b) has demonstrated that an array of extraliterary fields concerned with language and text, including linguistics, semantics, pragmatics, discourse analysis, conversation analysis, and their interdisciplinary blendings, have sought a scientific footing that often ignores or eschews the role of the emotions. Turning to literary study’s recent practices, Sternberg (1999: 294) has diagnosed a habit of hostile reading of canonical texts and suggested as an antidote a recentered sympathetic reading, a critical practice that avoids making texts into ideoartistic battlefields. It so happens, moreover, that the paradigm case there is Lessing, one of the great explorers and conceptualizers of aesthetic emotion, in the line of Aristotle’s poetics of impact. So the unfriendly readings of him in the twentieth century—particularly of his Laocoön (1766)—exhibit an affective approach to affective theorizing. As this characterization implies (and Rita Felski’s essay further elaborates), avoidance of the emotions as a subject does not strip critical, theoretical, and scholarly discourse of affect, for passionate advocacy and political stances within scholarship entail their own emo-
tions of revision and rectitude, and accompanying gestures of anathema and scapegoating. In the humanities, these show in heated contests about the status of subjects and evidence (history from below trumping the great men; literary recovery work breaking up the canon), while in the sciences they may be detected in hyper-specialization that fragments disciplines from within and, for instance, segregates affect and cognition into separate fields of study.

Since psychology took aesthetic experience as one of its core subjects early in its organization as a discipline, the eclipse of emotion in a field that understood itself as the science of mind invites comment. The rise of the behaviorist school of psychology (after 1913) de-emphasized for a half century the study of mental events and internal processes, turning attention instead to stimuli and responses that could be recorded by objective observations in laboratories. Following John Watson and B. F. Skinner, leading practitioners had little interest in emotions, moods, and thoughts, registering subjective states and processes only as factors intervening between the environmental stimulus and the subjects’ response (Mohr 1996: 84–86). This ruled out aesthetic response for a long while. Notably, when psychologists such as Berlyne reopened questions in the new experimental aesthetics of the early 1970s (Berlyne 1971; Machotka 1980), this research documented and contrasted levels of physiological arousal to more and less familiar stimuli, or to simpler and more complex works. It studied arousal-increasing devices such as dishabituation, novelty, expectation, complexity, conflict, instability, ambiguity and multiple meanings, and arousal-moderating devices such as familiarity, exemption from inhibition and exertion, grouping and patterning (Berlyne 1971: xii–xiii). Berlyne offered a general theory of aesthetic response to the arts, including narrative—particularly novels, as vessels of subjective experience, stories as devices employing surprising incidents. Beyond naming narratives as art objects, his work shows no awareness of the advances in narrative theory that were occurring in parallel during the 1960s and 1970s, however.

When the black box of the mind was reopened in the 1960s, internal or mental states such as motivation, desires, beliefs, and unconscious promptings were once again discussed. Though language was an important ground for recovering internal operations of the mind, after Noam Chomsky’s 1959 critique of the limitations of Skinner’s behaviorism, the cognitive turn did not immediately revive interest in affect or aesthetics. A major reason for this was the computational model of the mind adopted by cognitivists. Cognitive theories of storytelling often involve models of narrative communication based on artificial intelligence: computers have no emotions (see the critique of cognitivism in Sternberg 2003a, 2003b).
Subjective response accessed by introspection was no more a part of cognitive theories of art than it was in the new experimental aesthetics (which recorded physiological responses to art objects and performances). Emotion was also downplayed in analysis of narrative springing from the encounter of cognitive psychologists with Chomskyan linguistics. There, the task of elaborating story grammars emphasized the goal of comprehension and saw narrative understanding as a matter of developing cognitive skills.

Cognitive story grammars (or narrative rule systems), describe the elements of a story and how they combine, especially with an order of events that facilitate understanding and memory on the part of a reader or listener (Mandler and Johnson 1977). The focus is on facility, attention, memory, and recall (or in computer terms, storage and retrieval), enabled by shaping of narratives in the so-named Canonical Story Grammar Model (CSGM): Setting / Beginning Event / Internal Reaction / Attempt / Ending (Anderson and Evans 1996). Emotion plays a role only in the “Internal Reaction,” in which a character’s emotional response to the beginning event stimulates the formation of a goal. Neither the reader’s emotional engagement with the plot or characters, nor the characters’ own emotions as subjects rather than agents, nor the core affective qualities of narrativity received attention (see Sternberg 2003a: esp. 353 ff.). Work on story grammars had a pedagogical as well as a narratological branch: in educational theory, it was used to study and enhance comprehension in young readers. Here the emphasis on cognition is marked and the neglect of affect surprising. Obviously, comprehending written stories does require alphabetic decoding, chunking, attention, short-term processing, and recall—cognitive operations without which no print narrative could be processed. However, if the picture that emerges from the essays in this special issue is accurate, affective factors also contribute to understanding and the ability to learn, even long before children learn to read (see Dissanayake). This is not only a matter of sympathizing with or identifying with characters, though readers’ mental representation of characters’ emotional states is part of the picture (Gernsbacher et al. 1992). Psychologists have demonstrated that children with high scores for empathetic engagement grasp better the causal relations between plot events (Bourg 1996). Examination of the role

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7. Story grammars in the main developed through study of simple oral narratives (such as folk tales), but in structuralist narratology (e.g., Pavel 1985) they are also related to more complex narratives.

8. Slightly more elaborated story grammars extend to seven categories: setting / initiating event / internal response / goal / attempt / consequence / reaction (Mandler and Johnson 1977). Emotion is still limited to that experienced by the protagonist.
of emotion in comprehension of story schemata (Miall 1989; Kneepkens and Zwaan 1995) came out of discourse processing work not fettered by a merely cognitive approach. In the words of David Miall (1989), inquiry had to move “beyond the schema” to get at affective comprehension.

Much more recent cognitive work on learning and motivation recognizes the affective element of understanding, as indicated by the phrase “hot cognition” (Kunda 1990; van Peer 1997: 219). However, even though scholars of cognitive narrative poetics often claim that emotion now fits under its big tent (Stockwell 2002: 152; Hogan 2003b), few cognitive scientists pursue research agendas centered on emotion. It has been largely absent, deemphasized, or subsumed in cognition. Evolutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (2000: 98) speak for many scientists following Marvin Minsky: “One cannot sensibly talk about emotion affecting cognition because ‘cognition’ refers to a language for describing all of the brain’s operations, including emotions and reasoning (whether deliberative or nonconscious), and not to any particular subset of operations.” By this umbrella logic, cognition automatically includes emotion, but it is still the case that most cognitive scientists carry out their work without regard to the emotions; basic textbooks on cognition rarely refer to emotions, and then only in passing. The field of cognitive science is still very far from conceding Meir Sternberg’s (2003a: 364) point that even in processing the simplest and least artful narratives, emotion gets as unmistakably (if unobtrusively) twinned with comprehension as in high art’s knottiest gaps. And so twinned that either dynamics of response enters into multiple relations with the other, shiftable relations at that. Affective and conceptual processing may join forces or join battle . . . or run together between the extreme junctures: now in harmony, now in disharmony, for example, or now with this balance of power, now with that. The rhetoric of narrative thrives on such protean fact/feeling interdynamics.

Some recent cognitive narrative theory takes an innate intersubjectivity as a starting point for readers’ understanding of social and intermental minds in narrative (Palmer 2004), and so adopts a stance that is more welcoming to discussion of the relations between affective and conceptual comprehension. But mainstream cognitive science still studies intelligence, behav-

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9. Some experts in discourse processing want to distinguish literary narratives from ordinary stories (by hypothesizing traits of literariness), but such interest opens up another can of worms when it comes to the role of emotion in narrativity (see Sternberg 2003a: 364 ff.).

10. See Minsky’s Society of Mind (1986) and The Emotion Machine (2006) for his influential argument that emotions are tools to solve different real-world problem types (1986: 163). For a critique of Minsky and the legacy of this way of approaching the mind, see Sternberg 2003a: 360–71.
ior, language acquisition, logic, and so forth according to computational models. Even the burgeoning discussion of embodied cognition (Clark 1997; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Thelen and Smith 1994) seems unlikely to alter fundamentally this disciplinary commitment.

Science truly oriented toward the study of affect has emerged from other home bases within psychology, especially developmental, social, and evolutionary psychology; in fact, literary cognitivists who have made emotion central to their enquiry (such as Patrick Colm Hogan)\(^ {11} \) freely draw on these resources. More likely to reflect the understandings of affect and cognition as intertwined are psychology’s own interdisciplinary combinations, such as affective neuroscience, social neuroscience, and the hybrid blend of social psychology and cognitive science, social cognition (Panksepp 1998, Hermon-Jones and Winkielman 2007, Cacioppo et al. 2007, Forgas 2001).

Discussion of the emotions has begun to penetrate cognitive neuroscience, as suggested by the doubling of space dedicated to neuroscientific emotions research in the standard text, *The Cognitive Neurosciences* between the 1995 and the 2004 editions (Gazzaniga 2004). Unlike cognitive science, developmental psychology is centrally concerned with affect, especially in the study of personality (Bandura 1986) and prosocial behavior (Batson 1998; Eisenberg 1986). Evolutionary psychology sees emotions as adaptive programs with functional specializations that aid survival and successful reproduction (Cosmides and Tooby 2000; Hrdy 1999, 2007). Social psychology has also long recognized narrative as one type of cultural artifact possessing dynamic structuring techniques for the elicitation of emotions, and has often investigated the problem using film (Vygotsky 1971: 5; Rottenberg et al. 2007). Social psychology has also described emotional experience as a facet of group membership, with a bearing on bias and prejudice, as well as on belonging and the formation of social bonds (Turner 2000). Research in social psychology has looked into positive emotions such as empathy (Davis 1996), happiness (Lyubomirsky 2008), and love (Sternberg and Barnes 1988), as well as negative emotions such as anger (Tavris 1982), jealousy/envy, hate (Dovidio et al. 2005), and faked feelings such as false smiles and laughs (Lafrance and Woodzicka 1998).

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11. Hogan has integrated emotion into his discussions of genre and literary universals. As demonstrated by his essay “The Brain in Love: A Case Study of Cognitive Neuroscience and Literary Theory” (2007), Hogan does not limit himself to cognitive science as a theoretical frame; indeed, he relies more heavily on research in social and affective neuroscience, with some reference to developmental and evolutionary psychology. It is a curious consequence of the indebtedness of literary study to a well-known generation of cognitivists (especially Mark Turner, Mark Johnson, and George Lakoff) that later work primarily reliant on social and affective neuroscience should continue to bear the label *cognitive*. 
In a therapeutic context, shame and other consequences of trauma have been studied and theorized by psychoanalytic practitioners and clinicians (Bowlby, 1969–80; Tomkins 2008). Narrative has an important role here as a fundamental method of talk therapy and in the literary expression of traumatic experience (Kacandes 2001). I have already mentioned the narrative psychology of James Pennebaker, which employs expressive writing about emotional experiences to improve general health (Pennebaker 1997a; DeSalvo 2000). This work grew out of Pennebaker’s observation that all the different varieties of talk therapy had approximately the same success rate: he hypothesized that they had narrative expression (by the patient) in common. Pennebaker (1997b) has also demonstrated in many studies that writing feelingly about emotional experiences yields improved health. Lengthy courses of the talking cure may indeed benefit sufferers (Levy and Ablon 2009). Though psychoanalysis often relegates emotions to the realm of instinct, narrative can still provide models for expression of unconscious anxieties, according to influential applications of Freud’s theories. For instance, Bruno Bettelheim writes, “the form and structure of fairy tales suggest images to the child by which he can structure his daydreams and with them give better direction to his life” (1976: 7).

Among neuroscientists, clinicians have played an important role in restoring emotion to discussions of cognition, with an emphasis on the bodily integration of emotions, moral sentiments, intuitions, and reasoning faculties. Theories of embodied minds receive elaboration from clinical observations of patients with brain injuries. When a patient cannot feel ordinary emotions, his judgments and decisions are also impaired. Antonio Damasio’s scientific articles and popularizing books demonstrate this and extrapolate from clinical case studies an account of brain function that challenges the treatment of emotions and rationality as separate and dichotomous features of human experience. In Damasio’s view, emotion is not extraneous to decision-making but a necessary component of mental function, shaped by experience and dependent on bodily (somatic) markers. Though its relevance to narrative studies is not immediately apparent, reference to Damasio’s work (especially his trilogy 1994, 1999, 2003) abounds in recent literary criticism and narrative theory seeking to restore the affective to the domain of the cognitive. Its influence is not limited to literary studies, of course. Physiologist Jay Schulkin (2004: 56) supports Damasio’s view that emotional memory lives in the body, arguing, “Visceral/autonomic information processing occurs at virtually every

level of the neural axis, and what distinguishes emotional cognition from non-emotional cognition is the imposition of the visceral nervous system in decision making.” More generally, “the first part of the cognitive revolution mistakenly omitted or denigrated the importance of the visceral/autonomic system” (55). In correcting that omission, Schulkin suggests, “Merging cognitive science and affective science [would] rule out the study of a disembodied mind, a calculating mind uninformed by viscera” (ibid.).

That emotion and cognition work together in human bodies contrasts with the age-old opposition of reason and passion (and dualistic body/mind contrasts). Clinicians and neuroscientists have not been alone in making the case for recovering emotion, as scholars in the humanities have also made an affective (re)turn. In philosophy, for instance, work in aesthetics, ethics, and moral development builds bridges to the sciences. I have already mentioned Patricia Churchland’s call to practice neurophilosophy in *Brain-Wise* (2002). More often this work has taken a cognitive direction. For instance, Nelson Goodman’s *Languages of Art* (1976) breaks down the barriers between art and science in aesthetics, proposing *syntactic density*, *semantic density*, *syntactic repleteness*, and *exemplificationality* (252–55) as symptoms of aesthetic experience. These symptoms emphasize the cognitive role in art appreciation, but Goodman also addresses the role of the emotions in the perception of art (246–48), though without making any reference to Dewey’s earlier theorizing. Indeed, Dewey’s affective aesthetics had largely been cast aside for the better part of the twentieth century. Experimental (physiological) aesthetics had responded to Dewey’s elevation of emotional experience by denigrating emotion as an accidental result of encountering an art object, not even predictable as to what emotional response would be aroused in a particular viewer or reader (Vivas 1938). Accordingly, emotional response should not be part of the definition of aesthetic appreciation (Vivas 1937). Philosophy’s neglect of the body has been challenged recently in Richard Shusterman’s (2008) proposal of a new “somaesthetics,” which will benefit, among other pragmatic goals, education in the humanities (Shusterman 2004).

The hope that exposure to art refines emotional perceptiveness and sensitivity animates philosophical aesthetics with applications in the philosophy of education (Carroll 2003). Working from a cognitivist standpoint, Martha Nussbaum and Ronald DeSousa have advocated the recognition of the rationality of emotions, in *Upheavals of Thought* (2001) and *The Rationality of Emotion* (1987), respectively. DeSousa argues that emotions are a kind of perception, possessing a dramatic structure and playing a crucial role in decision-making, beliefs, desires, and rationality. Exposure to art, according to DeSousa, helps to elaborate “paradigm scenarios” to benefit one’s
management of emotional experience (1987: 182). Nussbaum (1990, 1995, 1997) often writes about the cultivation of the moral imagination, attributing to novel reading not just personal but also civic impact. But which novels yield such social benefits? Philosophers naturally approach literary texts differently than literary critics, being concerned to make generalizations about how human beings learn from literature, rather than seeking to generate fresh interpretations of individual works. Still, by examining particular works, they commend them to our attention. Nussbaum (1997: 90) holds that our emotional involvement in a novel by Henry James or Charles Dickens engages us in processes of empathy and conjecture that make us better citizens in the real world. Concern for fictional characters, their circumstances and needs, awakens moral and political interests that will lead us to right decisions in favor of unknown others.

This evocation of psychology’s empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson 1998) in the context of reading fictional narratives has accordingly been embraced by philosophers of moral development (Blum 1994; Hoffman 2000). Whether narrative empathy and other feelings evoked by fiction reading actually result in moral improvement has been questioned (Keen 2007; Landy 2008). Whether or not it does, ought it? Among moral philosophers, the debate about the status of emotional responsiveness to narrative typically centers on the question of whether it should be cultivated (to encourage recognition of other minds, enhance comprehension, or form morality) or distrusted, as a potentially misleading capitulation to a frame of reference warped by bias (Morton 2002) or as an incitement to unruly behavior (Plato 1881: 132). Ironically, the argument in favor of aesthetic emotions (cultivation through narrative) results in a more proscriptive, narrow list of valued narratives, while the suspicious argument (advocating dispassion) is much more willing to admit the potentially deleterious impact of narrative as encouraging escapism, time-wasting, and vicious habits. This latter side admits a broader range of narrative, including comic books, video games, and romance novels, but does so to warn against the dangers of emotionally-engaged reading practices. As I will shortly discuss, even the best philosophy on narrative and the emotions suffers from an overly narrow focus on exemplary texts that blocks a broader consideration of narratives and narrativity.

Since my concern here is narrative and the emotions, I will concentrate
on philosophers specifically interested in the aesthetics of narrative. Peter Goldie has explored both the philosophy of the emotions (2000) and emotions and narrative (2003, 2004). Susan Feagin made an important contribution to the revival of narrative aesthetics in philosophy with her *Reading with Feeling* (1996). A recent and thorough philosophical study of the role of emotions in aesthetics is Jenefer Robinson’s *Deeper than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art* (2005) and her subsequent précis of her theory in “Emotion and the Understanding of Narrative” (2010). Robinson surveys research into emotion in psychology and theories of emotion in philosophy, offering her view of emotions as a process of interaction between a person and the environment (72). This process involves interconnected affective appraisals, physiological responses, and cognitive monitoring (Robinson 2005: 3). Robinson regards cognitive-judgment theories of emotion (which assimilate emotion to cognitive appraisal of goals) as inadequate because the trigger of emotional and physiological response is not a belief or judgment, allegedly, but a rapid non-conscious affective appraisal (2010: 72). In her view, the response is pre-linguistic at first, though cognitive monitoring may follow, confirming or denying the early impulse through reasoning (73). Reflection may modify the response, intensifying it or causing it to dissipate.

Thus Robinson sidesteps the question of the rationality or irrationality of emotions, for the process itself is always initiated by an automatic affective appraisal happening before reflection (2005: 3):

> When human beings have an emotional response to something in the (internal or external) environment, they make an affective appraisal that picks that thing out as significant to me (given my wants, goals, and interests) and requiring attention. This affective appraisal causes physiological changes, action tendencies, and expressive gestures, including characteristic facial and vocal expressions, that may be subjectively experienced (and named out of the available emotion terms in a language) as feelings, and the whole process is then modified by cognitive monitoring. (2005: 113; original emphasis)

She presents this process as a universal description of human beings interacting with their environment. Robinson is attentive to cultural differences, however, which she acknowledges without stripping human emotions of their core elements, which distinguish basic emotion systems (88). That is, she allows that cultural variation emphasizes different emotions and names them distinctively (80–81): these features contribute to the after-the-fact appraisal of what a person feels, according to the folk-psychological sense available in his or her culture. This labeling may indeed alter the way an emotion process unfolds in a person’s experience (87). Though Robinson
draws on the most up-to-date research into the emotions in psychology and neuroscience to create her description of emotions as a process, she arrives at an understanding compatible with John Dewey’s (2005 [1934]: 43) views of seventy-five years ago, that “emotions are qualities . . . of a complex experience that moves and changes.”

Further compatibility with Dewey (and Richards, whom she does not mention) shows in Robinson’s central question: How does the engagement of the feelings in encounters with artworks contribute to their understanding? She is most interested in the sequential reading experience, not the deliberative purpose of a reader reflecting on meanings afterward. Her Aristotle is the theorist of the emotions and the arts of persuasion (De Anima and Rhetoric), not the theorist of actions as signs of character (Nicomachean Ethics). Robinson makes a priority of explaining how narrative literature, particularly realistic fiction, is first understood through the reader’s emotional responses. Rather than rooting the moral development of readers in their emotional reading experiences (as Nussbaum does), Robinson asserts that such experience is essential to the comprehension and plausible interpretations of the novels read. This is a promising direction, wedding emotion and cognition in reading comprehension, without invoking the typical gendered denigration of the soppy feeling reader. Yet Robinson parts company with Dewey when she chooses Edith Wharton’s The Reef as the text that represents not just narrative but canonical literature in her work. Dewey (2005 [1934]: 2–3) regarded narrative as a human art of communication and disapproved of the sequestering of art works in museums; I infer that he would disapprove of a narrow canon of great works of literature. He writes, disapprovingly, “When an art product once attains classic status, it somehow becomes isolated from the human conditions under which it was brought into being and from the human consequences it engenders in actual life-experience” (1). Yet choices must be made for the sake of illustration, and classics have the advantage of being well known.

Like Nussbaum, Robinson favors the realistic novelists like those of F. R. Leavis’s Great Tradition (George Eliot, Henry James, and Joseph Conrad), though she includes Edith Wharton as a Jamesian psychological novelist. Indeed, The Reef is her sole subject of close examination, exemplifying the morally serious, character-driven realistic fiction that she regards as educating readers’ emotions (2005: 101). Robinson’s choice of a sample novel that engages the emotions is value-laden, dismissing various other kinds of narrative: good intellectual puzzles in novel form, bad didactic fiction, and genre fiction that “merely aim[s] to entertain” (159). Though her questions set aside concerns about literary merit, a somewhat anxious invest-
ment in traditional psychological realistic fiction shapes them: “how emotion enters into our interpretation of these works, how we learn emotionally from them about human nature and human motivation, and how emotion manages and guides our responses to them through the manipulation of form” (103; original emphasis). Would she ask the same questions about the education of the emotions by narrative if she allowed graphic novels, thrillers, and fantasies about teenaged vampires to be considered?

Although Robinson defends a reader-response theory that treats emotional responsiveness to narratives as vital data (102–6), she does not adopt the enlarged category of narrative literature—extending to the popular—that has been advanced by reader-response critics (e.g., Radway 1984). Robinson’s primary interest in the role of the emotions in reading comprehension makes readily understood works such as “merely entertain[ing]” genre fiction less compelling to examine (2005: 159). She thus misses an opportunity to explore the emotions bound up in narrativity when she characterizes as “stock” emotions the drivers of narrative in genre fiction (136).16 Robinson allows that “It would be an unsuccessful detective story that did not make us curious and suspenseful about what is going to happen, and a failure for a Harlequin romance to arouse no feelings of satisfaction when the heroine is rescued by the mysterious dark and handsome hero” (ibid.), but she does not pursue the possibility that similar emotions inhere in narrative in general. She finds more interesting the rarer narratives that discourage emotional involvement (137).

The avoidance of popular fiction in favor of exemplary nineteenth-century realistic novels is a common flaw of philosophical defenses of novel-reading as a school for the sentiments. Philosophy often avoids individuality typical of literary interpretations, favoring instead introspective accounts that attempt to elucidate widely shared reading experiences.17 Such a philosopher also avoids a narrative that would make the examined experience appear idiosyncratic, so the desire to generalize exerts pressure in favor of canonical choices. I applaud Robinson’s daring in focusing on \textit{The Reef}, which is hardly the best known of Wharton’s works; it makes a refreshing alternative to \textit{The Ambassadors}. Yet Robinson’s account of narrative emotions depends upon the dismissal of many other novels, especially ones that entertain readers (159). Why must we set aside enjoyable

16. For efforts to understand the role of emotional response in the reading of popular subgenres such as thrillers, see Gerrig 1993 on participatory responses, and Warhol 2003: 41–50 on a variety of techniques employed to evoke emotion in popular narrative forms.

17. See Peter H. Jones (1975) on \textit{Middlemarch} and Nussbaum (1990) on \textit{The Ambassadors}. An even more common emphasis among philosophers is the selection of novels containing moral dilemmas, about which see Johnson 2004.
emotional responses as “stock emotions”? An individual reader may as readily acquire a sentimental education from an intensely emotional immersion in a formulaic romance as from an admired classic of high literary realism. Readers’ tastes, cultural contexts, and emotional dispositions vary, and these differences influence their responsiveness to narratives. By no means all who read narrative responsively have had their tastes formed in the Anglo-American canon of novels that loom so large in philosophers’ accounts of reading and narrative impact.

On a related front, there has been a debate among philosophers about the nature of fictional emotions, or emotions evoked by reading, viewing, or hearing fictional narrative. (This inquiry concerns a broader array of narrative texts and media [Yanal 1999: 8].) The “paradox of fiction” questions whether it is possible to feel genuine emotion in response to a fictitious character or event (Dadlez 1997; Hjort and Laver 1997), quite aside from the emotional character of key aspects of narrativity. Readers’ testimony strongly suggests that they often feel for characters, feel involved in turns of events, even when they are aware of the illusory quality of fictional worlds. Robert Yanal summarizes the “paradox set” in three propositions:

1. Some people (we’ll call them emoters) on occasion experience emotions towards characters or situations they take to be fictions,
2. Any person experiences an emotion only if he believes that the object of his emotion both exists and exhibits at least some of the emotion inducing properties specific to that emotion.
3. No emoter who takes the object of his emotion to be fiction believes that the object of the emotion exists and exhibits any emotion inducing properties. (1999: 11)

For philosophers, the crux of the matter lies in explaining the nature of readers’ emotional responses, felt for (and with) fictional characters and their circumstances, given their nonexistence. As Yanal (ibid.: 12) puts it, “We thus have yet cannot have emotions toward fiction.” The debate on the paradox of fiction is not settled, though, of the views I mention below—the “irrationality” charge, “make-believe” theory, “counterpart” theory, and “thought” theory—the last has received some confirmation from experimental psychology.

Few deny that emotional responses to imaginary beings do occur when readers or viewers immerse themselves in fictional worlds, and a number of different strategies have been employed to tackle this apparent paradox of fiction. Colin Radford (1975, 1977) initiated the modern argument that such responses are irrational, targeting the second of Yanal’s propositions. Kendall Walton (1978, 1990) suggests that readers and viewers are engag-
ing in make-believe. Thus the feelings they experience in response to fiction are only “quasi-emotions,” not the real emotions referred to in the first proposition but make-believe feelings elicited in the game of pretending. Counterpart theory presupposes possible worlds, but requires that individuals exist in only one world. Variations on it suggest that readers and viewers really respond to the analogous situations of actual people, reflection upon whom receives prompting by fiction (Lewis 1986), so as to account for the first proposition. So-called thought theorists argue that belief in the actuality of fictional beings is not necessary to evoke emotional responses from readers (Lamarque 1981, 1994; Carroll 1990; Smith 1995): thoughts without belief can do it. This view tackles the second proposition and supports the third.

In research that backs up “thought” theory, Ed Tan (1994) has demonstrated that film viewers may experience the same emotional responses as witnesses, regardless of fictionality. The research of the psychologists Richard J. Gerrig and David N. Rapp (1993, 2004) offers support for “thought” theory. In contrast to Coleridge’s view that readers must willingly suspend disbelief, they suggest that readers must make an active effort to disbelieve the reality of fictive narratives. Readers thus naturally experience narrative information as continuous with information gleaned from real experience and must exert themselves consciously to regard fictive narratives as fictional (Gerrig 1993). Middlebrow readers (and the publishers who cater to them) know the difference between reality and fiction, but they enjoy the feeling of surrendering to the illusion of a fictional world for the duration of a novel-reading experience and seek out narratives that invite transportation (Radway 1997).

**Narrative and Emotion in Literary Studies**

For most of the twentieth century, middlebrow readers’ feeling responses to emotionally evocative narratives and immersion in novels occurred in a sphere apart from the practices of literary studies. The discipline separated literary reading from reading for pleasure in everyday life and university-level critical practice of professionals from high-school-level appreciation guided by women. Thus, although Dewey’s theory of experiential learning influenced literature teaching in the high schools, and paved the way for reader-response criticism (an important conduit was Louise M. Rosenblatt’s *Literature as Exploration* [1938]), Wimsatt and Beardsley’s proscriptions of 1946 influenced generations of literary critics. These critics may have been passionate readers and teachers, but they sought to avoid the “affective fallacy” as a token of their professionalism.
Northrop Frye thus attempted to bring the rigor and authority of science to his descriptive taxonomies of literary genre: in the enormously influential *Anatomy of Criticism* (1957), he briskly dispenses with “all casual, sentimental, and prejudiced value-judgments” (18). Furthermore, Frye castigated negative responses to his schematization of poetics as revealing his critics’ “strong emotional repugnance” (ibid.). These were fighting words, dependent on the disrepute of emotionality. Frye admitted that critics have subjective backgrounds, but denied that these subjectivities were involved in critical responses to literature: “every cultivated person who is not suffering from advanced paranoia knows [that subjective pleasure and response to art] are constantly distinct” (ibid.: 28).

Parallel developments are found in New Criticism, disseminated by Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren’s textbooks *Understanding Poetry* (1938) and *Understanding Fiction* (1943). They encouraged belief in normative interpretations (rather than various readers’ responses, including emotional ones), objectivity, and dispassion, under the name of critical distance employed in the interest of textual analysis. Structuralism in turn sought to place the analysis of literary texts on a scientific footing (with an emphasis on typology that continues to influence contemporary narratology). This entailed an official aversion to the emotive, although elements of Shklovsky’s estrangement were silently incorporated (“radicalized” and typologized according to Sternberg [2006: 175]) in Genette’s narratology. Simultaneously, mainstream literary criticism veered away from scientific approaches that might have integrated data from the new physiological aesthetics. Empirical evidence from the psychology laboratory was not a welcome supplement to literary critical discourse, at least not until the late 1980s, when Victor Nell’s *Lost in a Book: The Psychology of Reading for Pleasure* (1988) reintroduced literary critics to physiological evidence about readers. Steering a course between a distrusted empiricism, on the one hand, and belles lettristic practices of literary appreciation, on the other, required strict adherence on the part of literary critics to the New Critical doctrine of analyzing “the text itself.”

Fashions in literary reading, particularly the academically sanctioned reading that demonstrates theories and produces interpretations, distinguished serious fiction’s intellectual demands from the affective and bodily effects of popular fiction. As Janice Radway (1997: 142) describes it: “Whether cheap fiction books were to produce the skin-crawling sensations of fear, the upwelling tears of pathos, the erotic excitements of romance, or the bated breath of suspense, they were picked up precisely because they were successful at moving the body and provoking the emotions.” Difficult modern narratives, by way of contrast, are supposed to
cultivate a decoding, puzzle-solving reading style, rather than an extension of readerly practices of attachment, immersion, and identification. As Suzanne Clark (1991: 2) has argued, this distinction has been strongly conditioned by gender expectations, associating the decoding of difficult texts with masculine mastery, and immersion and sympathetic character identification with feminine empathy.

Academic literary critics with few exceptions, until the 1980s, showed scant “interest in relating their own concrete experience of a text or in appealing to the emotional responses of their readers” (Radway 1997: 120). This left little room in criticism for reports of the individual experiences of readers, though to be sure, narratives continued to represent emotion-saturated circumstances, invite character identification, evoke responses from readers, and manipulate their feelings. In the theorizing of the 1970s, avoidance of the overt subject of affect often took the form of dodging readers’ responses. Roland Barthes’s post-structuralist masterpiece S/Z (1974 [1970]) deigns not to designate a code for the reader’s response, though it speaks eloquently of one reader’s engagement with Balzac’s story. Arguably, Barthes subverts the action and the discourse sequence for estrangement, and his hermeneutic code identifies units of an enigma that in practice evoke feelings of suspense, delay, and satisfaction in readers (see Sternberg 2006: 178–96). Still, Barthes disallows the traditional model of communication: “writing is not the communication of a message which starts from the author and proceeds to the reader” (1974 [1970]: 151), and dismisses as “prejudice” the notion that reading is a form of reception, or “a simple psychological participation in the adventure being related” (151–52). Dissimilar in so many ways to Barthes’s S/Z, Pierre Macherey’s A Theory of Literary Production (2006 [1966]) shares with it a familiar dismissal of other readers’ experiences. Even though Macherey is officially interested in how texts communicate with readers and with the ambiguities of emotion represented by narrative and critical texts, he warns that “we must not replace a mythology of the creator by a mythology of the public” (79). Attending to other readers’ experiences and opinions risks enfranchising the wrong readership, as for instance in Macherey’s prescription that the viewpoint of the social-democratic proletariat alone should be consulted in the appraisal of Tolstoy (ibid.: 343). Once the reader is allowed to be more than the individual critic or theorist (or the chimerical implied reader, of whose textually initiated responses theorists may adduce virtually anything), which readers’ responses count becomes a problem almost too large to handle.

Often the audience is left unspecified, or is implied to be those unaware of the way ideological goals work on them through manipulation of affect.
For instance, the English Marxist critic Raymond Williams directs attention to “structures of feeling” in literature and life, but never specifies who exactly lives and feels them. Does he mean everyone? Only the literate? All but those wise enough to detect them? It is unclear. Williams’s Marxism and Literature (1977) thus explicitly employs the terms feeling and affect in defining “structures of feeling,” without saying precisely who experiences them and how often. Structures of feeling are “meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt . . . characteristic elements of impulse, restraint, and tone; specifically affective elements of consciousness and relationships” (132).18

Though it is difficult to disentangle a definition of the emotional element or assign it characteristics from its place in “structures of feeling,” Williams (1983b [1976]: 246–48) shows interest in the psychological as a realm often conventionally separated from the social. The dividing line vanishes when Williams fuses inner experience with its outer context, directing attention to paradoxical integrations: “not feeling against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought: practical consciousness of a present kind, in a living and inter-relating continuity” (1977: 132, my emphasis). Williams’s critique of the politics of sensibility that allowed readers of industrial fiction to pity fictional workers while exhibiting indifference to their real-life counterparts serves as an influential demonstration of the utility of his phrase “structures of feeling,” even as it targets the emotions (involved in structures of feeling) for negative criticism as a source of hypocrisy and an explanation for apathy (Williams 1973, 1983a). Although Williams’s critique of sympathy still resonates in cultural studies’ approaches (Gallagher 1992), his lasting influence shows in contemporary efforts to historicize and situate culturally specific experiences and narrative expression of emotions.19

Considering this impact, it is striking that Raymond Williams’s readers might search his Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (1983b [1976]) in vain for definitions of affect, emotions, and feelings. Between aesthetic and alienation, elite and empirical, family and fiction, these terms fail to appear. They are of course involved in both sensibility and sentimentalism, as glossed by Williams. Despite the vagueness at the heart of the phrase, in combination with Williams’s dynamic account of change in cultural forms—dominant,

18. On Williams’s indebtedness to the traditional liberalism of F. R. Leavis, echoed in Williams’s phrasing here, but also on his departures from Leavisian understandings of culture, see Kanwar 1988.

19. In an independent parallel development, in part influenced by the Annales school, historians have also trained their attention on the emotions (Stearns and Stearns 1985; Rosenwein 2002). Thomas Dixon’s (2006, 2008) history of the emotions as categories and his focused study of nineteenth-century altruism make substantial contributions to this young field.
residual, and emergent—structures of feeling become an important target of analysis in narrative studies (Jameson 1981).  

Fredric Jameson (1995: 10) characterizes the age of postmodernism as one marked by a “waning of affect.” But signs of positive change with respect to the place of emotions in literary-critical discourse and the literature classroom began to appear in the late 1960s and accelerated in the 1980s. Among psychoanalytic theories of narrative, Norman Holland’s (1975) and Peter Brooks’s (1984) contributions consider the interactions of readers’ and narrative texts’ drives: Holland emphasizes the defensive function of form in resistance to fantasy, and Brooks considers the propulsive use of desire as a dynamic of signification. As early as 1968, Holland argued in The Dynamics of Literary Response that readers apply meanings to literary texts as part of their defensive reactions to the works’ emotional operations (104–33). The Freudian basis of Holland’s early work led him to see readers as resistant to the transformations unleashed by reading: “a literary work means by reworking those rather unsavory wishful or fearful fantasies at its heart into social, moral, or intellectual themes which are consciously satisfying to the ego and unconsciously satisfying to the deep wishes being acted out by the literary work” (ibid.: 104). Writing many years earlier, Roman Ingarden (1974 [1937]: 217) had criticized the overshadowing of aesthetics by what he called psychologism in literary scholarship, arguing that the aesthetic values and functions are falsely “conceived either as quantities and qualities of the psychological problems occurring in the reader during his reading or as the dynamics of the perceiver’s experiences of the work.” Shifting the discussion from problems within a reader’s psyche to narrative impact would turn out to involve the development of subjective criticism, the advent of research into reader responses, the revisionist work of feminists on gender and genre, and the exploration of emotions’ role in rhetorical narrative studies.

David Bleich’s essay “Emotional Origins of Literary Meaning” (1969) comes to the cautious conclusion that “it is not inconceivable that critical pleasure and creative pleasure are, after all, the same and . . . created by identical psychological mechanisms,” especially defensive responses and egoistic projections (40). Bleich’s self-described “heretical” report for the National Council of the Teachers of English, Readings and Feelings: An Introduction to Subjective Criticism (1975) brings emotion and narrative together by emphasizing the importance of students’ emotional responses to what they read. Reader-response criticism followed Bleich’s and Holland’s lead  

in studying the responses of individual readers (Radway 1984; Flynn and Schweickart 1986; Nell 1988), as differentiated from Wolfgang Iser’s (1974) reception theory, which relies on a posited implied reader, so idealized as to be indistinguishable from Iser himself. The focus on responses of actual readers did not yield much in the way of new insights into the interactions of narrative and the emotions per se, although these reports did verify that readers register their experiences of responding with feeling. Much later work in the tradition of reader-response criticism, such as Robyn Warhol’s *Having a Good Cry* (2003) makes the effort to produce a narratology of emotionally-evocative devices, but the more usual situation involved invoking the word “affect” and swerving away from any precise discussion of the emotions (Fish 1970). Iser (1978: 44–45) himself notes that Holland’s underlying theory of reading scarcely advanced emotive theory beyond I. A. Richards’s suggestions.

Other advances, particularly in feminist criticism, did occur as a consequence of opening up the analysis of the reading situation to hypothetically diverse readers, including women and readers of popular fiction. That readings differ as much as actual readers do became a premise rather than a situation to be deplored. Feminist criticism and theory (Moi 1985; Gallop 1988; Butler 2005) made declarations of a scholar’s subject position and personal responses an acceptable academic stance, in some circles preferable to a pretended objectivity (Messer-Davidow 1987; Miller 1991). This change enabled the expression of emotional responses to narratives on the part of some feminist critics, while others disavowed emotionality as an imposition of patriarchy bent on confining women to second-class status. An influential critique of traditional binary threefolds that put nature, woman, and emotion in opposition to culture, man, and reason (Ortner 1974) suggests that cultural arrangements and socialization accounted for the conventional oppositions rather than innate or universal traits of the female psyche. In novel criticism, this attention to the gendering of emotionality bore fruit in many discussions of gender and genre, especially regarding sentimentality and sensation fiction (Tompkins 1985; Tromp 2000). Contextual and feminist narratologists enriched recent narrative theory by bringing some interest in the emotions to a structuralist endeavor that has typically ignored them (Lanser 1986; Warhol 2003).

Among narrative theorists, Chicago neo-Aristotelians have offered a new means of mediating among texts, authors, and readers, which at least strongly implied a role for the emotions (Booth 1961, 1988; Crane 1952). Booth reintroduces the concerns of rhetoric into narrative studies, showing the way to both rhetorical narratologists with interests in communication and ethical theorists of the novel. So a place has been preserved for emo-
tion in narrative studies as an aspect of response and an elicitor of ethical engagement. This is not simply a matter of developing moral awareness through empathetic responsiveness to fictional characters (Nussbaum 1990). For instance, James Phelan’s (2004: 630) rhetorical literary ethics “conceiv[es] the literary text as a site of a multilayered communication between author and audience, one that involves the engagement of the audience’s intellect, psyche, emotions, and values.” Studies scrutinizing aspects of that multilayered communication work against and complicate a Tolstoyan model of art as a simple transmitter of infectious feelings from author to reader (Tolstoy 1925; Rabinowitz 1987). Another angle focuses on effects felt by readers: Hans Robert Jauss (1974: 285) appreciates such “communicative achievement[s] of art . . . as admiration, sentimental involvement, sympathetic laughter, and sympathetic tears” and regards this first emotional and “prereflective level of aesthetic perception” as a preparation for the reader’s imaginative engagement with a narrative (ibid.: 287).

That readers’ appetites, aversions, and desires for fulfillment and delay—fundamental ingredients of emotional experience—receive a workout in the temporal art of narrative brings its experiential and formal qualities closer together, without assigning limiting roles to specific narrative techniques. Meir Sternberg (1978) describes narrative’s master functions (suspense, curiosity, and surprise) as the only specifically narrative emotional effects, produced by the double sequence of narrative action/communication. Though this may seem to be a strict limit, other feelings and other strategies of evocation of feeling are shared by narrative with nonnarrative kinds of communication or are subsumed by suspense, curiosity, and surprise. Sternberg (1992: 529) emphasizes the protean nature of correspondences among forms and their functions, allowing space for variation in individual readers’ dispositions and resisting an oversimplifying formalism. He challenges narrative theorists “both to mark off in sharp, principled terms the [narrative] genre’s affective constants from cross-discourse variables and to systematize their flexible interrelation in generic practice,” asking “How, that is, would the working of humor, anger, empathy, disgust, making strange (etc.) within narrative differ from their counterparts outside the genre?” (2003a: 379). Focusing on impact need not mean collapsing into a condition of affective relativism or gross oversimplification. The study of narrative dynamics offers fine-grained methods for analyzing emotional characteristics of genres or individual texts.

21. Jauss’s hermeneutics supports Jenefer Robinson’s account of emotional responses to narrative, but she does not cite him in Deeper than Reason (2005).
deploying functions such as suspense (Ryan 2001; Vorderer et al. 1996) or the satisfaction of pleasure (Young 2001, 2009). Attending to the reading process, especially to readers’ activities of framing, problem-solving when confronted with gaps, and juggling previously framed, newly corrected, and discarded but remembered hypotheses about narratives, specifies key stages for the involvement of the emotions in narrative.

A Look Ahead

The explosion of interest in narrative and the emotions, broadly construed, shows in the variety of topics taken up recently by literary scholars encouraged by and participating in the affective turn. These include studies of narrative identification (Breger and Breithaupt 2009; Neumann et al. 2008), film genres and elicitation of emotions (Grodal 1997), intersubjectivity in film and fiction (Butte 2004), narrative faculties and emotional involvement (Walsh 1997), the role of emotional involvement in absorption and reading speed (Gerrig 1993; Miall 2007, 2008), and narrative empathy (Fricke 2004; Keen 2006, 2008). I have argued in Empathy and the Novel (2007) that scant evidence exists for narrative empathy’s contribution to real-world altruism. This devalues neither narrative empathy nor the widespread trust in the socially beneficial yield of novel-reading, which I regard as an admirable hope shared by many novelists. I do question causal arguments that equate experiences of narrative empathy with real-world empathy for living others, and call for better understanding of the conditions and circumstances that permit strategic communication of authorial empathy to different audiences (2008). There is still a great deal that we do not know about emotionally evocative narrative techniques (2007: 92–99). In my view we are unlikely to succeed in constructing a taxonomy of narrative techniques that reliably evoke narrative empathy, in part because narrative strategies have diverse (“protean”) results (Sternberg 1982) and in part because readers’ temperaments have a rarely acknowledged impact on their varied engagement with narratives. When emotions arise from makers and receivers in communication, provoked by representations and by narrativity itself, the potential interactions and crossing points dazzle us with possibilities. This should not be a discouragement to further study. To acknowledge the complications involved in studying narrative and the emotions is to prepare a sturdier foundation for subsequent narratology, narrative ethics, philosophical aesthetics, and psychology of narrative impact.

Clearly the recuperation of affect as a legitimate subject of study is well under way. Consolidation of inquiry into the emotions going on in many
different fields may now begin. An exemplary statement of intention, the Myrifield Manifesto (Freeman 2008), explicitly calls for study of the emotional experience of literature and the arts and nominates empathy as an underlying artistic structure. Empathy already enjoys a prominent position in theories of narrative emotion advanced by film studies experts, psychologists of mass communications, literary cognitivists, and scholars of discourse processing, so it is an especially promising research subject for cross-disciplinary discussion. The recent convening of interdisciplinary groups of scholars at symposia centered on emotions, the publication of special issues of journals dedicated to the emotions, the founding of new journals for affective science and emotions research (joining the already established *Cognition and Emotion* and *Motivation and Emotion*), and the for-


23. In addition to the 2008 gathering at the Myrifield Institute, many recent symposia indicate widespread interdisciplinary conversation about and discussion of emotions. This list suggests the range of disciplines involved. An important interdisciplinary gathering occurred in Amsterdam in June 2001 (Manstead et al. 2004). More recently, the Society for Personality and Social Psychology ran an Emotion Pre-conference workshop in Tampa, Florida (February 2009); the Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, hosted an interdisciplinary conference on Emotions and Machines (August 2009); and the International Society for Research on Emotion hosted a conference at University of Leuven in Belgium (August 2009). Literature, philosophy, art history and history groups also sponsored gatherings concerned with emotions: the Institute of English Studies at the University of London ran a multidisciplinary colloquium, Languages of Emotion (October 2004); the Italian Academy at Columbia University hosted Vision, Attention, and Emotion: A Symposium of the Art and Neuroscience Project (2008); analytical philosophers gathered to discuss emotions at the IIIº Encontro Nacional de Filosofia Analitica (ENFA3) in Lisbon (June 2006); Queen Mary College in London established a seminar series in 2008 at its Centre for the History of the Emotions; Groupe Phi, groupe de recherche en poétique historique et comparée, (CELAM–Université Rennes 2) et Modernités (TELEM, Bordeaux 3), en collaboration avec LILAC (ENS) et Alexandre Gfen’s FABULA, ran a conference in June 2009, “Émotions et puissance de la littérature.” Of these groups, however, only the Queen Mary College historians frequently discuss narrative.


25. Recently established journals include *Affect*, the newsletter of the NCCR Affective Sciences (started in 2006); *Emotion*, an American Psychological Association journal (begun in 2001); *Emotion Review*, the journal started in 2009 from the International Society for Emotion Research (ISRE); and ISRE’s newsletter, *Emotion Researcher; Emotions, Space and Society*. Only rarely do articles in these journals reflect on narrative. While there are many suitable outlets for research in the sciences and social sciences, literary studies have suffered reverses. Lit-
mation of new scholarly and scientific societies as well as less formal discussion groups and listservs all suggest the potential for an explosion of discovery, unlikely to be contained or controlled by the cognitive sciences.

The principles articulated in the Myrifield Manifesto suggest a way forward. The authors call for “a new emphasis,” shifting scholarly focus from producing distinctive interpretations of individual texts to exploring “the experience of literature and the arts,” including “their emotional aspects.” While this actually represents a return to Deweyan and Richardsian commitments rather than a new direction, it does endorse the reintegration of psychological aesthetics with literary studies. Recognizing that the forms of interdisciplinarity prevailing in the academy primarily involve cooperation among sister disciplines in the humanities, the Myrifield authors propose a new interdisciplinary approach that integrates the social and biological sciences with the humanities. This proposed integration implies the readiness to become actively involved with the methodology of non-humanistic disciplines, including the development of philosophical and empirical research methodologies.

I hope that the Myrifield authors would agree that the contributions of psychology and neuroscience to the conversation about emotions and the arts extend well beyond what they characterize as “recent new developments such as embodied cognition and cognitive linguistics that have special relevance for research in literature and the arts.” Empathy in particular would be far less well understood without the work of developmen-

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26. Some of the most important of these (not counting the many neuro-scientific research groups hosted by medical schools, where much of the exciting action on mirror neurons takes place) include the International Society for Research on Emotion (ISRE), International Association for Empirical Aesthetics (IAEA); Center for Interdisciplinary Research of Emotions at University of Haifa, Israel; the Max Planck Institute for Human Development’s Centre for History of the Emotions; Languages of the Emotions research cluster at Freie Universität Berlin; the Geneva Emotions Research Group of the Swiss National Research Center in Affective Sciences; and Peter Goldie’s Manchester Centre for Emotion and Value at the University of Manchester. None of these groups has a dedicated focus on narrative.

27. The following resources offer advance notice of events, calls for papers, and prepublication versions of work: the listserv at www.jiscmail.ac.uk/historyofemotions, run by the Centre for the History of Emotions at Queen Mary, University at London; the online collection, Geneva Emotion Research Group, at http://affective-sciences.org/research.material; the International Society for Research on Emotion listserv at listserve@isre.org; and Sentiments, the ASA Sociology of Emotions Section online newsletter, at www2.asanet.org/emotions/newsletters.html.
tal and social psychologists to draw upon. The cognitive commitments of the Myrifield authors ought not to discourage collaboration with emotion researchers in the affective sciences. Reopening the aesthetic theories that address fundamentals of the various arts is a good project: doing so without the assistance of musicology, art history, dance, and theater studies seems misguided, but such potential assistance is at least implied by their special welcome to “scholars in disciplines other than the humanities” (my emphasis). Conversation with non-humanistic disciplines should not preclude angles of approach from the humanities. In the case of “literariness” (along with empathy, a focus of the manifesto), for example, recent historical writing and genre studies should not be forgotten. Qualities of literariness almost certainly depend to some degree on the prized affects of historically situated emotional communities and changing understandings of what and how affects mean in different periods (Dixon 2006; Rosenwein 2006). As Franco Moretti (2005) has demonstrated, narrative genres come in and out of fashion, and these trends probably also alter the valued traits of literariness in a given period. As these suggestions imply, I think that an interest in literariness ought not to translate into a narrow range of reference to a high literary canon. Literariness ought not to mean worthiness, and its qualities should be sought in diverse exemplars. We have much to learn about emotion and narrative from a full range of texts (Ryan 2001; Sternberg 1978, 1992, 2006), unconstrained by value judgments.

The essays in this two-part special issue refer to narrative texts extending from the origin stories of Genesis to shared cultural narratives, from canonical novels to private letters to film comedies and jokes. While readings of eighteenth-century novels, Romantic, Victorian, high modernist and contemporary novels in English are examined, the contributors do not adopt a narrow definition of either the reader or the text. The emotions discussed range beyond anger, sadness, fear, surprise, disgust, contempt, and happiness (Ekman 1992) to encompass complex affective states such as defensiveness and suspicion; moral emotions such as empathy, sympathy, and altruistic feeling for others; and affective qualities of narrativity in humor and the roots of aesthetic feelings in infant experience. Here, too, a generous eclecticism shows: individual essays investigate the affective elements of literary theories expressed by mature literary critics of the twentieth century, the responses of neonates to their caregivers, and the dispositions of human ancestors in prehistory, as well as engaging with ideas about the emotions arising from many disciplines.
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