Chinese Behavior toward Taiwan:
Nationalism as a Driver of Foreign and Domestic Policy

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To my wife and parents

for unwavering and eternal support

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Introduction

When the Chinese Nationalists [KMT] retreated to Taiwan in 1949 to establish a government in exile, an obvious hostility emerged between the nationalists and the communists [CCP] who had evicted them from the mainland. Ruling from Taipei in Taiwan, the KMT retained *de jure* leadership over mainland China as far as most other countries were concerned. *De facto*, however, the KMT could assert little influence on the mainland where the communist party quickly began establishing its own institutions. Because the KMT occupied the island, Taiwan went from being a region with little interest to either party to being central to Chinese politics almost overnight. The two Chinas have yet to resolve this conflict, which has largely remained the same over the years. Yet, much has changed since the KMT threatened the CCP’s newly established rule in the 1950s; the KMT is no longer a credible threat to communist power. What then, if not the security threat posed by the KMT, has driven the centrality of Taiwan to Chinese politics? That is the question this paper attempts to answer here.
The question is pertinent for a number of reasons, most important of which is China’s insistence of the “One China Principle” which has governed China’s approach to the outside world since 1949 and still does so today. When the Nixon administration secretly negotiated the opening of China and the US to each other, the issue of Taiwan (specifically who should be recognized as the legitimate ruler of China) dictated much of the agenda, often obstructing otherwise pragmatic and meaningful negotiations. Today, China often makes explicit or implicit demands that recipients of aid, typically developing countries, recognize the CCP as the legitimate ruler of China. As China grows more powerful in the international system, understanding what drives and shapes its policy – that is, understanding why China sometimes prioritizes reunification with Taiwan over other policy objectives, like it did during the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis – is important. This is especially true because Chinese actions toward Taiwan have sometimes been counter-productive to China’s security. It is reasonable to expect the underlying reason to be decisive in how policy is formed in Beijing.

This paper suggests here that Taiwan’s role in Chinese politics is a consequence of the Communist Party’s struggle for legitimacy and their use of nationalism to obtain that legitimacy; at several points in the history of CCP rule, the CCP has “deployed” nationalism in order to shore up its otherwise waning support. The use of nationalism to derive legitimacy has shaped China’s relationship with Taiwan over time because nationalists have emphasized the importance of reunification with Taiwan as vital to the nationalist cause and to China’s survival in the international system. The discussion of nationalism that follows is an attempt to overcome the difficulties associated with explaining China’s behavior toward Taiwan in terms of established theories, namely those of international relations which offer only fragmented explanatory power with respect to this particular policy issue and others.
Nationalism, on the other hand, is a variable which figures prominently in the fluctuations of Chinese policy, particularly toward Taiwan. Like realism and liberalism it explains individual events or policies, but it goes beyond to explain how Chinese policy evolved from one event to the other, and how the process through which it changed affected the eventual outcomes. It is a powerful argument because the variables which affect nationalism are diverse, not least of which is China’s long history of relations with the world around it that has given rise to a population which is very assertive toward other states.

Before the paper returns to this argument it is necessary to understand why other attempts to explain China-Taiwan relations are inadequate. It is helpful to establish exactly what a theory has to explain in order to better illuminate the issue at hand. The following section includes a description of the bare minimum requirements for theory, so as to set the stage for reviewing already established theories. Moreover, it will serve to help evaluate the theory of nationalism that this paper puts forward vis-à-vis the established theories. This will allow a review of the dominating theories in International Relations with their strengths and weaknesses in the explanation of Chinese policy toward Taiwan.

**What a theoretical framework must explain**

Since 1949, China’s stance toward Taiwan has remained constant. At no point in the history of the Communist Party has the leadership been willing and able to dismiss the issue of Taiwan, nor have they been able to dismiss the “One China Principle” as the only solution to the issue. By virtue of China adopting this solution, the relationship between China and Taiwan is necessarily
hostile. Taiwan has three options, only two of which are permanent. The first, and temporary, is to preserve the status quo: to neither secede nor attempt to reunify, but instead continue to promote its fragile new democracy under its de facto sovereignty without challenging the communist party directly. The next is to secede, thus giving up KMT claims to leadership of mainland China and form Taiwan as a sovereign entity. Third, and cherished by mainland Chinese, Taiwan could reunify with China proper as an autonomous region similar to Hong Kong and Macao. No Taiwanese political leader has ever attempted reunification and it is unlikely anyone will: doing so would mean letting go of the claim to legitimate government over the mainland. Even though it is not given that the KMT will be in power in the fragile democracy, its main rival - the Democratic Progressive Party – is more likely to push for independence than for reunification as this party represents a substantial part of the Taiwanese population which desires secession. On the other hand, as this paper shows, history suggests that China is unlikely to let Taiwan secede. It is thus hardly surprising that conflict remains between the two Chinas since every solution sees a division across the strait.

Theories employed to make sense of China’s past behavior toward Taiwan will have to account not only for China’s stance – the unforgiving adherence to the One China Principle – but also the persistence of this stance over time, despite the changing currents of Chinese politics and the revised security threat posed by Taiwan. As this paper demonstrates, some of the key variables that are expected to influence foreign policy – security and economics – have changed significantly since 1949. Why, if these have changed, has China’s approach to Taiwan not?

In the light of the unchanging stance, moreover, it is necessary to explain why Taiwan’s centrality to Chinese politics has changed over time. If the basic premise – that Taiwan is a region of China – remains constant, why have the Chinese policy elite been more concerned with
Taiwan in some periods and less in others? For instance, until the late stages of negotiations with the US to open up diplomatically, Mao and his administration uncompromisingly insisted that the US recognize the One China principle before the two sides could negotiate a relationship (Kissinger, 2011). Yet, when the two announced the fruits of the negotiations, in the form of a number of communiqués, the US merely acknowledged that both sides of the strait agreed to the One China Principle, without establishing whether the Republic of China (KMT) or the People’s Republic of China (CCP) was the China in question (Kan, 2011). By 1996, however, the CCP engaged in missile launches designed to project its power onto Taiwan by shelling its nearby waters which could only prompt US involvement, given the close relationship between the Taiwanese and American governments. Indeed, the US sent two battle groups to Taiwan (Shirk, 2007; Rigger, 2011 and Kissinger, 2011), which some suggest is the largest US deployment of forces in South East Asia since the Vietnam War. This back and forth behavior is curious because the basic premise – the One China Principle – remained the same throughout; one or more variables must account for the flux in the centrality of Taiwan to Chinese politics. Figure 1 below is a crude representation of this fluctuation; there are two major periods where Taiwan was central to Chinese politics, namely 1945-1970 and again from 1989-present. In the intervening period, although Taiwan was never “gone”, it receded to the background relative to the other periods.
Figure 1

The Centrality of Taiwan to Chinese Politics
A theoretical framework would have to explain both the stasis of the One China Principle, and the changing centrality of Taiwan to Chinese foreign and domestic policy alike. It is not enough, in other words, to effectively explain policy actions are point X and Y, but also explain how policy evolved from one to the other. How did Chinese policy evolve from the 1954 Taiwan Strait Crisis where it came to armed struggle to 1979 where Taiwan did not command significant attention from the Communists? Tracing the importance of nationalism and its development in China lends itself to explain these fluctuations where our established political theories come up short.

Moreover, of course, any such framework would likewise need to explain the emergence of hostilities in the first place. What motivated hostilities, and what made the Taiwan issue so salient over time that this hostility still resonates with the Chinese people sixty five years after the KMT retreated to Taiwan? Even so, resonance by itself is not sufficient to explain how any general sentiment toward unification became a moving force in Chinese politics. In other words, it becomes necessary to show how the general public, or certain elite groups (outside the party top) could assert influence in the policy making process despite the authoritarian nature of Chinese politics under the CCP.

Chapter one shows that the paradigmatic theories of realism and liberalism can explain isolated events and policies, but they cannot account for them all adequately enough that we can meaningfully call Chinese policy toward Taiwan realist or liberal. The alternative frameworks beyond international relations offer some remedies but they too are inadequate at explaining the Chinese insistence on the One China Principle, while at the same time explaining the fluctuation of Taiwan’s centrality. Nationalism, however, viewed in the right light, can explain and account for all of the above. Nationalism, of course, is not a coherent theory in itself and it is necessary to
develop what nationalism means to the Chinese case which the latter part of chapter one is devoted to.

Chapter two shows the importance and centrality of nationalism in Chinese politics from early 20th century until 1960. Taiwan’s centrality to Chinese politics predates the KMT retreat to the island, prompting a revision of the claim that the centrality of Taiwan to Chinese politics originates with security crisis that appears between the two competing Chinas that many authors forward, as reviewed in chapter one. It also traces the role of nationalism in the two armed conflicts between China, Taiwan and the US over the Taiwan Strait that occur in 1954 and 1958 as well as lay the groundwork for the change that occurs within Chinese nationalism in the very late fifties and early sixties, which explains the shift of Taiwan from high priority to lower priority.

Chapter three is dedicated to the period that lies after this change, playing out how the change in nationalism affects Chinese policy in general and why Taiwan is persistently low priority for the Chinese government for an extended period which only ends toward the end of the eighties. In the mid to late eighties, due in particular to CCP involvement in the shaping of nationalist discourse in Chinese society, nationalism returns to figure prominently in the Chinese population where it had laid dormant. Consequently, Taiwan returns to the center stage of Chinese politics where it still remains today.
Chapter One

This chapter reviews the paradigmatic international relations theories with respect to China and analyzes the recent literature on Chinese policy making, particularly with respect to Taiwan. The chapter finds the current literature wanting and suggests instead a closer look at nationalism in China, which allows for a more accurate account of Chinese policy over time and subsequently allows for a stronger causal argument than that put forth by proponents of the established theories.

International Relations Theory

International Relations Theory boasts three major frameworks of theory: realism, liberalism and constructivism. Realism was the first theory to emerge in a coherent framework and realism is indeed frequently applied to the Chinese case. Liberalism emerges not as an alternative to realism, but rather as a substantial amendment, suggesting that there are ways around some of the limitations realism prescribes to international relations. Constructivism,
although it accepts that realism and liberalism can be accurate in some circumstances, suggests that realism and liberalism should not be considered as “universal” because the very ideas on which they are based can change over time. As will become clear, while these major theories retain some explanatory power in certain situations, but they lack such power in explaining Chinese policy toward Taiwan in general, and importantly, over time. The evidence behind the importance of nationalism for the Chinese case developed toward the end of this chapter overcomes these difficulties.

The purpose of these theories is not necessarily to predict particular events or particular behavior, but rather to represent an approximation of what can be said universally of political behavior. Such theories provide what Kenneth N. Waltz considers a guidepost of sorts to evaluate behavior, asserting that “[o]nly through some sort of systems theory can international politics be understood” (Waltz, 1979, p. 29). As the paper proceeds, that is the role it will grant realism, liberalism and constructivism in exploring the present topic. Put differently, in analyzing Chinese foreign policy the paper will lean on the established theories of what drives policy, not directly to support one theory over another, but in order for such theories to serve as a point of departure that allows both author and reader a common framework around which to organize the arguments.

The value of International Relations theory, Kenneth Waltz suggests, lies not in its ability to explain single events but the larger trends (Waltz, 1979). Rather, it is clear that “[t]he contingent elements of personality, prejudice, and subjective preference, and of all the weaknesses of intellect and will which flesh is heir to, are bound to deflect foreign policies from their rational course” (Morgenthau, 1972, p. 9). In other words, the fact that the theories do not have explanatory power in a few cases does not invalidate them in general. However, this paper
will show that Chinese relations toward Taiwan are anomalous to the theories, but the relationship emerges from a rational and consistent process and so cannot be excused by “contingent elements of personality, prejudice, and subjective preference” as Morgenthau suggests. In other words, we cannot discard China’s behavior toward Taiwan on the grounds that the actors were either irrational, or that the emergent behavior was an “accident”. That is not to say that China’s behavior toward Taiwan has always followed a distinct and conscious pattern, but a pattern which realism and liberalism cannot explain clearly emerges.

**Realism**

Realism suggests that China’s pose toward Taiwan is one of security. No matter the cost, it is in the interest of China to prevent the rise of Taiwan as a power and to prevent the strategic use of the island by the United States – the only power which can truly challenge China in South East Asia currently. It is not surprising, in the realist realm, that China has come to armed conflict with Taiwan in the 1950s and the 1990s, and a dozen or so “standoffs” over the past sixty-five years. Also, given the close relationship between the US and Taiwan, aggression toward Taiwan inevitably brings uncertainty as to the conflict’s outcome; if the US comes to Taiwan’s aid, the cost to each side would be substantial. Realism can thus account both for aggression and restraint in China’s posture toward Taiwan at certain points in their long relationship.

According to realism, as any power’s economic and military might grows, the relative advantage of the already established powers will decline at the same pace. Since survival, in realism dependent only on self-help, is the central objective of any participant it is in the interest of every country to prevent the accumulation of power by another: China should pursue a policy
which seeks to minimize the accumulation of power in Taiwan, for example. Along these lines, China’s behavior toward Taiwan is often analyzed in terms of security threats, labeling China and Taiwan as security threats of one another thus deriving a state of conflict. Indeed, several points of the relationship between the two Chinas seem to fit the bill – they have come to conflict several times, and to the verge of conflict numerous times. However, realism does not account well for how Chinese behavior would move from one to the other: why show restraint at some points, but emphasize Taiwan beyond what might seem rational (in terms of maximizing security) at others?

Realism is in particular trouble when we pose the question of why the nature of the conflict has changed over time when the basic stance has not. Taiwan was no doubt a security threat to China in the first two decades of its existence as the Republic of China. One pertinent comparison with a well-known threat to the United States is Taiwan’s similarity to Cuba in its strategic position – less than 100 miles off the coast and at the entrance to a large sea of islands, thus forming the optimal stepping stone for foreign powers. Also, for some time it was not unreasonable to think that the KMT, rested and regrouped, could retake the mainland (Rigger, 2011). Both are motivations for aggression and conflict, but neither is relevant today as an explanation for why Taiwan is so important to China. Military technology has outgrown the importance of the strategic position, and the KMT were never able to outgrow mainland China on the military front (Rigger, 2011). What remains as a security concern for China is the possibility of Taiwan as a stepping stone for the United States, strategically an enemy to the Chinese state in realist terms. However, as Susan Shirk points out, there have not been American forces on Taiwan since the 1970s (Shirk, 2007); the American public is unlikely to support US involvement in Taiwan (Xie and Page, 2010), no doubt because the US wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan have discouraged involvement abroad and because Taiwan no longer represents a true asset to the US way it used to. Those who still support US involvement to defend Taiwan tend to do so for moral reasons (Xie and Page, 2010).

Instead, the realist interest in Taiwan today is the thriving economy, but this can certainly not be said of Taiwan in 1949. No doubt, the inclusion of Taiwan into the Chinese economy would strengthen China’s position in the global market not least because it would lose a significant economic competitor. When China is often referred to as a rising power, that rise is largely economic, which would make Taiwan even more important as an economic partner. But, what explains the changing emphasis from security to economy? Realism does not offer much of an answer – and the answer is one which is central to how we should understand China’s foreign policy.

A last realist argument relates to Taiwan’s symbolic importance for the autonomous regions in China, Tibet and Xinjiang provinces: fears exist that Taiwan’s possible secession from China would inspire others to follow the same path. China may thus be committed to retaining Taiwan in an attempt to preserve its territorial integrity elsewhere. However, the secession movements in Tibet and Xinjiang predate the Taiwanese movement, and not until very recently was it the intention of Taiwan (under the now main opposition party) to secede. Again the direct security threat seems to have disappeared if not altogether, then at least to such an extent that it alone can no longer explain why China invests substantial resources in gaining control over Taiwan.

While China does not seem concerned with Taiwan as a security threat, it nonetheless continues to increase its military strength, and it regularly does a show of force in the waters
around Taiwan - including shelling them on the eve of the first Taiwanese democratic elections in 1995 (Shirk, 2007). At times this hostile stance toward Taiwan is invoked as a reason to “contain” China, because of the very realist notion that China is “up to no good” – which, as this paper shows, does not follow naturally from China’s current or past behavior toward Taiwan. Realism thus clearly shows some weakness in explaining both current behavior as well as the changing tides of China-Taiwan relations.

In sum, certain events and policies in recent Chinese history fit with the expectations realism forwards, but the paper shows here that not only is realism limited in its scope over time, but even at most points where it fits the bill, some other variable – often nationalism – accounts better for the outcomes than realism does. In other words, even though certain events and policies could have resulted from realist behavior, the following chapters show that they most often did not. The last two Taiwan Strait Crises, in 1958 and 1994, which conceivably could be (and in the literature is often thought to be) security motivated military action. In reality, nationalism played a very significant role in the decision making at the elite level that prompted the crises. While realism appears to account for much Chinese behavior toward Taiwan a closer look reveals that it does not, especially if we add nationalism as a variable to consider.

**Liberalism**

Like realism, liberalism suggests that states are the actors and that they act as self-interested individuals. The general gist of liberalism holds that anarchy and the chance of war can be mitigated. Neo-liberalism suggests that states can avoid stand-offs through engaging one another in international institutions, which may both be coherent structures with their own staffs, but also
institutions as agreed-upon-norms to which states adhere in their dealings with one another. Parallel is commercial liberalism, which suggests that trade has pacifying effects because the interests of everyone involved are affected by their involvement in trade. In other words, because two states trade with each other, in a free(ish) market, we assume that the trade is beneficial for both, raising the cost of conflict between the two because both states would forego the benefits of trade to engage each other in a conflict.

Liberalism accounts better for the China-Taiwan struggle for sovereignty than realism does. In the late 1960’s and early 1970’s China invested substantial resources and time in acquiring recognition as the legitimate representative of China at the UN and for other countries to recognize this on bilateral terms as well (Madsen, 2001). Liberalism provides a better account in part because of the heavy involvement of the UN in the negotiations. None of the rights which are bestowed upon sovereigns would be extended to China, were it not recognized as a sovereign. It is irrelevant in this sense whether China (the CCP) were a de facto sovereign – depending on the definition we adopt\(^1\) - if the international community does not extend recognition. As such, whereas Taiwan today is a de facto sovereign, it cannot hold a full UN seat just as it cannot participate in many other organizations which relate exclusively to sovereigns. The two sovereigns cannot coexist because they still to this day both claim legitimate power over the Chinese mainland. The question is not whether Taiwan can hold sovereignty or not (as an independent country), but whether the CCP or KMT is the legitimate sovereign of China. Naturally, other states can only formally recognize one.

\(^1\) For discussions regarding sovereignty, see for example Madsen (2001), Hobson and Sharman (2005)
China invested vast resources in receiving recognition from other sovereigns and in international organizations in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This reliance on the international system to recognize and moderate in the sovereignty conflict is perhaps not simply due to a respect for the international institutions, but it is nonetheless counter to the realist consideration of power and security. Although China achieved recognition as a sovereign at the United Nations, it was unable to forge alliances through the UN to depose of what was now an illegitimate ROC attempting to rule China from Taipei - and it does not appear that China aimed to use the UN to forge such alliances. Instead, as Madsen (2001) explains, China pursued recognition because it was a source of legitimacy for the government to have international recognition. As chapter three shows, here too nationalism was a deciding factor, not in the CCP’s choice to pursue it, but the parameters with in which it was able to.

The Chinese case did little to change the balance of power. As such, it does not seem reasonable to attribute Chinese behavior to the realist notion of security in this period because the respect for sovereignty or the substantial effort to obtain sovereignty does not resonate with “self-reliance”; the institutional recognition – as opposed to de facto recognition – of sovereignty should be secondary if not irrelevant to a realist. The battle for sovereignty is an important element which a theoretical framework must come to terms with, and chapter three shows us how nationalism allows us to do so.

China’s efforts to gain recognition persisted through several decades. In 1949, all but the different communist countries in Europe recognized the KMT as the legitimate sovereign. Within a few years, a number of non-communist European countries switched to recognize the CCP, and many newly independent countries chose to recognize the CCP over the KMT as well (Madsen, 2001). In 1971, the United Nations switched its recognition of the KMT to the
recognition of the CCP as the Chinese representative, handing the veto power from Taipei to Beijing.

Although realists could here claim that the negotiations, despite being present, had little effect on the actual actions of China throughout, it is clear today that China’s effort to solidify its international recognition both transcends its security concerns, and has had profound effects on how China went about its military business in the region. That is, China invested substantial resources in participating at the UN, with no apparent goal to revise the distribution of power in the system – giving liberalism explanatory power over realism in this case.

However, liberalism’s heavy reliance on the effects of interdependence on peaceful relations makes it hard to trace its applicability through to the present. In fact, China and Taiwan now trade significantly, direct mail takes place, and Chinese can now travel to Taiwan without passing through Hong Kong or some other airport hub for China-Taiwan travel. Economically, that is, China and Taiwan are growing ever closer, yet politically they seem to be growing farther apart (Rigger, 2011). Leading up to the 2012 general election in Taiwan the KMT was getting closer to China, while the main opposition – the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) – is gaining support while squarely opposing a closer relationship with China.

Much like with realism, certain events and policies appear to be well represented by the expectations derived from liberalism. Here too a closer look reveals the importance of nationalism explains behavior in such a way that liberal behavior – which ascribes little to no policy effects to public opinion – can no longer be a credible explanation for anything more than very isolated instances of Chinese history. In particular, it cannot satisfactorily explain why China has been unwilling to change its stance over time, especially in the light of the growing
importance and complementarity of Taiwan in the Chinese economy. While liberalism is suggestive of recent developments amongst the ruling KMT and China, it does not illuminate well the longstanding conflict between the two.

Alternatively, constructivism offers an explanation which relates better to the evolution of the centrality of Taiwan in Chinese politics, including the importance of domestic pressures such as nationalism, and it can better account for the stasis in China’s stance toward Taiwan while allowing Taiwan’s importance to fluctuate over time.

Constructivism

Alexander Wendt, in his seminal piece *Anarchy is What States Make of It*, points out the ways in which this systematic theoretical approach challenges the focus on the systems structure in realism and liberalism, and instead suggests “that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure.” (Wendt, 1992, p. 394). The difference is important because “process” emphasizes the endogeneity of identity and ideas. In other words, because identity and ideas are not automatically “given” in the system – they are not structural – they are malleable and can change as the process continues. At a later point in the process, the changes which have already occurred will affect how the process shapes ideas and identities at this later point. As the paper will show here, Chinese policy toward Taiwan – indeed its policy in general – has emerged through a process. There is clear evidence that identity plays an important role in Chinese policy, and that this identity has changed over time under the influence of current and past events. Constructivism, in this sense, is inclusive to my argument whereas realism and liberalism are not.
Realism and liberalism each operate on the assumption of anarchy and rationality, but as constructivists point out, these are concepts which are products of the implicit agreement amongst actors that participate in the international system. In other words, the universality of realism and liberalism is challenged because the behavior of international actors – sovereign states – depends on the norms of the system, which may well change over time (Copeland, 2006). The difference between realism and liberalism and their counterpart, constructivism, is best illustrated by way of example:

In a game of chess a number of pieces and rules are given. Within those rules the players plan and act so as to maximize their chance of winning the game (to win means to survive because the alternative is defeat by death – allegorically similar to the realist quest for self-preservation). Within these rules, learning does take place: the two players do not pursue their initial strategy to its full extent because each player is faced with a new set of variables when the other has moved a piece. As player A moves a piece, player B adapts his strategy to maximize his chances of winning. Moreover, if player A and B play with each other more than once they are likely to learn of each other’s style, making the initial strategy for subsequent games already adapted compared to the initial game. Realism and liberalism allow for and emphasize this kind of learning amongst international actors: Chinese policy makers in 2011 are not oblivious to the outcomes of previous policies, including the reaction of other international actors to such policies.

Constructivism instead suggests a kind of learning which lies beyond this rational approach to a set game. It suggests, simply, that as players of chess we can change the rules of the game. In reality it is not set in stone that bishops can only move diagonally – and it is not set in stone that China and the US must be hostile; if the basic premise that to survive you must kill
your opponent disappears from the game then the victory of one does not equal the demise of the other. This would make for a boring game of chess, but it describes a desirable set of norms for society. Constructivists suggest, for example, that sovereignty is not a given rule of the game, but rather a norm which has emerged in a process – one which could disappear. If this is true, then we cannot take for granted that the actors in the international system are states, nor can we assume that they are similar to one another. Realism as an explanation of the international system would thus begin to fall apart.

That said, it is important to note that although the two other paradigms may not be universally true, the system which they describe, and which we perhaps find ourselves in, is difficult to escape because of the uncertainty which governs the decisions of all players involved. Although China and the US may learn to reinforce each other’s power, it is by no means given that they will. In either case, because states today seem preoccupied with their own survival, such a learning experience would be lengthy and even the mildest bumps on the road could be major setbacks. Constructivism effectively challenges the notion that we can expect realism and liberalism to be efficient at explaining outcomes over time. It is not surprising that we might find liberalism applies in one situation and realism in another. This, however, is counter to the foundation on which realism and liberalism are based, as supposedly universal paradigms because their very premises are challenged in a Constructivist’s account of the international system.

More specifically, though, Constructivists stress the importance of history in the decision making of actors in the international system. How China acts today is not merely a rational, calculated response to the variables Taiwan presently represents – security, economic or other. Instead, the response to Taiwanese action today is based on how previous Chinese leaders
responded, and what the outcomes were, and how those outcomes have shaped the decision making process of both policy elites and commoners. Outcomes, then, are not merely restricted to how the relationship between China and Taiwan took shape – whether the aftermath of a conflict was favorable or not to Chinese power and capabilities – but also how the aftermath may have changed the dynamics of societal forces which have impacts on future decision making. Put differently, constructivist theory opens up to the transforming powers of domestic and international pressure, affecting identity building which is central, as we shall see, to the Chinese case.

Constructivism as a theory is thus permissive of nationalism as a moving force: Public opinion can shape international politics. To give an account of nationalism as a deciding variable to account for a country’s history is in fact constructivist.

That said, constructivism does not offer satisfactory explanatory power. Constructivism accounts for why a process is possible, but not for the actual process itself. Constructivism, in its assertion that the underlying variables can change over time allows for the importance of identity, but it does not explain why certain identities emerge. Why, if this paper is right, did any particular kind of nationalism emerge, and why has it changed back and forth over time? Why has nationalism been more salient and important for Chinese policy at some points, and not others?

To answer these questions it is necessary to look beyond international relations theory. Many have written specifically on China-Taiwan relations, but these articles and books are often “snap-shot” analyses which lend themselves to explain certain actions in their isolated environment, often without a regard for long-term trends, and with only limited orientation
toward the future. Inevitably, many of these alternative arguments must partially ignore the process described by Wendt and other constructivists and adopt a structure-dependent conception of politics in order to make such short term analyses. Instead, this paper argues, we must look to how policy is formed, and to which variables affect the policy process. Although the list of variables is hardly exhaustible, a few stand out if we look past the paradigmatic approaches demonstrated above. The paper proceeds by reviewing some of the alternative arguments in the current literature for China’s policy behavior.

**Current literature**

A significant problem in the literature, and what precipitates the desire here to expand on an already well-visited field, is the tendency to analyze China-Taiwan relations without thoroughly investigating why items of interest – for example Chinese foreign policy – have become what they are at the point of departure for analysis. In other words, authors have often analyzed China-Taiwan relations with the expectation that the process through which relations took shape is irrelevant to the functional outcome, or at least have felt compelled to let it rest for the sake of argument. This could well be the case because the dynamics of relations often are taken to have endured over the decades. That is, because the One China Principle has remained constant little attention is given to the actual actions behind and reactions to the principle, wholesale ignoring why the One China Principle prevails in lieu of other policies. Obviously any analysis of Chinese policy is better served by understanding why any outcome emerged as opposed to simply observing the outcome. The persistence of the One China Principle can only serve to give analysts a false sense of security in their arguments if they do not look beyond it.
More strikingly, analysts overwhelmingly take for granted the hostility between China and Taiwan. Although it seems we can easily take for granted hostility (because it has persisted), it is nonetheless important to understand why hostility emerged – whether it was an accident of history, it was manufactured, or it has evolved from pressure by elites affecting national discourse. Is it a deep-seated cultural and ethnic conflict, or is it a simple consequence of security concerns as per the realist argument that states are concerned with and invest their resources according to how security is best obtained? A closer look proves both assertions wrong. It is neither deep-seated, nor is it free of its own history as will become clear by this chapter’s end.

A second problem arises from the first. For those authors who acknowledge the importance of the origin of the conflict, a single point in China-Taiwan relations is often their point of departure. Specifically, many rest their argument on the security concern which underpinned the first decade after 1949, when Taiwan was formed as an opponent to China. Alternatively, the tendency is today to understand the conflict in its current form, which is to say resting the argument on the secessionist underpinnings of the conflict. An enigmatic example of this trend is Phillip Saunders’ *Long-Term Trends in China-Taiwan Relations* (2005), where, as the title suggests, Saunders stresses the importance of understanding China-Taiwan relations through long-term trends. Even then, all of the variables he introduces post-date the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis and thus ignores five decades of the developing relationship.

Regardless, many authors offer valid and interesting alternatives to the paradigmatic approach which, although they are inadequate in explaining the outcome, offer an insight into Chinese policy behavior toward Taiwan.
Katzenstein and Okawara (2001) advocate the use of an eclectic approach – “drawing selectively on different paradigms” – instead of parsimoniously striving for explaining events and behavior in rigid paradigms like realism, liberalism and constructivism. They illustrate their point by looking closely at what is “natural” (the condition to which states will gravitate) in certain situations, concluding that no outcome is natural, status quo or an ‘equilibrium’ because “[t]he complex links between power, interest and norms defy analytical capture by any one paradigm.” (p. 154). The authors clearly suggest, like this paper does above, that outcomes of policy (in their case toward Japan) depend not only on the variables present in the system, but rather an “accumulated history”, but they also suggest that the paradigms are still useful so long as our goal is not to arrive at which is better, but rather how they in unison can explain outcomes and help us predict the future.

While the paradigms are useful guideposts, it is inaccurate to suggest that together they create a larger picture. That is, none of the theories are mutually exclusive, but they certainly constrain one another in such a way that unless we are extremely careful, the eclectic approach may easily be reduced to a use of certain theories where they conveniently provide a plausible explanation, and not others. The trouble with the eclectic approach is exactly that it cannot explain adequately, within IR theory, why some theories seem to fit at one point and not at another. Just like realism and liberalism by themselves, it begs the question: What underlying cause changes to make the variety of explanations possible at different points in time? In this sense the eclectic approach is no improvement.

Shirk (2007), without specifically addressing the major theories above, suggests that China’s preoccupation with Taiwan today is to be found in domestic politics more so than international politics. That is, although not divorced from the events and pressure in the
international system, specific policies toward Taiwan are clearly shaped by power struggles amongst the communist elite, and between said elites and the different influential groups in China, notably intellectuals and students who are in a position to organize and carry out opposition to communist rule. Shirk thus argues persuasively that we cannot treat the policy elite as insulated from the population, nor can we treat the policy elite as a coherent, rational and predictable unit, as we are often compelled to do when we consider states to be the major players in international relations. A good example of a split within the Communist elite is the importance of The Gang of Four: They were a set of influential communist party members who challenged the modernist and pragmatic faction which was in power after the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s (Kissinger, 2011).

Although Shirk is concerned primarily with China’s relationship with the United States, her evidence shows an interesting trend: As Chinese leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao increasingly have found it difficult to solidify a support base around their personas as Mao and Deng were once able to, factional politics threaten to play a greater role within the communist party – a point with which notable China expert Shambaugh agrees (Personal communication, 1 March, 2012). Often, the People’s Liberation Army (the PLA) is influential in certain decisions, specifically with respect to Taiwan, a trend which Shirk and other American analysts (CRS, 2008) have attributed to a heavy reliance on the PLA to protect continued communist rule. Simply, the very top policy elite are often compelled to vote with PLA preferences because the PLA’s influence is substantial (Shirk, 2007, location 553).

Potentially, then, the CCPs decision to increase military spending, especially toward equipment and training specific to operations involving Taiwan, may be less of an attempt to revise the current distribution of power in Asia, and more a reaction to very real domestic issues
which challenge the continued rule of the communist party. There is a profound difference between whether China’s desire is to increase its military spending to satisfy a domestic audience, or it is a general desire to project power toward Taiwan as a consequence of a coherent, desirable path of policy. However, Shirk does not provide us with any framework to evaluate the importance of domestic influences on Taiwan policy. Naturally, if we suggest that different actors play certain roles, and have varying amounts of power over policy making at different points, then we must ask what influences these actors and how their preferences change over time.

Given the inadequacies of the alternatives currently available at explaining these variables, this paper looks toward the way nationalism has evolved in China. Nationalism has deep roots in China and nationalism has often been the tool used by policy makers to affect the direction of policy; many of the splits between elites are along nationalist lines. Looking closer at the role of nationalism both helps expand on Shirk’s point above, as does it explain the course that China-Taiwan relations have taken over time, and it provides a reasonable framework for explaining why relations are where we can currently draw them up. More importantly, by showing how nationalism affects Chinese policy toward Taiwan, not only does this paper show how the elusive China-Taiwan conflict consistently defies the paradigmatic approaches to analyzing policy, but it will provide us with a framework within which this papers conclusion can propose a number of possible trajectories of relations in the future which reflect more accurately the underlying variables of Chinese policy.

Before this paper moves onto answering the many lingering questions about what causes Chinese policy toward Taiwan, it pinpoints what is here meant by nationalism. Unlike the international relations theories which are formed around a nucleus of assumptions, nationalism is
merely a concept: it does not offer the analyst the same tools for application as established political theories do. Nationalism is also notoriously illusive, even leading some observers to call it “fuzzy” (Hughes, 2006). As a consequence it is necessary here to develop nationalism in context so as to make obvious its merits in explaining Chinese behavior in chapters two and three.

**Nationalism in China**

Recent political literature overwhelmingly finds that nationalism is central to continued Communist rule in China (Halper, 2010; Shirk, 2007; Legro, 2007; Downs and Saunders, 1998-1999). It is increasingly clear that communism has run its course in China – after economic reforms began in 1978, economic progress has pulled the country, and the ideology of its government solidly away from orthodox communism. Though China still has some way to go to match the free markets of Western and other developed countries, its markets are today remarkably freer than those of countries at similar income levels (Zoellick, 2005 and Gill, 2005). As a consequence, the Communist Party’s legitimacy is increasingly derived from its ability to improve the economic welfare of Chinese, and not the ability to guide China through social revolution – the record of poverty alleviation in China is substantial, with more than 600 million lifted out of poverty since 1978 (Williamson, 2012).

Nationalism has increasingly become a source of legitimacy for the CCP as economic progress has had less success in satisfying the Chinese people. According to many analysts, certain points in history – like the massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen
Square - show clearly that economic progress alone is not a stable foundation of legitimacy. Economic growth has also lead to stark income gaps, especially between East and West China (Lin, Cai & Li, 2003) and between the emerging economic elite (many of whom have perceived “corrupt” ties to the CCP, thought to have benefitted disproportionally) and the general population.

In the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident, the Communists established a patriotic education campaign which “appealed to nationalism in the name of patriotism to ensure loyalty in a population that was otherwise subject to many domestic discontents”. In other words, facing economic disparity and a general lack of faith in communist rule, “the Communist regime substituted performance legitimacy provided by surging economic development [with] nationalist legitimacy provided by invocation of the distinctive characteristics of Chinese culture” (Zhao, 1998, p. 287). To be sure, in the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen incident, the Communist Party tried and succeeded at shoring up support based on a neo-authoritarian alternative to democracy – an approach which furthered the notion that modernization (a furthering of China’s economic progress) was only possible through authoritarian rule (Petracca and Xiong, 1990; Perry, 1993).

In other words, as many analysts have suggested, the CCP currently derives its legitimacy from both economic progress and from its nationalist credentials as protector of the Chinese people. More often than not, the two are complimentary: economic progress tends to national pride, and confidence in the Chinese state. The two are also at odds with one another because China’s export-driven economy relies on good trade relations with other countries – a troublesome aspect when those same countries are thought to infringe upon the right of the
Chinese people. As a consequence, the CCP must balance the two without neglecting either enough that it causes any civil or military strife that would challenge communist rule.

For the reader familiar with the literature on nationalism in China it should come as no surprise that it is far from trivial how nationalism is defined. Because the varying ideas of nationalism in the literature diverge significantly from each other both in terms of the origins and the consequences of nationalism, it is not only necessary to choose a definition, but to justify the choice as well. What follows is an analysis of the literature on nationalism in China in an attempt to overcome the disparity within the literature to make it operational for this paper’s purpose.

Of particular interest is the way in which nationalism in China has tended to change over time, which necessitates a dynamic definition. This paper makes two specific differentiations which are paramount to understanding nationalism’s role in China:

First, the conception of nation in China has changed from self-regarding to other-regarding, referred to in this paper as inward and outward nationalisms, respectively.

**Inward nationalism:** At times the orientation of nationalist sentiment has been overwhelmingly toward defining China in its own right, with respect to its own culture and rich history. Often in China’s history, periods of inward nationalism have prompted debates about whether Chinese society should be based on traditional culture or not, and what traditional Chinese culture entails.

**Outward nationalism:** At other times the orientation of nationalist sentiment has been toward asserting China toward other nations. That is, asserting China as different and unique in the light of its differences from the outside world. This at times led to semi-xenophobic behavior
and at other times to projecting Chinese values onto the surrounding community, as with a number of armed conflicts and efforts to increase China’s influence abroad.

The two are opposite ends to a spectrum. Consequently, where China has found itself throughout its history is a matter of degree. To call a particular period of nationalism “inward” is not to suggest that the Chinese did not assert themselves toward the international community, but simply that the general trend was preoccupation with an inward sense of nation.

Second, because China’s current system is such that the state and the government are synonymous, it is important to differentiate between motivations for nationalist sentiment. It is much outside the scope of this paper to pursue these motivations at length, but a single distinction will suffice for the purpose of the discussion here, between cultural nationalism and patriotic nationalism (sometimes called state nationalism).

Within democratic systems of government, it is fairly easy to distinguish between patriotic nationalism and cultural nationalism, because they each have distinctive ways of expression. Patriotism is support of the state regardless of its government. Many Americans will “rally behind the flag” regardless of whether government is controlled by Republicans or Democrats. Nonetheless, each group has different conceptions of what “America means”, which is reflected in elections and switching governments over time, not through opposition to the state.

In China, though, the latter type of nationalism – insofar as it is in disagreement with the party line – will have to pursue a new government. Because state and government are intimately connected – it is a party-state – such nationalism is thus inherently anti-patriotic. Too often, the general literature on nationalism in China fails to distinguish between patriotic nationalism and cultural nationalism. Although the two often appear with the same overarching goals throughout
recent Chinese history – preservation of China and its culture – it is far from always the case. In other words, nationalist groups can and do exist in opposition to the Chinese state, and they have been important in the way nationalism has been shaped for more than a century as chapter two and three show.

In the extreme, the necessity for a differentiation between cultural and patriotic nationalism lies in accounting for the opposition to the Chinese state by ethnic groups who desire their own government. Cultural nationalism tends to form along ethnic lines, being expressed often as one ethnicity’s conception of a desirable state of affairs different from another. Those who assert themselves as Tibetans tend to be in opposition to the Chinese state, as expressed well in the push for independence for Tibet – which is also true for the Uighur Muslims in Xingjian province, and Inner Mongolians. All three groups seek their own state.

The Communists have struggled to encapsulate the separate nationalities in China into a Chinese nation rather than a Han nation. Although they have clearly been unsuccessful in Tibet and Xinjiang, many of the country’s different nationalities identify closely with ‘being Chinese’. For some people it is to such an extent that they have assimilated into the Han ethnicity, making them largely indistinguishable for the untrained eye. The Chinese population, while overwhelmingly Han Chinese (more than 90 percent), is officially made up of 55 different nationalities. The fifty four which are not Han Chinese inhabit 64 percent of China’s land (Zhao, 1998). As many observers pointed out to the author during meetings in Beijing, there are divides along lines of nationality, but ethnic rhetoric and sentiment seems curiously absent from mainstream Chinese nationalism today.
This is perhaps at the roots of the lack of focus on cultural nationalism and the full focus on patriotic nationalism in China in the past many decades. Despite the important distinction between cultural and patriotic nationalism, most discussions on Chinese nationalism in the past few decades are overwhelmingly focused on the latter (Guo, 2004). What is worse is that many analysts invariably use “state as nation” or “nation as state”. In other words, THE nationalism in China is one which revolves around the state, and thus the CCP. Clearly, this is an inaccurate and inadequate depiction of reality. It is necessary that we treat the state separately from the nation – even if they overlap significantly – because that condition is not given. It will become clear later that much of China’s current nationalism does not actually revolve around the state, and assuming that it does, skews our ability to analyze Chinese policy decisions.

As opposed to the general literature on nationalism in China, this paper contends that nationalism has deep roots in Chinese history, and that this history very much matters for the shape nationalism takes in China today. Suzuki (2007) suggests that it is a long-running, deep-seated conflict between the Chinese and the Japanese that fuel the current anti-Japanese nationalist campaigns in China, including a large popular anti-Japanese demonstration in 2005 which caused significant trouble for the Communist Party to contain. Where some authors talk of “new nationalism” in China, emerging from around 1989 until present, Suzuki suggests that there is nothing new about it.

Suzuki eventually overstates the extent to which this is true, but as chapter two and three show, nationalism did not simply emerge in the years leading up to 1989. To be sure, nationalism exerted momentous power throughout the last half of the 20th century. It is true that the Communist party has attempted and been somewhat successful at inducing nationalist feelings in China post-Tiananmen – as it were in the 1950s and 1960s – but it was only able to do so
because of an underlying sense of nationalism which had been more than a century in the making by the time the Communists came to power in China.

To situate the arguments put forth in chapter two and three, the next and last section of this chapter addresses the different conceptions of nationalism in China today and the recent past, particularly the view of Zhao and Whiting, two important scholars on Chinese nationalism, both of whom largely ignore the historical origins of nationalism.

One outcome, many ideas

Chinese nationalism, because communist policies under Mao asserted this, is generally viewed as a source of conflict with the outside world. After a short affair with Soviet style communism, Mao imposed on Chinese development the idea of a Chinese exceptionalism – one which foreign powers and non-communist domestic elements were bound to undermine. But, although it seems in its current form to clash with the largely neo-liberal international society (think United States, Europe and Japan), Chinese nationalism is extremely dynamic. Nationalistic sentiment and the way in which it affects policy has changed tremendously over time, and it continues to do so today, largely in response to current challenges, but also as a consequence of its own history. To illustrate this point, it is helpful to look at Chinese nationalism from a variety of angles and pull together a few lose ends in the literature to create the bigger picture. Neglecting to do so is bound to limit our ability to understand and react to Chinese nationalism in the future.

Zhao and Whiting each impose a set of categories on the history of Chinese nationalism which are meant to explain Chinese nationalism and its direction over time (Zhao, 1998;
Whiting, 1995). Each set will prove inadequate to account for the history of nationalism in China when we recognize that inward and outward nationalisms are different, and are symptomatic of trouble in the general literature with coming to terms with the effects of nationalism on Chinese policy. This is a consequence of the narrowly viewed emergence of nationalism in the late 1980s, which does not extend far beyond Tiananmen Square, into the rich history of nationalism in Chinese politics between the 1940s and 1989. Chapter two and three correct that error, opening up for new and improved venues of analysis of Chinese policy, past and present.

Zhao (2000) refers to Chinese nationalism in terms of nativist, anti-traditionalist and pragmatist. Common for them all are their concern with furthering Chinese culture and secure the Chinese people. Nativism, Zhao explains, “asserts that China’s decline is primarily due to foreign transgression and that sine qua non of national recovery is vigilance against foreign insults and pressure” (p. 5). Anti-traditionalism in turn rejects Chinese culture and tradition, believing it to be the source of Chinese inferiority, and thus an obstacle to future Chinese greatness. Pragmatism is the notion that neither complete adoption nor complete rejection of any set of traditions is a sure way to improve China and preserve its culture. Instead, pragmatists will selectively adopt from foreign technology and practice where suitable, and refrain from the same when the strongest suit is domestic.

Whiting (1995) offers an alternative but not mutually exclusive set of distinctions of Chinese nationalism, namely in terms of affirmative, assertive and aggressive nationalism. Affirmative nationalism “centres specifically on ‘us’ as a positive in-group referent with pride in attributes and achievement” (p. 295). Assertive nationalism “adds ‘them’ as a negative out-group referent that challenges the in-group’s interests and possibly its identity” (p. 295). Aggressive
nationalism in turn “identifies a specific foreign enemy as a serious threat that requires action to defend vital interests” (p. 295).

Although these are superficially similar to Zhao’s points above, they are substantially different when the two sets are juxtaposed throughout China’s history. Zhao’s theory suffers immediately because he does not apply them to Chinese history, but merely discusses them in the context of the aftermath of Tiananmen Square. Using the categories to describe Chinese behavior over the past several decades then naturally depends on a certain amount of extrapolation, but it is possible to extend them with some satisfaction, as is reflected in figure 2. Whiting largely provides his own application of his terms to Chinese history.

Clearly the two, although they may sound similar at first, have quite succinct applications. Whiting’s assertive and affirmative nationalisms intersect with Zhao’s pragmatism and nativism interchangeably. If we assume initially that each category captures a valuable aspect of Chinese nationalism, the two different sets are inadequate seeing as they fail to individually account for aspects captured by the other during the same period.

Because both sets are inherently concerned with China vis-à-vis the international community, let us consider it in the context of China’s general stance toward the international community over time. Legro’s (2007) classification of China’s general posture toward the outside world is a useful framework around which to show how Zhao and Whiting differ. As figure 2 shows, China has been relatively integrationist over time, save for a period during Mao’s rule which saw China attempt to revise the order of the international community.
Figure 2
Established Categorizations of Nationalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime or leader</th>
<th>Separatist, integrationist or revisionist(^1)</th>
<th>Nativist, Antitraditionalist or Pragmatist(^2)</th>
<th>Affirmative, Assertive, or Aggressive(^3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qing Dynasty</td>
<td>Separatist</td>
<td>Nativist –</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pragmatist –</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Integrationist</td>
<td>Pragmatist –</td>
<td>Affirmative –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Mao Zedong</td>
<td>Revisionist</td>
<td>Antitraditionalist/nativist –</td>
<td>Assertive –</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Aggressive –</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assertive –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Deng Xiaoping</td>
<td>Integrationist</td>
<td>Pragmatist –</td>
<td>Affirmative –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nativist –</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assertive –</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Affirmative –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Jiang Zemin</td>
<td>Integrationist</td>
<td>Nativist –</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Pragmatist –</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assertive –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Hu Jintao</td>
<td>Integrationist</td>
<td>Pragmatist –</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Adopted from Jeffrey Legro (2007), \(^2\)Adopted from Zhao Suisheng (2000), \(^3\)Adopted from Allan Whiting (1995)
China has experienced nativist nationalism both under Mao Zedong and under Jiang
Zemin, while Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, occurring in the meantime, reflected a clear pragmatic
agenda. Yet, as Legro points out, China’s general posture toward the international society was
revisionist under Mao, while it was integrationist under Zemin. In other words, China under Mao
attempted to challenge the established order, institutions and distribution of power in the
international system, while China under Zemin showed resolve to participate in the international
system if not without reservations, then without actively challenging the structure of the system.
Nativism, attributing China’s troubles to foreign power and influence, is likely to connote Maoist
policies while in reality revisionist policy does not necessary follow from the assertion that to
avoid foreign transgression, one must change and challenge the system. Looking at Whiting’s
categorizations, nativism was accompanied by “aggressive” nationalism – the idea that a specific
enemy, in this case the United States, the Soviet Union and Japan, is to blame for the lack of
success or even “backwardness” of China at this time. Aggressive nationalism in this sense is a
very Realist notion, because it identifies and vilifies certain enemies whose presence in the
system is a threat to Chinese survival. Operating within the international system inevitably leads
to confrontation over fundamentally different views of the world.

In and of themselves the categories do little to help characterize Chinese behavior. The
problem with such rigid idea of nationalism in China is the inapplicability of the terms, making it
easy to dismiss nationalism as a causal factor of Chinese foreign policy. The problem arises with
these categories because they are not coherent. They are not, in fact, points along the same
spectrum.

Consider Zhao’s nativism, anti-traditionalism and pragmatism. In the context of the
differentiation of inward and outward nationalism made above, it is clear that these are not
alternatives to one another. Nativism – the idea that China’s position is a function of its ability to stand against outside pressure (self-reliance) – is an overt expression of outward nationalism. So too is pragmatism. Both are sentiments which hold as their highest motivation the capability of sustaining and defending China. Anti-traditionalism, however, is inwardly directed since it deals more closely with “the idea of China”. Anti-traditionalists, in other words, seek to redefine what it means to be Chinese, rather than determine what China must achieve to withstand foreign pressure. Anti-traditionalism is still concerned with China’s strength vis-à-vis the outside community, but its focus is on domestic reforms, which leaves a very different set of consequences for China’s foreign policy.

Pragmatism may thus occur for two reasons. First, consensus in the Chinese policy elite is in fact that some mix of traditionalism and westernization are the best match for sustaining China. Second, pragmatism is a reflection of the very real domestic tensions between nativism and anti-traditionalism. Indeed, as chapter two and three show, nativists and anti-traditionalists have had substantial influence on certain elite groups which have compromised on foreign policy. For Chinese policy to be pragmatist is an empty signifier which covers over two distinctly different policy making scenarios – ones which are important to the analysis of Chinese policy.
Zhao’s Three Possible Nationalisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inward Nationalism</th>
<th>Nativist</th>
<th>Anti-traditionalist</th>
<th>Pragmatist</th>
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<tr>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Outward Nationalism</td>
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</table>

Whiting’s categories experience a similar problem. The affirmative form of nationalism by Whiting is a reflection of an inwardly directed sense of nation, which is to define China in its own right. Affirmative nationalism may hold both nativists and anti-traditionalists, but seeing as Whiting makes not such differentiation, here too a category of nationalism covers a wide range of possible policy motivations, making it less than helpful in analysis of Chinese policy.

On the other hand, assertive and aggressive nationalisms inherently derive their status from the way in which the Chinese self-identify. Whether assertiveness develops into aggression is based on the perception of whether an outsider is thought to be at fundamental odds with the particular idea of China that one holds. An anti-traditionalist that pushes for westernization, for example, could be assertive toward the US but would probably not be aggressive. A nativist on the other hand could be expected to exhibit such aggression because Chinese traditionalism is perceivably at odds with western ideas of markets and international relations, such as sovereignty.

Assertive and aggressive nationalisms can exist on their own, regardless of which sentiment – nativism or anti-traditionalism – prevails, but whether Chinese policy turns out to be
assertive or aggressive can stem from that internal struggle. Assertive and aggressive nationalism thus are not alternatives to affirmative nationalism, but at times rather a function thereof. Consequently, this type of categorization cannot capture Chinese behavior in a way conducive to analyzing Chinese policy making.

**Whiting’s Three Possible Nationalisms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Affirmative</th>
<th>Assertive</th>
<th>Aggressive</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inward Nationalism</strong></td>
<td>✔</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outward Nationalism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Common to both authors’ categorization is their orientation toward China’s role in the international community. Zhao captures some of the internal conflict between nativism and anti-traditionalism, but the framework has a tendency to obscure this conflict in the categorization of Chinese nationalism as pragmatic. Whiting fails to capture any of this conflict, and subsequently obscures the causal links between the different outcomes he suggests emerge. Both fail wholesale to recognize that it is a domestic drive for certain nationalisms which eventually translate into foreign policy. That is, they fail to differentiate between what is inward and outward and subsequently, both frameworks are merely observations of certain behaviors rather than an analytical framework proving causal links. Chapter two clearly shows that failure to differentiate between the two leads to a problematic account of nationalism in China.
Perhaps because they make no such distinctions, they both fail to consider the Chinese nation and the Chinese state as separate entities. The observation of assertive and aggressive nationalism, for example, is based on the behavior of the Chinese state – whether it asserts itself strongly in international organizations or engages in conflict with other states. Yet, affirmative nationalism inherently takes place within the different constituencies of the nation. The struggle between nativism and anti-traditionalism is one between different cultural views – it is not the state which is in seven minds as much as it is the different groups it must please. By orienting the explanatory framework exclusively toward the state means failure to capture any and all functions of inward, cultural nationalisms except by coincidence.

Consequently, chapters two and three are organized around the differences between the cultural nation and the state, as well as inward and outwardly oriented nationalisms.
Chapter Two

When viewed through the lens presented in chapter one, nationalism becomes a powerful explanatory variable where international relations theories come short of explanation and prediction. It is the role of this chapter to show this connection between nationalism and policy outcomes between the 1930s and the 1960s, as well as show why the distinction between outward and inward nationalism made in chapter one is a valuable addition to analysis of Chinese policy.

Accordingly, the chapter proceeds by reviewing a number of critical points in recent Chinese history which have importance for the way in which we perceive of the current Chinese government. The points are valuable for two reasons:

The points allow for single scenario showcasing of different theories. It is in this isolated form that international relations theory has some explanatory power. That is, individually viewed, certain behavior can plausibly be attributed to a number of explanations. More importantly, the different points also allow for comparison amongst themselves. The lingering questions regarding why policy has changed over time must naturally be analyzed in this sense.
Single point evaluation, as much literature tends to display, will inevitably skew findings toward those broader and more encompassing theories that one might assign behavior to in isolation.

Single point analysis ignores, as Alexander Wendt puts it, process. Nationalism, a process of social development is a rapidly changing variable which one misses when pursuing single scenario analysis. Choosing a few points also affords some depth that an exhaustive account of Chinese history simply cannot. Indeed, such an account is not possible at any length.

To anticipate the full argument of this chapter, it is worth capitalizing on central aspects of that argument:

- Chinese interest in Taiwan pre-dates the island’s central role in the dispute between the KMT and the CCP, which suggests that security concerns were not the exclusively drivers of conflict in the years after the KMT retreated to the island.
- The CCP did not behave according to the prescriptions suggested by realism between 1949 and 1960. Security issues do seem to have affected behavior significantly, but the CCP’s necessity to cater to its domestic subjects and its domestic constituents appears to have affected behavior as well, especially toward Taiwan.
- The legacy of China’s century of humiliation had significant effect on the expectations held by domestic groups of government behavior. Accordingly, the government acted along clearly nationalistic lines, even where such actions worked against other overarching goals in the Mao administration.

Recall from the introduction and chapter one that while China’s policy toward Taiwan has remained constant since 1949 – with the One China Principle – the importance of Taiwan to Chinese politics has fluctuated over time. Figure 2 above illustrates this fluctuation.
Largely, Taiwan has been central to Chinese politics throughout 1946-1960 and again from 1988 to present. This is not to suggest that Taiwan has not been a concern in the meantime, but simply that it figures less prominently on China’s list of priorities. Considering the complexity of Chinese history the figure is obviously a simplification, but it serves well to sum up the broad lines of China-Taiwan relations.

**Before the People’s Republic of China (-1949)**

Taiwan, although considered a Chinese province before Japan took over the island, was never an integral part of the Chinese state. As with many others of China’s provinces under the Qing dynasty, involvement was limited to preventing Taiwan from becoming the nest of rebellious groups that could threaten central rule (Rigger, 2011). Even though many Taiwanese were ethnically Han Chinese, a separate Taiwanese culture had developed and some observers considered Taiwan entitled to sovereignty at the time of the Second World War for that very reason (Madsen, 2001).

Taiwan’s special status today partially originates from the transfer of Taiwan to Japan at the end of the 19th century. China suffered a crushing defeat in the First Sino-Japanese war in 1894-95, a perpetuation of the terrible defeats suffered to European colonial powers earlier. The war was primarily fought over Korea and northern China, far from the shores of Taiwan, but for a number of reasons Taiwan was the best war reparation Japan could wish for: Japan had a burning wish to exhibit its intention and capability of becoming a contender for power in the Asian Pacific and Taiwan was the ideal place to make such a display (Rigger, 2011).
Japan’s victory and success in obtaining Taiwan can largely be attributed to its ability to adapt to the international system which was being imposed by Europe and the US in the 19th century. For decades Japan did the opposite of China: where the Qing refused to open up to outside powers and participate in the international system on European terms, Japan quickly and efficiently opened up to the international system (through pressure from the US). Consequently, Japan adapted European technology, including weapons and tactical methods far superior to China and was (largely) allowed to operate as a sovereign, where China time and time again had its sovereignty encroached upon. The loss of Taiwan, in the eyes of many, was a continuation of the humiliation China had suffered at the hands of many European powers just decades earlier.

When 1919 came around Japan had become involved in the First World War and occupied the German territories on the Chinese mainland as part of the Allied forces (Harrison, 2001). At the Versailles Conference which concluded the war, Japan was awarded the area instead of transferring it to China whose territory it used to be. Held together with the overwhelmingly anti-Japanese sentiment which had built up since the 1890s, an outpour of nationalism, based on an aggressive stance toward Japan, permeated large shares of the Chinese population. It came to violent clashes between students and government officials and the violent reaction set the tone for Chinese politics in years to come. As Ebrey puts it, “Nationalism, patriotism, progress, science, democracy and freedom were the goals; imperialism, feudalism, warlordism, autocracy, patriarchy, and blind adherence to tradition were the enemies” (2010, p. 271).

The violent clashes which included beating Japanese merchants and burning Japanese goods – and the beating of government officials perceived to have enabled Japan to take advantage of China – is a recurring feature of nationalism in China. Similar clashes later took
place in the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s. On all three occasions nationalism was on the rise in China.

The increasingly nationalist sentiment amongst Chinese was partially at the roots of the role the KMT and CCP were to play. The cultural nationalist assertion that grew out of China’s experience with Japan was expressed in an outward nationalism, based on China’s relationship with the world around it. The Chinese government, which changed frequently between 1900 and 1920 was often perceived as incapable of protecting China from its foreign enemies (Harrison, 2001). Clearly, in this sense China is expressed as “nation” rather than “state”, seeing as such a strong outward nationalism became the roots of the KMT and CCP, both of which attempted to challenge not only the incumbents in government, but the regime altogether.

Both the KMT and the CCP established significant bases of support derived from the anti-foreign nationalism. The KMT did so by directly appealing to opening up to the outside world and replacing the Chinese government with (eventually) a democratic set of institutions and the CCP did so by proposing a new concept of government (at this time still orthodox communism with international orientations) which promised to do away with the international system which had been so devastating to China. Moreover, the nationalist movements served to expose large shares of the Chinese population to political ideas; this served to enlarge the communist constituency because those newly presented with political choice tended to be underprivileged peasants and students outside the economic elite. The KMT, on the other hand, derived most of its support from economic elites which had long been exposed to politics in the cities.
Both parties were decisively anti-foreign, promising a stronger and more internationally assertive China. In other words, both parties based their support an outwardly directed nationalism. Although the CCP’s communist name and rhetoric might suggest otherwise, the party quickly grew to be nationalistic. To be sure, the CCP often invokes the idea of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (Hughes, 2006), which is somewhat at odds with the idea of orthodox communism, but a recognition that China, with its culture, ethnicities and place in the international system, is unique.

The underlying centrality of nationalism in both the KMT and the CCP is also the reason why Taiwan eventually became central to Chinese politics before the KMT retreated there. When Japan was defeated in World War Two, the large area of China that Japan had occupied since 1919, Taiwan and the area that Japan had conquered throughout the war was returned to Chinese hands. In the 1930s Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek, the respective leaders of the CCP and KMT had both expressed little interest in Taiwan. Mao even went so far as to suggest that Taiwan, under a communist government, would be allowed to fulfill its long desire for independence (Snow, 1968). By 1945, however, the two parties – who had been (problematic) allies in the war against Japan – were battling over the legitimacy needed to govern the country, and the main focus of each was capturing the nationalist “vote”. The reclaimed areas became nationalist symbols because they represented China’s reemergence from the Century of Humiliation – a reemergence that both parties attempted to take credit for.

Taiwan was the ultimate symbol because it had been Japan’s prized possession designed to showcase the country’s capabilities. Indeed, Japan had subsidized nearly every kind of sector on Taiwan more so than at home: much of the infrastructure present in Taiwan today was built during the Japanese occupation (Rigger, 2011), the literacy rate in Taiwan became one of the
world’s highest (International Yearbook on Education, 1948) and the economy developed rapidly (Davison, 2003). Taiwan on Chinese hands was a testimony to China’s superiority over Japan, and testimony to its ability to field modern western methods of economics and education. In this light, as Madsen points out, it would be detrimental for a nationalist party to give up Taiwan (2001). Both parties thus capitalized on the Chinese possession of Taiwan from 1945-49.

In sum, the centrality of Taiwan pre-dates the KMT move to the island. It is clear that the “initial” Chinese interest in retaining Taiwan was not for security reasons that we expect from the realist reasoning presented in chapter one. China also stood to gain little economic benefit from forcing Taiwan’s hand, seeing as the expected benefits from Taiwan’s inclusion in the Chinese economy could have accrued with independence as well. Instead, the importance of Taiwan was driven by nationalist sentiment in the Chinese population. The leaders of the KMT and CCP who all matured politically during a time where nationalism was prominent in the minds of many, drove official Chinese policy toward Taiwan and the outside world.

Moreover, it is useful to understand that the nationalist sentiment was long running. It was based on and shaped by a long number of events which were decisive for China in a hundred years of humiliation, and by the inability of governments to respond to the challenge to the nationalists’ satisfaction. The battle that played out between the KMT and the CCP was to a far extent focused on which party could deal with China’s humiliating legacy – and by which nationalist conceptions each party adhered. The KMT valued Chinese cultural tradition mixed with some western initiatives, including weapons technology and increased trade, which is why it is dubbed “pragmatist”. The CCP, by virtue of being communist, established itself as rejecting western ideas and influence, but also rejecting Chinese tradition wholesale, in particular Confucianism. Both ideas had deep roots in China’s past.
Starting in 1949, China inevitably had to focus on Taiwan. The KMT moved to the island with more than a million supporters, vowing to get back at the CCP that now controlled the mainland. Superficially the period easily strikes one as being security driven – an increased alertness between China and Taiwan toward each other. At least for the period that the KMT seemed a viable enemy to the CCP, this could explain the centrality of Taiwan to Chinese politics and public discourse. The following analysis of nationalism during this period is not meant to suggest that security issues by themselves did not drive a part of Chinese policy toward Taiwan or the rest of the international system, but instead to suggest that nationalist factions and considerations within the new CCP government increased the emphasis put on Taiwan throughout. Initially, much of China’s reaction toward Taiwan stems from a desire to shape ideas of China’s role in the international system domestically. That is, to signal to the domestic population that China, under the CCP had made progress in its position vis-à-vis other (often aggressive) states; that the CCP had brought an end to China’s humiliation. Taiwan became the symbol of the CCP’s success, and as chapter three shows, it still is.

Taiwan as a security threat

The KMT retreated to Taiwan with the remains of its broken army in 1949. The party established itself in Taipei with the government institutions it had employed on the mainland; it continued to “rule in absence”. The Chinese Civil War had not yet come to a conclusion, and the two sides built up to counter-attacks on each other; for a short period in the early 1950s it was not
unthinkable that the KMT could retake the mainland with a re-organized military force (Rigger, 2011) since it officially retained the support of most of the world’s government – rhetorically and militarily. The CCP was building up an amphibious force in Fujian province across the strait designed to retake Taiwan from the KMT and hopefully bring an end to the civil war (Kissinger, 2011). Neither offensive happened because the Korean War and the United States entered the picture.

The US showed resolve to intervene to protect an ally in Asia by entering the Korean War, but the movement of American troops north of the 38th Parallel, into North Korean territory and further on towards China could only serve as proof to the Chinese that the US was after more than simply protecting its allies: it seemed on a quest for hegemony in the region. Taiwan, an island only a hundred miles away from some of China’s most important economic zones, was an optimal stepping stone for the US to enter China, moving the security concern far beyond simply the KMT and its supposed ability to retake the mainland. To China, although the Korean War was fought in a different theater, Taiwan became an integral part of the conflict.

In order to prevent the CCP from retaking Taiwan, US president Truman dispatched a battle group to the Taiwan Strait, which would effectively stop China’s amphibious force from getting to Taiwan. By design the American force also prevented the KMT from attacking the mainland. Truman’s administration made it clear to Chiang Kai-shek that it would not tolerate aggression from either side. Ironically, the US deployment to the Taiwan Strait enabled China to move more of its resources to the Korean theater (Kissinger, 2011).

By the time the fleet was recalled by Eisenhower in 1953, China’s efforts to retake Taiwan had been further foiled by a lacking USSR backing, and it quickly became clear that
without direct US support China had little to fear from Taiwan. The endeavors from either side were never officially given up, but a closer look at the conflict between China and Taiwan that ensued shows that the conflict had few roots in security considerations and stronger associations with an attempt of both sides to establish domestic legitimacy.

**Chinese aggression toward Taiwan: the role of legitimacy**

The US withdrew the 7th fleet in 1953 because the fleet prevented attacks in both directions, as Eisenhower pointed out, essentially making the US Navy “serve as a defensive arm of Communist China” (State of the Union, 2003). After the fleet left, the KMT began building up defensive capabilities on a number of small islands still under their control, some of which were mere miles of China’s cost. As a response, China began shelling the islands and threatened full scale military intervention – the beginning of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954-55). The crisis is often described in terms of balance of power strategy which supposedly saw Mao attempt to pitch the USSR and the US against one another; if the US intervened militarily in Taiwan, the USSR would have to retaliate on behalf of the fairly weak Chinese government. That said, although the distribution of power in the international system was important at the time, it was clear to a number of observers that China did not engage Taiwan with a desire to conquer the island. Khrushchev, the USSR leader during the crisis, complained that Mao was firing on the islands if China had no use for the islands (Kissinger, 2011). It was clear that China was attempting a largely symbolic gesture by attacking Taiwan.
Mao acknowledged to Khrushchev that:

“all we wanted was to show our potential. We don’t want Chiang to be too far away from us. We want to keep him within our reach. Having him [on the nearby islands] means we can get at him with our shore batteries as well as our air force. If we’d occupied the islands, we would have lost the ability to cause him discomfort any time we want”

(Kissinger, 2011, p. 157).

The CCP thus could not have considered Taiwan an overwhelming threat. It was better served by Taiwan’s continued presence, because it would assist China in pushing the USSR to back it and because the CCP continued to struggle to establish its legitimacy at home. The first seems to have figured prominently in the CCPs considerations, but much of the evidence is based on hindsight. Because the First Taiwan Strait Crisis effectively caused the USSR to back China with promises of nuclear armaments and economic aid, observers have assumed that Mao had designed the maneuver to gain such concessions, but the CCP had still not consolidated its power domestically, and the crisis with Taiwan aided the party tremendously.

Forced to pick sides in the civil war, many supporters of the communist party held views that were more easily compatible with the CCP’s agenda than the KMT’s agenda, but as the CCP established a new set of institutions in the 1950s it was clear that support for the Communist Party did not necessarily mean support for the current party line; several factions formed to challenge the direction of the party, and more importantly, China as a whole.

Beyond communists support, the continued ability of the party to stay in power across the country relied heavily on adherence to the party even for those who had not picked sides in the conflict. Divides still existed within the Chinese population – not all KMT supporters had fled to
Taiwan, and many remained who had no affiliation with either of the large parties. The divides were exacerbated by the nationalizing efforts of the CCP (Lin, Cai & Li, 2003) that led to a truly socialist state, which expectedly led to resistance amongst many groups.

The victory over the KMT on the mainland and the “draw” between China and the US in the Korean War, which was considered a victory for China, established the CCP as a vanguard for China’s reputation; it seemed to have finally brought an end to a century of humiliation.

However, as domestic reforms and concerns took over the minds of many, that the legitimacy it derived from its role as vanguard began waning (Harrison, 2001). The outwardly directed nationalism which was concerned primarily with protecting China from the influence of other nation states declined in response to a much less pressing condition of the international system. The opportunity to continue deriving a large share of the CCP’s legitimacy from its nationalist credentials was slowly diminished.

In response, much as the CCP did in the late 1980s and the 1990s, it capitalized on the necessity for itself to remain in power to protect China in an attempt to perpetuate the outward focus of Chinese nationalists, seeing as an outward focus could easily be replaced with an inward one that would question CCP rule as favorable. Taiwan’s continuing presence – and with it the United States – ensured the CCP a convenient target for nationalist rhetoric, which was designed to gain the party much needed legitimacy amongst the general populace. As we saw above, Mao and his administration had shown resolve to use Taiwan in such a way.

Indeed, the party made significant efforts to capitalize on the threat of Taiwan and the US in the 1950s. Many who were not supportive of the party line were cast not as “bad communists” or “bad party members”, but as “bad Chinese”, fusing the meaning of nation and state into one
by suggesting that the party line sustained the nation. What is more, many “who were accused of failure to support the party and thus the nation were often also accused of being supporters of the Nationalist Party [KMT]” (Harrison, 2001, p. 239). Consequently, Taiwan and the KMT were cast as the antithesis to what the CCP had achieved in the international community after 1949, and the continued presence of Taiwan as an anti-Chinese force legitimized the CCP in much of its actions.

In much the same way, the CCP repeatedly cast its central rhetoric around its ability to reverse the devastating policies of the feudal Qing which had seen Chinese elites “sell out” to Japan and other imperial powers. The nationalizing efforts in the 1950s were cast as attempts to return China’s riches to its people – from the elite to the peasant and worker. Opposition to the socialist agenda of the CCP was similarly cast as anti-Chinese because the reversal of Qing-era policies was largely regarded as a national victory.

Nonetheless, domestic politics increasingly came to the fore in a Chinese population no longer nearly so preoccupied with the country’s international role. Throughout the fifties fractionalization not only of Chinese society, but the Communist Party itself continued to spread. Disagreement with the party line became particularly evident during the Hundred Flowers Movement in 1957 when Mao openly encouraged critics of the party to voice suggestions for improvement under pressure from factions who were dissatisfied with their lack of access to leadership even though they had been instrumental in the CCP’s victories. Apparently startled by the overwhelming outpour of criticism, the party reversed the policy and consequently punished those who had criticized the CCP. Upwards of 3 million people were ostracized for either explicitly criticizing the party and especially its leadership, or showing sympathy for those who had (Ebrey, 2010). The brief interlude of freedom of expression was a clear indication that the
party should seek legitimacy in other ways – open debate and reconciliation of competing ideas would have to wait.

In 1958 the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis broke out when China began shelling Taiwan like it had in 1954, turning the focus away from China’s domestic situation. Here too, it is clear that the Chinese effort was symbolic and not an attempt to retake Taiwan or make the KMT surrender. Many observers suggest that China was attempting to test US resolve to intervene on behalf of Taiwan – once again the idea that Mao had by design used Taiwan to play the world’s two superpowers against one another.

Even so, Mao specifically ordered his troops to avoid hitting American targets, and they were not to return fire, should the Americans target them. Also, the Politburo’s Standing Committee, according to some observers present during deliberations, was not willing to authorize any actions which could cause armed conflict with the US (Wu, 1994). What is more, the shelling of the islands was predictable: it avoided military targets, was typically announced ahead of time, and only occurred on odd-numbered dates at one point (Xiaobing, 1995; Kissinger, 2011). It was, in other words, not necessarily meant to achieve unification as much as assert China’s power over Taiwan, at a time when the party desperately needed a handle on domestic unrest.

**Conclusion**

Nationalism caused a significant share of Chinese policy decisions between 1935 and 1960, driven partially by a population prone to express nationalist sentiment, and a government which
found itself thriving as a destination for that sentiment. Nationalist sentiment ran high toward the end of World War Two and it played a part in shaping policy outcomes. The competing parties battled for the support of a highly nationalist population, which had itself been shaped significantly by China’s past encounters with the outside world; Taiwan invariably became a central part of the two parties’ rhetoric in the late 1940s because it was a nationalist symbol. Had the KMT not resigned to Taiwan in 1949 it is entirely possible – if not likely – that the island would have retained a large share of the importance that we so easily ascribe to the presence of the KMT on the island.

The CCP’s response to nationalist pressures – and competing nationalisms at that – were part of the drivers behind the CCP’s effort to capitalize on Taiwan as a symbol of outside intrusion; the Chinese effort to win the battle over Taiwan was never whole hearted and the party depended greatly on the presence of outside dangers to retain its position as legitimate leaders of China.

Special efforts were made to fuse the competing nationalisms into one by emphasizing the need to stand together as Chinese against the outside world. Next, the CCP quite successfully managed to cast the state as the nation, blurring the lines between nationalism and patriotism to the extent that some have claimed that we can without problems assume that the two are synonymous in China (Zhao, 2000). However, as this chapter shows, it was through an active effort that the CCP achieved such similarities, and not by a “natural” outcome.

Most important of all, it should be clear that the CCP did not manufacture nationalist sentiment as many authors claim that the CCP did at a later point. The nationalist undercurrent to Chinese politics stemmed from social memory which emerged already 50 years before
nationalism became a deciding force in the CCP’s attempt to stay in power; it continued to
develop over time under the influence of particularly outside influence, such as Japan’s atrocious
crimes during the Second Sino-Japanese War in the 1930s, and the KMT-CCP struggle for
legitimacy as rulers of China before the Chinese Civil War largely concluded in 1949.
Chapter three

Why the one China principle prevails

In 1958, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier made it clear to the US that “the Taiwan question” could not be negotiated. There was no way, no matter the benefits, that China would be able to allow any other solution than “one China” (Kissinger, 2011). The alternative, the so called “two China solution”, would be a Taiwan which no longer vied to retake the mainland, or claimed legitimate power, but nonetheless remained independent from the mainland (which would, at least for a time, be propped up by the US). Considering Taiwan’s symbolic importance it was not in the domestic interest of the CCP of letting Taiwan go; the emphasis placed on Taiwan as an arch enemy of the Chinese nation would make the two China solution seem like a loss for the CCP as vanguards of not only the state, but of the nation.

It is hardly surprising that the one China principle permeated Chinese policy throughout the years after 1945. The persistence of the principle over time has become self-reinforcing because Taiwan has been elevated to such a status that it retains its symbolical importance well
into the 21st century. As we will see, after 1985 CCP leaders specifically targeted nationalist sentiment and with it Taiwan, when it encountered issues with deriving legitimacy from other policies. This was true even when it was counter-productive to China’s security as a whole: the CCP brought China to the brink of armed conflict with the US in 1995-96 in order to prevent Taiwan from moving too far from the mainland thereby signaling Chinese weakness. The nationalist foundations described above, and the concerted effort of the CCP prolonged the island’s special status, and thus hostilities between the two.

1960-1985

After the 1958 crisis in the strait, and China’s insistence on the one China principle, the topic cooled somewhat. It didn’t come to any armed provocations again until 1995 when the third crisis broke out. The period brought two of the most contested communist initiatives: the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Both had social mobilization objectives to solidify the rule of the party, much as the campaigns against Taiwan and the US had in the 1950s, but they dealt with alternative aspects of nationalism – ones which precluded Taiwan and the outside world as the central tenets. More specifically, the emphasis of Chinese nationalist moved away from the international arena, in which Taiwan played a special role, to an inward, domestically concerned version of nationalism.
Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution

The Great Leap Forward was designed to let China overtake the UK, and catch up to the US within just a few years. Amongst the promises of the victorious CCP in 1949 was a promise to reverse Qing policies which had led to economic ruin and toward the end of the 1950s Mao and the CCP elite grew impatient with the progress. China had actually grown at 6% per year since the CCP came to power, but a growing population meant that the rise in living standards stagnated (Shirk, 2007). The CCP imposed a number of reforms on the Chinese population including the collectivization of agriculture, under guise of it being the only way to overcome economic and political inferiority of China’s past. The focus had thus switched away from the importance of outside influence in China, and to the strength of domestic customs and institutions. In the eyes of Mao, the Great Leap was an attempt to reverse damages started by the Qing and perpetuated by the KMT before the CCP came to power.

The propaganda which followed the campaign to reform the Chinese economy focused widely on “values and ideals” of the individual Chinese (Kissinger, 2011). Much of the propaganda’s focus was on moral obligations to the nation – in fact the state. Those who did not support the reforms were cast as anti-Chinese, much as dissenters had been in the early 1950s. The CCP thus attempted to establish a sort of moral superiority in connection with following through the initiatives which were meant to secure China economic grandeur.

The legacy of the Great Leap is easily reduced to its ultimate failure: tens of millions of people died from the famine that ensued from the poorly planned reforms (Harrison, 2001; Shirk, 2007). Often the failure of the reforms are attributed to a flawed incentive system, placing quantity over quality, but the CCP amazingly managed to mobilize the vast majority of Chinese
to participate, most of them of their own free will (Williams, 2007). Many Chinese who had lived through the miserable times of the first half of the 20th century were eager to accept the promises of the party, and the vast majority of youth had been brought up constantly exposed to the casting of anti-party as anti-Chinese. The nationalist arguments underlying the party’s reforms were both persuasive and pervasive in China at the time.

When the Great Leap failed, it had devastating effects on the belief that many had so far retained in the CCP and the prospects for Chinese socialism. The Great Leap did not fail because the commitment of Chinese workers and peasants was incomplete; the causes were many, but largely included incomplete or inadequate economic policies. In particular, the CCP attempted to do in China in a few years what the UK had spent the greater deal of a century doing: moving from agriculture to heavy industry (Lin, Cai & Li, 2003). In between lies “light manufacturing” which is widely understood as a necessary transition for developing economies and China ironically became a case in point in the 1980s and 1990s.

Mao was the foremost proponent of the reliance on people’s free will to enact the economic reforms, but withdrew from public decision making in the wake of the leap’s failure. A more pragmatic set of leader came to the forefront of economic decision making, including Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai (Ebrey, 2010). The new set of leaders indirectly blamed Mao’s direction, based on ideology, for the perils of the economy by pushing for greater party control of the economy. Because of Mao’s history of purging the top leadership, however, the sympathies of the party members was not discussed openly and so factionalism rose significantly within the party again (Ebrey, 2010).
According to most accounts, the splits within the party became so severe that Mao felt it necessary to purge not only the top echelon of the party, but the grassroots as well. He initiated a campaign to reeducate most public employees in the way of revolution (according to his personal vision), and those who were seen to promote splittism and dissent were purged from the party, sometimes under violent conditions. The consequence was a general sentiment that undermining ones superiors was in the service of the revolution to clear those who were perceived to be in opposition to Mao’s idea of party line (Ebrey, 2010).

The attempt to “re-educate” communist elites reflected a desire to alter the Chinese identity. Mao’s push for the revolution was based on the belief that China needed to shed with its past in order to get ahead – it was the remnants of culturalism and conservative Chinese culture which had caused the failure of the Great Leap. Mao sought to rid China of its “four olds”: old customs, old culture, old habits and old ideas. The campaign also manifested itself in the destruction of many cultural treasures which were considered symbols of China’s humiliating and inferior past (ironically many treasures survived because they had been “kidnapped” by the KMT when they retreated to Taiwan). The revolution was attempted by Mao and his supporters to define China in terms of socialist revolution and certain moral imperatives.

Consequently, although the focus of the revolution was certainly to shape nationalist sentiment, it was quite different from the nationalism that had been pushed for throughout the 1950s: whereas the party’s rhetoric had identified itself against the intrusion of outsiders in the past it now identified itself against China’s troubled past – and it’s internal identity. The Cultural Revolution decisively moved nationalist rhetoric away from the outward directed, anti-foreign, internationally assertive foreign policy, to the inwardly oriented attempt at defining China in its own right. For a period, nationalist sentiment ran high and influenced Chinese policy making,
but the switch in the orientation of that nationalism precluded Taiwan in many ways, seeing the island fade away from official rhetoric and domestic pressure alike.

The struggle for sovereignty

For a number of reasons, especially the estrangement of the Soviet Union in the 60s, the CCP was prompted to push for international recognition, both on the bilateral level and at the United Nations in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Naturally, since the CCP was attempting to dislodge recognition of the KMT on Taiwan, the island was never truly absent from Chinese politics in this period. What is of particular interest here are the “sudden” reasons behind the CCP’s move for recognition which it had neglected to pursue throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Reunification with Taiwan does not appear to be one of those reasons.

The general outward nationalism which held most foreign countries in contempt for their supposed record of undermining China precluded the CCP from pursuing diplomatic ties with many of these countries for several years. As long as the CCP derived part of legitimacy from being assertive toward the international system, supposedly a counter-reaction to the track record of foreign countries meddling in China, the party could not pursue strong diplomatic ties. In the early 1950s only other communist countries, mainly those of the Soviet Union officially recognized the PRC over the ROC. Several European countries recognized the PRC soon after, but a grand exodus from the ROC to the PRC failed to appear. In particular Japan and the United States, the two countries which were the center of the anti-foreign traits of outward nationalism in China would refuse recognition for another two decades.
In 1949, President Truman and his administration were not averse to recognizing the PRC over the ROC (Madsen, 2001; Kissinger, 2011), but China remained cold toward the US, perhaps because Beijing was unaware of Washington’s apprehension toward the KMT (Madsen, 2001). The Korean War estranged Washington and Beijing even more, and neither seriously attempted to establish diplomatic ties until the 1970s. Some observers suggest that China’s lack of resolve to re-approach the US originated with Mao’s very pragmatic foreign policy, which is purported to ignore diplomatic ties that did not have tangible benefits.

In reality, however, the line toward the US that emerged in the Korean War put China on a path from which it was difficult to deviate as the first two Taiwan Strait Crises would show; the US was cast as fundamentally incompatible with China: “The war was portrayed in China as an act of resistance to American Imperialism” (Harrison, 2001, p. 234) which was designed, as we saw earlier, to evoke nationalist sentiment derived from the devastating effect of imperialism to China’s past. The voluntary communist soldiers who were sent to fight alongside the North Koreans in the war were celebrated as heroes and the CCP linked the soldiers’ heroism with their commitment to protect China against the imperial influences (Harrison, 2001).

Although some other aspects played into why the US and China could not re-approach each other for a long time (read ROC lobbyism in the US, involvement of the USSR), the CCP’s outward nationalist affiliation would almost surely have prevented it from retaining broad support while openly accepting diplomatic ties with the US. The two Taiwan Strait Crises only served to increase the distance between the two.

When the nationalist rhetoric in the government was effectively changed from outward to inward at the beginning of the Great Leap, it allowed the government some leeway with regards
to diplomatic relationships. Although the preoccupation with revising China’s identity hardly encouraged better ties between China and the US, there was no longer a significant obstacle within China to such a relationship. Consequently China made some headway in establishing diplomatic ties with many smaller countries and dialogues began between the US and China in the mid-1960s (Kissinger, 2011). The severity of human rights abuses during the Cultural Revolution prolonged the time it took for particularly many democratic countries to recognize the PRC (Madsen, 2001).

China’s bid for UN membership was not only made difficult by western opposition. When the US entered Korea it did so with a UN mandate, trailing many European countries – including some which officially recognized the PRC, notably the UK and its territories as well as Norway, Sweden and Denmark. The Korean War and the recognition of the ROC at the UN made it difficult for the CCP to officially work toward UN membership because the organization was in China widely believed to be corrupt.

The move from outward nationalism to inward nationalism after 1958 allowed the government to start negotiations in earnest. By 1971, the PRC had two thirds support in the UN which effectively moved membership of the UN from the ROC to the PRC. A lot of China’s newfound support had been established in bilateral meetings and not at the UN and the vote in the general assembly was merely the culmination of a prolonged Chinese effort to win over the support of individual countries.

Nationalist pressure did not cause China’s move toward inclusion in the international system, but the absence of outward nationalism was a necessary condition for China’s ability to pursue recognition. The CCP seems to have acknowledged this by keeping most bilateral
negotiations secret – in particular those with the US and Japan – because nationalist sentiment would have almost certainly proved an obstacle in the process. For its part, of course, the US had its own interests in keeping negotiations secret (to avoid influence from the powerful “China lobby” which lobbied on behalf of Taiwan), but it was particularly in the CCP’s interest.

The very pragmatic strain to China’s pursuit of recognition is furthermore evident in its decision to let the one China principle rest in the negotiations with the United States and some other countries. The US and others would necessarily have to stop recognizing Taipei in order to recognize Beijing, but the CCP tacitly accepted that some countries would continue to have de facto diplomatic ties – so called “special relationships” – which effectively changed little in the relationship between the US and Taiwan when the US switched recognition in 1979. It did, however, provide the CCP with international legitimacy at the UN, not only the symbolic recognition as a “great power” which comes with membership of the security council, but very practical applications for China in its foreign policy, including the veto power which could have prevented UN intervention in Korea had “the right” China held the seat then.

Some authors suggest (see Madsen) that the CCP and the ROC each pursued recognition because of its link with domestic legitimacy. For China that seems, in the light of widespread assertive nationalism, unlikely. Nationalism – and domestic legitimacy – certainly played a central role in how negotiations unfolded, but it only appears to be the motivator in hindsight. China’s international recognition was widely celebrated, but not until the 1980s did it become a major source of legitimacy for the CCP. During a time where outward nationalism dominated, China actually made an effort to keep its international dealings out of the public’s reach.
It would be likewise inaccurate to suggest that Taiwan was truly central to Chinese policy between 1960 and 1971. By virtue of being “at the other end” of China’s attempt to achieve recognition, Taiwan played a role, but the CCP’s push for recognition is more a reflection of pragmatic policy desires than it was an attempt to delegitimize Taiwan. Taiwan was central to China’s foreign policy by association, not by design.

**Economic reform and rising living standards**

When Mao died in 1976, the radical faction that had been propped up by his personal power within the party was ousted. The Gang of Four, consisting of Mao’s wife and three other party elites were put on trial for the atrocities committed during the Cultural Revolution which saw millions dead or prosecuted for “anti-Chinese” behavior. Hua Guofeng, Mao’s designated successor, was replaced by Deng Xiaoping whose moderate economic policies had been successful in leveling the destruction of the Great Leap some two decades earlier, but had landed him in exile upon Mao’s request. Deng was less sympathetic towards the ideas of revising China, and focused on very pragmatic economic policies all the while retaining the overarching goals that the CCP had represented since 1949.

In the ensuing period, from 1978 until well into the 1980s, the CCP moved away from either inward or outward looking nationalisms. By virtue of the break with the radical parts of the party, Deng’s administration had to distance itself from the inward looking revision of Chinese identity; instead, the administration largely embraced Chinese traditionalism, though never making explicit use of China’s history to justify its policies like the administration under Mao had done. At the same time, the pragmatic economic policies included a certain degree of
opening up to the surrounding world and doing business with neighboring countries – Japan in particular. The outward looking nationalist rhetoric used by the party in the 1940s and 1950s would not serve the economic goals. Either type of nationalism was thus left to rest by the government, although as we will see in the next section, it continued to brew in certain groups of the population.

Consequently, and perhaps not so surprising, Taiwan was rarely brought up in government rhetoric, and few moves were made by the CCP to bring Taiwan and China closer to the fulfillment of the One China Principle in this period. Instead, the government relied on the raising of living standards (which was by all measures awe-inspiring) to ensure the support of the Chinese people. In the first 7 years alone (1978-1985), 125 million Chinese were lifted out of poverty. Many more were exposed and became accustomed to commodities that had been out of reach: roads, telephones and electricity were increasingly brought to communities (Madison, 2007). The rising living standards are still the backbone of CCP legitimacy today, mostly sustained by an often more than nine percent growth rate every year.

**1985-present**

The period circa 1985 until present is even more nuanced in terms of nationalism. This is partially because more and more Chinese are aware of the role of nationalism in Chinese society and much discourse on nationalism’s role in China emerged from 1985 into the 1990s; the connection between the CCP and nationalism is much more explicit. What is more, technology made a type of discourse available to observers which had not existed so far: mass media and
online social networking. As we will see, both have been decisive in Chinese nationalism and the way that the CCP has been able to approach it from the late 1980s onwards. Combined, these factors allow for a more detailed dissemination of Chinese nationalism in the period after roughly 1985 than is available for previous points of Chinese history, in the general literature.

By 1985 China established economic ties with nearly every country in the world, and particularly US/China and Japan/China trade was soaring. The Chinese economy grew at record rates, but certain groups within China were discontent with the country’s development. The pragmatic economic policies effectively meant that the party had to abandon most of the principles the party was established on, but the CCP had effectively moved from the ideological to the economical and it continued to derive much support from its ability to reverse the overwhelmingly negative outcome of the Cultural Revolution. The party was almost wholly able to shed with its own fault in the revolution in part because Mao died, and because the very public trials of the Gang of Four suggested that the fault lay with party members who did not represent the party line.

In 1985, the forty year anniversary of the end of World War Two was celebrated in Beijing in a government planned event. The commemoration coincided with the anniversary for Japan’s invasion of Chinese Manchuria and for various reasons it escalated into anti-Japanese protests in the days that followed. Much of the literature on Chinese nationalism tends to focus on this time period as the beginning of nationalism’s significant influence on Chinese politics (Suzuki, 2007), but as should be evident from chapter two and the preceding part of this chapter, the event was largely the beginning of a new escalation of nationalism – one which was to last far beyond the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989 – but far from the beginning altogether.
It is important that we do not automatically accept these diverse sources as proof that nationalism mattered to Chinese policy more after 1985 than it did before. As we have seen above, nationalism played a significant role in Chinese policy making and the general direction of the Chinese party well into the 1970s. The fundamental way in which nationalism expanded and the way that nationalism was exploited by the party did not change significantly between the 1950s and the 1990s. Paramount to any conscientious analysis of nationalism in China after 1985 is thus an understanding that nationalism in China runs deep; as opposed to the claims of much contemporary literature on China, the importance and the shape of nationalism in China from 1985 stems as much from China’s nationalistic past as it does from party manipulation of nationalist sentiment.

Leading up to 1989, which culminated in the death of hundreds of students in Tiananmen Square, it had become obvious to the party leadership that economic progress would not satisfactorily serve as a lone origin of legitimacy (Downs and Saunders, 1998-1999). Re-invoking the idea of the CCP as vanguard against the outside world became a central tenet of party rhetoric, and the party proceeded to attempt a “controlled nationalism” which effectively meant “inspiring but not aggravating” those parts of the population who reacted to nationalism, especially students and youth, but also those factions of the party who had never quite let go of the more ideological party line.

As Harrison (2001) points out, nationalism was only one amongst many ideologies that were tried out by various parts of the population in response to the CCP’s waning power, including a push for democracy. Partially, many of these saw the light of day as widespread because the media were allowed to report on them – and because the state owned media was allowed to publish material critical of the party’s past, especially during the Cultural Revolution.
It was not until 1989, when the popular movement effectively brought in to question the CCP’s continued rule, that the media were shut off and heavily regulated again (Shirk, 2007).

Although the Tiananmen Square demonstration that led to the massacre is often attributed to a pro-democracy movement, the reality is much more complex than that: like some suggest of the 1985 rallies which lead to anti-Japanese demonstrations, the rallies that led up to the massacre were anti-government demonstrations more so than anything else, and the international media was partially at fault for its branding as democratic (X. Wang, personal communication, November 24, 2011).

The 1989 incident, for the first time since the Cultural Revolution, brought into question the continued rule of the CCP. After all, capitalist policies – which were not far removed from China’s new economic reforms – are easily carried out in a democratic society; at the very least it would seem counter-intuitive that a communist party should be the obvious choice to govern such an economy. Consequently, the CCP was forced to pursue another venue of legitimacy, and the choice fell on an outward looking nationalism which played into the anti-Japanese movement. It is accurate to talk about “choice” because evidence shows that the CCP effectively pursued (Perry, 1993) and was moderately successful (Zhao, 1998) in exacerbating anti-foreign nationalist sentiment to its own benefit.

The CCP launched a “patriotic education campaign”, which “appealed to nationalism in the name of patriotism to ensure loyalty in a population that was otherwise subject to many domestic discontents” (Zhao, 1998). Interestingly, the CCP never refers to “nationalism”, but simply to “patriotism”. Clearly, as we should expect in the framework suggested above, the CPP will pursue the fusion between state and nation because it is in its interest to consolidate itself the
leader of both. Recall that the CCP attempted the same in the 1950s, when its nationalist credentials were used to tether its role as central government, citing the importance of a CCP state to protect the Chinese nation. Consequently, opposition to the party was cast as unpatriotic and more importantly, anti-Chinese. Where the two appear to be synonymous, the ruling party has a substantial advantage when nationalist sentiment affects policy making.

A central tenet of the campaign was the celebration of China’s past victories against foreign powers, in particular that of Japan. Japan’s atrocities were described at length of Chinese textbooks (Shirk, 2007) and the government funded demonstrations in front of the American and Japanese embassies the same way it funded celebrations on Tiananmen Square, clearly inciting anti-foreign behavior with government funds and resources. Zhao (1998) suggests that the government’s actions were wholly responsible for the anti-foreign sentiment which spread widely in China in the early 1990s, and although clearly nationalism had its independent roots in Chinese history, the general literature accepts that the nationalism that emerged was a government construct.

Taiwan naturally became central to this sentiment since it retained its role as a symbol of imperialist influence. Whereas the US and Taiwan relationship had more or less been left to its own devices since the US switched recognition to the PRC, the CCP began to show signs wanting to impose itself on Taiwan once again. When it became clear in 1995 that Taiwan would have its first democratic elections, China’s response was violent. It ended in the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995-96), the first time since 1958 when outward nationalism last receded, that overt hostilities broke out.
The excuse for China’s behavior toward Taiwan was less the election than it was the US’s allowance of Lee Teng-hui, the now leader of the KMT, to visit his alma mater, Cornell University. In order to make it to the university, Lee had to be granted a VISA, which the Chinese authorities had already been promised by the US state department that he would not get (Shirk, 2007, Kissinger, 2011), but the US congress passed a motion, nearly unanimously, to ask that he be granted a VISA, and Lee was allowed to make his alumni reunion at Cornell.

The Chinese media went into frenzy when this information emerged in China, and in particular the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was pushing for China to reassert itself in the international community, showing that such overt neglect of its international agreements would not be tolerated. Much like the two earlier crises, however, China was careful to avoid casualties, while strongly signaling domestically that it was in fact engaging Taiwan. It was catering, in other words, to domestic pressures while attempting to avoid jeopardizing important economic relationships. By 1995, both Taiwan and the US were major trading partners and much new investment, which kept the Chinese economy growing at surreal rates, originated with US and Taiwanese investors.

After the US had deployed a battle group to the strait to protect Taiwan (by some accounts the largest US deployment to Asia since the Vietnam War), China stopped shelling the island and the crisis quietly came to an end. The CCP pitched its effort as David against Goliath, although not defeating Taiwan and the US; it had stood its ground and had not let the imperialists gain a foothold. However, as Xie and Page (2010) show, the Clinton administration was catering to its own constituency when it decided to intervene, but there had never been an intention to actually engage China – merely prevent the Chinese Civil War from breaking out again.
The CCP continued to live high on its anti-imperialist credential for several years: As a Chinese policy expert pointed out to me, when the US accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the Chinese government intentionally supported the public outrage against the US. The demonstrations that followed in Beijing were the largest since the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989. Chinese state media called the attack “barbarian” (Shirk, 2007), a reference meant to inspire Chinese people’s sense of nation, because “barbarians” in China traditionally has referred to foreign and therefore inferior groups of people (Ebrey, 2010). The best example of CCP involvement was the government request that universities transport their student to the protests outside the American embassy (Shirk, 2007). Clearly, the CCP was conducting the development of anti-foreign sentiment.

However, the demonstrations got out of hand and the government eventually had to shut it down. The anti-foreign sentiment had also begun to cost China in the economic arena, making it difficult for China to gain at seat at the WTO, and it was simultaneously battling other countries for the right to the 2008 Olympics. The delicate balance the CCP tried to strike between economic progress and outward nationalism was dangerously close to tip out of its favor. Consequently, when an American spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet near the Chinese island of Hainan, the CCP response was nearly the opposite: state media neglected to report many of the details, did so only after a delay, and otherwise cautioned those with strong anti-US sentiment to express it orderly. Like they did during the student protests against Japan in 1985, university authorities were ordered to keep the students on campus (Shirk, 2007).
Conclusions

The centrality of Taiwan to Chinese policy fluctuated substantially between 1960 and present. The major driver behind these fluctuations seems to have been nationalism, or in a short period the lack thereof. Where outward nationalism continued to be at the fore of Chinese politics, Taiwan remained central in Chinese society. When the nationalist sentiment instead turned inward after China seemed to have solved most of its issues with the surrounding community, Taiwan receded as a significant issue.

In an effort to revive outward nationalism during a time of legitimacy crisis for the party, Taiwan intermittently appeared and disappeared as a topic in the official rhetoric. Eventually, however, most stayed preoccupied with domestic issues and a sense of inward nationalism. Upon reaching a general level of wellbeing across the broad population, inward nationalism faded too. The result was the first years of the 1980s where little attention was given to nationalist issues at all. The end of the 1980s saw a resurgence of nationalism, largely designed and invoked by the government, but nonetheless drawing on the long-running importance of nationalism to Chinese policy.

It is clear that nationalism did affect policy outcomes, particularly with respect to Taiwan. Taiwan played a role in a larger design which is based on China’s long history, not only with Taiwan, but with the international system as a whole. The centrality of Taiwan to Chinese politics is not so much correlated with nationalism, as it is with outward nationalism in particular; where inward nationalism played a larger role, the role of Taiwan instead diminished.
Conclusions

In choosing how to approach China in the international system in the years to come, it is valuable to understand how Chinese policy emerges. This paper shows, first and foremost, that nationalism is a deciding factor in how Chinese policy develops. The Communist Party and its counterpart, the Nationalist Party, both gained power on a wave of nationalism that characterized much of public life in China from the end of the 19th century forward. The nationalist credentials of the CCP came to play a significant role in its ability to stay in power in the past and the present alike and Chinese nationalism is extremely dynamic and has often changed, typically on a spectrum fielding outward and inward nationalisms at its extremes, with different implications for Chinese government and society. Wherever outward nationalism came to dominate, so did Taiwan in public discourse.

There are at least three major implications from the findings of this paper, none of which can be ignored in the analysis of Chinese policy making.

Showing that nationalism affects decision making, especially to such a degree as is evident from this paper, is to show that identity and ideas matter. Inherently, nationalism takes
on a constructivist character in the realm of international relations. Nationalism had such effects throughout Chinese history that at times domestic pressures dictated large shares of Chinese foreign policy, which runs counter to realism and liberalism alike. Where nationalism affects policy outcomes and different nationalist groups fight for dominance the theory of “single unitary actors”, that underpins realism, crumbles.

Where realism does appear to explain some of Chinese policy behavior, this paper shows, the outcomes which are attributed to realist behavior are often better explained by the domestic pressure that exist or does not exist within the Chinese nation, typically of a nationalist origin. In evaluating Chinese behavior, we would be foolish to expect that the present is any different – China does not appear to behave as paradigmatic theories have proposed it will. Nationalism, by virtue of explaining a long period of China’s history, is a much more satisfactory method of analysis than established theories, and it is a more appropriate starting point for analysis of policy. Nationalism is not the end all be all, but ignoring it wholesale as most contemporary literature tends to is a slippery slope to inadequate analysis.

In the established theories, with regard to Taiwan, it is not clear why the island would come in and out of vogue in Chinese society if it were really a security threat that motivated China to maintain its hostile stance. Instead it is clear that where nationalism has changed character, so has China’s relationship with Taiwan, particularly the extent to which the CCP pursued reunification.

Within Chinese nationalism two major tendencies are dominant: outward and inward. Where outward nationalism – a concern with the outside world as the origin of Chinese hardship – dominated, Taiwan was a particularly hot topic because it retains symbolic meaning in relation
to the CCP’s nationalist credentials. When nationalism, after China’s relationship with the international community improved significantly in the late 1950s, nationalism developed into an inward focus – a question of how to define China in its own right and not simply in relation to the surrounding world. The inwardly directed nationalism focused primarily on the preferred type of Chinese government and its ideological and cultural underpinnings. Insofar as any group not in agreement with the Communist Party could achieve a large following, an inwardly concerned populace could threaten Communist rule. At least twice in the history of its power, the CCP made overt efforts to shape nationalism in a certain direction – typically from inward to outward – so as to avoid the potentially devastating effects inwardly focused nationalism could have.

The CCP has been able to shape nationalism, particularly in the late 1950s and early 1990s where central, concerted efforts to “reeducate” the public in order to legitimize CCP rule and problematize the effects of the international community on China’s fate took place, with significant success. Nationalism was not only dynamic, it was also malleable. The success of the party in the early 1990s seems at the root of why much current literature attributes the emergence of nationalism to conscious and calculated design. However, this paper shows that while nationalism changed somewhat under CCP influence, its root stretch back into China’s history – in fact so far that even early supporters of the Communist Party cannot lay claim to its origins.

The CCP knowingly pushed for Chinese nationalism to take an outward focus after 1989, but it could not have done so had nationalism not had deep roots in Chinese society. It is clear that the CCP “shaped” nationalism, but did not “manufacture” it. The party’s connection with nationalism was of a reactive nature – it was forced to build its legitimacy up around it, and where the course of nationalism deviated from that desired by the party, it would respond to...
threats by manipulation as we know today it did with the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis and when nationalism took a turn for the inward in the late 1980s.

A few things should thus be clear as we move forward in gaging the direction of China in the years to come. It would be incorrect, for example, to expect that nationalism would disappear if the CCP stopped trying to affect it the same it currently does and historically did – nationalism will exist regardless, and there is nothing to suggest that nationalism in China will favor the international community if “let lose”.

Although policy making is notoriously in the hands of a few in the authoritarian CCP, pressures from the population have in the past and will in the future affect policy decisions. Several recent incidents show that the party has to respond with great care to groups of nationalists expressing anti-foreign or xenophobic sentiment, because those groupings have tended to grow significantly. If handled incorrectly, the CCP seems aware, it can create instability which jeopardizes economic growth and continued CCP rule. Therefore, the role of western soft power is tremendously important – the way in which news of western behavior reaches the vast expanse of Chinese citizens is of particular importance. The CCP can affect it to a far extent, but it is mostly in the hands of western countries to display themselves as targets of “positive” emotion rather than “negative”.
References


