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An Interdisciplinary Approach to Rural-to-Urban Migration and Political Inclusion in São Paulo and Manaus, Brazil

Latin American and Caribbean Studies Capstone

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Abstract

We should view the trend of rural-to-urban migration as critical to the development of Brazil, whether that is through industrial development in São Paulo or commercial development in Manaus. However, the process of absorption of migrants poses a difficult challenge, whether it is in terms of equitable services or inclusion in political consideration. Both cities have taken differing routes, using various political vehicles such as labor unions, environmental organizations, and, a popular means of mobilization in the region, social movements. In the pursuit of this case study of the ways in which migrants to São Paulo and Manaus integrate into the municipal and even national political conversation, we see how to understand and conclude which arrangement is best to ensure a more accessible future for those migrants.

Introduction

One common, and rarely reversed, demographic trend in Latin America facilitating the metropolitan development seen today across the region is rural-to-urban migration. However, the periods in which this migration occurs, and the cities which receive such migrants often creates differences in which these new migrants, and the roles they fill in their new cities, have come to assert themselves politically in municipal as well as national politics in consideration of many other competing political actors. Therefore, there would be appropriate public policy and political mobilization methods
necessary for the industrial worker of the Southeast compared to the fishers or settlers moving into growing interior cities such as Manaus. In addition, the question of mobilization for those already long time residents of the most isolated neighborhoods for migrants, often favelas, is worthy of address to ensure that these pathways are truly inclusionary. This is where we consider which forms of organization and mobilization are necessary to promote the best possible participation of these new migrants in the metropolitan and national political settings. Using case study analysis covering politics, economics, sociology, urban policy and experience in the region, one can see how despite initial challenges for integration into municipal life by rural-to-urban migrants in São Paulo and Manaus, their vehicles of civil society, whether labor or environmental, allow for an easier manifestation of their political power at the municipal and national levels, and which allows for the maximum levels of integration.

**Methodology**

For this study, there is predominant analysis of sociological and political literature pertaining to the issue at hand. For the sociological context, we review Paul Singer’s *Economia Política da Urbanização*, and from it, we trace social relationships pertaining to inclusion and integration in an urban setting. For the political context, we analyze the various forms of actors in the political circles of both studied cities, and under what circumstances they allow recent migrants to integrate into the political scene of their respective cities. In addition, there are a series of questions formulated by Browder and Godfrey to evaluate the effectiveness of a government’s ability to meet the needs of migrants: “1) The political and economic circumstances in which the city became a
magnet for migrants, 2) The functions and services provided by the city and its adaptability dependent on economic predominance, 3) The extent to which the city is able to provide opportunities for employment and consumption, and the extent to which those economic considerations are able to fuel a native population growth, 4) the growth of industry and the extent to which this garners national and transnational economic attention, perhaps encouraging political attention as well, and 5) is the migration to the city the final step of mobility for the migrant population?” (Browder 59). The objective of these criteria is to determine the reasons for migration in Brazil, the municipal factors that cater to the needs of migrants, and those circumstances that either integrate migrants or push them to migrate further. In identifying the latter, this helps us transition into the study of political solutions, historically and presently, of integrating migrants into the political scenes of their respective cities and meeting their needs themselves through government. For this study, in order to understand the contrasts present between two possible trends and solutions to integration of rural-to-urban migrants in Brazil, our two case examples will be São Paulo, in the southeast, and Manaus, in the North. Through the analysis of these two contrasting urban environments, by learning about their formation, economic development, settlement patterns and civil society involvement, we hope to learn which city’s methods have been more effective, which political actors have been most effective and which solution can indicate a close to applicable trend for other similar Latin American cities.

_Literature Review_
According to Wagner and Ward, of the three types of net positive population increase in Brazilian cities, those being "natural population growth, internal migration and foreign immigration, foreign immigration is the least important in analyzing Brazilian urban growth" (Wagner 250). To understand these population movements, we must begin by understanding the political context. One of the major political actions to fuel the trend of rural-to-urban migration started just before the advent of the Republic. The Lei Aurea, signed by Princesa Isabel, freeing the slaves of Brazil would launch a large sector of the Brazilian population into mobility (Nóbrega 10-11). Unwilling or unable to remain on the old landholdings on which they used to work, and with several obstacles present in purchasing their own land, this new segment of the population would make their way towards cities (Huguet 94). Joining them would also be other poor rural migrants as well as army veterans seeking the high land values of land within proximity to a city (Huguet 94). Unbeknownst to them, the land that they settled would form the beginnings of the Brazilian favela (Huguet 94). After the presidency of Getulio Vargas, the only major federal program designed towards migration would be under Juscelino Kubitschek, with the creation of Brasilia (Maram 136). Designed not only to alleviate the population movement towards the southeast, but to also help develop and populate the Centro-Oeste, the Kubitschek administration pursued the creation of a new federal capital to replace Rio de Janeiro, which would become the Distrito Federal and its chief city, Brasilia (Maram 136). The next major trend to influence migration at the national level was that of the dictatorship of 1964-1985. Based on several precepts for development, the most prominent of which was a “national security imperative”, there was a promoted development of the interior of Brazil, particularly of the North towards
cities such as Manaus (Hecht 663). This policy and its security orientations came into being as a result of the dictatorship's military ease in suppressing guerillas in an urban setting rather than a rural one (Schmink 481). After the Ditadura, the drive towards state led development, whether it is under the ISI (import-substitution-industrialization) model or the ELG (export-led growth) model, fell in popularity (Winn 633-4). In trying to understand the setting faced by migrants upon arrival to cities like São Paulo and Manaus, we must understand that the economic difficulties they faced in their lands of origin do not face immediate resolution upon resettlement. Also, their presence often becomes long term, where the risk of successional generational poverty increases. In most instances, the economic stigma associated with being a migrant can bring isolation and a difficulty in integration, especially on an individual or family level (do Rio Caldeira 31).

In order to understand better the context of Brazil's, and indeed many Latin American countries' urbanization after WWII, we must come to understand how Latin American cities came to be industrialized and to possess the demographic profiles as we know them today. Until the positivist age, which peaked around the turn of the 20th century, most of Latin America, Brazil included, was “agrarian, in population distribution and economics” (Nóbrega 21). However, with a growing need for trade and promote what some elites saw as cultural development, investment in cities came. Some cities developed to meet the needs of a trade center as Ilheus did in Jorge Amado's Gabriela, Cravo e Canela as Brazil's portal to the world and fountain of cacao, or as Manaus developed in a similar manner with respect to the rubber industry (Hecht 254). Others however, while starting development in a similar manner, would grow as industrial
centers, in cities such as São Paulo and its surrounding periphery ABC region (Nóbrega 21). With the economic pull to cities as an accessible and bountiful pool of labor, it was only a matter of time before these cities would take different trajectories based on who came to these cities. Economically, “from 1930 to 1970, the economic trend guiding urbanization and the magnet for migrants to move to cities was ISI” (Cerrutti 2-3). Furthermore, another factor fueling this growth at the political level was their administrative purpose as well as their commercial value (Cerrutti 2). Also, among the four categories for evaluating speed of urbanization in Latin America, from slowest to fastest: Behind, Moderate, Right and Advanced, Brazil is among the countries possessing the 2nd fastest rate of urbanization, at the top of the list for its category (Cerrutti 7).

For this study, we focus on São Paulo and Manaus, two cities that reflect different trends of urban development and inclusion for Brazil, but also for Latin America: one being the historical industrial center which received a combination of internal migrant as well as immigrant populations looking for jobs, and the other being an interior former virgin land whose job seekers came to stake their claim in what many Brazilians refer to as the “interior”. As such, we see two different forms of labor markets develop in Brazil. For São Paulo, the economic profile we see is an evolution from a trading post for the coffee industry (Nóbrega 1), the famous second tier in the early 20th century Brazilian political system known as café com leite (Weinstein 264), to an industrial powerhouse that catapulted to be the most populous city in Brazil. For Manaus, the city started as a trading point in the Amazon for rubber extraction (Wagner 254), and fulfilled that purpose as a vertically integrated rubber trading post for Brazilian
as well as foreign needs, through WWII (Mageste). After the war, however, Manaus’s status as a major commercial center for rubber decreased, “leaving the labor force of the rubber industry to fend for itself” (Wagner 254). After WWII, economic development took two major turns. For São Paulo, the economy continued to focus around hard industry (Singer 124), and eventually expanded around the periphery, taking advantage of the proximity of port cities such as Santos and Campinas, and the expansion to the ABC region of São Paulo state (Singer 127-8). This industrial growth, challenged in the post-industrial neoliberal period of Brazil’s history following the Ditadura, would later be met by the development of São Paulo as a major financial center for Brazil as well as Latin America (Singer 123). For Manaus, the decline of rubber as a major industrial component of the economy would result in Amazonas’ continued predominance as a center of extractive economics, just with a different resource. One way in which this form of development was accelerated by the federal government was the promotion of a “colonization” program that was meant to populate the interior of Brazil (Hecht 663). As a result of this program, there was a new labor pool that eventually fueled a new economy in the region based on logging and cattle ranching (Hecht 663). Both activities brought capital, but turned out to be detrimental to not only the environment, but also intruding on other economic activities, such as those of the original rubber tappers (Keck 410). Eventually, after domestic and international pressure called for the protection of the Amazon, policy makers at the state and federal level started looking for a sustainable alternative to the extractive economy (Keck 412). A solution was found in the zona franca. The zone was essentially a free trade zone, started in Manaus, which allowed for greater manufacturing investment and made that part of the Amazon a new
import-export center (Killeen 68). This example eventually spread to several other Amazonian cities, becoming a model for growth in the region (Killeen 68). At the same time, a form of extraction still forms part of the Manuaurá economy, with the city being a major trading point for fish, and with its road link to Caracas, a transit point for some agricultural products (IIRSA 103).

As for labor, we saw different forms of transition as well. For example, while Brazilian labor was primarily concentrated in rural labor, with “69% of the population involved” in such in the 1940s, we saw that same sector “decrease to 32% in the 1950s” (Santos 31). With an industrial economy, the typically cooperative character of Brazilian rural life saw a transition to which urban workers that relied on interaction with municipal government to one in which they relied on each other for support (Singer 33). In the past as a result of the corporatist Estado Novo of Getulio Vargas, for many years, organized labor was seen as integrated with the interests and actions of the state (Riethof 32). As such, the need for independent labor, which also came to incorporate a changing labor demographic, came into being, where the CUT would organize among entire economic sectors (Riethof 43).

In general, we see 9 major influences for migration, including, but not limited to “wage rates, education, levels of urbanization, population density, income distribution and relative rates of growth” (Wagner 251). Most of these social and economic indicators, varying between push and pull factors for cities, have been the most predominant in influencing movement from the campos and sertão to the cities. In addition, we must also consider proximity within regions to be a factor, as evidenced by the following data with respect to intra-regional migration:
(Santos 47)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percent Inter-regional Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-West</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>76.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This data reinforces the trend of the Northeast as the primary source of Brazilian rural-to-urban migration. While in the past, the settlement in the city by new migrants would encompass concentration in the city as well as some settlement in the periphery, the trend currently leans towards settlement of the periphery (Cerrutti 19). This, however, is a general trend for urbanization in Brazil, as well as Latin America, and does not apply in every case, historically or currently. Now that we are familiar with the trends as well as the context for São Paulo and Manaus, we will examine the specific trends amongst their migrants, labor forces and civil society that crafted the environment and response to migrants and migration for that time period after WWII.

*São Paulo*
Another reason for São Paulo’s large draw for immigrants is its geographical position in what is termed the “Brazilian heartland”, consisting of itself, “Brasilia, Minas Gerais, and the state of Rio de Janeiro formerly known as Guanabara” (Wagner 255). This region is well known for several factors, such as accessibility to jobs, pre-existing connections to other successful migrants, and access to markets. For origins of migrants, distance was a considerable factor, wherein longer distance would be inversely related to the willingness to migrate (Wagner 251). Therefore, while the bulk of migration to all parts of Brazil came from the Northeast of the country, the distance factor contributed to the arrival of many migrants from the Southeast, including, but not limited to, Minas Gerais and the interior of the State of São Paulo. The map below can illustrate the pattern of migration in general that was prevalent for the majority of the post-WWII period:

What we can discern geographically about migration to São Paulo in the decadas de 50 e 60, decadas de 60 e de 70, decadas de 70 e de 80 Brazilian rural-to-urban

(Santos 34, 45) Image courtesy of Geografalando.com
migration context is that for a majority of time in the post-WWII period, São Paulo received a considerable majority of rural-to-urban migration, with the majority origin being Northeastern. Within the rural-to-urban migrants that come to São Paulo, there are several different classes. The demographics of migrants coming from Minas Gerais, for example, were considerably socially diverse, which experts attribute to “an early social stability and a maintenance of social integration” (Wirth 226). The asset-rich might migrate due to the lack of productivity in their rural holdings and an ability to translate their capabilities to attract labor (Singer 53). This in turn attracts two notable classes of worker, each with varying degrees of ability to integrate into the city. There is the “young professional”, who is usually able to apply a skill set and take advantage of having “no dependents as to maximize his upward mobility” (Singer 53-54). Secondly, there is the "unskilled laborer", who usually migrates to provide for dependents, and therefore is the most likely to stay in the same city for an extended period, and usually faces difficulty with mobility (Singer 53-54). In addition, an important trend to notice with the urban development of São Paulo is the rise and fall of certain labor markets. For example, while the prevalence of upper level professionals, “the middle class and the skilled working class decreased, the rise of the unskilled working class and mobile service workers increased from 1980 to 1997” (Taschner 92). This change in labor demographics is associated with the influx of rural migrants, as the data also showed an increase in skilled agricultural labor (Taschner 92). Since there is some disparity between the skill set available from the new migrants and the labor needs from industry in São Paulo (Singer 43-44), there will be difficulty in attaining optimal employment to accommodate migrants. As Singer notes, while “previous research has focused on the
difficulty to absorb migrants”, the issue in reaching a conclusion regarding mobility does not rest in a lack of ideas, but an approach from an individual level, rather than a social level (Singer 55). As such, Singer notes that the ability of migrants to attain mobility and integrate into the city where they currently reside depends on their ability to maintain social bonds with migrants in similar circumstances and from similar backgrounds (Singer 55).

In relation to the Browder and Godfrey criteria, we can determine the following about extant municipal management of migrants to São Paulo. São Paulo became a magnet for migrants in the post-WWII era due to industrial jobs (Cerrutti 2-3). For the services available, São Paulo was theoretically able to meet the needs of new migrants in comparison to their place of origin (Sahota 238). In addition, due to São Paulo’s position as the largest city in Brazil by GDP and population (Hoyos 7-9), we can assume that the economic opportunities available were able to fuel such a success in continued population attraction as well as native population growth. In addition, the future growth of São Paulo as a critical financial center would exponentially enhance growth to encourage further migration (Hoyos 7-9). Finally, while São Paulo remains a focal center for reception of migration, trends indicate that since the 1960s, it has also served as an exit point for migration towards the Centro-Oeste and the Norte (Santos 45).

A major sector of society and politics that would categorize São Paulo in the waning days of the dictatorship, and to the twenty-first century, was the development of organized labor. The new Brazilian labor movement, rising to prominence around the late 1970s and involving the leadership of Lula, would come to be identified by operational independence, an emphasis on labor democracy, a willingness to create
broad labor coalitions, and a focus on attaining political accomplishments for the benefit of members (Riethof 32-33). In the ABC region of São Paulo, this new labor organization would manifest in the form of the “Unified Worker’s Council, or CUT” (Riethof 33). As opposed to the tendency of many labor movements in the era which would tend towards more political activism, the CUT, while still a minority actor on the Brazilian labor scene (Riethof 33) would maintain its position as a predominantly labor actor rather than a political actor. Throughout its development, however, it would come to be more inclusive as an organization (Riethof 34). Another important defining factor of the campaigns of the CUT was its focus on “citizenship rights” (Riethof 34), a factor that would definitely be attractive to rural-to-urban migrants to São Paulo, especially considering their status as fluid in reflection of how they were seen and managed by the Paulista Social Welfare Ministry (Wagner 257).

**Manaus**

To understand how Manaus came into being, we must remember the 5 stages of urban development in the Brazilian Amazon: "1) Native subsistence, 2) Extractive frontier, 3) Agricultural frontier, 4) Relict frontier, and 5) Urban primacy" (Browder 60-2). Nowadays, while the native subsistence part of Manaus’s history has retreated to the forest, various aspects of the rest of Manaus’s economic history constitute an active part of the modern day jungle metropolis. New petroleum discoveries in the region, which have attracted various interested business, maintain the extractive economy in Manaus (Killeen 40). Moreover, agriculture is still alive and well in the region. While cattle ranching has declined in popularity due to environmental concerns, the region still
leads in production of "soy, rice, and Brazil nuts" (Killeen 39). What's more, the urban economy has been strengthened not only through the free trade zone, but also through the development of a regional energy grid (Killeen 40). A major manufacturing base also has cropped up in the region, consisting of products such as "motorcycles, electronics, chemicals and biotechnology" (Killeen 68). Also, in the post-industrial sector, tourism has become a profitable enterprise in the region (Killeen 68). All of these developments have made Manaus a formidable urban competitor in the region for investment and production (Killeen 68).

In contrast to São Paulo, where new migrants who were lucky enough to settle there could do so in the city center, the migrant settlement of Manaus took the form of gradual development of suburbs on the periphery of the metropole (Browder 58). In the Brazilian context-comparable to most Latin American cities, the term “suburbs” refers more to lower to lower middle class neighborhoods more characteristic of a favela outside the metropole than a planned neighborhood vision contrary to that which we are accustomed in the US. Therefore, according to the “Central Place Theory”, which assumes equal provision of public services, those closer to the city center are able to take better advantage of services while those in the periphery have difficulty with priority (Guedes 162). As a result, a public service priority “hierarchy” develops (Guedes 162), and as such, the political inequality in provision of services can translate into a social inequality as migrants, those living in the periphery of Manaus, are distanced from services. This is further amplified where the unofficial status of migrant settlements is discounted from official demographic counts, further complicating inclusion and provision of services (Guedes 162-3).
In order to visualize the trends that have led to urbanization in the region over a 30-year period, this graph represents the urban migration for the whole of the Amazon region, including, but not limited to, Amazonas and its state capital, Manaus:

**Urbanization of the Brazilian Amazon**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>1960 Population (% urban)</th>
<th>1990 Population (% urban)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>160,208 (21.2%)</td>
<td>434,708 (55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amapa</td>
<td>68,889 (51.3%)</td>
<td>267,576 (67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>721,215 (33.2%)</td>
<td>2,213,966 (76.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Para</td>
<td>1,550,935 (40.6%)</td>
<td>5,391,864 (56%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rondônia</td>
<td>70,783 (43.5%)</td>
<td>1,125,118 (53.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roraima</td>
<td>29,489 (43.1%)</td>
<td>135,956 (70%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Browder 58)

As a supplement, the following summary of relations between government and migrants has come to our attention based on the Browder and Godfrey criteria for municipal effectiveness in meeting migrants' needs: The first question we understand based on the initial colonization program by the military regime (Hecht 663). The second one we understand based on the trends of migration towards the north (Santos 55) combined with the accessibility of services near the metropole of Manaus (Guedes 162). The third and fourth, we understand based on the existence of the free trade zone in Manaus (Killeen 40). For the final question, while trends indicate that the most recent trends of migration seem to terminate in the North (Santos 55), ever-changing economic conditions, those felt most by the lower classes, can encourage endless migration.
(Santos 54). Manaus, being in a unique position among the cities of Brazil, has encountered and embraced the activity of environmental NGOs (Jacobs 61). Additionally, the activity of environmental NGOs in the region has rarely been single issue. The environmental aspect of their activity allows for an umbrella that can incorporate social inclusion, democratic participation, and environmentally sound economic growth (Jacobs 62).

Part of the influence of these environmental organizations as a tool of urban advocacy, particularly among marginalized communities, is in the peripheries of cities, particularly involving advocacy for environmental protection and environmental education (Jacobs 63). The novelty of this political trend is its contrarianism in the face of classical understandings of participation of the poor in political advocacy (Jacobs 63). Such is evident in the neighborhoods of Zona Norte and Zona Leste of Manaus, neighborhoods impacted the most by pollution, where residents have taken matters into their own hands by advocating for more “greening” of the area (Nogueira 5431). As a result, this form of advocacy has the potential for reverberation on several levels. Due to the tendency for greater interaction and integration of environmental causes, the social movements of Brazil with environmental focus garner an exponential ability to advocate and exert influence for their cause on larger levels (Jacobs 64). With Manaus’s interconnectivity to the rest of Brazil and the world by recent trade developments (Guedes 166), as well as the expansion of the big tent of issues for environmental movements, this gives the environmental NGO path of power and recognition a considerable potency in the local, and national, arena. Where the interconnection of the Amazon River and the trade relationships between large and small actors in the
Amazon provide a commercial avenue for mobility within the hierarchy of metropole and periphery in Manaus, the environmental cause also allows for upward movement within this paradigm (Guedes 184).

**Civil Society**

For São Paulo, one of the strongest forces for political change and inclusion at any level was organized labor. Few cases better illustrate this than that of Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva. It was Lula himself in his capacity as head of the CUT when he mentioned that the conventional role of the extant political parties in Brazil wouldn’t be able to meet the needs of the labor base of São Paulo and the ABC (Rosenberg 94). Plus, as mentioned by Lula, a major shift in the labor movement occurred when organized labor became less affiliated with the government at the time, which meant association with the dictatorship, and labor run by labor (Rosenberg 95-6). While there were also elements within Brazilian labor that were unwelcoming towards migrants due to potential “labor competition” (French 131), cooperation between extant workers and their migrant counterparts was characteristic in the early post-war period in São Paulo’s ABC region. One historical example exists where the combined workers, native and migrant, were able to work with the municipal government to establish “consumer cooperatives” in response to cost-of-living concerns (French 134).

For Manaus, an equivalent movement, and figure for rallying domestic and international support was the cause of the rubber tappers, and their leader, Francisco “Chico” Mendes (Winn 10). His was one of the first examples of modern Brazilian environmental advocacy, and upon his death, became an Amazonian Brazilian martyr.
for environmental change and advocacy (Winn 10). Alongside his rubber tapper organization would soon be indigenous organizations, among others, who would combine their goals of improving conditions for themselves and securing certain rights would form the core of the modern Brazilian environmental movement (Winn 11).

In analysis of power players in Brazil, it is important to emphasize the potential of social movements. When considering the role that NGOs play in Brazil, they are just one of many actors that incorporate social movements. In a political sphere where parties have rarely, if never, played an important role in policy making, let alone as a notable tool for social inclusion, the social movement has been the Brazilian way of addressing grievances, petitioning government, and allowing for a form of sociopolitical inclusion uncommon in the de jure Brazilian political system (Mainwaring 91). In addition, while keeping in mind that the migrant populations to São Paulo and Manaus were diverse in terms of social class, the development of social movements as a means to access and address grievances would be a development to the lack of socioeconomic and political options available to the poorer migrants (Santos 61). For the majority of these movements, in light of their eventual inclusion of several civil society actors as well as considering the diverse social population of the migrants, the goals of these were primarily addressing shortcomings in access for those unable to afford them.

**Explanation for Political Mobilization Difference between the two cities**

Eventually for São Paulo, the issue would be the demand for labor with respect to the importance of migrants. Due to a steady stream of labor without an equal or
greater need for jobs filled, these new migrants would eventually be relegated to a state of limbo (Wagner 256). This stood in contrast to Manaus as the federally promoted colonization program as well as the lure of the free trade area was sufficient to not only attract, but to maintain a consistent supply of jobs in response to demand. In addition, the factor of central development in São Paulo as opposed to periphery development in Manaus played a notable factor. Furthermore, in Manaus, the environmental issue illustrates a difference. Within social movements themselves, there is disagreement on the approach that people take to the environment, particularly with respect to conservation versus preservation (Keck 411). It is also worth noting that growth in Manaus persists at a “considerably higher rate than the national average” (Cohen 41). The significance of this is to be considered when comparing the trajectories of past growth in São Paulo for future study to see when Manaus could attain similar patterns of urbanization as well as settlement.

**Solutions**

One means to address the issue of migrant absorption that was tried by the city of São Paulo was restriction of entry. The city maintained a Secretariat of Social Welfare that was in charge of monitoring the intake of migrants (Wagner 257). Based upon the needs of the city at the time, as well as considering any potential political liability present with absorption, migrants would either be permitted to reside within São Paulo, or be turned away, either to their point of origin or to an area in São Paulo’s periphery (Wagner 257). It was in this instance where cooperation with the federal government proved fruitful. Those who were rejected had the opportunity to take
advantage of colonization programs in the North and Northeast (Wagner 257).

Furthermore, the free trade zone of Manaus could also offer greater prospects for jobs (Wagner 257).

For organizations that might facilitate the representation of interests in a political setting, some might mention the ability of political parties. However, such is not the most effective case in Brazil. In Manaus, this author’s experience tells that the general consensus on political parties as a means of representation are that parties offer little chance at mobilization and accomplishment for new actors. In addition, for Brazil in general, political parties have not always been the most effective method for political mobilization (Mainwaring 91). This had some influence from the various authoritarian periods in Brazil’s history, but the traditional dichotomy of political relations in Brazil has been between the incumbent government and various opposing civil society groups, including, but not limited to, the "Catholic Church, social movements and unions", among others (Mainwaring 91).

Noting the various actors, vehicles and public avenues that are available to include new migrants and their interests in the municipal conversation on public policy and inclusion, this is where the idea of polycentricity might come into play. Polycentricity is a political economic theory originally formulated by the economist Elinor Ostrom as a solution to resource management, intended to balance the local needs of community management and the effectiveness of top-down government management for inclusive and effective resource management policy (Andersson 777). While the issue of political inclusion of rural-to-urban migrants to Brazilian cities does not fall under the guise of resource management, the goals of inclusion and effectiveness of interaction with
government to represent political interests certainly make the consideration of the polycentric model a notable one.

There is one forum in Greater São Paulo that seems to approach this idea of polycentricity: the Citizenship Forum and Intermunicipal Consortium (Jones 257). This organization, facilitated only by the recent advent of elected mayors for São Paulo, was organized with the concern of popular participation in municipal budgeting processes (Jones 257). As such, the forum includes such participants as representatives of civil society, the business community and state representatives (Jones 257). While state leaders say that there is still progress to be made with respect to the original goal, fiscal effectiveness on the forum’s part, it has been generally acknowledged that this forum is taking a strong initiative in tackling an issue that desperately needed resolution in São Paulo itself and the surrounding municipalities (Jones 257).

Within this Forum and Consortium itself, there is already diversity among the defined civil society actors. These actors include, but are not limited to "neighborhood and community associations, popular and social movements, issue specific institutes and NGOs, service non-profits, and other organizations that range from the social service arms of the Catholic church to Rotary to corporate philanthropy" (Acharya 44). In a similar manner as a legislature, the budget proposal is prepared in two different preparatory committees, one called policy-area that manages budgetary prioritization and one called territorial that manages municipal program expenditures (Acharya 42). From there, the proposal is edited and reviewed in assemblies and plenaries, where it faces the vote in a council whose electors consist of those from the policy-area and territorial evaluations, those from the municipal legislature, those from historically
disadvantaged communities, and those from state ministries (Acharya 42). A major factor in participation, though, is that rich and poor actors have equal participation in the approval process (Acharya 43).

The importance of a solution such as this is that it can surmount the potential organizational difficulties present in relying on one form of civil society to be the ultimate forum for solution. One issue, for example, with the role of environmental organizations in Brazil is that the environment for cooperation with government is far from optimal. The primary complaint made by local and state government is that environmental NGOs have tried to establish a “parallel governance apparatus” to address social ills, and making demands that create new budgetary burdens for government (Jacobs 62).

Another consideration, at least in the São Paulo context, is whether the independent nature of the labor movement can be reconciled with this form of governance. Lula himself said that, in the context of the pro-democracy movement of Brazil in the 1970s and 80s, it would be difficult, perhaps irrational, for the labor movement to distract from its objectives by associating with other movements (Rosenberg 66). Therefore, what we can interpret from this is that even with big tent actors outside of a formal political setting, consensus within an organization or movement is a rarity, especially within Brazilian political actors of an opposition. Also, considering the extent to which Brazilian public policy and politics involves the state rather than what Scott Mainwaring has described as “gelatinous” actors (Mainwaring 93), from the standpoint of these various actors as well as the migrants, this form of inter-municipal governance might be the preferable solution to the migrant management issue.
Therefore, if a city such as São Paulo is capable of organizing in this forum all relevant actors in civil society and potencies in state government to cooperate and approve a budget, an activity usually performed by local legislature or finance ministry, then certainly a similar function for social welfare can be applied in a similar setting. In summation, similar policy could incorporate migrants in a similar trans-municipal forum within a progressive inclusion scheme for representation, with the state legislature as a participant and the executive as a mediating presence.

**The Municipal Level**

Review of the previous political mobilization and municipal management models show that with the proper organization and cooperation of official avenues, there remain effective channels for migrants to integrate politically at the municipal level. The benefit of the São Paulo model is that its progressive inclusion system is designed to allow those previously marginalized or minimally represented in other forums otherwise to have their say with respect to a meaningful policy-making decision process that has an ever relevant effect for them. As for the Manaus model, the benefits and abilities for power brokering are that with several different layers of government in the region, and with a big tent of interests, the environmental NGOs are able to effect and represent the address of issues at their most immediate level.

**The National Level**
In considerations of the various power brokers among migrants in several Brazilian cities, we understand that the means by which civil society, which advocates for the integration and address of issues faced by rural-to-urban migrants, can have similar impacts at the national level as they do at the municipal level. One example where this is best illustrated is in relation to the protests that occurred in 2013. Where the initial spark was the bus fare hike in São Paulo, the protests later evolved into a mobilization of social movements to address questions of rising costs of living, development questions, municipal management, and corruption (Mallen). Other examples show the impact that organization among environmental NGOs can have at several levels in Brazilian society, such as that of Chico Mendes (Winn 11). More importantly, due to the interstate nature of migration, it would be of critical importance that managing not only their absorption into their new locales, as well as addressing the root causes for their migration, be a priority and an opportunity for the National Congress to resolve.

**Application to other Latin American Cities**

With this model in mind, we can perhaps see similar ones applied in other Latin American countries. Not only do several other Latin American countries exhibit similar patterns of development from export led growth to industrial output (Rosenberg 49), as well as rural to urban migration (Rosenberg 105), but also similar civil society actors that contribute to municipal level power brokering for migrants. For example, the social movement trend is no longer exclusive to Brazil, as political parties across Latin America have lost credibility as a mobility tool, and have lost popularity to social
movements (Killeen 40). In addition, in Latin America we see similar patterns of labor development among migrants as contributive to urbanization. With the transition of cities from commercial to industrial focus, many Latin American cities with growing industrial bases developed consumer economies, and a labor force “concerned with provision of services” (Singer 109-110). As such, the development of social cohesion based on class would create the environment ripe for economics based on import substitution (Singer 110).

For example, in Lima, one of the more economically afflicted neighborhoods called El Augustino, one particularly affected by the reception of rural-to-urban migrants (Mata 75), became known as a rising center for organization to address the concerns of these new residents. Once a hotbed of activism for opposition to the military dictatorship of the 1970s, the neighborhood would later organize councils to manage various social organizations, which catered to the needs of the migrants (Jones 252). Eventually, the work of these neighborhood councils, such as MIADES, would warrant the attention of the central government of Peru to the point where budgeting would be appropriated for this council to manage and administer what many would consider necessary social services in that neighborhood (Jones 253). An important political theoretical point to take from the El Augustino example would be present in the MIADES council paradigm, particularly in consideration of its similarity to the São Paulo Interurban management model. The similarity is present wherein the council provides a method for amalgamation of civil society and social movements, and concurrently acted in a decentralizing capacity (Jones 253), where the municipal government was concerned,
and therefore bearing resemblance to the Andersson and Ostrom polycentricity model for governance.

Other notable examples exist in Bogota, where despite political autonomy for the Capital District, considerable checks on the mayor’s power come from not only the city council, but the association of several public sector workers and their representation (Jones 254). In addition, the rural-to-urban migration issue is complicated in Bogota due to the need for resettlement for internally displaced persons (Albuja 10). In addition, similar difficulties are present in Buenos Aires, specifically pertaining to the jurisdictional issues between the city and province (Jones 254). This is also noteworthy considering the magnitude of rural-to-urban migration in Argentina (Davis 203).

Finally, we see similar patterns of transjurisdictional settlement in the greater scheme of migration with Mexico City, where Puebla, Orizaba and Cordoba all absorbed excess migration, some in a parallel tandem, and subsequently developing barrios as understood in the Mexican context (Morse 7). Other stories that Mexico City migrants tell are about political participation, where migrants demonstrate more voting participation than natives, as well as an increase in political involvement associated with improving socioeconomic circumstances (Cornelius 105-6). However, Cornelius also notes that “participation in community organizations should not be considered mandatory pre-conditions for political participation” (Cornelius 108). Therefore, considering the case of both these cities issues with jurisdictional application and ever increasing and potentially marginalized rural-to-urban migrant populations, it would make sense that the quasi-legislative model proposed for Brazilian cities, and based off of the São Paulo model would work in this circumstance. A progressive representation
scheme ensuring inclusion for marginalized populations (i.e. the new migrants) and inclusion of relevant social services NGOs as well as representatives of the overlapping jurisdictions, applied to social service policy, can prove to be a solution to this issue outside of Brazil.

**Conclusion**

After reviewing the data, trends and patterns of political organization and manifestation in the aforementioned contexts, one can see how the polycentric solution is capable of improving the integration of migrants in the municipal and national political scene, in order to improve their lot. Whether coming from Minas or the Northeast, and whether coming for industrial and service jobs or to stake out a claim to new land and markets, the role of the rural to urban migrant has been fundamental to the growth of not just the cities of São Paulo and Manaus, but also as part of the developmental narrative of the Southeast and North, as well as for all of Brazil.

With the lack of resolution to rural poverty in those isolated regions of Minas Gerais and the Northeast of Brazil, we found the push factors that contributed to a large internal exodus. In addition, after the end of extractive economies that made use of primarily immigrant labor, such as that of coffee in São Paulo or rubber in Manaus, neither exclusively one transition or one movement would be the sole cause of change to come, but a combination of economic transition with a newly arrived and domestic labor force would be responsible for the times that followed. In addition, while the
development of the North of Brazil combined with the introduction of free trade zones were novel policy in Brazilian history, they represent an era of development, one associated with the military, that is unlikely to return. In addition, considering the potential for further environmental regulation in Manaus, combine with the growth of the periphery of the metropolitan centers of the Southeast, it seems unlikely that Manaus will supplant São Paulo as the primary recipient of rural-to-urban migrants in Brazil.

When traditional means to inclusion in those cities for new migrants, primarily with respect to inclusion in civic life and addressing their quality of life needs, various avenues to civil society, such as the labor movement or the environmental movement brought successful routes to participation in civil society, a means to address grievances. While these organization gave different political routes, and eventually means to interact with political parties towards greater involvement at the municipal and federal level, it still wouldn’t resolve the issues relating to absorption or migrants and managing their issues within the governmental context. This is where the concept of polycentricity comes into play, in the extra-institutional context with the environmental movement, where the various actors of the movement come from their various interests to constitute a cohesive policy. In addition the São Paulo model combines the integration of various constituents within a greater metropolitan area, a geographic situation that presents the current migrant settlement trends, which lean more towards settlement of the periphery than the center. This is where the Intermunicipal Forum is a benefit, not only in this transjurisdictional sense, but also for its inclusion of several actors, including civil society such as the social movements, state actors, such as elected legislators of possibly those aforementioned parties, as well as for its
progressive inclusion mechanisms to include historically marginalized actors. As mentioned earlier, while this forum was designed for budgeting at the municipal level, a similar concept could be applied to management of migration, perhaps in a social services capacity. In addition, taking into consideration the “social integration and stability” among migrants themselves (Wirth 226), despite some class difference, we can expect them to act as a cohesive force in such a framework. In particular, this approach to addressing the needs of migrants on a social level in interaction as well as policy (Singer 55) will further expand the breadth and effectiveness of policy affecting migrants. As such, applicable social movements could be included, state level legislators and perhaps even federal deputies considering the transnational nature of rural-to-urban migration in Brazil, as well as the progressive inclusion scheme. With this in mind, it seems that despite the transnational and international support that relying on solutions such as those of the environmental movement in Manaus can achieve, the polycentric governance arrangement model of São Paulo shows the better potential for inclusion and achievement with respect to rural-to-urban migrants.
Works Cited


On my honor, I have neither given nor received any unacknowledged aid on this paper.

Daniel Boccio