Geopolitics, Ideology, and the Frontier

Understanding the Continuity in Motivations behind Conquest and Administrative Policy in Xinjiang, 1688-Present

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I. Introduction

The area that now constitutes the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on the northwest frontier of the People’s Republic of China has been in a constant state of regime turnover over the last millennia. The Manchu Qing dynasty (1636-1911) conquered Xinjiang in a series of wars and campaigns lasting from 1688 to 1759. Recent Scholarship undertaken since the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s has brought forth many new perspectives on questions regarding the objectives, motives, and ideological underpinnings of the Qing conquest and the administration of Xinjiang during the Qing era. As the Qing dynasty, specifically the late Qing dynasty, is the direct predecessor to Communist China in that it shared relatively the same territorial boundaries, understanding the motives behind Qing administrative policy in Xinjiang is important when attempting to understand the nature of the Communist administration in the province.

By attempting to trace the origins of the ideological and geopolitical motives behind the Chinese administration in Xinjiang throughout the Qing period and the Communist era, this paper will attempt to answer several questions framed by the main argument of the thesis. The argument put forth by this thesis is that the primary motives underlying the Qing dynasty’s conquest and administration of Xinjiang are the largely the same as the motives behind the CCP administration in the region since 1949. Both recently and historically, the intense interrelationship amongst ideology and geopolitical strategy in creating the motives and objectives of Chinese policy in Xinjiang can be seen in official discourse. In 1992, Wang Enmao, who governed Xinjiang for almost thirty years, called for the erection of a “great iron wall to protect Xinjiang against agents of hostile forces” (Harris 118). Similarly, fears that the Zunghar state and the Russians would form an alliance against the Qing, potentially leading a force from Xinjiang that could threaten Beijing itself, dictated Qing dynasty frontier policy from the 17th
century onward (Barfield 283). In order to illuminate the origins and importance of such volatile and powerful motives upon the official discourse of administrative policy in Xinjiang, the argument of the thesis will address three main questions. These three main questions, presented in chronological order, are 1) Why did Xinjiang matter to the Qing, 2) Why and when did the initial motives behind the Qing administration and conquest shift during the Qing era, and 3) Why did Xinjiang matter to the CCP after 1949? When addressing these questions, it important for the reader to understand that the history of Xinjiang has largely been dictated by the interactions of various nomadic peoples and empires “through migration, trade, or imperial conquest” that controlled it or sought to control it at various points during its history (Millward 78). Thus, Xinjiang’s history is one that is not only intrinsically linked with China, but also with the rest of Central Asia.

Answering these questions will allow a variety of motives to be traced through two distinct time periods of Chinese history. The origins and subsequent influence of these motives upon Chinese administrative policy in Xinjiang during different periods will then be seen. Ideological trends, such as the emergence of Maoism, and world geopolitical developments, such as the nineteenth century “Great Game” for Central Asia, that directly influenced the motives behind Chinese rule in Xinjiang will also be seen, allowing for important shifts in motives to be sufficiently ascribed to specific time periods. The end result of this question-and-answer methodology will be a comprehensive comparison between the Qing and Communist periods that will show how the motivation behind Chinese rule in the region originated, evolved, and shifted overtime through two distinct phases of East Asian history. This comparison will attempt to reveal the degree to which Qing motives, ideology, and beliefs influenced the perceptions, policy, and rhetoric of the Communist leadership that has attempted to administer Xinjiang from
1949 to the present day, and whether or not the nature of these motives has remained inherently unchanged despite shifts in their “outward” appearances.

The discussion of the first question will attempt to find the answer to why Xinjiang became important to the Qing dynasty, specifically by uncovering and examining underlying concerns and geopolitical developments that both initiated the Qing conquest of the region and its subsequent administration until 1820. This discussion will show how the Qing conquest was initiated by accident, and that the primary motive behind its desire to control the region was dictated by continuous concerns over threats posed to the security of China proper. The discussion of the second question will show the continuity in motives behind the initial conquest and Qianlong-era administration of Xinjiang, and how these motives began a transformation due to the convergence of the various imperial powers within Central Asia and new, emerging ideology within the thinking of the Qing ruling elite. It will be seen that by 1884, an important motivational shift had occurred wherein the ideology of integration had gained increasing importance in dictating administrative policy. This ideology would further entrench itself throughout the twentieth century. Finally, discussion of the third question will illuminate how the primary motives underlying Qing administrative policy have continued to hold sway during the Communist era, and how these motives further evolved in the context of the various fluctuations of integrationist ideology. This ideology would be exacerbated to the point of hysteria under Mao, and then would be notably retrenched under the developmental administrative policy adopted by Deng Xiaoping.

**II. Why did Xinjiang matter to the Qing? (1688-1820)**

The first question necessitated by the thesis- “Why did Xinjiang matter to the Qing” will be addressed in the ensuing discussion. It is important to understand that the Qing conquest of
Xinjiang, which would be formally completed in 1759, is primarily a result of the provocation of the Zunghar khanate. This “accidental” conquest would pose new challenges for the Qing. A frontier region culturally, ethnically, and politically distinct from China, administering Xinjiang necessitated the adoption of policies that were noticeably different in nature from those used to administer other newly conquered regions and the provinces of China proper that possessed a large Han population. This new approach to administrative policy, described by Rowe as “divide and rule fragmentation” was also inherently different as it abandoned many of the tenets of policy seen in the historical precedents set by previous dynasties in Xinjiang, most notably the Ming dynasty (75). Thus, during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the “Qing administration in Inner Asia [stood] apart from both the administration of China proper and the pattern of expansion and settlement in the south” (Di Cosmo 294).

The Qing conquest of Xinjiang, formally initiated as a response to the Zunghar advance into Outer Mongolia in 1688, was noticeably different from all previous conquest attempts in that its end result was the incorporation of Xinjiang into an empire that wielded a degree of power like no other previous Chinese dynasty had held before. By the late seventeenth century, the Zunghar khanate, a confederation of Oirat Mongol tribes united under the banner of Tibetan Buddhism, had developed under the leadership of its Khan Galdan (r. 1677-1697) into a state capable of uniting the Mongol tribes and creating a legitimate imperial power that could compete with the Qing emperors and the Russian Tsars. The Zunghar khanate at this time included within its territory what is today the northern portion of the Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region. The Zunghars projected their power into the south of Xinjiang through mining and trade, and enacted treaties with the Russians that legitimized their ability to extract tribute from the region’s nomadic tribes. The Zunghars posed a specific threat to the Qing and the Russians as they
possessed both the intent and capability to exercise their influence upon the affairs of the Khalka Mongol tribes by the late 17th century. The Khalkas, who resided in present day Inner Mongolia, were ruled by the various eastern Chinggisid Mongol Khans that had for decades been sought to be controlled by the Qing Emperors (Millward 89-91). In addition, the Russians had continued to expand into Siberia and posed an immediate threat to the Qing’s Mongolian frontier. Thus, the Khalkas became an important chip in perhaps the first geopolitical “Great Game” for control between the Russians, Qing, and Zunghars in Mongolia and the northwestern frontier regions. Galdan’s 1688 campaign into present-day Outer Mongolia, which provoked the Qing conquest of Xinjiang, shows how the primary motive for the Qing conquest was to secure the frontier regions in the face of the threat posed by foreign imperial expansion, specifically the Russians and Zunghars.

Qing administrative policy in Xinjiang immediately following the victory over the Zunghar khanate in 1759 reflected the initial motives and goals of the conquest. As outlined above, the desire of the Qing emperors, most notably Qianlong, to counter the dual threat of Russian and Zunghar imperial expansion along the northwestern and Mongolian frontiers served as the primary motive of conquest. It will be shown how this motive reflected upon the nature of the Qing administration in the region in the immediate decades afterward. Scholars such as Di Cosmo, Clarke, and Millward have discussed at length how the motive to establish control in the name of territorial security influenced administrative policy in Xinjiang in the latter half of the eighteenth century onwards (Clarke 41). These scholars note how certain aspects of Qing administrative policy in Xinjiang, namely the institution of military rule, the administrative bureaucracy, and extensive imperial knowledge-gathering projects- which will be discussed in the following paragraphs- served to increase the ideology of “imperial control” in order to
legitimize Qing rule in the eyes of conquered peoples. In this regard, Qing methods of imperial rule draw many similarities to the institution of European colonial rule (Di Cosmo 309). The Qing belief that regions such as Mongolia and Xinjiang were crucial to protecting the inner portion of their empire against external expansion, first from the Zunghars and Russians, and then eventually from the British and Khoqandis after 1820, served as the justification for administrative policy in which centralized control over the territory was the priority. As a result, a primary focus of administrative measures in Xinjiang under Qianlong was the permanent entrenchment of military personnel through the implementation of the banner system.

The military hierarchy of the banner system, supported by the establishment of “theoretically self-supporting military-agricultural colonies,” was the mechanism through which the Qing attempted to implement the “divide-and-rule fragmentation” that characterized administrative policy in Xinjiang during the late eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries (Rowe 73-75). The formal beginning of Qing administration came in 1768 when the Qianlong emperor officially annexed the region into the Empire. The Emperor justified the annexation of Xinjiang using the argument that controlling the province “saved money and enhanced security” as according to Millward (97). This argument met much initial resistance from the prominent Han literati who served as the emperor’s top advisors. The Han literati, until the early nineteenth century, held the view that Xinjiang was a strategically unimportant pastureland that historically had not presented an immediate benefit to the Empire’s inner regions, which were culturally and ethnically separate, and in some views superior, from the peripheral frontier (Rowe 73-75). This view, although officially undermined by the 1768 annexation, in actuality became a central ideological motive that dictated the nature of the Qing administration in Xinjiang until at least the 1820s. This ideological influence can be seen in how the Qing directly ruled Xinjiang from
the imperial capital at Beijing as a subjugated state under the military government of the banner system.

As a subjugated, vassal-like state, Xinjiang was administered separately from the inner empire, with the aim being to segregate Xinjiang from China proper. The banner system was the means to this end, wherein the primary concern of Qing control was on the maintenance and entrenchment of the tens of thousands of banner troops that were stationed throughout the territory in the latter half of the eighteenth century (Millward 99). At the local level control of the Xinjiang territory was left in the hands of tribal and Muslim elites, who, to varying degrees, continued the systems of government that had existed before the conquest. Ultimate control over governing matters was given to the military governor, who was responsible for supervising the lieutenant governor stationed in the area comprised of the former Zunghar state in Northern Xinjiang, and two imperial councilors placed in Southern and Eastern Xinjiang (Clarke 45-46). Thus the Qing ruled Xinjiang by super-imposing the banner system over existing local power structures. This hierarchy gave the emperor and his officials the ability to not only geographically separate and segregate various ethnic groups from one another, but also to enable certain aspects of Qing provincial ruling customs to be imposed upon Xinjiang and its local ethnicities. Thus, the Qing administration sustained stable control over the region during the late eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries by maintaining a sizeable military force and appeasing the local populations by largely staying out of their political and cultural life. This system allowed the administration to pursue its primary aims of creating and financing a bulwark on its northwestern frontier that would serve as a buffer against Russian expansion and Muslim invaders and as a conduit of trade with the rest of Central Asia.
The belief amongst many scholars, notably Clarke, Millward, and Fletcher, that the process of Qing expansion in Xinjiang was initiated and dictated by a desire to check external threats, is certainly plausible when examining not only the predominance of military rule, as outlined above, but also in how conflict, both within and without Xinjiang, made controlling the territory through the establishment of imperial power a major concern of the Qing administration. This strategic motive can be seen in the nature and course of conflicts that occurred in Xinjiang and Central Asia until 1820. From the beginning of the Qing administration, which saw the use of absolute military force by Qianlong in the genocidal extermination of the Zunghars from 1757 to 1759, security concerns necessitated a permanent military and imperial presence in Xinjiang. These concerns were also reflected in the aims of Qing administrative rule in Xinjiang until at least the late nineteenth century (Millward 97-99, Rowe 74).

Specifically, until 1820 “the main threat to Qing rule in Xinjiang did not in fact arise directly from the Uyghur population itself, but from Central Asia” (Millward 109). After the destruction of the Zunghars, the various states and tribal peoples of Central Asia began to attempt resistance against the Qing presence on their borders. Having been a thoroughly “islamicized” region for centuries, neighboring Muslim states saw the presence of a non-Muslim imperial power in their region as a direct threat. Beginning in the 1760s, Ahmad Shah of Afghanistan attempted to unite his troops with other Muslim rulers in Central Asia in order to directly challenge the Qing hegemony in Xinjiang under the guise of a ‘holy war’. This initial threat came to an end after the Qing halted their impending advance upon Afghanistan and Ahmad Shah directed his efforts at territorial expansion elsewhere. The Khanate of Khoqand, a Turkic Muslim state in Central Asia, emerged as an influential trading partner with Qing China.
in the late eighteenth century, and then as the main threat to Qing rule in the region when they participated in a series of invasions, beginning in 1820, in conjunction with the descendants of the influential Afaqi Khoja clan. The wariness of Qing authorities over the potential threat of the Afaqi Khojas, who were resettled and harbored within Khoqand in 1755 by the Khoqandi Khans following the Qing conquest, precipitated the granting of favorable trading rights by Qing authorities to Khoqandi traders, who came to dominate the tea and rhubarb trade between Qing China and Russia beginning in the 1780s (109-110). The Qing created this favorable trade relationship as a response to the threat they perceived from the continuing influence that the Khojas exerted upon the religious ideology of the Uyghurs, who remained as a potentially unified internal threat to the Qing in Xinjiang, most notably in the Tarim Basin region (Clarke 60-61).

Likewise, the Qing administration in Xinjiang until the 1820s focused not only on defense, but also internal development in order to both control Xinjiang and protect China proper from growing external threats. By the turn of the nineteenth century, Qing authorities aimed to establish imperial control within Xinjiang through the implementation of the *tuntian* model of military farms. These state-run agricultural colonies were established to supply grain and help cover the costs necessary for the massive military occupation of Xinjiang, itself unprecedented in size and scope in Chinese history up until that point (Millward 104). However the military occupation and the accompanying *tuntian* system were not reflective of any efforts by the Qing to formally integrate or assimilate Xinjiang into China proper, a point which has been extensively supported by various scholars. Rather, from the late eighteenth century until roughly 1820, the Qing administration sought to effectively control Xinjiang while segregating it from China proper, while making it a regional bastion that would facilitate the projection of imperial
power into Central Asia (Clarke 39-42). The implementation of imperial power in this regard served as the means of creating security and control in the region in the face of external threats. These aims and motives were reflected both in the structure and actions of the “divide-and-rule fragmentation” of Qing administrative policy, as outlined below.

First, the nature of the banner system and administrative bureaucracy itself reflected Qing efforts to directly control Xinjiang and segregate it from the inner provinces. The Qing military deployment in the region, which amassed to about 50,000 banner troops by the mid-nineteenth century, is estimated to have been at least over half Manchu and Mongol, and less than half Han Chinese. Likewise, until the 1880s, only ethnic Manchus or Mongols constituted the imperial officials that served in the high administrative offices (Millward 98-100). The Qing also separated and segregated imperial officials in the cities from local populations by placing them in “separate and purpose-built administrative citadels,” translated from Chinese as new city or city fortress (Clarke 50). Furthermore, the bureaucratic instrument that became the centerpiece of the military and civil administration in Xinjiang, known as the Lifan Yuan - translated as “the court for the administration of the outer provinces”- transcribed Qing imperial ideology amongst the local populations of Xinjiang. The Lifan Yuan was also a main method of projecting Qing imperial power throughout Xinjiang and into Central Asia by means of segregation (Di Cosmo 294).

Through the Lifan Yuan, the Qing administration administered both military and civil affairs in the region and created an effective avenue of communication and mediation between the imperial government in Beijing and the peoples of the Central Asian periphery. Staffed primarily by higher officials within the banner system and the Mongol aristocracy, the Lifan Yuan projected Qing political authority and legitimacy in the region by managing three rituals-
the *Chaojin* or pilgrimage to the emperor, the imperial hunt, *weilie*, and the tribute, or *chaogong*. An important aspect of these rituals is how they were derived from customs and rituals rooted in the culture of the peoples of Central Asia, rather than in the rituals of the Qing court. In essence, these rituals not only enabled the Qing to control local populations by requiring their participation in the Lifan Yuan, but also legitimized Qing imperial power and ideology in the eyes of local ethnic groups by adopting cultural practices that were distinct from those of China proper. Thus, by using the Lifan Yuan, the Qing segregated Central Asia from “the political, economic, and cultural milieu of China” as imperial authority and ideology was effectively projected across multiple cultural frames (Clarke 44).

Second, the efforts of the Qing to create a sense of segregation, subjugation, and imperial power in Xinjiang during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were not only reflected in the focus of the administrative bureaucracy, the banner system, and the Lifan Yuan administrative court, but also in the expansion of imperial knowledge of Xinjiang through extensive knowledge-gathering projects. Such projects began during the campaigns against the Zunghars in the eighteenth century. These projects, which consisted of cartographic surveys, the construction of public monuments detailing the Qing conquest, and ethnographic and historical works, compiled such information as dictionaries of place names, genealogies of local ruling families, engravings depicting battles of the conquest, and ethnographic profiles of the region’s peoples (Millward 106). In essence they served as a means to both collect and codify knowledge of Xinjiang and to commemorate conquest. The ideological purpose of these knowledge-gathering projects— to assert that the “newly conquered territory was a part of the Qing realm”—aimed to project imperial power in the region as a counter to external influences (Millward 1999, 70).
By compiling and publicly codifying historiographic, geographic, and ethnographic data in the language of local peoples, the Qing, much like in their use of the Lifan Yuan, were able to demonstrate their legitimacy over Central Asia by implying across “multiple cultural frames” that Xinjiang and the other peripheral regions under Qing control were indeed rightly belonging to the Empire. Specifically, surveys conducted for the mapping of Xinjiang not only served as a method of compiling geographic and territorial knowledge, but also as a means of obtaining information essential for establishing military posts that demarcated the boundaries of Qing imperial control in the northwest regions. Map surveys also served as a means of projecting imperial power as they were conducted in Central Asian regions that fell beyond the official territorial boundaries, such as present-day Afghanistan (Clarke 54). The use of knowledge-gathering projects by the Qing in Xinjiang, all completed by the late eighteenth century, not only served to set the cultural and historical boundaries between Xinjiang and the rest of China, but also to incorporate Xinjiang into the greater imperial ideological framework, as well as performing strategic and military purposes that were essential to Qing administration and influence in Central Asia.

The answer to the first question presented by this thesis- “Why did Xinjiang matter to the Qing?”- in terms of causes, motives, and aims of administration and conquest, lies in several historical events and situational causes during the period stretching from the beginning of the Zunghar campaigns in 1688 to the beginning of the Khoja and Khoqandi invasions in 1820s. Defending against invasions and threats posed by neighboring empires, beginning with the Zunghars and Russians and then the Khoqand Khanate, who harbored an ideological threat in the Afaq Khojas, served as the impetus for conquest and as the overarching motive for the militaristic nature of the Qing administration. During this period, the expansion of empire
through a variety of means—such as the banner system, self-supporting military state farms, the Lifan Yuan court, the administrative hierarchy, and imperial knowledge-gathering projects—was essential for securing Qing control in Xinjiang. Using Xinjiang as a territorial buffer to protect China proper, segregating and controlling its internal population, and projecting and transcribing Qing imperial power amongst the region’s various peoples were important means for achieving security. The institution of imperial power was primarily a means to check against the subversive influences beyond Xinjiang’s borders. However, as will be discussed in the subsequent section, after 1820 there were a variety of processes, both within and beyond Xinjiang’s borders, that caused the perceptions, motivations, and ideology that influenced Qing administrative policy to shift.

**III. Why and when did the initial motives behind the Qing administration and conquest shift during the Qing era? (1820-1911)**

The second question framed by this thesis—“Why and when did the initial motives behind the Qing administration and conquest shift during the Qing era?”—is of notable importance, not only when discussing aspects of Qing rule in Xinjiang throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but also in determining the links between similar ideological and strategic concerns that serve as motives behind the Communist administration in the region to the present day. In the ensuing discussion that will answer this question, it is also necessary to discuss how the Qing ruling elites’ belief that Xinjiang was inherently “linked” to the provinces of China proper evolved and came to serve as an increasingly important motive behind administrative policy in the region, especially after 1884. This section will attempt to answer the aforementioned question framed by this thesis in the context of the time period stretching from the 1820s to the 1911 revolution that overthrew the Qing dynasty.
As discussed in the answer to the first question framed by this thesis, the Qing administration in Xinjiang from conquest until the early nineteenth century was motivated primarily by strategic concerns, which in turn necessitated the ideological and physical projection of Qing imperial authority in Xinjiang and Central Asia as a means of securing control over the territory to check against external threats. The militaristic focus of imperial rule in this period meant that local peoples, notably the Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim groups, were continued to allow, for the most part, their existing traditions of local government and feudal hierarchy. However, the turning of the nineteenth century saw the resurgence of internal uprisings, notably a wave of rebellion by Chinese and Turkic Muslims in 1862 that culminated in an 1864 incursion led by Yaqub Beg. Foreign invasions orchestrated by the Khoqandis beginning in the 1820s and the Russians beginning in 1871, and commercial and colonial forays into Central Asia by the British Empire were also of great concern to the Qing (Starr 60-61). These various conflicts resulted in the deployment of additional banner troops and strengthened the military and security focus of the Qing administration in Xinjiang. As will be discussed, the year 1884, which saw the formal incorporation of Xinjiang into the Qing Empire as an official province, marked a major ideological turning point that created new motives and enhanced existing ones for the Qing administration. The ideological shift that occurred at this point, having been developing since at least 1800, is that the Qing dynasty now viewed Xinjiang as an inalienable part of China. This ideological shift launched administrative policy initiatives that aimed to politically, culturally, and ethnically integrate Xinjiang into the concept of a unified Chinese state, in order to fully implement imperial authority in Xinjiang (63).

The intertwined relationship between the Khoqand Khanate and the Xinjiang territory, which had been fostered through annual tributary payments made to the Khan of Khoqand and
the large volume of trade between the two countries, had become considerably tense by the early nineteenth century due to the repeated demands of Khoqandi rulers for relief from Qing customs taxes (Millward 110, Clarke 61). The increasing tension between the Qing and Khoqand was also rooted in the influence that the descendants of the Afaqi Khoja clans had upon the local populations in Southern Xinjiang. The Khan’s demand for the lifting of customs duties came to a high point in 1817. Successive refusals by the Daoguang emperor to grant the desired exemptions resulted in raids into the Kashgar region of Xinjiang by one of Afaq Khoja’s descendants, Jahangir, and his followers beginning in 1820. By 1826 the raids had gained the support of both Khoqand and the local Muslim population, and successive invasions by Khoqandis and their Kirghiz allies resulted in the slaughtering of several Qing garrisons in the Kashgar regions and the beginning of uprisings against Qing authority by the local Muslim populations. The imperial court reacted by increasing the Qing military presence, especially in the southern Tarim Basin, and by constructing heavy fortifications around Muslim towns on the frontier. The Qing also instituted a boycott on trade with the Khoqandis (Millward 110-12). Han Chinese merchants, capitalizing on the boycott, began to set up shops in areas previously reserved for local Muslim merchants under the segregationist administrative policies that had been the hallmark of Qing rule in the region during the Qianlong era. This development served to increase animosity between Han merchants, Khoqandi merchants, and the local Muslim population.

In 1830 full-scale invasions into the Kashgar region, under the command of Khoqandi generals using Khoqandi troops resulted in a Qinq victory, albeit at great financial and material cost as several cities were sacked. Realizing the continuous threat to stability in the region that the Khoqandis and their Khoja allies now posed, the Qing court formally reassessed its policy
aims in the region. 1832 and 1835 agreements with Khoqand lifted customs duties on Khoqandi merchants and pardoned local supporters of the rebellion (113-14). Although the agreement would foster relative peace and stability in the region until the 1850s, the Qing court now clearly recognized not only the division between the local Muslim population and the growing Han settler population but also the inherent interconnectivity between Xinjiang’s local ethnicities and foreign states in Central Asia. Qing administrative policy thus underwent a major change starting in 1831, wherein new policies that encouraged permanent Han settlement and farming aimed to counter perceived external threats not only through increasing imperial influence, but also by culturally and ethnically integrating Xinjiang into the Chinese state. Administrative policy measures instituted after the Khoqandi campaigns of 1830-1831 aimed at creating a permanent Han presence that would accompany the growing amount of banner troops stationed permanently in the region. This Han presence would be facilitated through the encouragement of Han Chinese migration to the region. The immediate strategic objective of this policy, as noted by Millward, aimed at using migrants to increase taxable revenue in order to finance the enlarged military presence, as well as to provide a further base of stability by increasing the “Chinese” foothold in the region (105). Therefore, the immediate concerns that dictated such policy motives in this instance were primarily rooted in a desire to increase security rather than in ideology. Policies that encouraged large influxes of Han Chinese migration from the inner provinces still indicated the beginning of a gradual ideological shift, however, as they officially broke with the previous stance of the Qianlong court, which had prohibited influxes of Han farmers and settlers in the name of preserving the segregation between imperial officials and the local population (Clarke 71). After 1834, with the formal approval of the Daoguang emperor, tax and land incentives were indeed given to potential Han
colonists to encourage them to migrate, particularly to Altishahr, the portion of the Tarim Basin that lay on the boundary with Khoqand, and form agricultural colonies; as a result, “a nucleus of Han colonists began to form” in Xinjiang, and Chinese cultural customs naturally became more apparent in the region (Twitchett 374-75).

Daoguang’s migration policies also mirrored the aspirations of prominent court intellectuals of the time period, such as the governor-general of Xinjiang, Nayaceng, and the literati scholars Wei Yuan and Gong Zizhen. These individuals advocated using migration policies as a method of populating the Xinjiang region with Han settlers, which in turn would facilitate the implementation in Xinjiang of a more “Chinese”-style administration reminiscent of the inner provinces. Wei and Gong in particular believed Han migration to be the most effective way to secure the territory for the Empire (Millward 105, 107). Thus, the official adoption of resettlement policies by the Qing court in 1834 was motivated by inherent security concerns as well as by the emerging ideology of integration. Expounding upon the significance of this apparent shift in administrative policy, Clarke makes an assertion, central to his thesis, that “from the early 19th century onward the goal of integration became embedded in the state’s perception of its relationship with Xinjiang” (iii).

Despite the incentives for poor farmers and other Han settlers to migrate, throughout the 1830s and 1840s Qing mismanagement resulted in a variety of failures to establish permanent colonies of settlers, although the Han presence continued to grows slightly nevertheless (Twitchett 385-86). During these decades, the terms of the treaty with Khoqand had created a temporary, albeit brief period of stability wherein the Qing managed to reconsolidate their hold on Xinjiang. However the late 1840s saw the resurgence of external threats, once again in the form of incursions into Southern Xinjiang by the Afaqi Khojas from within Khoqand, which
would occur in four main phases from 1847 to 1861 (Clarke 74). Rumors of British support for the Khojas abounded in the 1840s against the backdrop of increasing Western imperial expansion in China which had brought the British into conflict with the Qing in the First Opium War of 1839-1842 (Twitchett 387). Although these rumors proved unfounded, they foreshadowed the “Great Game” for control of Central Asia between Britain, Russia, and Qing China that gradually eroded the Qing’s hold on Xinjiang beginning in the early 1860s. The influence of the great game eventually helped to create a formal shift behind Qing motives for administration and control of Xinjiang. By 1884, the notion that controlling Xinjiang created a strategic buffer zone to protect against external threats would be replaced by the idea that Xinjiang must be formally integrated into the Empire in order to preserve and maintain the territorial integrity of the entire Qing state.

In 1864, six separate jihads were declared against Qing rule in six different regions in Xinjiang. Although derived from a complex array of factors, the influence of uprisings by Hui Muslims (ethnically Chinese Muslims) in neighboring Gansu and Shaanxi provinces that had begun in 1862 became the spark that ignited rebellion. Likewise, the 1864 rebellions in Xinjiang were initiated by Hui, and not Turkic Muslims, although Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims soon joined in, in what has become known as the first Uyghur independence movement (Millward 117). The Khoqandi general Yaqub Beg, his own personal background being shrouded in mystery, entered into the picture in 1865 when he led a small Khoqandi force into the Kashgar region at the behest of the Khan of Khoqand and the rebels who had taken Kashgar city. In a series of campaigns that demonstrated Yaqub’s prowess as both a military commander and as a shrewd ruler, by the summer of 1871 he controlled all of Southern Xinjiang, including Kashgar.
and Urumchi, and established himself as the political and religious leader of the region, now effectively an emirate incorporated under Islamic Law (120).

Initially being a mix of both internal unrest and Khoqandi intervention, the period beginning in 1864 saw the almost total loss of Qing control in Xinjiang. This was magnified in July of 1871 when the Russians decided to take matters into their own hands in order to prevent Muslim rebellion from spilling into their borders. Russian troops moved into Xinjiang, occupying the Ili region, and in 1872 enacted a commercial treaty with Yaqub Beg. Russian actions were not only dictated by their own domestic concerns and the desire to limit Qing influence, but also over concern of increasing British expansion in Central Asia. The Russians sought to prevent British efforts to form an alliance with the newly-created emirate ruled by Yaqub (Clarke 77). Thus, the Yaqub Beg campaigns thrust the Qing in Xinjiang into the geopolitical great game for power in Central Asia.

The reconquest of Xinjiang in 1878 by the Qing general Zuo Zongtang stands as one of the few military and strategic successes for the Qing during the latter half of the nineteenth century, a period that saw the “opening” of China to Western trade and domination at the barrel of a gun. The Qianlong-era view that Xinjiang constituted a territorial buffer essential to the protection of China’s frontier, an idea made more legitimate by the Russian occupation of Ili and the military aid that the British had given to Yaqub Beg, served only as part of the basis of the argument to reconquer the territory (Millward 126-127). After the swift 1877-1878 reconquest, where Zuo’s troops had encountered little to no resistance as Yaqub desperately waited for British support, Qing forces were again in control of Xinjiang; however the previous legacy of Qing imperial control, both ideologically and physically, had been completed wiped out across
the landscape after the turbulence of the previous two decades of strict Islamic rule under Yaqub Beg (131).

The end result would be the completion of the transformation of Qing administrative policy in Xinjiang that had been happening since resettlement efforts began in the 1830s. This transformation would be completed with provincehood in 1884. Echoing the thinking of the early nineteenth century scholars Wei Yuan and Gong Zizhen, Zuo Zongtang advocated for the formal incorporation of Xinjiang into the Qing state under the junxian system that governed the inner provinces that constituted China proper. This effectively replaced the system of segregated military rule under the banner system instituted by the Qianlong emperor (Millward 136, Clarke 78-79). Similar to the reasoning of Gong Zizhen, Zuo believed that giving Xinjiang provincehood would be the proper means of securing the frontier and reducing the historically high costs of administration. Perhaps as equally as important, this formal shift away from segregation as an aim of administrative policy illustrated the increasing influence of the ideology of integration, an idea partly based on the growing belief that Xinjiang was an integral and inalienable part of not only the Qing Empire, but of China itself.

Preceded by the 1881 Treaty of St. Petersburg that returned the Ili valley region from Russian control, the formal declaration of Xinjiang’s provincehood in 1884 also indicated a shift in motives and aims of administrative policy by introducing the idea of sinicization. Many scholars believe sinicization eventually became a motive for administrative policy unto itself, especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Clarke 81-83). According to the new ideological framework, as security concerns on the frontier motivated integration, integration in turn motivated policies aimed at ethnically, politically, and agriculturally transforming Xinjiang to secure its place as a portion of Chinese territory. Thus, the aim of
securing China’s frontier through provincialization went hand in hand with sinicization of the local population: from 1884 until the end of the Qing dynasty in 1911, the “cornerstones of Qing policy were the encouragement of Han settlement, direct rule by Han Chinese officials, attempts to link Xinjiang with neighboring provinces,” and attempts to “culturally assimilate the Uyghur population through Confucian education” (Clarke 82, Starr 63).

However, some scholars, such as Nicola Di Cosmo, argue that 1884 did not mark a shift in the motives behind administrative policy. Rather, Di Cosmo argues that “the transformation of Xinjiang into a province in 1884 occurred only as a consequence of the need to consolidate Qing sovereignty in the face of foreign pressure: the change was not intended to be the prelude to assimilation” (294). Although there is merit to Di Cosmo’s claim, the evidence put forward by this thesis has shown that by 1884, the influence of evolving administrative ideology, in addition to internal and external pressure, increasingly motivated the Qing leadership to control Xinjiang in the context of the belief that Xinjiang, just like the inner provinces, should be administered and made an inherent and necessary part of China. Thus, integrating and perhaps even “sinicizing” Xinjiang after 1884 was integral to securing the territory of China as a whole, especially in the face of foreign pressure and internal unrest.

The end of the Qing dynasty in 1911 and the ensuing creation of the Republic of China witnessed Xinjiang undergo a period of semi-independence and warlord rule under various Han and Turkic entities. This period, which would stretch until the final consolidation of control by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, saw the converging influence within Xinjiang of various outside ideologies and geopolitical developments, namely the two world wars, revolutions and civil wars in Russia and China, the emergence of Western-style nationalism, and socialism (Millward 179-80). The convergence of these external influences within Xinjiang’s borders once
again illuminated the growing importance of Xinjiang in the grand course of world events. After
the beginning of Communist rule in 1949, Xinjiang once again became a meeting ground
between two major powers- the Soviet Union and China- just as it had been during the latter half
of the nineteenth century between Tsarist Russia, the British Empire, and Qing China.

**IV. Why did Xinjiang matter to the CCP in the period after 1949? (1949-1990)**

Answering the third question posed by this thesis- “Why did Xinjiang matter to the CCP
in the period after 1949?”- will illuminate how the underlying motives behind administrative
policy in Xinjiang from 1949 until the present day have been dictated both by geopolitical
concerns and by ideological constructs that originated in the Qing dynasty era. These ideological
constructs- namely that Xinjiang should be integrated and assimilated into the Chinese state as a
means to achieve various domestic and foreign policy goals, and that Xinjiang belongs in the
Chinese state due to its historical legacy- thus show a continuity in administrative ideology from
the late Qing era to the current day. Likewise, the People’s Republic of China has maintained
into the twenty-first century that “Xinjiang has always been a part of China” (Harris 112).

Ideology is not the only motive underlying administrative policy in Xinjiang, however. This is
true for the Qing dynasty period since the late eighteenth century as well as the entire
Communist era. The desire by the Communist state to prevent the influence within Xinjiang of
external forces in Central Asia, a motive that has been apparent since the end of the Qing
conquest in the mid-eighteenth century, has also dictated administrative policy action in the
region under the various periods of Communist rule. As will be subsequently discussed, specific
geopolitical concerns- namely suppressing local independence movements, checking the
expansion and influence of the Soviet Union in Xinjiang and Central Asia, and securing
influence over trade and natural resources—were, and continue to be, strong motives that determine the nature of the administrative policy of the Communist Party in Xinjiang.

In terms of policy objectives, since 1949 the policies of the CCP have often had as their objective the total integration of Xinjiang with China, an objective which some scholars believe comes from the notion held to by successive leaders that China is a nation rightfully controlled by the Han people (Mcmillen 84). The goal of total integration in Xinjiang, as in other peripheral regions, has been justified by the CCP based on a variety of security concerns, political and economic factors, and historical interpretations. Forced integration of the province’s ethnic minorities has been pursued to varying degrees despite the rhetoric of the “successive constitutions that defined China as a multiethnic political community” in which all ethnic groups were to be afforded the right of self-determination (Rawski 839).

When the People’s liberation army entered Xinjiang in September and October of 1949, they were first faced with the task of eliminating the scattered armed resistance of groups loyal to the Nationalist government and of Turkic groups associated with the former East Turkestan Republic. This led to the implementation of direct military rule that saw the systematic purging of officials suspected of disloyalty to the new Communist government as well as the reintegration of some former GMD (Nationalist Party) officials into the military government and the PLA. As the Communists gained control over the region and eliminated their various opponents under military rule, by the early 1950s the military government had been disbanded and “Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conferences” were erected to facilitate controlled elections that would create the People’s Governments that existed throughout the rest of the country (Millward 238-39). A gradual administrative approach, which would last until the beginning of Mao’s Great Leap Forward in 1957, was then implemented, the ultimate aim being
to secure the Party’s control over the province and to integrate the local populations into the socialist ideology and membership of the Party. This gradual approach, which saw the incorporation of Uyghurs and other non-Han officials into the lower levels of the administrative structure, was motivated by several ideological and geopolitical factors.

First, continuous conflict and instability during the years between the 1911 revolution and the 1949 revolution had seen Xinjiang ultimately become a satellite state of Tsarist Russia and then the Soviet Union after 1917. Since 1944, Xinjiang had been split between the mutually antagonistic regimes of the East Turkestan Republic in the northwest, essentially a Soviet satellite state, and the GMD provincial authorities based in Urumchi, who in actuality orchestrated a loose degree of control over their jurisdiction and had often relied on indirect Soviet support (Clarke 203-4). Thus, the local populations encountered by the PLA in 1949 were decidedly anti-Chinese in their views, and the CCP decided to take a gradual approach to implementing formal provincial government so as not to foment widespread rebellion that could undermine it. This gradual approach, further strengthened by initial Soviet support for Chinese control of Xinjiang, was derived from the general cooperation between Mao and Stalin during the early 1950s. Second, Mao’s wish to establish a unified Chinese state bereft of foreign and capitalist influences necessitated that Xinjiang be formally integrated into the political system of the People’s Republic. Third, Mao’s desire to develop China into a socialist state based on Stalinist-Leninist administrative principles motivated the Party to institute widespread agricultural and administrative reform in the socialist vein.

The three factors outlined above motivated administrative policy measures from 1949 to 1957 that aimed to incorporate Xinjiang into the overall political and ideological structure of China while simultaneously quelling dissent and distancing the Party from the Han-centric
“assimilationism” espoused by the Nationalist Party (Starr 90-91). The main policy measures were agricultural reforms, namely the implementation of the *Bingtuan* state farm system, and the political reorganization of Xinjiang into the Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). These policies, although orchestrated under a socialist context, were strikingly similar in motives and aims to Qing dynasty era policies, specifically under Qianlong.

Beginning in 1950, the first process of agricultural reform, the Party’s Land Reform Program, initiated the shift to collectivized agriculture in the region and destroyed the power of local elites and prominent landowners by redistributing land to the peasants. On the eve of the Great Leap Forward in 1957, some 11,000 hectares of land had been redistributed to poorer peasants while almost half of the region’s nomadic herders had been placed into collectivized farms (Millward 241-42). This succeeded in removing many of the Party’s ideological enemies while strengthening support for the Party amongst the peasants. However the Bingtuan system of military-agricultural colonies ultimately transformed the ethnic and administrative makeup of Xinjiang. The Bingtuan system was derived almost directly in nature from the *tuntian* system of military state farms implemented under the Qianlong-era administration in the late eighteenth century. The Bingtuan system formed communities that served the simultaneous purpose of reclaiming land for sedentary agriculture and for forming local militias to support the Party’s efforts. The basis of the Bingtuan system was the massive resettlement of Han Chinese from the interior to Xinjiang. In just a few short years, by 1957 the Bingtuan population had grown to around 300,000, most of which were Han Chinese (Millward 251, Starr 91). The aim of the Bingtuan system, seen in its creation of a large military force loyal to the Chinese state and the implementation of “Han-style” sedentary agriculture, was not only to link the agricultural, ethnic, and ideological characteristics of Xinjiang to that of the interior, but also to strengthen
security on the northwestern frontier. Thus the Bingtuan system is strikingly similar in its objectives when compared to Qing-era administrative policy.

Likewise, the system of theoretical autonomy and self-governance for non-Han ethnicities in Xinjiang, embodied in the title of “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” also had similarity to the Qing-era civil administration and bureaucratic hierarchy. In 1953, the Party, applying Stalin’s theory of nationalities, began placing Xinjiang’s peoples into the ethnic groups officially designated by the government’s Nationalities Affairs Commission. Each ethnicity was given their own designated autonomous area to be governed, at least in theory, by a local representative body led by members of that respective ethnic group. In practice, although the autonomous areas allowed for the preservation of local Muslim practices and institutions, Han officials were placed in every representative body and the decisions of each body were ultimately dictated by the central government and the Party (Millward 242-46). The “autonomy” system thus implemented the overarching control of the Communist Party over existing local power structures, creating centralized control in the province similar in nature to the early Qing administrative system.

The effects of Mao’s Great Leap Forward that lasted from 1957 to 1961 were felt throughout Xinjiang just as they were across the rest of China. This period was highlighted by widespread xenophobia, economic and political chaos, the infusion of far-left communist ideology throughout all aspects of political and cultural life, and heightened tension with the Soviet Union. In Xinjiang, the immediate effects of the economic reforms of the Great Leap Forward and the ensuing Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution were to abandon the gradual approach to integration seen in administrative policy before 1957. The underlying motives behind administrative policy- countering the potential effects of external, primarily Soviet,
influences, implementing socialism, and fully integrating Xinjiang into the formal structure of the Chinese state remained the same.

However the influence of these motives upon the aims and objectives of administrative policy was heightened by the infusion of Mao’s nationalist ideology, which was inherited from the historical perceptions of what should constitute the “Chinese” state, both geographically, culturally, and ideologically. Mao’s ideology was also derived from the principles of Han nationalism espoused by his republican forebears, Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-Shek (Clarke 212). This ideological principal has some similarity to the thinking of Wei Yuan, Zuo Zongtang, and Gong Zizhen, who advocated for the provincehood of Xinjiang in the nineteenth century as the best means of integrating it politically, administratively, and culturally into the concept of a “Chinese” state, as discussed previously. However, the ideal of sinicization that first emerged in Qing policy after 1884 is somewhat different from Han nationalism, in that it was not based on the belief in the superiority of the Han race and its right to dominate Asia (Rawski 839). However, Han nationalism and sincization both had at their core the principle of inducing “Chinese-ness” amongst ethnic minorities, regardless of the definition of “Chinese-ness” according to the context of the time period. Mao’s ideological principle that China was rightfully dominated by Han Chinese became a large influence over Xinjiang’s administrative policy from 1957 to 1976. However due to the extreme tenets of this style of nationalism and its potential to arouse ethnic uprisings in Xinjiang, it was often concealed in administrative policies under the rhetoric that non-Han peoples in Xinjiang were Soviet sympathizers (Millward 256).

Wang Enmao, who governed Xinjiang from 1949 to 1966 and then again under Deng Xiaoping from 1981 to 1992, orchestrated administrative policy during the Great Leap Forward and the initial phases of the Cultural Revolution that was closely in line with the aims of Mao’s
ideology and policy. These aims came to fruition beginning in the late 1950s. Wang and Mao both wanted to establish the control and authority of both the Party and the Han throughout Xinjiang as a means of integrating it totally into the Chinese state. In policy, this would mean not only eliminating all opposition but also incorporating ethnic minorities into the Party and assimilating them into Han society by wiping out cultural traditions, languages, Islam, and any traces of “local nationalism” (Mcmillen 84-5). As well, the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1950s brought about increasing conflicts between Soviet and Chinese troops at the border, especially in 1969. Tense Sino-Soviet relations were heightened by increasing unrest amongst some minority groups who were still loyal to the Soviet Union and who were wary of the nationalities and autonomy policies (Millward 257-58). In Xinjiang, administrative policy during the Great Leap Forward also followed the path of Mao’s agricultural and economic reforms being instituted throughout the rest of China, which aimed to create modern agriculture and industrial capacity in rapid fashion. The rapid overhaul of these reforms often had disastrous results; in Xinjiang, drives to collectivize agriculture through the formation of people’s communes resulted in widespread famine with estimates of up to 200,000 dead. Collectivization efforts during these years also finally wiped out the solidarity of the nomadic Kazak herders on the Xinjiang steppe as herding households were forcibly merged into communes or factories, while dissenters were executed (260).

More importantly, administrative policies during the Great Leap Forward resulted in the active suppression and elimination of many Turkic and Muslim officials and Party members. Policies reflected Mao and the Party’s aim to fully integrate and assimilate Xinjiang into a decidedly Han Chinese, “modern” socialist nation-state and to eliminate foreign (mainly Soviet) and non-Chinese influences. In Xinjiang, by the late 1950s Soviet textbooks had been replaced
with Chinese ones while non-Han Party members were purged due to their supposed pro-Soviet leanings (256). The focus of the nationwide Anti-Rightist campaign in Xinjiang, supposedly aimed at removing conservatives and traditionalists from the population, ended up focusing on the removal of “local nationalists” and “modern revisionists” (Soviet sympathizers) from the Party ranks. The vast majority of these individuals were non-Han in origin (McMillen 94-98). Although many of these pretexts were false, there is evidence to suggest that the threat of Soviet intervention and influence in Xinjiang was very real; in 1962, the Yi-ta incident saw the mass emigration across the Soviet border of tens of thousands of non-Han individuals from Northern Xinjiang with direct Soviet help (Millward 263-64).

The years of the Cultural Revolution, from 1966-1976, also saw a massive upheaval within society in China and Xinjiang. Widespread anti-Soviet hysteria and geopolitical tension with the USSR also continued to motivate policy, illuminating the importance that Beijing placed on Xinjiang for its perceived strategic necessity. In Xinjiang, by this time period Mao’s Han nationalist ideology was no longer orchestrated in policies under the guise of xenophobia. Across the province, Islam and Central Asian cultural customs were deemed as subversive and un-Chinese, and were accordingly suppressed. Kurans were burned and mosques and Islamic sites were closed across the province (Starr 97). One policy measure constant throughout this period, maintained since the late 1950s, was the massive influx of Han civilians into Xinjiang through state-sponsored settlement policies. Beginning during the Great Leap Forward, an estimated one and a quarter million Han migrated to Xinjiang (Millward 263). The size of this migration far and away eclipsed the efforts made during Qing dynasty, and the ethnic makeup of Xinjiang emphatically changed. Thus an overarching objective of the Party’s various policy measures in Xinjiang was to induce assimilation as a means for integration and development. Local Party
rhetoric espoused by Wang Enmao echoed with assimilationism—“the complete blending of all the nationalities is critical to continued socialist construction” (Starr 94).

In contrast to the Mao years, the years under Deng Xiaoping, which lasted from 1978 to 1992, were highlighted by the official retrenchment of the assimilationist policies of the Mao era, and the introduction of a more pragmatic reform program that emphasized “political stability, economic growth, and the de-emphasis of ideology on policy-making” (Millward 276). Similar to both 1949 and 1884, the new Communist leadership under Deng inherited a Xinjiang that had been ravaged by the effects of incessant ethnic and political conflict within, due to the chaos unleashed by the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Thus, new forms of administrative policy were necessary to achieve the Party’s continuing goal of wholly integrating Xinjiang into the Chinese state. This shift in administrative policy that repudiated the assimilationist and Han nationalist ideology of Mao harkened a move back to the goals and aims of administrative policy in Xinjiang during the period from 1949 to 1956. The gradual nature of instituting control during this period was reflected in policies that sought to reinstitute autonomy for ethnic minorities and to incorporate them into the Party administrative hierarchy (277-79).

However, two inherent motives that had dictated administrative policy during the Mao years remained the same. These were the belief in the necessity to integrate Xinjiang into the Chinese state and in the necessity to reinstitute control over Xinjiang in order to counter the effects of external influence that could potentially cause upheaval within its borders. Although, as it will be discussed, the policies of Deng Xiaoping were domestic and internal in focus, they increasingly became motivated and influenced by important geopolitical events, namely the continued pressure exerted by the Soviet Union, diplomatic negotiations with the United States, and events transpiring in the Middle East. The latter years of the Dengist period also witnessed
the resurgence of ethnic unrest and movements for ethnic independence, which by this period were intrinsically tied to external developments (Harris 115). Thus, it can also be said that Xinjiang during the Dengist period came to embody perhaps another “Great Game” for control in Central Asia.

The chief aim of administrative policy during the Deng years was a return to moderation and liberalization through the abandonment of Mao’s assimilationist ideology, economic development, the reinstatement of Party authority over Xinjiang, specifically through the reintegration of ethnic minorities into the Party structure, and an increase in border defense and security. Deng’s restoration of Wang Enmao to the position of de-facto governor of Xinjiang in 1981 ushered in a new position that the “fusion of nationalities” so desired by the Party in the past could be realized only in the long term. Returning to policies aimed at accommodating the unique characteristics of ethnic minorities was deemed necessary in order to ensure stability, quell separatism, and maintain the authority of the Party. Liberalization resulted in the loosening of restrictions on the practice of Islam, the reintroduction of non-Han languages in schools, and the revival of the cultural and social practices of ethnic minorities (Millward 277, Clarke 320-21).

Important as well, the policy of “opening” Xinjiang to the rest of China and the outside world during the 1980s allowed Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities to travel and migrate to places outside of their homelands (Starr 114). However, the Party still made clear to ethnic minorities the line between what would be considered legal and illegal in terms of religious and cultural expression, and that the nature of these practices would ultimately be dictated by the Party. Likewise, Deng’s economic reforms in the region aimed to integrate Uyghurs and other minorities back into the fabric of society by raising their standard of living. Another aim of instituting economic development was to quell potential sources of unrest amongst the large
numbers of impoverished minorities who had begun protesting against the Central Government with increasing frequency since 1980 (Clarke 323). Economic policies under Deng concentrated on the de-collectivization of agriculture, developments in infrastructure, the introduction of limited free-market practices, and the encouragement of foreign investment. Throughout the 1980s Xinjiang’s economy became formally integrated into that of China as a whole by its placement into successive five-year plans, wherein the government adopted strategies aimed at extracting Xinjiang’s natural resources to spur development in the East Coast provinces (328-29). Economic reforms therefore saw the continued integration of Xinjiang with China. Special attention was paid to the socioeconomic status of citizens in order to increase internal stability, and as a result standards of living in Xinjiang rose steadily throughout through the mid-1980s (Millward 279).

Politically, the Party reinstituted its own authority and control within Xinjiang, especially in ethnic minority communities. Although power in the Party was ultimately left in the hands of Han officials, new laws introduced in 1980 and 1984 increased the minimum required proportion of non-Han officials in local representative parties and called for the training and cultivation of new non-Han party officials. Deng’s rehabilitation of former party officials, many of them minorities who had been sacked during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, also increased the party’s legitimacy in Xinjiang. These new political reforms were also motivated by the government’s wariness of nationalist rumblings throughout the 1980s by ethnic minorities in other regions, notably Tibet, as well as Xinjiang. Thus, integration of minorities into the Party became an effective way of preserving Party authority (278, 281).

Finally, Wang Enmao’s focus on strengthening border security and defense, transcribed in policy by 1982, was an effort rooted in several geopolitical developments that had heightened
the government’s fears that internal stability might be threatened due to Xinjiang’s linkages with the rest of Central Asia. These events, namely the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Soviet diplomatic overtures with the Vietnamese, and continuing Chinese alignment with the United States in Central Asian geopolitical matters, increased animosity between China and the Soviet Union. The Chinese feared the Soviets could hem them in in Central Asia if they were to be successful in their military and strategic efforts (Clarke 312-17). Furthermore, by the late 1980s, Wang Enmao and the Party leadership in Xinjiang worried that the Islamic nationalism which had arisen in Afghanistan might spread, initiating a “jihad” of sorts in Xinjiang (331).

Throughout the years of Deng Xiaoping’s administration, administrative policy in Xinjiang resulted in increased, albeit still limited autonomy for ethnic minorities, an increase in living conditions, economic development, and trade, the growth and integration of minorities into the Communist Party, an increase in the “openness” of the region to the outside world, and a shift away from Han-centric ideology. The end result was the rapid integration of Xinjiang into the larger Chinese state and an increase in internal stability, although ethnic unrest and tension still continued sporadically. However, the liberalized reforms of the Deng years were indeed a double-edged sword; by the late 1980s, the plateauing of autonomy and freedoms granted to local minorities had resulted in increased calls for independence. As well, the wave of democratic protest that swept China in 1989, increasing contact with the outside world, and the increasing exploitation of Xinjiang’s natural resources by Beijing had initiated a new wave of ethnic uprisings and ethnic nationalism which has continued almost unabated to this day (Starr 112-119). Thus, the Party’s ultimate goal in Xinjiang of integration, and perhaps eventual assimilation, although ever more closer to success, remains distant. However the underlying motives behind administrative policy during the Deng years- concerns over the influence of
external forces and geopolitical events spreading into Xinjiang, as well as the ideology that Xinjiang is necessarily and rightfully a part of China- continue to hold varying degrees of influence.

**V. Xinjiang since 1990 (1990-Present)**

Since 1990, Xinjiang has witnessed a massive upsurge in political and ethnic violence by Uyghur separatists, which has produced considerable backlash by the Chinese government. This resurgence in internal unrest coincided with the breakup of the Soviet Union, the emergence of independent Central Asian states, and Beijing’s increased focus on extracting Xinjiang’s energy resources (Moneyhon 121). The resulting government crackdown on ethnic separatists has furthered calls for Uyghur independence. Meanwhile geopolitical events- such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, the expansion of US influence in Central Asia, an increasing disparity between energy demand and supply, and the emergence of new independent states in Central Asia, namely Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan- have tightened Beijing’s focus on Xinjiang as the government has adopted the view that Xinjiang and Central Asia has immense importance in world affairs (120-23).

Since 1991, the result of Beijing’s tightened focus on Xinjiang has been the implementation of new administrative and developmental policies aimed both at increasing Xinjiang’s interconnectivity with the rest of Central Asia and at furthering Xinjiang’s integration with China (Mackerras et al. 39). Economically, new policy measures have increased Chinese and foreign investment in Xinjiang with the aim of developing efficient methods of extracting Xinjiang’s energy reserves and modernizing infrastructure in order to support extraction. Economic development has also resulted in the resurgence of Han migration to Xinjiang. The upsurge in Uyghur nationalism, coupled by Beijing’s fear of Islamic terrorism seeping into
Xinjiang, has resulted in policies aimed at curbing the contact of Xinjiang’s Muslims with the outside world. Beijing desires to forcefully exterminate separatist movements and to subtly increase the Party’s political power (Harris 121-23). Administrative policies have been orchestrated against the backdrop of China’s “Open Door” foreign policy, wherein Beijing has sought to use Xinjiang as a medium to increase its influence over its Central Asian neighbors while further buttressing its “project of integration and development within Xinjiang.” Beijing has cooperated with the US in regards to their interests in the region, which after 2001 have been primarily focused on combatting the spread of Islamic extremism (Clarke 39-40). The most notable foreign policy result of China’s “Open Door” policy in Central Asia is the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001. The six member states of the SCO- China, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan- have outlined the twin imperatives of the organization, which are expanding regional economic cooperation and increasing regional security, the latter having been established under the pretext of countering Islamic terrorism and preventing cross-border crimes such as drug trafficking (Mackerras et al. 101-102).

Thus, as the increasing geopolitical significance of Central Asia has led to China’s restructuring and broadening of both its regional foreign policy and administrative policy in Xinjiang, several important questions about the current nature of the motives behind its administrative policies have been illuminated. First, with the growing importance of the geopolitical motives that are behind the integrationist project in Xinjiang, what is the current status of ideology as a motive of administrative policy? With China’s abandonment of policies aimed at assimilation in the post-Mao era, it currently seems that Beijing has undergone a motivational shift when orchestrating the nature and aims of policy. Second, is the integration of Xinjiang, which has been both a motive and aim of administrative policy at various points since
1949, still the primary aim of China in regards to its administrative policy in the region? Or has the influence of the “Open Door” policy and the goal of increasing Xinjiang’s linkage with Central Asia taken precedent over this aim? It is the opinion of this author that only time will tell the answer to this question. Lastly, which ideological notion has been more predominant in the Communist era, both historically and currently- the notion that Xinjiang is, and always has been, an inherent and integral part of China, or the notion that Xinjiang, for a variety of strategic reasons, should be controlled by China? The answer to this last question has recently become somewhat of a topic of debate amongst scholars, however it does not necessarily concern this thesis. What is apparent, after the evidence put forth in the preceding discussions, is that during the Communist era, concerns over China and Xinjiang’s own security and Beijing’s fear of external influence and intervention have been constant and unrelenting motives behind its administrative policies in Xinjiang.

VI. Comparison and Conclusion

The ensuing discussion will create a succinct, yet detailed summary of the historical trajectory of the various motives underlying administrative policy during the Qing dynasty and Communist eras, with the ultimate aim of constructing an informative comparison between the primary motives behind administrative policy during these two respective periods. The end result will provide a definitive yes or no answer in regards to the argument put forth by the thesis, restated here: the primary motives underlying the Qing dynasty’s conquest and administration of Xinjiang are the largely the same as the motives behind the CCP administration in the region since 1949.

The completion of the extermination of the Zunghars by the Qianlong emperor in 1759, which put a formal end to the Qing conquest of Xinjiang, increased the scope of China’s
northwest frontier to nearly the same size and limits which it has today. Invoked by the immediate threat posed by Galdan’s invasion in 1688, the conquest of Xinjiang was ultimately justified to the prominent Han literati by the Qianlong emperor on the grounds that it both enhanced the security of China proper and reduced financial costs. Qianlong believed that Xinjiang could relieve a population burden on China proper by harboring large amounts of banner troops in permanent, self-supporting military garrisons (Millward 96-97). Although Qianlong continued to encounter literati resistance to this notion, the passage of time led to a change of heart, and by the early nineteenth century, many Qing statesmen accepted the notion that holding Xinjiang was essential to the security of China proper.

The fact that the conquest of Xinjiang and its subsequent incorporation into the Qing Empire was initiated by accident as a response to the Zunghar invasion, and not motivated by any prevailing “integrationist” or “assimilationist” conquest ideology, is reflected in the nature of Qing administrative policy during the eighteenth century. Evidence for this fact, detailed at length previously, can be seen in the existence of “parallel administrations and legal systems for Turkic Muslim, Mongol, and Chinese inhabitants of the region” during this time period (101-02, 107). The aim of integrating, and then ultimately assimilating Xinjiang into the Chinese state was not apparent until provincehood in 1884. However the ideology of assimilation was never truly influential at this time either; still, its roots can be traced back to the implementation of policies encouraging Han migration to the region beginning in 1834.

The Qing were motivated to incorporate Xinjiang as a province in 1884 due to the chaotic period of rebellion, foreign intrusion, and rising financial costs from 1862 until 1878. The idea put forth by notable statesmen— that integrating Xinjiang into China proper through provincehood, Han migration, and the implementation of the juntian system was the best means
of establishing control and security in the region- was also an important motive behind the 1884 decision. These two motives, which had come to reflect the increasing influence of the emerging integrationist ideology, subsequently lent to the shift towards administrative policies in 1884 that embodied efforts, albeit ineffective, to sinicize Xinjiang. Integrationist ideology had then, by at least 1884, evolved further towards becoming a motive of its own, and it would continue to gain importance until 1911. However the notion that the ideology of “manifest destiny” or “sinicization through assimilation,” which has been attributed by some scholars as being present during the Qianlong period and as being the primary motive behind mid-nineteenth century Qing migration policies, is somewhat flawed (Zhao 18-19). The Han migration policies enacted by the Qing in 1834, which were largely unsuccessful, were motivated more by strategic concerns rather than ideology. Only after 1884 was ideology a major motive.

Further examination of this period conducted under the argument of the main thesis has also illuminated the origins of an important ideological motive that would continue to develop throughout the late Qing Dynasty and eventually become an extremely influential motive during the Communist era. This notion is that Xinjiang needs to be, and should be, an inherent and integral part of China. The first origin of this notion can be seen in the vast imperial knowledge-gathering projects conducted by the Qing in Xinjiang in the late eighteenth century. According to Millward, “although certainly not their intent, these works, through the production and collection of geographical knowledge about Altishahr and Zungharia, asserted that the newly conquered territory was part of the Qing realm… ultimately pav[ing] the way for a popular conception of China” (Millward 1999, 70). By the first half of the nineteenth century, this conception had already begun to grow, spurred on by the integrationist ideology of scholars such as Wei Yuan and Gong Zizhen, whose ideas would ultimately influence Xinjiang’s incorporation as a province
and subsequent administrative policy after 1884. This notion was further legitimated by the effects of the “Great Game” for Central Asia conducted between Russian, Britain, and the Qing Empire in the mid-nineteenth century. The “Great Game” showcased to Qing statesmen the increasing inability and ultimate failure of Qianlong’s “segregationist” administrative policies in being able to properly control and secure Xinjiang. Thus, one can see how the primary motives that dictated administrative policy during the Qing era were 1) the continued presence of significant external threats on the frontier and 2), only after the mid-nineteenth century, the evolving ideological notion that integrating Xinjiang into China proper, both culturally and geographically, was necessary and essential to achieve security in the region. These motives would continue to evolve and exercise great influence during the Communist era.

The Communist period in Xinjiang likewise saw the continuance of the second primary Qing motive, and at different periods, the transformation of it to become heavily imbued with an assimilationist stance. Integration has been the primary goal of the Chinese Communist Party in Xinjiang since 1949. Through the effects of various administrative policies enacted under successive administrations, the idea of integration eventually became a widespread ideological construct, primarily under Mao, that by the end of the Cultural Revolution had firmly become a motive behind administrative policy unto itself. Unlike the Qing, who did not begin to see integration as anything other than as a means to achieve control and security within Xinjiang until the last decades of the dynasty, the Communists almost immediately embodied the ideology of integration as a justification for administrative policy in Xinjiang. This can be seen in policy action from 1949 until 1957. With the commencement of Mao’s Great Leap Forward, the goal of integration reflected in policies aimed at assimilating Xinjiang’s ethnic minorities through forcible, and often violent means. The influence of the late Qing dynasty era, as discussed
previously in the answer to the third question framed by the thesis, is seen in the administrative policy of 1957-1976 in that policies also attempted to ideologically assimilate Xinjiang’s ethnic minorities through sinicization. During the Qing dynasty sinicization had been conducted, albeit on a small scale, after 1884 through the education of Uyghurs in Confucian schools. This time around, sinicization was embodied in the principles of Maoist ideology. Maoist ideological principles, based partly in Stalinist socialism and Han nationalism, held that anyone accused of local nationalism, modern-revisionism, or conservatism should be purged from the Party and exterminated. Any individual labeled with these accusatory pre-texts was considered to be non-Han or non-Chinese; thus, the Muslim and non-Han ethnicities of Xinjiang were most often the targets of these policies. Therefore, through policies aimed at assimilation, Mao orchestrated integration through radical forms of sinicization.

The first, and primary, motive behind administrative policy during the Qing era outlined by this thesis- the continued presence of significant external threats on the frontier- has also been extremely influential during the Communist era. Mao, Deng Xiaoping, and the subsequent administrations after 1992 perceived the Soviet Union and then Islamic extremism to be extremely dangerous due to their perceived linkages with Xinjiang’s ethnic minorities. Similar to the Qing dynasty, who were wary of the threats posed to their security posed by the Zunghars, the Khoqandis, the Khojas, Tsarist Russia, and the British Empire, the Communist state has also been continually worried about the subversive influence of external threats upon their integrationist policy in Xinjiang. Although Beijing no longer sees Xinjiang as a strategically important buffer zone like Qianlong did, instituting control, suppressing internal dissent, and projecting influence over Xinjiang’s Central Asian neighbors are all strategic objectives deemed necessary if the current economic and developmental policies aimed at linking Xinjiang to the
rest of China are to be continued. One aspect just described, the aim of countering external threats through the projection of Chinese influence, is notably similar to the various Qing efforts to institute and project imperial power in and beyond Xinjiang. Thus, although the form of external threats emanating from beyond Xinjiang’s borders changed during the Communist era, the ultimate motive to control external influence has remained the same.

One final aspect concerning the apparent continuity of the second primary Qing era motive during the Communist era has been the symmetrical fluctuation in the importance of this motive in determining the nature of administrative policy during the two periods. As just discussed, Mao’s ideological principles that motivated administrative policy during the 1957-1976 period imbued integration with the ideology of assimilation. However, with the beginning of the Deng years, as has been discussed previously, the Party backed away from ideology in an effort to implement a more pragmatic approach to administrative policy as a means of ensuring regional stability. This retrenchment of ideological influence upon policy is notable in that it reflects the lack of any primary ideological motives during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Just as Qianlong sought to secure Xinjiang in the name of increasing security and reducing imperial expenditure, so did Deng seek to control Xinjiang in the name of regional security and several economic reforms that concerned China as a whole.

Although Qianlong-era policies were notably different in their emphasis of segregation for Xinjiang rather than on integration, it is important to note that ideology has fluctuated in its influence throughout the Qing and Communist eras. While during the Qing era, the ideology of integration gradually emerged and gained a foothold over time, the continued growth of integrationism’s influence between the end of the Qing dynasty and the beginning of the Communist era had seen it become firmly entrenched by the beginning of the Communist rule in
Xinjiang in 1949. The apex that integrationist ideology reached under Mao, and its subsequent softening under Deng, mirrors the lack of influence it possessed under Qianlong and its increasing importance after the mid-nineteenth century. Noting this historical fluctuation while also considering the current context of the internal situation in Xinjiang, insights concerning the future direction of Chinese administrative policy and foreign policy in the region may be obtained. As internal instability continues to escalate in Xinjiang under the context of increasing calls for Uyghur independence, the Xinjiang of today has increasingly come to resemble the Xinjiang of the late eighteenth century. That is, an ethnically and culturally unique region that will always be intrinsically linked to Central Asia, which will continuously strive to preserve autonomy at the local level, and which will continue to be inherently different, although increasingly linked, with China proper.

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Works Cited


