Justice for Noncitizens:
A Case for Reforming the Immigration Legal System

Anna Paden Carson, Class of 2016
Poverty 423 Capstone
Winter Term 2016
Professor Brotzman

“On my honor, I have neither given nor received any unacknowledged aid on this paper. Throughout this semester, Professor Brotzman and various classmates have helped me with drafts, sentence structure, transitions, and arguments.” –Anna Paden Carson
Abstract

To the surprise of many, the immigration legal system exists as a function of the executive branch rather than the judicial, and many of the Constitutional rights guaranteed in a judicial court do not continue into the immigration legal sphere. Noncitizen defendants in the immigration court system are not guaranteed the same due process rights or right to appointed counsel as citizens, which severely limits their opportunities for a successful outcome. Moreover, while many noncitizens await their trials in these courts, they are often placed in one of the 234 immigration detention facilities across the nation, which further exacerbates the direness of their situations. When combined together, detainment and the immigration legal system cripple noncitizens attempting to challenge their removal cases. Defendants are too often denied, through various barriers, even the access to justice to try to seek relief. The current United States immigration court and detention systems are grossly inadequate for providing just treatment for noncitizens by operating on the assumption that they do not possess the same rights as United States citizens, and it is imperative to reform the immigration system in a way that more accurately represents the ideals set forth by the American Constitution.

Tags: immigration law, detention, noncitizen, due process, appointed counsel, Constitution
Although immigration policy remains today one of the most hotly contested issues in the political sphere, the conversation often overlooks discussion of the immigration legal system: the place that ultimately determines United States noncitizens’ fates. Interestingly enough, the immigration legal system, or the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), evolved as a function of the executive branch rather than the judicial, and many of the Constitutional rights guaranteed in a judicial court do not continue into the immigration legal sphere. Constitutional guarantees such as the right to a speedy trial, right to an attorney, and statutes of limitations are irrelevant in immigration court. Moreover, while many noncitizens await their trials in these courts, they are placed in one of the 234 immigration detention facilities across the nation. While the American Bar Association maintains that the purpose of detention is to “ensure court appearances and effect removal,” because immigration detention is considered ‘civil’ detention, individuals are not entitled to the same protections under the law as those who committed a crime and serve time in ‘criminal’ detention (“Unlocking” 167). When combined together, the immigration detainment and legal system cripple noncitizens attempting to challenge their cases, and defendants are too often denied even the access to justice to try to seek relief. The current United States immigration court and detention systems are grossly inadequate for providing just treatment for noncitizens by operating on the assumption that they do not possess the same rights as United States citizens, and it is imperative to reform the immigration system in a way that more accurately represents the ideals set forth by the American Constitution.

The immigration system in the United States, and particularly the immigration detention and court systems, is currently broken. Twelve million undocumented immigrants presently live in the United States, and the number of foreigners trying to enter the country illegally increases each year. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICE have quadrupled their spending between the years 2003 and 2015 to attempt to further secure the southern border and increase immigration enforcement personnel. However, as enforcement and therefore detainments have increased, the number of persons entering into the immigration court system has obviously increased along with it, but the courts have not adapted to this change. Between those same years of 2003 to 2015, immigration court spending increased by only 74%, and the numbers of judges and courts have remained stagnant. To properly account for these changes in immigration enforcement, National Association of Immigration Judges President Dana Leigh Marks maintains that the immigration courts should be doubled or even tripled in size immediately (“Empty”).

Today there are 254 full time immigration judges operating in 58 immigration courts across the nation, but the conditions in which they are expected to work are unsustainable. The average caseload per judge is 1,200 cases per year, compared to 380 cases per year for federal district judges (Abbott 3). Four to six judges often share one law clerk and, as immigration law is considered only second in complexity to tax law, those clerks likely do not have necessary time to study foreign-country developments and case precedent to aid in well-informed decisions (Abbott 1). This certainly can lead to inconsistent rulings through judge and clerk burnout and unfair odds for the defendant (Abbott 3). Moreover, because Congress is spending more money to arrest noncitizens but not adequately funding the EOIR to account for these changes, backlogs have increased by 163% in the courts. As of February 2016, 474,025 cases are pending for an average of 1,071 days each, and noncitizens in Chicago have started receiving court dates for 2019 (“Reducing,” “Empty”). In many cases, noncitizens remained detained throughout this waiting period, which in turn burdens the government, costs the taxpayer, and hurts the noncitizen and his or her family. These two factors—a noncitizen facing the immigration court
system while being detained in an immigration detention center—qualify a detained noncitizen as being part of one of the most disadvantaged and vulnerable groups in the country.

While waiting for their day in immigration court, ICE often holds noncitizens in either one of the 234 detention centers throughout the country or in one their designated immigrant beds in a criminal jail. Immigration detention in the United States is considered civil detention, and because the Supreme Court considers this “not imprisonment in the legal sense,” it is not beholden to the protections set forth by the Constitution. The distinction between civil and criminal detention was first raised with the Supreme Court case Wong Wing v. United States (1896) where the decision differentiated between “detention or temporary confinement, as part of the means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens.”

With the insistence that immigration detention is solely a governmental holding mechanism used simply to fulfill its civil immigration enforcement goals, it is more easily justifiable to deny detainees their fundamental human rights (Chacón 623). But the line between civil and criminal detention and treatment is frequently blurred. Immigrant detainees are commonly placed in the same facilities, and subject to the same treatment and conditions, as criminals. But statistically, 61% of noncitizens detained are not criminals, and of those that do have criminal records, 50% of them committed nonviolent crimes like traffic offenses (Plus). Dora Schriro, a senior official at the Department of Homeland Security, even admitted that more than half of immigrant detainees were being detained under punitive conditions inappropriate for simply civil detainees (Chacón 623). The everyday reality of someone in an immigration detention center, then, is grim.

A joint report filed in 2004 acknowledged the shortcomings of immigration detention centers in comparison to its legal expectation. The Leadership Conference for Civil Rights and American Bar Association report described, “The combination of physical isolation, substandard
conditions at facilities, limited access to lawyers, and the lack of legal information demoralizes many detainees—some even to the point that they give up their cases and agree to be deported rather than continue to be imprisoned” (“Unlocking” 172). In the detention centers, men and women are housed separately, so families are frequently torn apart. Each person is designated a specific bed, given an alien registration number,—which, rather than their name, becomes their identifying factor in detention—and stripped of any personal belongings. Uniforms range from different colored t-shirts to full jumpsuits, and detainees must be present for several “counts” throughout the day. Communicating with the outside world also proves difficult. To talk on the phone, detainees must have a credit or a calling card, for which their family members have to pay, and receiving calls is very difficult to arrange as an entire dormitory usually shares a single phone. Mail delivery is no easier, as all incoming and outgoing mail is screened and inspected, making it a slow and frustrating process (Myslinka). A report conducted by the U.S. Civil Rights Commission further condemns the punitive nature of these detention centers.

This report makes it clear that the current conditions of adult immigration detention centers violate the standards of civil detention. Many detainees call their cells hieleras, or freezers, as the dormitories are frequently frigid. Living conditions are often unhygienic, and medical care is usually delayed, if not denied. Transgender women regularly are placed with male detainees, subjecting them to mistreatment and harassment, and religious freedoms, like Muslim prayer times, are usually interrupted by counts or meal times (Misra). Moreover, a New York Times report found that over 300 detained immigrants are held in solitary confinement on any given day, a condition that the United Nations special rapporteur on torture said indeed constituted as torture (Urbina). Detention of a family member also has consequences for those outside of detention as well, as detention often puts immigrants and their families in deep
economic and psychological distress. The 2007 median household income for a noncitizen family was $36,000, as compared to $50,000 for citizen families. This meant that a third of noncitizen children and a fifth of noncitizen adults lived in poverty and usually relied on public assistance. So when a member of that family entered detention, a significant chunk, if not all, of that family income disappeared (Passel). A study by the Urban Institute researching the immigration effects on noncitizens’ United States-citizen children found that in 2011 alone, over 5,000 children were in foster care due to an immigrant parent’s detention or removal, and the emotional toll of the situation negatively affected the children’s behavior, anxiety, and eating and sleeping patterns (“Accessing” 14). All of these factors suggest that immigration detention cannot truly be considered a civil detention and instead must be classified as criminal in nature.

Even with evidence that immigration detention centers are in fact punitive and equal in nature to criminal imprisonment, the number of detainees, and thus cost, continues to increase. Between the years of 1994 and 2013, the immigrant detention system grew more than five times, and the average daily-detained population increased from 6,785 to 34,260 (“Unlocking” 162). The increase in the detained population started in 2007 when President George W. Bush ended “catch and release” policies at the southern border. Rather than merely turning away those trying to enter the United States without authorization, ICE would detain the immigrant before formally deporting them. Another spike in the detainee population occurred in 2010 when Congressional appropriations language in ICE’s budget ensured funding be available for 34,000 filled immigration detention beds at all times. ICE has interpreted and enforced this as a mandatory 34,000 bed quota per night, and interestingly, about half of those beds are located inside actual criminal jail facilities which again calls into question immigration detention being classified as civil (“Immigrant Detention”). Since the enactment of this policy, the number of detainees across
that nation has never been lower than 30,000 per day (Chacón 622). Monetarily, the government currently spends over $2 billion per year on immigration detention, breaking down to approximately $158 per day per detained immigrant: twice the cost of incarcerating an inmate in criminal jail for a day (Eagly 31).

Worst of all, detention makes it difficult for detainees to have sufficient access to justice because they are not entitled to the same protections as persons in criminal detention. This is especially notable with regards to the Sixth Amendment that guarantees criminal defendants the right to appointed counsel. Because noncitizens in immigration court are considered civil defendants, they are excluded from this right and thus must either represent themselves in court pro se or pay for their own representation. The process of actually obtaining a representative if one chooses, however, can pose enormous challenges, and particularly when in detention. Often where the process begins is in the immigration court: immigration judges are required to advise immigrants of their right to obtain representation at their first hearing, or their “master calendar hearing” (Eagly 14). The judges then distribute a compiled list of low-cost and free legal services in the area to the defendant (Eagly 15). However, as over 40% of immigration detention centers in the nation are located more than 60 miles outside a city center, the possibility of finding representation and the possibility of an attorney agreeing to represent that detainee diminishes significantly (Eagly 35). The statistics show that immigrants with court hearings conducted in these rural areas and smaller cities had a fourth of the representation rates of detained immigrants held in larger cities (Eagly 2, 8). With greater exposure of this geography-related problem, many nonprofit organizations now organize detention center visits composed of representatives from law school clinics and larger firms to conduct know-your-rights presentations and perform intakes with any new detainees. From this, some detainee cases are assigned pro bono
representation, or at least have an opportunity to learn more about the options available (Eagly 30). For those in detention facilities where these types of interventions are not possible, a mere 36% of detained immigrants who sought counsel actually obtained it, likely due to a plethora of factors including financial hardship and inability to travel to attorney appointments (Eagly 34). These inadequacies in the immigration court system, the punitive and criminal nature of immigration detention centers, and the barriers to access to justice once inside those detention centers may seem shocking, but they are all to be expected given the history of the court system and detention centers.

Beginning with the Immigration Act of 1891, the Department of Treasury established the Office of Immigration, which first placed the sector of immigration under federal control. Within this office, inspection officers questioned foreigners entering United States territories, and the Office of Immigration had authority to deport any foreigners who violated the law back to their country of origin. Deciding this deportation power was too much for an individual, the Immigration Act of 1893 created the Board of Special Inquiry comprised of three inspection officers. This change came during the same year the Supreme Court upheld the Constitutionality of the 1892 Geary Act with Fong Yue Ting v. United States (1893), reaffirming that immigration law indeed fell under the executive branch of government and that Congress held the exclusive ability to establish and regulate all national immigration policy (Reyes 136). In 1903, all immigration responsibilities moved into the Department of Commerce and Labor, and ten years later it moved to specifically the Department of Labor when the previous department divided into two (“Evolution”). With regards to legislation, the Immigration Act of 1921 was the first of its kind to actually set a quota for each nationality and limit the number of persons that could enter the country, whereas earlier laws had only barred immigrants with contagious diseases or
undesirable political views from the country (Motomura 6). Even with this new legislation, immigration to the United States continued to increase, and there were a growing number of appeals from cases decided by the Office of Immigration. To account for this growth, the Secretary of Labor created the Board of Review to hear immigration case appeals. The Department of Labor further expanded in 1933 with the creation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and this new department moved to the Department of Justice in 1940. To simplify legal matters, Congress combined all previous immigration and naturalization law into the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which gave special inquiry officers (later known as immigration judges) the sole ability to decide deportation matters. Ultimately, the culminating event for the development of the immigration court system into what it is today was the establishment of the Executive Office for Immigration Review in 1983 (“Evolution”).

Because the EOIR falls under the Department of Justice, a part of the executive branch, the Attorney General of the United States in fact appoints immigration judges, and the prosecution in immigration court is attorneys from the Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (“Two Systems” 7). With respect to the defense representation for immigrants, any attorney the Board of Immigration Appeals has fully accredited as well as reputable individuals or law students under the supervision of an attorney may serve as counsel in proceedings (“FY 2014” F1). In terms of the actual process within the court system, immigrants could get DHS’s attention and be placed in the immigration system through anything from an unsuccessful adjustment of immigration status application, to DHS enforcement measures within the borders of the United States, to an arrest or conviction in judicial court (“Accessing” 7). From here DHS charges an immigrant with a Notice to Appear either via mail or in-person by an ICE officer. ICE oftentimes detains the individual, as well, to
avoid any chance of fleeing while the case is pending. But the likelihood of a noncitizen skipping court is very small: in the Fiscal Year 2013 review, federal data shows that 74% of non-detained noncitizens appeared for their immigration court hearings, and for those with legal representation nearly 100% appeared (“FY 2013”). The notice begins a removal proceeding in EOIR court where the DHS and ICE attorneys make a recommendation to the immigration judge on whether the immigrant should be deported (“Reimagining”). From here begins the trial portion of the court that could last between weeks and years where immigrants either find representation or represent themselves pro se to seek various forms of relief. This is a complicated process that often puts immigrants in situations more difficult than even in criminal judicial court.

With the surge in undocumented immigration in recent years and therefore increase in immigration court proceedings, the United States government has pushed the EOIR to decide more cases even more rapidly. Unfortunately for the noncitizen in the hearing, this translates to the fact that many cases are largely dependent on the judges to whom they appear rather than the actual merit and claims of their case. The court proceedings are certainly stacked against the defendant, as successful claims for immigration relief often involve marshaling evidence and arguing long and complicated legal arguments. This area is improved for the few defendants that can afford representation, but unlike criminal judicial proceedings, those defendants are required to testify and subject to cross-examination by government attorneys regardless of language abilities or mental capacity. At the end of testimonies and arguments, the judge can either decide that the defendant is not removable, thus terminating proceedings and releasing the defendant, or find them removable. From here once the judge has deemed the defendant removable, that judge can either order deportation or decide that the immigrant qualifies for some form of relief, whether that’s cancellation of removal, asylum, or adjustment of status with a green card, for
example (“Accessing” 8). Additionally if the judge deems the defendant removal, he or she can opt to voluntarily depart the country, a kind of voluntary deportation, which eases the restrictions on reapplying for immigration relief in the United States in the future. Both parties hold the right to appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals within the department of the EOIR, but following this decision immigrants can leave the EOIR’s jurisdiction to ask for judicial review by the federal courts of the United States Court of Appeals. In very rare cases, the decision can be further appealed to the United States Supreme Court who renders a final verdict. These appealed decisions are where many of the case precedents are found for other immigration claims. Like the system itself, immigration laws have had to also adapt to accommodate the increasingly complex field of immigration.

The most recent large-scale expansion of immigration law took place in 1996 with the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA). Prior to these reforms, most immigration cases were either exclusion or deportation cases: exclusion cases being where someone tried to come to the United States but was stopped by the INS and deemed inadmissible, and deportation cases being where a noncitizen violated some part of their visa conditions. With immigration numbers increasing and growing more complicated, however, the IIRAIRA created six additional types of cases including removal, credible fear review, reasonable fear review, claimed status review, asylum only, and withholding of removal, to account for the change (“FY 2014” B1). As an additional piece of the Act, Congress created quick, streamlined ways to deport noncitizens by bypassing a hearing with an immigration judge, and perhaps most significantly, the federal government authorized mandatory immigration detention for the first time. This, of course, had huge consequences on immigration detention numbers and costs. Even today, various other forms of relief or reforms, such as President
Obama’s Executive Orders of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) or Deferred Action for Parental Accountability (DAPA), continue to emerge as possibilities for relief thanks to evolving societal demands.

As seen through the history and current state of immigration court and the immigration detention system, the federal government currently operates on the belief that noncitizens do not possess the same rights under the Constitution as United States citizens. Based on judicial decisions and interpretations of current laws and those decisions, however, this belief has no basis. The key factor in this debate rests on the interpretation of the word “person” in the Equal Protection Clause of Section One of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution:

No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws (Contreras, emphasis mine).

Theoretically, if one could show that “person” in this context implies the inclusion of all people including noncitizens, due process would be extended to citizens and noncitizens alike, and the current immigration system would have to be deemed unconstitutional. Even before the creation of the Equal Protection Clause, beginning with the discussion of the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798, James Madison, representing the Anti-Federalist standpoint on the issue, argued that, “…it will not be disputed that, as [aliens] owe, on the one hand, a temporary obedience, they are entitled, in return, to their [Constitutional] protection and advantage” (Boyd 326). One of the most influential Founding Fathers, then, rejected the interpretation that noncitizens do not have Constitutional rights because they entered the United States illegally. The creation of the 14th Amendment certainly opened the door to debates of what the Founders truly meant by the term “person.”
In the interpretation of any law, many judges, and particularly with regards to the Supreme Court justices and the interpretation of the Constitution, try to consider the original intent of that law. As seen even in the Equal Protection Clause, the Constitution identifies two types of individuals in its language: “persons” and “citizens.” Remarkably enough, the only rights reserved exclusively for “citizens” in the Constitution are the right to vote and hold public office; all other rights listed, including those in the Bill of Rights, use the term “person.” While some argue that writers of the Constitution intended for these two terms to be interchangeable, others express the importance and intentionality of this distinction. Senator Jacob Howard, for example, one of the sponsors of the 14th Amendment, introduced the Amendment and its purpose on the Senate floor on May 23, 1866 by describing,

The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment disable a State from depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person, whoever he may be, of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or from denying to him the equal protection of the laws of the State. This abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with the injustice of subjecting one [group] of persons to a code not applicable to another (Boyd 328, emphasis mine).

The Supreme Court itself has waivered on its interpretation of the distinctions between these two terms, but key decisions provide clear evidence to support Senator Howard’s understanding of noncitizens’ rights.

The Supreme Court has a long history of acknowledging a differentiation between the terms person and citizen. With Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), the Court ruled for the first time on the matter of infringement of Equal Protection rights. Although largely disregarded after the decision of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) ten years later, the majority opinion set precedent that noncitizens have at least some claim to Constitutional protection by explaining that if a fair law is administered unfairly “so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons of similar circumstances,…the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
“[14th Amendment].” The decision in Wong Win v. United States (1896) futhered this opinion by holding that noncitizens in criminal proceedings were guaranteed the same Constitutional protections as United States citizens. While both cases involved Chinese noncitizens and the Chinese Exclusion Act, the Wong Win decision described how these protections extended far further than simply one racial or ethnic group: “It must be concluded that all persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection by [the Fifth and Sixth Amendments] and that even aliens shall not be…deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law” (emphasis mine). Reaffirming these two decisions of Yick Wo and Wong Win, in Yamataya v. Fisher (1903) the Supreme Court ruled that anyone present inside United States territory was entitled to Constitutional protection. Specifically, Justice John Harlan reiterated in the majority opinion that,

It is not competent for…any executive officer…to cause an alien who has entered the country, and has become subject in all respect to its jurisdiction…to be taken into custody and deported without giving him all opportunity to be heard…involving his right to be and remain in the United States. No such arbitrary power can exist where the principles involved in due process of law are recognized (Boyd 332).

After these three progressive rulings, interpretations of immigration decisions became increasingly strict with the World Wars and their aftermath, reflecting the nation’s often-xenophobic tone fearful of outsider intrusion. A realignment with and reaffirmation of the interpretations of the above three Supreme Court decisions did not occur until the second half of the 20th century.

In recent years, the Court has reinforced its opinion that there is a difference in meaning between the terms “person” and “citizen” in three notable cases. With Almeida-Sanchez v. United States (1973), the Court ruled that any elements of the Constitution like due process that related to criminal charges protected noncitizens, both legally and illegally present (Contreras).
Additionally, in 1982 the Court ruled in Plyler v. Doe that Texas could not deny undocumented immigrant children free public school education because it violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Texas statute had indeed discriminated on the basis of illegal immigration status, and the Supreme Court clarified this position by stating, “Whatever his status under immigration laws, *an alien is a ‘person’* in any ordinary sense of the term… the undocumented status of these children does not establish a sufficient rational basis for denying benefits that the state affords other residents” (Contreras, emphasis mine). The most recent Supreme Court decision, though, is influential in regards to both the Equal Protection Clause and immigration detention. In Zadvydas v. Davis (2001), the Court ruled that the United States could not detain immigrants under an order of deportation for longer than six months unless removal was in the foreseeable future or under special circumstance. The central clarification for this argument, however, was Justice Stephen Breyer’s majority opinion that held, “… the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent” (Zadvydas). While this decision seems straight forward, in practice ICE and EOIR together have interpreted the parameter of the “foreseeable future” broadly, and they continue to detain immigrants for periods longer than six months due to minimal enforcement of the ruling. Read together though, legal evidence and Court precedents suggest that noncitizens have full Constitutional protections, except in the cases of the right to vote and hold political office. It is actually a single clause from the Congressionally-enacted Immigration and Nationality Act that many blame for standing in the way of real progress.

*The* most recent revision to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) came in 2011 where Congress reaffirmed Section 292 of the Act stating that a defendant in immigration court had the right to counsel as long as it was “at no expense to the Government” (Adams 176). These
six words have greatly undermined efforts to show that defendants in removal proceedings have the right to assigned counsel, even with sufficient case law precedent. The challenge to this comes from the fact that some believe this Congressional Act seemingly holds more weight than Supreme Court decisions, as the EOIR falls under the executive branch rather than judicial. There also exists little case law on the very specific subject of right to assigned counsel for noncitizens. Three federal courts of appeals, however, have acknowledged that at least in some cases noncitizens’ rights could be substantially impaired without access to counsel. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that, “where an unrepresented indigent alien would require counsel to present his position adequately to an immigration judge, he must be provided with a lawyer at the Government’s expense. Otherwise, ‘fundamental fairness’ would be violated” (Adams 176). This decision rejected section 292 of the INA and supported determining right to counsel on a case-by-case basis. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided “Congress’ treatment of indigent aliens…may not be Constitutional as applied in individual cases. The Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process applies to immigration proceedings, and in specific proceedings, due process could be held to require that an indigent alien be provided with counsel…” Also advocating for the individual determination for appointed counsel, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a noncitizen could successfully argue that the deprivation of assigned counsel in immigration court infringed on his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment (Adams 177). Therefore at least three Circuits recognize the potential the lack of a right to appointed counsel in immigration court poses for violating the Fifth Amendment, on top of the other Supreme Court case precedents. Looking at this issue holistically, the INA statute should not undermine the Constitutional claims for right to counsel
for noncitizens. Looking at the picture that has been described as a whole, the current system of immigration court and detention classifies as unconstitutional.

In addition to being unconstitutional, the current immigration system is also unjust on ethical grounds. This claim can be substantiated using John Rawls’ theory on justice, which requires treating noncitizens as equals under the law. Behind Rawls’ hypothetical “veil of ignorance,” people do not know anything about their personal situation including religion, race, sex, talents, or values. It is from this situation that they must decide on the principles of justice, and Rawls believes that people would voluntarily choose to guarantee both the maximum amount of liberties to all people—the Principle of Equal Liberty, and choose to permit inequalities as long as they were to the advantage of the least well off and attainable for anyone through equal opportunity—the Difference Principle (Garrett). Using these two principles as indicators then, the immigration detention and court systems currently violate these principles. The first principle fails because, following Rawls’ lead, citizenship status should also be included behind the veil of ignorance. Citizenship is like all of the other personal situations Rawls deems sources of advantage and disadvantage, and if it was included behind the veil, people would choose to include the full protection of the Constitution and due process in the guaranteed equal basic liberties. Additionally, even citizens’ liberties are threatened by the current immigration system, as shown most effectively through the previously described effects of this system on noncitizens’ US citizen children. The second principle also fails as it compounds rather than mitigates the disadvantages faced by noncitizens and their families, who are already part of one of the least advantaged populations in society. Therefore, the current state of the immigration system fails Rawls’ theories on fairness and justice, providing then even more
evidence to the Constitutional and case law arguments which demonstrate clear differential
treatment between citizens and noncitizens.

As shown, it is clear the federal government classifies immigration law and detention as
civil matters, as opposed to criminal. But the Supreme Court decisions used to justify a criminal
defendant’s right to appointed counsel use language that make them seem applicable to a civil
defendant in immigration court. The Court first recognized a Constitutional right to appointed
counsel in state criminal prosecutions with Powell v. Alabama (1932) upon realizing the
fundamental unfairness in placing an educated and trained lawyer against a layperson, and six
years later Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) extended this court appointed counsel to all federal
prosecutions. The landmark case that truly solidified the Constitutionality of a right to appointed
counsel in all criminal trials, however, was Gideon v. Wainwright (1963). Here the Supreme
Court unanimously ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for indigent criminal
defendants was a fundamental right applied to the states through the 14th Amendment’s due
process clause. This right could further be brought into the immigration sphere, however, with
the decision of Turner v. Rogers (2011). In this case the Supreme Court in fact rejected the civil
claim for appointed counsel for the unrepresented petitioner: a father facing imprisonment for
civil contempt due to his failure to complete child support payments. This muddled the decision
of Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972) that had extended the right to appointed counsel in criminal
cases where incarceration was a possibility. In Turner v. Rogers then, the Court clarified that the
possibility of incarceration alone was not sufficient to qualify for appointed counsel in civil cases
and additionally, the majority opinion stressed that civil contempt proceedings are usually simple
in nature with the state not represented in the proceedings (Guttentag). In immigration
proceedings, though, the proceedings are almost always very complex, and the government is
always represented with counsel! Thus the Court’s logic in Turner, if applied to EOIR immigration court, would likely support rather than deny detained immigrants’ right to appointed counsel.

There are also numerous Supreme Court decisions that outline the severity of deportation in immigration proceedings. Notably, the Bridges v. Wixon (1945) decision acknowledged that deportation could deprive immigrants of “all that makes life worth living” and ordered that extraordinary care be practiced to ensure that the “depriv[ation] of liberty…meet the essential standards of fairness” (Guttentag). Unfortunately, this advice has consistently been ignored as one of these standards of fairness—appointed legal representation—continues to be denied in immigration court, even though the same reasons the Supreme Court cited in its decisions to appoint counsel for indigent criminal defendants applies to civil noncitizen defendants. Adding to this, in both Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr (2001) and Padilla v. Kentucky (2010), the Court reaffirmed that for noncitizens facing deportation, removal is often a more severe punishment than even a criminal sentence (Guttentag). Today, many try to use the logic of both Gideon and Turner to extend the right to appointed counsel to the most vulnerable immigrant populations, such as those detained. Linking the logic argued above that noncitizens indeed have Constitutional rights as seen through both Supreme Court decisions and John Rawls’s theory of justice, it is imperative to extend due process protections to noncitizens in immigration court.

Various reforms need to be enacted in order to uphold the United States’ ideals Constitutionally, morally, and ethically. Focusing first on the immigration detention system, rather than using this costly and punitive detention measure that supposedly serves as a “holding tool” for noncitizens awaiting trial, the government should invest more resources into
alternatives to detention. Since 2009, ICE has invested some funds into a significantly lower cost alternative-to-detention option called Intensive Supervision Appearance Program II (ISAP), and the trial period was deemed a success. Operated by a for-profit firm, ISAP used electronic ankle monitors, surprise home visits, employer verification, and in-person reporting to supervise its participants, and at the end of 2014 ICE renewed its five-year contract with the firm. This indicates at least a partial commitment to alternative-to-detention options. In 2013, ISAP monitored about 40,000 persons, or around a tenth of the individuals ICE detained, for as low a cost as 17 cents per person per day (Epstein 1). That same year, 99.6% of those being monitored by ISAP appeared in immigration court, and 79.4% complied with deportation orders (Epstein 2). This shows, then, that alternatives-to-detention can be extremely effective in accomplishing the very reason why ICE and the government claim detention is necessary in the first place: to ensure noncitizens appear at their EOIR court dates and comply with removal orders.

Furthermore, even considering the highest estimate of ISAP costing $17 per person per day, this is $150 less than detaining a person for a single day in an immigration detention center. The political feasibility of this is high, as well, as implementation of ISAP has already started at least on a small scale. Moving to the immigration court system, possible reforms seem more difficult to achieve.

Within the immigration court system, there are a couple of seemingly obvious proposals to help ensure justice for noncitizens while at the same time promising benefits for the government in terms of cost and efficiency. To reduce case backlogs, lighten immigration judge’s number of cases, and more quickly adjudicate immigration removal matters, the government should “right-size” the immigration courts by adding 150 immigration judge teams (consisting of at least an immigration judge, language specialist, law clerk, and legal technician)
to the system. With 254 judges already working for the EOIR, Congress recently funded 55 additional immigration judge teams for the 2016 Fiscal Year. The addition of the 150 immigration judge teams between the years of 2017 and 2018 would be initially costly—about a $150 million investment—but this would ultimately increase efficiency and fairness and lower costs within the immigration system as a whole. More timely hearings thanks to a more appropriately staffed court system could reduce detention costs by hearing cases more quickly and increase savings for alternative ISAP measures. And even with this additional staff, the budget for immigration courts would still only be 4% of the total $18.5 billion immigration enforcement budget (“Reducing” 1-7). Perhaps the most controversial proposal, but also the most impactful, is the idea of implementing a public-defender-type system in the immigration court system.

Appointing counsel to noncitizens in immigration court would speed up the trial process and thus lower costs of detention and intensive supervision. In a 2011 survey, immigration judges nearly unanimously agreed that if a defendant had representation then that person’s case was adjudicated more quickly and efficiently (Eagly 59). Rather than prolonged court cases including scheduling hearings or cases where the defendant requested more time to explore immigration relief options, the appointed counsel could meet with the noncitizen prior to even the first scheduling hearing and be prepared to inform the judge of how they should proceed in the case (Eagly 62). While this would indeed entail an expensive startup cost, the program could soon pay for itself by saving that money in reducing the time detainees spent in detention and by using immigration judge’s time more efficiently through lightening his or her docket for other cases. Rather than an unrepresented detained noncitizen having six hearings over the course of two years, for example, appointed counsel could ensure that same client had two hearings over
the course of only six months, all while being released on bond or alternative supervision. One groundbreaking study found that between 2007 and 2012, over the course of 1.2 million deportation cases, only 14% of detained immigrants secured representation due to the barriers in obtaining counsel due to geographic or financial burdens (Eagly 2). Detainees with counsel succeeded in obtaining relief in 21% of cases: 10.5 times greater than the 2% rate of those representing themselves pro se (Eagly 9). Those success rates were even greater when nonprofit organizations, larger law firms, or law school immigration clinics represented the immigrant, as immigration judges agree they are oftentimes more skilled than private immigration attorneys (Eagly 9, 52). This indicates that in many cases noncitizens would in fact qualify for immigration relief, but they simply lack the legal knowledge, language abilities, and means to defend themselves in court. Even with the obvious benefits for the government, taxpayers, and noncitizens alike coupled with Constitutional evidence and case law, the feasibility of implementing a program of appointed counsel in immigration court is simply not politically possible. This does not mean, however, that a system of appointed counsel in immigration court should not be the ideal to strive for in future immigration reforms.

Overall, today’s immigration court and detention systems do not provide just treatment for noncitizens. The average case in the EOIR takes 1,000 days from intake to completion. Immigration detention centers have evolved into increasingly punitive, criminal-like facilities. Noncitizens are repeatedly left to fend for themselves in a broken system that deprives them of due process rights. By examining Constitutional language, Supreme Court and Appeals Court case law, and Rawlsian ethical principles, it is clear that Constitutional protections need to be extended to noncitizens in immigration law as they are in judicial legal proceedings. Since noncitizens enjoy exactly the same rights as citizens, including due process and appointed
counsel, when facing criminal charges in the judicial system, it is only logical that they enjoy those same rights in legal matters relating to immigration. This blatant inconsistency is both unconstitutional and unjust, and our government must correct this wrong by reforming the immigration legal system immediately.
Bibliography


