How to Save a World: 
Examining Heidegger’s Poet with Marion’s Discourse of Praise

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Abstract:
In our modern world, there exists the sentiment that poetry is useless. Philosopher Martin Heidegger rejects such a notion. He states that modern man has closed himself off from the world through self-assertive production, a movement that has left the modern world in a godless state of destitution. Heidegger asserts that the poet is the one who allows for the potential of returning the world from destitution by providing a trace of the fugitive gods and, ultimately, turning man back to the world through the use of daring language. However, Heidegger, while noting this significant ability of poets, never explains what qualifies as ‘daring language,’ nor does he explain how a poet should use such language. This thesis is an expansion of Heidegger’s poetic project into the realm of praise in which one comes to understand that the ‘daring language’ of Heidegger’s poet is the discourse of praise as proposed by theologian and phenomenologist Jean-Luc Marion. Through an exploration into Marion’s discourse and performance of praise, this thesis will illuminate not only the value of poetry in a modern world, as Heidegger perceives, but also how Poets write in such a way that could save the world from destitution: they praise.

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The *Atlantic*, an American literary, political, and cultural commentary magazine, published an article in 2013 which began, “Poetry is useless.”¹ The article, by writer and reporter Noah Berlatsky, explains that this statement has been strongly propagated throughout new-millennium culture, and deems it a “prevailing sentiment.”² He continues, “poetry doesn't move public conversation; its only use, the thinking goes, is to give some handful of people tenure so they can spend their days in the ivory tower endlessly recycling their unentertaining irrelevance.”³ Indeed, in our modern age, we bear witness to the financial starvation of arts programs in schools, a lack of cultural support for young artists, and a push away from creative forms such as poetry into the hard sciences, business, and other ‘more productive,’ fields.

This ‘war against poetry’ as it is termed by Russell A. Fraser in his book *The War Against Poetry*, may have been rooted in society hundreds of years ago. He notes in his first chapter that, “Early in the sixteenth century, Tyndale and Coverdale, the translators of the Bible, agree in stigmatizing poetry and popular romances as pernicious. Such truth as they convey is partial. The truth conveyed by Scripture is a plenary truth.”⁴ Even centuries ago, poetry was deemed to be insignificant in revealing anything to humanity. But the ‘death of poetry’ may also be examined over the last few decades, which is precisely what Joseph Epstein posited in his 1988 essay, “Who Killed Poetry?” Epstein begins, “I was taught that poetry was itself an exalted thing. No literary genre was closer to the divine than poetry.”⁵ He continues his discussion of an originally religious language associated with poetry when he writes, “Such quasi-religious language to describe poetry was not unusual; not so long ago, it was fairly common.”⁶ However, we are no longer in the ‘not so long ago,’ and our modern day seems to have stripped poetry of any significance entirely, and thereby contributed to the overall decline of the creative field. He concludes, “the entire enterprise of poetic creation seems threatened by having been taken out of the world, chilled in the classroom,
and vastly overproduced by men and women who are licensed to write it by degree if not
necessarily by talent or spirit.” In short, poetry no longer holds a significance for him; it has been
removed from the world. The question remains: How does one return poetry to the world?

German philosopher Martin Heidegger flips this question in in his essay, “What are Poets
For?” and looks not at how to return poetry to the world, but how to return the world to, or rather
through, poetry. Heidegger presents a hyper-productive, calculative world, a world of science and
technology, within which modern man has been turned towards self-assertive production. Rather
than propagating and supporting this modern world, as Berlatsky, in his Atlantic article, implies
many do in our current times, Heidegger warns strongly against such self-assertive production.
Heidegger contends that such a notion of self-assertive production stems from Nietzschian
metaphysics which claim that man has total dominion over his own will, indeed can will himself to
will. Such self-willing, according to Heidegger, has left the world in destitution because man has
closed himself off from the divine and has caused the gods to flee from the world.

Let us take brief stock of Heidegger’s destitute time. One must note that, “The word “time”
here means the era to which we ourselves still belong.” Before even describing the conditions of
the destitution, Heidegger wishes us to know that this destitute era is not one of the past that we can
learn from nor one of the future that we may plan for accordingly, but rather is our own present
time. The era of destitution is “defined by the god’s failure to arrive, by the ‘default of God.’”
Heidegger believes that the gods have fled the world, but what is more so, “[the world] has already
grown so destitute, it can no longer discern the default of God as a default.” Not only has divinity
left the world, but humans have become unable to realize their own destitution, for both the leaving
and the awareness of the leaving are pushed aside when man is focused on his self-willing
production.
Poets, Heidegger claims, provide the potential for a turn away from this destitution by
daring what modern man does not dare. “What do they dare, those who are more daring?”\textsuperscript{11} Heidegger explores this question eventually settling that “They dare the precinct of Being. They
dare language.”\textsuperscript{12} Those among us who are the more daring, we call them poets for the destitute
time. They are those who venture deepest into being, who “attend, singing, to the trace of the
fugitive gods” (92), and in doing so allow for a world in which man is turned away from self-
assertive production to a world which is let be, a world which can be a home for the gods again, a
world returned from its destitution. Poets, if they are truly poets for a destitute time, allow for the
advent of a world recovered from, or at least turned away from, modern destitution, a world which
can be reunited with the divine in a meaningful way. It may be said then that poets for a destitute
time are poets who can save the world.

It would seem now that our job is already done: a close examination of Heidegger’s essay
will reveal that Epstein is incorrect, that poetry indeed can retain some significance because it
provides the modern world a way out of its destitution. But something remains lacking in
Heidegger’s work. It remains unclear how the poet turns man back to the world and turns the world
from destitution. He explores, deeply, a poem by Rilke which he uses as the foundation through
which he explains that poets can provide a way to save the world, but Heidegger does not
specifically state how the poet does this, other than his brief statement that the poet ‘dares language’
and that the poet ‘sings.’ How can poets in modern times, as they approach their work, do so in a
way that makes them poets for the destitute times? How does a poet write useful poetry for the
modern world?

Jean-Luc Marion, a French theologian and philosopher, also views the modern world as one
of destitution, specifically, one has been given over to an idolatry. However, Marion does not turn
to the poet as the one who can save the world from idolatry. Rather, Marion relies on his complex notion of praise to re-instill the divine invisible into a visible world. His ‘discourse of praise,’ like Heidegger’s poet, is closely tied to the use of language. The discourse of praise is the language that remains vigorous enough to hold open a paradoxical distance between an ab-solute God and man in such a way that it actually traverses this distance, allowing the divine to be given into the world. For Marion, praise becomes a way to connect the world to the transcendent divine.

Heidegger specifically avoids the word praise in his essay, choosing instead the more secular word ‘sing.’ Even more curiously, Heidegger uses several poems in his essay, specifically Rilke’s *Duino Elegies*, which contain substantial use of the word ‘praise;’ however, Heidegger consistently chooses lines from these works which avoid the word. What is lost when Heidegger avoids this language? Perhaps clear direction for the poet on how best to compose poetry for the destitute times, direction that may be recovered in a reading with Marion.

What follows is a co-reading of Heidegger’s poetic project with Marion’s thoughts on praise. I contend that what Heidegger truly advocates for when he envisions poets for the destitute time who ‘dare language’ is poets who utilize the discourse and performance of praise. Understanding praise provides a ‘how-to’ of becoming a ‘useful’ poets, a poet for Heidegger’s destitute time. Throughout much of his work, Marion discusses the notion of praise and its various elements. Each of these elements, which will soon become familiar to us—non-predicative language, distance, anonymity, and giving as gift—may also be seen in Heidegger’s thoughts on the poet. This project will first explore Marion’s notion of praise in detail, so that we may understand and thereby hold a model of praise up against Heidegger’s poet. The thesis will then return to Heidegger’s various essays on poets in order to explore one of Heidegger’s chosen poet for a destitute time, Rilke, and comprehend the ways in which the poet allows for the world to return
from destitution and, importantly, do so through Marion’s discourse of praise. Finally, we shall endeavor into poetry published after Heidegger’s time to ultimately determine if Heidegger’s notion of the poet extends to our current year, maintains a relevancy today, and praises in such a way that allows our current world a chance to return from destitution.
CHAPTER I: WHAT IS PRAISE: MARION’S DISCOURSE

In order to understand ways in which Heidegger’s poet might be utilizing praise as an underlying medium contributing to the poet’s qualification as a poet for the destitute times, we must first examine a model of praise. With such a model in our grasp, we will be able to hold it against Heidegger’s essay for comparison and illumination. For such a model, I turn to “one of France’s leading...scholars and phenomenologists,” Jean-Luc Marion. Marion has written extensively about religious praise in his work, The Idol and Distance, specifically within his meditative chapter on Denys. Many of the phenomenological and theological concepts which he brings up in this initial discussion of praise also reappear in his later works such as God without Being, which will also be addressed in this chapter. We shall now endeavor into Marion’s thought to gather foundational ideas on praise, beginning with God without Being to conceptualize Marion’s view of the destitute world; we will then endeavor into the heart of Marion on praise through The Idol and Distance. We shall reveal in this chapter both the ways in which Marion’s idolatrous world is saved from destitution through the saturation of the invisible and the giving of gift as love, as well as the specifics of the discourse of praise—non-predicative language, maintaining distance, anonymity, and giving—which mark praise as language that is suitable for the divine.

Marion’s Idolatrous World: Icon, Idol, and Gift

Like Heidegger, Marion finds the modern world to be one of destitution. His destitution, although different from Heidegger’s, remains significantly like Heidegger’s in that it originates inherently from man’s imposing of himself over the divine. Specifically, in his work God without Being, we see that such imposing involves the worshipping of idols rather than icons. In short, Marion qualifies the modern era as a time full of idolatry. The idol, which receives undeserved
worship, will “present itself to man’s gaze in order that representation, and hence knowledge, can seize hold of it.” Marion argues that man’s gaze which should venture into mystery becomes instead fixed on the idol. The idol as something visible “dazzles the gaze: yet “the idol returns the gaze…thus act[ing] as a mirror…that reflects the gaze’s scope.” Thus the only knowledge gained from an idol is that of one’s self-contained, perhaps even self-willing, self. While the idol indeed dazzles the one who gazes, the one who gazes is only dazzled by himself and hence given over to vanity. Therefore, idolatry, as it leads to vanity, leaves man in a state of destitution incapable of accessing anything beyond his “human gaze.”

The icon however is a visible object which becomes filled with the invisible. Rather than the idol which “results from the gaze that aims at it” an icon “summons sight in letting the visible...be saturate little by little with the invisible.” One’s gaze must go beyond the visible and into the invisible or else risk bedazzlement by an idol and further vanity and desolation. Essentially, one must see past the limiting ideas of the world, yet keep this vision through-world and into a boundless divinity in order to escape idolatry. For Marion, it is in this invisible, beyond-ness wherein God lies. God does not exist in-the-world, or as Marion states, “God does not fall within the domain of Being.” Where is God if God is beyond being? God always “comes from an infinite distance and far exceeds any concepts.” God “comes to us in and as gift” and even more so through the gift of love.

We observe that Marion’s world becomes removed from destitution when man’s gaze extends to the invisible through the visible, which manifests as icon over idol, a manifestation only possible through the gift of love. To see God as love, “does not pretend to comprehend, since it does not mean at all to take; it postulates its own giving, giving where the giver strictly coincides with the gift, without any restriction, reservation, or mastery.” Man does not need to comprehend love
to receive it, and indeed there is no quality or feature of man which enables him to receive love over another. The giver is gift, is love. How does one receive the gift? Importantly, man receives this gift within the world only through giving gift in turn, a giver and “conced[ing] that it comes by a gracious concession.”22 When one possesses the gift he will “dispose of it, enjoy it without passing through the gift and the reception of the gift.”23 Man gives gift, which can be called gift of love, and in doing so receives this gift from the divine giver.

For these gifts and love to be given in their purest form and therefore received (since the reception is the further giving), man must be indifferent to the values of the world as is Marion’s God, values that perhaps fall under the value-ascribing metaphysics which Heidegger fights against in his “What are Poet’s For” essay. Therefore, in order for God’s love to vanquish idolatry, man must change out of his modern, limiting self through gift and revert his gaze to the invisible, an invisible which luckily can manifest in the world as icon, as invisible in the visible. In viewing God as love and gift, God is considered to be beyond being because, turning to helpful scholar Christina Gschwandtner, such an approach to God “does not limit the divine to the language of being” which would be “ultimately idolatrous because it reduces the divine to “a being” where being is used univocally of humans and the divine.”24 We are inclined then to ask: What language can one use if one cannot use the language of being to speak with regards to God?

We have seen the quality of idolatry which marks Marion’s world as a destitute world cut off from the divine, and we discovered that it is only through the invisible saturating the visible and the giving of gift as love that the world can be reunited with the divine. We will now explore this issue of a language suited for God in *The Idol and Distance*. 
Discourse of Praise: Distance, the Absolute, and Giving Gift

Marion struggles in his chapter on Denys in *The Idol and Distance* with the issue of naming God. He is acutely aware that the time in which he writes, indeed the modern time, is one wrought with the worship of idols, idols that have become false names for God. Ultimately, Marion deals with something larger than naming God in his work, instead endeavoring to find language’s relation to God and discover a language capable of existing without “methodological contradiction” with that which language attempts to express. What he discovers in this search for language is the discourse of praise. We will now delve into a close reading of Marion’s chapter to understand precisely this discourse of praise, revealing Marion’s ultimate conclusion that the discourse of praise constitutes non-predicative, non-performative language that employs an ‘as’ structure in order to simultaneously uphold and traverse distance between Requisite and requestant.

First, let’s explore the notion of distance. Marion begins, “the intimacy of the divine strictly coincides with withdrawal.”25 Marion understands the separation of the divine from the worldly, and further contends that a paradoxical closeness with and potential accessibility of that divinity exist because of the distance of God from the world. Distance is the paradox of God’s separation and simultaneous closeness. It is the intimacy experienced as withdrawal. It is, in short, God’s relation with the world. To maintain this intimacy with the divine, man must inhabit distance. Yet, Marion continues, “distance must, in order that we might inhabit it, be identified.” Distance will be identifiable only if we can say it and speak of it.”26 The question now arises: How does one speak distance? What language is suited for distance?

One cannot speak of distance by calling God a supreme being, nor by saying that distance is indeed something such as a spacio-temporal quantity, nor by identifying distance itself as nothing at all. Marion rejects these counter arguments immediately through an analysis of language of objects.
It is not an uncommon occurrence in modern Christian thought to refer to God as “supreme Being.” But to talk of distance “radically prohibit[s] that one hold God as an object, or as a supreme being,” because “distance escapes the ultimate avatar of a language of the object.” In speaking of the object, the speaker binds the divine, via linguistic relation, to something un-divine, ties the divine to the objective world. In this unsuitable relation, the speaker treats God as an idol, and contributes to the idolatrous destitution of the modern world. Language of the object treats God ontically and negates a true attempt to access the divine. In summary, “The stakes of distance” are not ones that can be accessed through language of the object, but, “have to do first with the fact that it prohibits one from claiming any ontic treatment concerning God. On this condition alone could the divine things be understood divinely.”

In order for divine things to be understood divinely, we require a language which maintains distance rather than creating its own relation to the divine. Perhaps we can just call distance “nothing,” because it cannot be spoken of within a realm of beings. But this objection, which Marion also claims to be an idolatrous one, once again attempts to implore a thinkable, objectified relation to God. Marion replies to this notion, “the unthinkable can be aimed at as such only in remaining unthinkable. In that way we approach the point of view of the absolute.” The unthinkable can be aimed at only “in admitting it as ab-solute.” In other words, God, above the language of objects, is the unthinkable ab-solute. In the admittance of God as ab-solute, one comes to see God as beyond any thinkable relation. The concept of ab-solute is further demonstrated in the following quote:

Not by finally lending it the status of subject, borrowed from our ego and univocally metaphorized, but in admitting it as ab-solute: undone from any relation, and therefore also from any thinkable relation, that would tie it to an absurd “other than it.” The ab-solute dissolves the tie that ties it to our thought. It undoes itself, whence our undoing, which, rigorously, is attuned to the ab-solute as such and, in its undoing, honors the ab-solute. Far from it being the case that the factually and
Theoretically unavoidable impossibility of thinking the ab-solutely unthinkable should end the enterprise of thinking it, that impossibility authenticates and, in a sense, inaugurates the enterprise.\textsuperscript{31}

The ab-solute is beyond thinking. The divine is the unthinkable. In admitting and accepting this concept, a concept with which modern man finds great discomfort given his willingness, indeed forceful predisposition, to relate everything to his own thought, his own identity and individuality, his own \textit{ego}, man allows the ab-solute to be an ab-solute, for the divine to be divinely. However, while this admittance and consequential acceptance is an appropriate step to understanding and maintaining the distance between the world and the divine, it does not constitute language, and our question as to what language is best suited for speaking distance still remains. What language allows our thoughts to think the unthinkable?

Thus far we have explored the inability of the language of the object as an inappropriate language to maintain distance. It is important to note that language of objects, as classified by Marion as that which converts the divine to the un-divine by binding it to individual human thought, is a subcategory of predicative language, a type of language which Marion discusses in great detail in this chapter. In understanding predicative language, we leave open the possibility to understand something that is not predicative language, something that is perhaps the language we are seeking, a language which speaks distance and allows the divine to be divine. Therefore, having now understood the significance of maintaining distance when speaking the ‘ab-solute,’ we shall explore how the larger concept of predicative language collapses and defies distance.

Predicative language dominates a majority of human speech. Marion writes, “Discourse commonly makes use of a predication that concludes categorically with an attribution of a particular predicate to a particular subject, or, more formally, of \( x \) to \( y \).”\textsuperscript{32} Discourse’s goal is nothing more than to alleviating the gap between \( x \) and \( y \), where \( x \) comes to describe \( y \) in such a way that \( y \)
becomes x, removing any distance between the two. Discourse, thereby, “crosses distance.” In this process, “the subject is exhausted adequately in the sum of that which is predicated of it.” By explaining the subject through predication, the subject becomes exhausted of the distance it once maintained from the predicate. The subject becomes exhausted in of itself as it is totally defined and encompassed by the predicate. Any distance or excess or mystery that the subject held is collapsed as the speaker appropriates the subject through his or her predication of the subject. Therefore, to speak of God predicatively is to use God as a subject and thereby exhaust and appropriate the absolute. Such predication, for Marion, becomes a form of idolatry. He writes, “When it predicates categorically, language produces objects and, whatever they might be, eliminates distance through that very appropriation.” Marion now raises the question: “Can one make use of language in traversing distance, even in order to traverse it?”

Predicative language cannot be used in traversing distance because predicative language dismantles and collapses distance. Therefore, in order to use language in relation to God, we must look beyond the objective names such as “supreme being,” and “nothing” and must employ a rigorous form of language if we ever hope to access the divine through words. Marion now turns to Dionysius on praise in response to these concerns. Marion notes acutely that “Denys tends to substitute for the to say of predicative language another verb, to praise.”

How precisely does praise sustain distance? Praise passes, “beyond the categorical alternative in order to reach another model of discourse,” a discourse of praise. In order for the discourse to be successful, “It must conjoin the rigor of a precise language with the demands that ensure it distance—that is, it must maintain it and travel through it.” In order for praise to function as praise, it must simultaneously hold open distance between the one who praises, the requestant, and the one to whom praise is given, the Requisite, the absolute God, and also travel through this
It is only in the holding open and the traversing of distance does the paradox of distance truly manifest: an intimacy in the absence of God, a relation to God that also necessitates a closeness with the ab-solute.

Let us first examine how praise hold opens the distance. Praise succeeds in maintaining distance because it praises the Requisite without naming the Requisite. Praise praises anonymously. Anonymity is not the use of negative predication (Anonymity does not equal God has no name), but rather anonymity uses no predication. In this lack of predication, this inability to ascribe name to the Requisite, “The absence of names turns into the name of absence, even the name of the Absent.”40 Names are often thought to be the source of meaning, yet the Anonymity exposes names as “the distraction of possible meanings” and rather “the abdication of meaning” in that the inability to use names gives the thoughts of the requestant over to “the sense-less direction of an excessive signification.”41 The anonymous arises as the name of the absent out of an excess, and “leaves us without a name, as one is left speechless—in astonishment or rapture.”42 In other words, names fail, but the aim in the language of the requestant still persists and perhaps reaches even further beyond in its excess and rapture now that it is unbounded to the arbitrary meaning of a name, freed by anonymity. Between the constant failure of names and the aim of signification, which both increase in inverse directions, “distance rises up.”43

It will now be especially pertinent for the understanding of anonymity and the discourse of praise as a whole one peculiar facet of Marion’s concept anonymity. This peculiarity is that polyonymy, or containing multiple names, becomes equal, in many ways, to anonymity. Marion writes, “For the point of view of the Requisite, anonymity and polyonymy go together, as two banks of the same distance.”44 He further describes the relationship between polyonymy and anonymity as a “fundamental equivalence.”45 Perhaps this equivalence arises because one who praises with
multiple names understands the insignificance of the name, or rather that the significance of the name is the unthinkability behind it, a beyond-though quality that gives the praise, even if it contains names, over to anonymity. In the presence of multiple names, the names themselves become not objectification, for no relation is drawn out by the names, but rather signifiers of the meaningless-ness that allows the absolute to remain absolute, and ultimately, for the distance to remain open and traversable. Such quality of the polyonymy can be found in Marion’s statement: “Because anonymous, one and the same meaninglessness gives rise to an infinity of praises—the distance, now ensured of its irreducibility, can be endlessly traversed.”

Distance rises and is continually maintained through anonymity, but how is it traversed? Marion delves now into the structure of praise through the “operation designated by ‘as.’” Praise uses an ‘as’ structure, in which the human requestant, x, praises the divine Requisite as y. An example of such an as-structured praise statement includes, ‘I praise God as good.’ Here, the ‘as’ “is not equivalent to ‘as if’” or ‘equal to’ or ‘is’ but instead to “inasmuch as.” We see this as sharply contrasting predicative language which inherently implies that x, through categorical predication, become y, by closing the distance between x and y. Praise avoids predicative language which closes distance by indicating “the relation under which x aims at the Requisite; y presupposes distance and therefore refers back first to x.” In other words, the y (ie. praising God as good) reflects not on the Requisite but on the requestant, even though it is intended for the Requisite. On this, Marion writes, “This means that y aims at the Requisite, but describes the requestant x.” In stating, “I praise God as good,” the ‘as good’ describes the perception of the speaker more so than the actual reality of the ab-solute, and, even though the speaker makes a statement about God, the statement is “always understood within a metalanguage that implicates the speaker in the very determination of the statement.” The requestant speaks subjectively and, therefore, avoids the objective language
which closes distance. Praise “takes up the subjectivity of the speaker within the unsurpassable aim of the Requisite.” In other words, praise functions as non-predicative ‘as’ language that aims at the Requisite, but does not name nor objectify the Requisite, and in doing so maintains a distance between requestant and Requisite while also allowing this distance to be traversed through the aim of the language.

It is important to note now, having settled on a definition of praise, that the discourse of praise is not equivalent to the basic performative use of language. Performative language is language which completes the action it designates in its saying. Marion rejects the conclusion that “the praise is performed as soon as the speaker states it,” and he provides an example of such a false conclusion when he states, “You are praised, since I say “I praise you.” Unlike a justice of peace declaring a couple ‘husband and wife’ or the lover proclaiming ‘I love you,’ the speaker who praises does not need to meet, “a minimal qualification,” to validate their utterances and enact praise as praise. The speaker does not have to be anything when praising; he or she need only be the requestant, which he or she is already, inherently, “since all (requestants) make request by definition.” Marion questions, “Who, or what, will ensure a qualification that is universal and infinitely varied according to the infinity of names…that support praise?” Indeed, there is “no distinction, no privilege” that would make an individual qualified to perform praise, therefore each requestant is instantly qualified precisely because he does not need to be. In short, praise cannot be performative language because its discourse requires more than just the requestant; praise requires the requestant, the Requisite, and distance. Marion continues, “The marvel—that each term is discovered in fact qualified to perform praise—makes all the more evident the absence of justification of such a power—save through the Requisite itself.” The Requisite is the final determinant of the discourse of praise, and the requestant, “receives that qualification previously
from what his statement aims at without predicating anything of it.” The lack of qualification required to praise provides the requestant with an “ecstasy, in which he who states finds himself in advance taken up by what the statement, without predication, aims at, confirms that no subjectivity burdens the language of praise: to be sure, y directly qualifies x and not God, but that x is, in each y, y’, y”, and on their occasion, radically invested by distance.” We see now that praise functions as neither objective nor subjective language, but something beyond both.

The final concept which should be mentioned to round out our understanding of the discourse of praise as brought forth by Marion in this work is a small feature in his discussion of the non-performative aspect of praise which connects praise to another theological concept that we experienced in *God without Being*. Marion notes that “instead of making things with words” praise “elaborates with word gifts.” And, on this statement, one can come to “merit the dignity of gift—to traverse distance.” Knowing previously from *God without Being* that God manifests as gift, and that gift is only received in its giving, we come to see praise as a way to accept and return gift, and that this constant giving amounts to traversing distance. What is given as the gift? Language is given. Language is both given and received. What is given in the language of praise? Marion continues that when man gives praise to the ab-solute, man “in giving it, to give himself with it (in a “short ladder” to oneself that does not cease not to land, and that continues to grow longer to the point that one finally recognizes in it Jacob’s ladder, where angels climb and descend), manifests nothing less than the kenosis proper to distance.” In praising, the requestant does not only give gifts of words but gives his or her entire self in the praise. Praise risks man, but in doing invites divine to inhabit earth, allows the invisible to become part of the visible as manifested in the angel metaphor. Marion’s requestant is given over in and to praise. This self-less giving over which
allows the gift to manifest and the divine to inhabit the world, the icons to exist, distance to be held open and traverse, is the true form of praise as described by Marion.

To say that the discourse of praise constitutes non-predicative, non-performative language that employs an ‘as’ structure in order to simultaneously uphold and traverse distance between Requisite and requestant should hold increased meaning now. Our analysis of praise in Marion’s *The Idol and Distance*, has led us to a complex understanding of a distance maintained through anonymity, anonymity which can manifest as polyonymy. Praise alone is the form of language which is rigorous enough to sustain and successfully traverse distance. In this traversal lies a beautiful and constant giving in which the requestant is entirely given over to the absolute, and that through this giving as praise, the divine comes to inhabit the world, icons are sustained on earth. Praise exists as a language beyond predicative objectification, beyond even subjectification because of the given-over structure of praise which Marion lays out. Each of these qualities of praise will be useful as we endeavor in the next chapter of this thesis to examine Heidegger’s poet as a praising requestant.

As we transition now into a deeper analysis of Heidegger’s “What are Poet’s for” and other writings on poetry, we should keep in mind the discourse of praise as found in Marion, and ultimate goal to allow the invisible to manifest as the visible and rid the world of idolatry by while also providing givenness and love. Keeping these specifics close in mind, we turn now to Heidegger, and, more precisely, his analysis of Rilke as a poet who succeeds in being a poet for the destitute time.
CHAPTER II: Heidegger’s Poet as One Who Praises: Explorations of Rilke

To understand if Heidegger’s notion of poetry can be related to the concept of praise as characterized by Marion, I would like to discuss specific ideas in Heidegger’s essays further. In this discussion, I will turn to other scholars to aid in the exploration of a poet of specific importance in Heidegger’s essay “What are Poets For?”: Rilke. In this examination of Heidegger’s poet, we will undoubtedly see connections to Marion’s conception of praise through ideas such as the invisible, gift, and love as well as more specific features of the discourse of praise such as the Requisite, anonymity, and distance. Ultimately, this chapter will elucidate the poet’s use of a language other than predicative language allows things to be returned to the Open and the invisible to be reunited with the visible, the poet’s ability to open man’s heart space in order to allow man to reopen himself to a world containing both death and love, and the poet’s reception of language as a ‘more willing’ quality which allows him to accept and propagate gift through distance. Let us now endeavor further into this essay where we shall see what precise facets of Rilke’s poetry provide Heidegger his portrayal of poets in a destitute time.

Rilke’s Open, Predicative Language, Gift-Giving of the Thing

Heidegger claims early on in his essay that poets are the ones who reach into the abyss. When he endeavors to explain this reaching, he turns to Rilke. Heidegger, admittedly, has a complicated relationship with Rilke, and this tumultuous relationship is not hidden in this essay. In short, Heidegger believes that Rilke was at one point restricted in his art form by Nietzschean metaphysics, claiming that some of Rilke’s work “remains in the shadow of tempered Nietzschean metaphysics”.60 Therefore, in his discussion of Rilke, Heidegger only speaks of “Rilke’s perfected poetry,” a group which is hard to define, but contains Rilke’s famous works such as his Sonnets for
This group of ‘perfected poetry’ also includes the following unpublished poem of Rilke’s, which Heidegger will use to access some of his most substantial ideas in this essay:

As Nature gives the other creatures over
to the venture of their dim delight
and in soil and branchwork grants none special cover,
so too our being's pristine ground settles our plight;
we are no dearer to it; it ventures us.
Except that we, more eager than plant or beast,
go with this venture, will it, adventurous
more sometimes than Life itself is, more daring
by a breath (and not in the least
from selfishness).... There, outside all caring,
this creates for us a safety—just there,
where the pure forces' gravity rules; in the end,
it is our unshieldedness on which we depend,
and that, when we saw it threaten, we turned it
so into the Open that, in widest orbit somewhere,
where the Law touches us, we may affirm it.

The first thing which Heidegger emphasizes in his elaboration of the poem is its opening: “As Nature…” How are we to understand this Nature? Heidegger comments that “the ground of beings is Nature.” Nature is also referred to as Ungrund, or “the pristine ground.” Let it be known that this is not the Nature associated with history, natural science, or the opposite of art, but something deeper and “narrower.” In Rilke’s poem, Nature means “the Being of beings.” What is the Being of beings? The Being of beings becomes ‘the will.’ We see here where Heidegger may take some pause and begins to disagree with Rilke as this language leads one back into the realm of metaphysics where Heidegger takes issue with the will. But Heidegger continues in his analysis of Rilke, and scholar Julian Young in his work Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art helps explain this continuation when he writes, “In his best work, Rilke calls the Urgrund, not ‘the will,’ but rather ‘the venture’ and, even better, ‘the Open.’”
But what is “the Open?” Heidegger states, “Rilke likes to use the term ‘the Open’ to designate the whole draft to which all beings, as ventured beings, are given over…The Open is the great whole of all that is unbounded.”67 To understand the open, we must first look at the term venture which plays in with the Open. Nature as the Being of beings “lets beings loose into the daring venture.”68 “Being is the venture pure and simple.”69 Being is venture, but venture is also the exposure to Being. Young helps us again when he states, “The venture, says Rilke, offering a poetic metaphor of his experience of Being, flings us ‘ventured ones’ out into existence yet at the same time holds us in a ‘gravitational pull’ towards itself as the ‘center’ (PLT 104).”70 To be ventured is to be unprotected, to be exposed to and by Being and also pulled always towards Being. To be ventured is to be exposed to the Open, which is the unbounded form of existence. In the venture of Being, the exposure to the Open, man can truly be, essentially.

However, modern man is not exposed to Rilke’s Open. Modern man, places before him the world as the whole of everything objective, and he places himself before the world. Man sets up the world toward himself, and delivers Nature over to himself. We must think of this placing-here, this producing, in its broad and multifarious nature. Where Nature is not satisfactory to man’s representation, he reframes and redisposes it. Man produces new things where they are lacking to him. Man interposes something between himself and things that distract him from his purpose. Man exposes things which he boosts them for sale and use. Man exposes when he sets forth his own achievement and plays up his own profession. By multifarious producing, the world is brought to stand and into position. The Open becomes an object, and is thus twisted around toward the human being. Over against the world as the object, man stations himself and sets himself up as one who deliberately pushes through all this producing.71

Modern man creates a world that is separate, cut-off from Nature, from the Open, and ultimately, from his own Being. Young describes this as “The ‘danger’ to human beings” when man becomes “complexly insensible to ‘the Open’ and its ‘pull’, cut off by the metaphysics of naturalism.”72 This metaphysics of naturalism manifests as man’s self-assertive will. Heidegger uses Rilke’s line, “Except that we, more eager than plant or beast, go with this venture, will it…” to
launch into the danger of the self-assertive will. Heidegger writes, “By such willing, modern man turns out to be the being who, in all relations to all that is, and thus in his relation to himself as well, rises up as the producer who puts through, carries out, his own self and establishes this uprising as the absolute rule.”73 In becoming this producer through willing, man turns everything, including himself and the world into “material for self-assertive production.”74 But what is the danger of being turned away from, indeed against, the Open? Heidegger remarks, “The design of self-assertion itself extends the realm of the danger that man will lose his selfhood to unconditional production.”75 Man will not only lose the world to destitution when turned away from the Open, but man will also lose his Being. How does modern man, through willing alone, turn himself and the world from the Open?

Man turns from the Open by objectifying. As Young states it, man materializes the world by “conceptualiz[ing] the world into objects.”76 Heidegger explains, “By building the world up technologically as an object, man deliberately and completely blocks his path, already obstructed, into the Open.”77 In his self-assertive willing, man has objectified the world. This objectification becomes distinctly tied to modern man, as evident when Heidegger writes, “As long as man is wholly absorbed din nothing but purposeful self-assertion, not only is he himself unshielded, but so are things, because they have become objects.”78 How does man overcome his own self-assertive modernity? Clearly, man cannot do so through objective language, for the objectification turns away from the Open, indeed turning man away from his own Being.

Already, we notice that the use of the term ‘object’ relates precisely to what Marion believes not to be in the discourse of praise. Language of the object does not allow distance to be upheld between requestant and Requisite, but rather a different sort of rigorous language, found in the discourse of praise, holds open distance and allows praise to be praise, for the divine to be divinely,
and to de-objectify the world. To understand further what Heidegger means when he believes we have made an ‘object’ of the world, it may be useful to briefly look at another essay of his, “The Thing,” in which he comments on the difference between objects and things. In exploring this essay, we shall see additional ties to Marion’s praise.

Importantly, just as Marion’s predicative language remains an issue because it does not maintain distance, so too does Heidegger comment on distance in his essay, “The Thing.” He writes, concerned with the speed with which man can travel in the modern world, “Man puts the longest distances behind him in the shortest time. He puts the greatest distances behind himself and thus puts everything before himself at the shortest range.” The ‘Man’ which is described here appears to be the modern man of the destitute time who can be said to abolish distance through objectification. Heidegger continues his discussion of distance in this essay when he states, “nearness does not consist in shortness of distance…Nor is great distance remoteness.” Clearly, Heidegger, in his understanding that nearness and remoteness do not necessarily relate to distance, has some sense of the paradox of distance which Marion describes, although at this point in the essay, Heidegger does not seem to take distance as such a phenomenological concept. But we do get a sense of the phenomenological significance of the Thing shortly thereafter. Heidegger questions next, “What is a Thing?”

His response:

The jug is a thing. What is the jug? We say: a vessel, something of the kind that holds something else within it….As a vessel, the jug is something self-sustained, something that stands on its own. This standing on its own characterizes the jug as something that is self-supporting, or independent. As the self-supporting independence of something independent, the jug differs from an object. An independent, self-supporting thing may become an object if we place it before us, whether in immediate perception of by bringing it to mind in a recollective re-presentation. However, the thingly character of the thing does not consist in its being a represented object, nor can it be defined in any way in terms of the objectness, the over-agaistsness, of the object.
The jug exists as a thing with thingly character because it is independent. The jug is not codependent on man, does not require man to exist. Man’s bringing of the jug into existence codependently, by categorizing and quantifying the jug in his mind, employs predicative language, thereby turning the jug into an object. By objectifying the jug, man robs the jug of his thingly nature. Allowing the thing to thing becomes a significant task, for when the thing things, the thing possesses the potential to call to man. Heidegger writes on this point, “If we let the thing be present in its thinging from out of the worlding world, then we are thinking of the thing as thing. Taking thought in this way, we let ourselves be concerned by the thing’s worlding being. Thinking in this way, we are called by the thing as the thing.” What is the significance to being called by the things as things?

The significance of being called by things is illustrated well in James L. Perotti’s book *Heidegger on the Divine*, when he states, “things of the earth open up a world.” By allowing things to thing, one allows the world to be as world. Significantly, when the jug can be a thing, the jug gives in outpouring, for Heidegger writes, “The giving of the outpouring can be a drink. The outpouring gives water, it gives wine to drink.” Perotti notes further that the jug, in its outpouring, “is understood as that which pours out of itself and in so doing is a gift-giving, or an offering” and represents “a giving-forth that is at one a giving-back to the gods” for the drink is “consecrated to the gods.” In allowing things to thing and world to world, one enters into a relationship with the divine that allows a constant giving forth through things, a giving of some gift. One would be amiss if not now to connect Heidegger’s notion of the Thing to Marion’s Icon, for in the Icon, the invisible rises up in the visible, and the world is opened up to God in a constant gift of love. The Icon, as we have come to know, can be praised under the discourse of praise in order to receive and give the gift.
But Heidegger does not turn to the notion of praise here, but rather thinking as seen when he concludes: “When and in what way do things appear as things? They do not appear by means of human making. But neither do they appear without the vigilance of mortals. The first step towards such vigilance is the step back from the thinking that merely represents—that is, explains—to the thinking that responds and recalls.”

Who is the one who thinks in response? In answer to this question we may discover who indeed praises. Who can turn away from predicative, objectifying language? Who can allow things to things, the world to world, the divine to be mingled with the mortal, the gift received and given again, and the invisible to be imbued in the visible? Indeed, this thinker, this ‘singer’ in Heidegger’s language, is the poet.

The poets, perceiving that man and things and the world itself are cut off from the world, “sing the healing whole in the midst of the unholy.” Instead of propagating destitution as does modern man through self-assertive production and objectification, “[Poet’s] singing is turned away from all purposeful self-assertion…Their song does not solicit anything to be produced.” Where modern man definitively does not praise for he objectifies the world, there still remains the potential for poets to praise. The singing poet, somehow, allows man and things and the world to be returned to the Open and to return the world from destitution. The ‘somehow’ by which the poet does this will be explored next as we enter more extremely into Rilke’s poetry.

**The Transformative Heart Space and the Angel as Anonymous Requisite in Rilke’s Duino Elegies**

We’ve seen thus far that Heidegger’s poet, by allowing things to return to the Open through speaking, indeed thinking and eventually ‘singing’ in a different way than modern man, could be
singing within the discourse of praise. While we have seen that the poet has the potential to let things be as things, we have yet to see precisely how the poet can convert the already objectified objects of the world, the objects man has created through self-willing and predicative language, into mysterious, dwelling things. We shall now explore the praise paradigm further as we endeavor to discover the ways in which the poet returns the world from predication and objectification.

In order for man to be exposed to the Open, man must turn himself away from self-assertive objectification. But where can man turn? If objects lie in the consciousness of the mind, where can Things reside? There must exist a space for things to be things or else man cannot receive the divine gifts of things, cannot allow the gods to reenter the world, cannot remove the world from its destitution. Heidegger answers these questions by giving us the interior heart space, another phrase which he has taken from Rilke’s poem. He writes, of the heart:

> The inner and invisible domain of the heart is not only more inward than the interior that belongs to calculating representation, and therefore more invisible; it also extends further than does the realm of merely producible objects. Only in the invisible innermost of the heart is man inclined toward what there is for him to love: the forefathers, the dead, the children, those who are to come….the interior of uncustomary consciousness remains the inner space in which everything is for us beyond the arithmetic of calculation, and, free of such boundaries, can overflow into the unbounded whole of the Open. This overflow beyond number rises, in its presence, in the inner and invisible region of the heart. The last lines of the ninth elegy, which sings man’s belonging to the Open, run: “Existence beyond number/wells up in my heart.”

In the inner heart of man, there is an overflowing of love beyond numbers, beyond calculation, and beyond reason, an overflow that can now flow into the Open because it is boundless in the heart space. Everything that could be lost to death, such as the people who touch a man’s life, can continue to dwell in the heart. This heart space turns man over into the Open, exposing him, for “The interiority of the world’s inner space unbars the Open for us.” Thus, by turning to the heart space, as Rilke does in the final line of his elegy, man becomes “free, outside of the relation to the
objects set around us that only seem to give us protection.” Such objects were first created by man to protect things from being lost, from death, and so man cut off himself from his heart space, from things, and from the world. By turning to the heart space, man is released into the Open, as are all the things he loves, for he no longer needs the false protection of objectification and can hold that which he may lose forever in his heart.

But the question still remains as to how one changes the objectified world into a world of freedom in the heart space? Heidegger believes that the world and the things of the world are given over to the inner heart space through language. He writes, “Language is the precinct, that is, the house of Being.” What do poets dare? “They dare the precinct of Being. They dare language.” Poets, rather than turning to predicative objectification, instead risk Being through their language. Further, “All beings—objects of consciousness and things of the heart, men who impose themselves and men who are more daring—all beings, each in its own way, are qua beings in the precinct of language. This is why the return from the realm of objects and their representation into the innermost region of the heart’s space can be accomplished, if anywhere, only in this precinct.”

Poets then, established as those who are more daring, more venturesome, more willing to be exposed to the Open by returning objects to the heart, are more daring because they dare language. The poets, being more venturesome, “dare the venture with language.” In order to accomplish the “inner recalling conversion” of objects into heart-things, the poet dares language. Poets use daring language in Heidegger, and requestant use a rigorous language in Marion’s discourse of praise; such a similarity should not go unnoticed.

Heidegger states that before this language, before poetry, may successfully complete the conversion, it must be first directed at a being who already contemplates the inner heart space. This necessity for the language to be directed draws us back into the realm of Marion’s praise, where a
requestant converses with a Requisite, where man opens a dialogue with God. Heidegger writes of this necessity,

Therefore, where the whole of all beings is thought of as the Open of the pure draft, the inner recalling conversion must be a saying which says what it has to say to a being who is already secure in the whole of all beings, because he has already accomplished the transmutation of what is visible in representation into that which is an invisible of the heart.94

But to whom does the poet ‘say’ in Heidegger’s vision of the poet? Heidegger claims, “This being, in Rilke’s Duino Elegies, is the Angel.”95 The Angel is a figure referenced in much of Rilke’s poetry, and, as Heidegger interprets, is a “creature in whom the transmutation of the visible into the invisible, which we achieve, seems already accomplished.”96 So the poet offers language to the Angel, a being who already has completed the conversion of the world into the heart, as the beginning of man converting things of the world and the world itself into his own heart. Now that we have a vague sense of the purpose of the angel, as an addressee who kickstarts man’s own conversion of the world into the heart space, we shall explore the significance of the call to the angel in Rilke’s Duino Elegies. We will also take time to explore questions such as: How does the Angel function in Heidegger’s reading of Rilke? What notion of the divine is encapsulated by the Angel? And finally, how does calling to such a figure relate to Marion’s notion of praise? In doing so, we’ll turn to several Heideggarian scholars to examine Heidegger’s reading of Rilke’s Angel.

Heidegger himself writes that the Angel is “a basic word in Rilke’s poetry,” and classifies it as similar, in this respect, to the Open and Nature.97 Given the significance of these other basic words in Heidegger’s essay to understanding Rilke to be a poet for the destitute time, the Angel also holds a particular significance. The Angel becomes significant as the being who has already transformed the visible to the invisible of the heart. The Angel is capable of doing such a thing because the Angel, according to Jenny Yates Hammett in her essay “Thinker and Poet: Heidegger,
Rilke, and Death,” “dwells in the Open,” and even more so, belongs to “the realm where life and
death are one.”⁹⁸ She notes further that “The Angle of Rilke’s Elegies is at home in the realm of the
invisible.”⁹⁹ Clearly, the realm of the invisible is related to the immense concept of death, but what
is this relationship? Hammett elaborates on this relationship by using Heidegger’s thoughts in
“Language in the Poem,” when she writes, “Heidegger says that encountering the invisible and
deepest pain belong together. It is in the Land of Pain, the realm where love and death are one, that
Rilke concludes his Elegies.”¹⁰⁰ We now receive a further understanding of Heidegger’s inner heart
space, and can understand why man has turned itself away from the Open and shielded the heart
space. Death, loss of love and life, is painful.

Man shields himself from this pain through objectifying, through making things visible so
that he can measure and ascribe value and not truly let such things live so as to be lost. But in
Heidegger’s invisible, where the Angel resides, pain is present, but so too is life and love even in
death and loss. To elaborate on this beautiful paradox, P. Christopher Smith in his essay on Rilke
and Heidegger comments that, “The angel knows presence and absence as eternally one.”¹⁰¹ This
coexistence of presence and absence in the same space is contrast to the modern man’s desire to
isolate absence by shielding oneself from it, but the paradoxical space of the heart allows for the
simultaneous presence of these strong forces.

The paradox of absence and presence may remind one of Marion’s simultaneously absent
and present God. In Marion’s thought, the absolute God can remain divine and therefore be praised
precisely because his absence is a presence maintained through distance. There is a sense of
distance hinted at in Smith’s essay which states, “the angels’ awareness is “above” this ordinary
human condition; they view the realms of death and life together.”¹⁰² Smith reads these angels as
irreconcilably as separate from man. However, I am dissatisfied by this reading for if the only
qualification of the Angel’s heightened status above men that they interpret life and death as one, than Rilke’s poetry and Heidegger’s essay lose much of their meaning because then man, if Smith is correct, could never hope to ever transform the visible into the invisible, could never hope to open his heart to the world, to loss, and to death, in such a way that one does not shield oneself. We must view this transformation as a possibility for man. Indeed it is such a transformation that Rilke experiences in his Elegies, and it is the transformation that Heidegger wishes for modern man. Yet, importantly, this reading points us towards considering Marion’s notion of distance, and the quality of distance in the poet has not yet been satisfied. But before we tackle an understanding of Marion’s distance in Heidegger’s poet, let us continue to look at the Angel, specifically as another feature of Marion’s praise, the anonymous Requisite.

While the initial reaction to the concept of anonymity in Rilke’s poetry might be one of disbelief, for it is undeniable that Rilke calls specifically to the Angel at the start of his *Elegies* by definitively naming the Angel as Angel, I’m inclined heavily to believe Marion’s notion that anonymity, a factor required for the arising of distance between requestant and Requisite, can manifest as polyonymy. As a reminder, Marion writes in *The Idol and Distance*, “From the point of view of the Requisite, anonymity and polyonymy go together, as two banks of the same distance.” We can perceive this anonymity strongly in Rilke’s *Elegies* if we return to Hammet’s essay “Hiedegger, Rilke and Death.” She writes,

> Rilke writes that while in Russia he was surrounded by "the darkness of God" and thus "named" him. But "now you would scarcely ever hear me name him." To name is to comprehend as object of thought, to possess, as Rilke sees it. Instead of possession one learns relation, and there arises a namelessness that begins with God…Attributes are taken away from God, the no longer expressible, fall back to creation, to love, and death.

In this letter which Hammet cites, it is evident that Rilke understands a namelessness to God which stems from relation rather than possession. One can determinately relate Rilke’s thinking in this
example to Marion’s praise, which focuses on reaching out to God in anonymity, not through the predicative language of objects but rather through a relation, a relation which in Marion becomes the notion of distance. So, as seen originally Marion’s essay and now also in Rilke, God takes on a nameless sense because possession is done away with, because man reaches out in relation. But does such a namelessness appear in poetry, for it is truly the poetry which Heidegger wishes to examine, not merely Rilke’s letters? And, further, how can we justify the use of the name ‘Angel’ within this anonymity?

In the letter, Rilke discusses that, in the namelessness, attributes are taken away from God and returned to earth. This return occurs through Rilke’s Angel, who Heidegger states must be addressed to spur man’s own ability to transform. So the Angel, under this name, takes on the qualities of an absolute, nameless god, and in doing so, I contend, becomes one of the many names which construct a polyonymy of anonymity as seen in Marion. We see that the Angel takes on such a role in Heidegger’s reading of Rilke, and can examine this claim further with the assistance of Julian Young in his work *Heidegger’s Later Philosophy*. Young asks, “Who are Heidegger’s gods?”105 Who indeed are the gods that Heidegger believes have fled from the world and man’s closed off hearts? To answer this question, Young turns to a later Heidegger essay which address Angels when he states, “‘the angel is the essence of what we otherwise call “the gods” more purely expressed’ (GA 4 p. 20).”106 Therefore, we can justify the use of the name Angel, for the Angel comes to represent the multitude of names and meanings to the divine, a divinity which manifests in Marion as the absolute God.

The notion of the unnamable God and the Angel gets explicated further as we explore its use in Rilke’s poetry. I will shortly explore Rilke’s Ninth *Duino Elegy*, which I believe is the most substantial poem in which we can address the notion of praise in Rilke’s poetry. To understand this
Elegy in full, we must explore the procession of the Elegies as works that focus on transforming the visible into the invisible. In order to show this transformation in full we shall examine the Duino Elegies through Kathleen Komar’s essay, “Rethinking Rilke’s Dineser Elegien at the End of the Millenium,” an appropriate reading of the Elegies in light of Heidegger’s focus on modernity.

Komar begins by questioning, “What is it about his poetry that so speaks to us in the postmodern era?” In light of our exploration into Heidegger’s thought, we may pose a similar question: why, ultimately, is Rilke so fascinating for Heidegger and his conception of the modern world? Komar suggests, and she admits her opinion models those of many other Rilke scholars, that “at least one aspect of his appeal lies in his attempts to understand how human consciousness can survive its temporal prison and reach out to a metaphysical realm without abandoning this human, physical world.” While of course Heidegger is the first one to criticize the realm of metaphysics that he believe is distorted by Nietzsche, it is obvious that Heidegger is drawn to Rilke because of his searching, because of his quest beyond the closed-off, self-assertive nature of modern man. The Duino Elegies, composed between 1912 and 1922, Komar notes, “are a response to the isolation of individual human consciousness and the pressures of a dehumanized technological world so strongly felt by writers and artists between the two world wars.” Heidegger is greatly similar to Rilke with regards to the concern of technology, and, further, how production and objectification hide man from things, from his utmost being, from the world. But what precisely does Rilke accomplish in his writing of the Duino Elegies, and what does Heidegger take away from this accomplishment?

Komar writes on the overarching trajectory and accomplishment of the Elegies.

The Dineser Elegien begin with a speaker who realizes precisely his isolation and alienation from greater coherence and wholeness. He attempts to find some access to the realm of transcendent consciousness and unity figured by the angels. He first contemplates a directed assault, with the lines quoted by Derek Jacobi as Francis
Bacon, “Who, if I cried, would hear me among the angelic orders?” But the speaker immediately realizes that his consciousness is not yet conditioned to receive an answer from a power so much greater than the self. In the course of his quest, Rilke learns that the poet’s true task is not to call to the angels or aspire to the divine realm, but rather to achieve the humanly possible in a world transformed by human consciousness and given duration in poetic language.110

Like Heidegger’s modern man who finds himself isolated from the world, from things, from others, and from his own being through his own objectification of the world, Rilke too finds himself isolated. As Heidegger notes when he examines Rilke, the beginning of man’s own transformation and opening of the heart involves imploring the Angels, begins with a call to the Angels, begins by, as we see in Marion, opening a dialogue with the Angels by addressing them. However, this dialogue ultimately fails because, as Komar notes, “He quickly perceives, however, that his limited consciousness is not yet conditioned to survive a direct apprehension of the transcendent.”111 This perception occurs in the First Elegy. So the task then becomes, how does the poet maintain this dialogue in a meaningful way? How does the poet complete the transformation?

In the Second Elegy, Rilke attempts to work out of his isolation into a sense of the divine, and ultimately achieve the transformation of the world, through understanding the nature of the Angels. Komar writes of the Second Elegy that, “the poet finds himself confronted with the problem of exploring the nature of the angels, whom he wishes to praise.”112 Interestingly, we see Komar directly use praise language here. Rilke wishes to praise, but he cannot yet. What stops him? It is language itself which stops Rilke from praises and on this Komar notes, “how does one put into words a being which is by definition beyond the merely rational?”113 Rilke does so by blending the rational and the irrational, the visible and the invisible, through new and daring language. In this Elegy, and throughout his works, “Rilke fuses a natural or physical category (pollen, spaces, shields) with one belonging to the transcendent realm (divinity, being, rapture). He joins the concrete and the abstract, natural and transcendent, in order to undermine such categorization all
together.” In other words, Rilke uses daring language in the form of poetry to access the same paradoxes that the Angels inhabit. Understanding the angels is only possible through, “forcing his reader to imagine beyond the linguistic limits s/he normally employs.”

Komar, in this examination of the Second *Elegy*, hits on several vital themes in our discussion of both Heidegger and Rilke. We see, firstly, an example of what Heidegger’s ‘daring language’ actually looks like—it is the innovative linguistic of poetry, it is uncommon associations, paradoxes, the limit of language and consequently the limit of being. When we reach the limit of being through poetry, we approach the nature of angels, we approach the ability to retain the paradoxes in the world and consequently live, as Heidegger wishes, exposing the heart to loss and death, allowing the world to be in the space of the heart rather than owning it through the objective mind, allowing the invisible into the visible. Additionally, Rilke realizes that there still exists something beyond language which exists with the Angels. I am deeply reminded in the call to the Angels in the First and Second *Elegy* and the ultimate existence of Angels beyond basic language of Marion’s ab-solute God who is directly addressed and who exists beyond predicative language and names, even if such a dialogue initially fails. So if basic language cannot satisfy the nature of Angels, what kind of language is suitable for the Angels, for maintaining a dialogue in the poetry?

It is in the Seventh *Elegy* that we see a major shift in Rilke’s thought. Throughout the past elegies to this point, Rilke has been very daring with his language, stretching beyond the limits of previously known language. He has been dismantling categorizations and allowing paradoxes to form and sustain, all of this under a call to the Angels and an attempt to understand their nature. But, Komar notes, “In the Seventh Elegy, the speaker reverses the entire direction of this activity. What had been an attempt to call the angels in the opening lines, what had been summons or wooing becomes by the end of the Seventh Elegy a demonstration and celebration of the human
condition, a rejoicing that praises the world of man to the angels.”116 The poet has, by this point realized, as Heidegger realizes when he reads Rilke, that in his daring language, the “poet recognizes that he has the power of rescuing objects from time and decay by transforming them within.”117 Such an example of this rescuing, of a thing, in the Heidegarrian sense, living in the space of the interior invisible of the heart, can be seen in the following lines of poetry:

Vast reservoirs of power are created by the spirit of the age, formless, like the tense yearning gained from all things. Temples are no longer known. Those extravagances of the heart we keep, more secretly. Yes, where even one survives, a single thing once prayed to, served, knelt before – it stands, as it is, already there in the invisible. Many no longer see it, but lose the chance to build it inside themselves now, with columns, and statues, grander!118

By the power to transform object, to fill the worldly with the divine, Rilke’s task no longer becomes one of calling to the angel in an attempt to understand the angel’s nature. Rather, “The Seventh Elegy brings the poet to the realization that his task is one of transformation not transcendence…the transformation of the physical world by human consciousness has always had the power to create a kind of ‘human transcendence,’” which Rilke himself emphasizes in the Seventh Elegy when he writes “Being here [in this physical world] is magnificent.”119 In transforming object, in allowing the world to become a home for the divine, the poet has opened the heart to allow the visible to become invisible, to allow the angel’s paradoxes of life and death to exist in the human condition through this heart space, through a re-divinification of the world. In this opening of the heart, Heidegger’s gods can return to their abodes. How does this shift of task, this successful transformation of world manifest in the poetry? Man begins to praise the world to the angels. Praise becomes the language of poetry which allows the dialogue with the angels to be sustained, which allows the success of the transformation of the world, and the opening of the heart.
Such praise can be definitively found in the Ninth Elegy, the Elegy which, significantly, Heidegger uses in his conversation of the heart, but from which he noticeably excludes Rilke’s praise language in this discussion. The Ninth Elegy specifically mentions praise and the invisible heart in the following stanza, marking the speaker’s acceptance of this task of transformation, and his giving over to praise,

Praise the world to the Angel, not the unsayable: you can’t impress him with glories of feeling: in the universe, where he feels more deeply, you are a novice. So show him a simple thing, fashioned in age after age, that lives close to hand and in sight.
Tell him things. He’ll be more amazed: as you were, beside the rope-maker in Rome, or the potter beside the Nile.
Show him how happy things can be, how guiltless and ours, how even the cry of grief decides on pure form,
serves as a thing, or dies into a thing: transient,
they look to us for deliverance, we, the most transient of all.
Will us to change them completely, in our invisible hearts.120

How does Rilke transform the invisible to the visible, marking him as a Heideggarian poet for the destitute time? He does so through transforming the world through daring language. How does this transformation manifest in language? It ultimately manifest fully, when the task of transformation is accepted, as praise. Heidegger neglects this point when he does not acknowledge praise language as the fundamental, daring language of the poet. We know that this language takes the form of praise because the poet himself acknowledge that he gives praises to the angel. Does Rilke’s praise aligns with praise as laid out by Marion? Yes, for reasons we have seen thus far: the lack of predicative language and the giving-gift character of thinging things, and now, a requestant-Requisite relationship between speaker and Angel given anonymously in which the visible can become transformed into the invisible in the heart space through the use daring and rigorous language which manifests itself in Rilke’s poetry as praise language.
Distance and Reception: Being More Willing

The final major quality of praise that remains to be addressed in Rilke’s poetry or Heidegger’s essays is the concept of distance. This concept has been hinted at several times thus far, but its direct relationship has not been elaborated upon. If we can establish a relationship between Marion’s distance and Heidegger’s concept of poetry, it will be difficult to deny that Heidegger’s poet is indeed one who praises in a religious sense. To access this final point, I pose the following question: If the job of the poet as seen in Heidegger is to remove man from self-assertive production, how does the poem do so, seeing as the creation of a poem can be seen as production? On this notion, Heidegger replies, “Those, then, who are at times more venturesome can will more strongly if their willing is different in nature…They answer sooner to Being that shows itself as well. They will more strongly in that they are more willing.”

Heidegger, in writing on being ‘more willing’ is analyzing Rilke’s use of will in the unpublished poem line, “go with this venture, will it, adventurous.” He rationalizes Rilke’s use of will in this instance as different from ‘to will,’ which is precisely what modern man has done to close his heart space and enable destitution. Poets, being the more venturesome, do not will their own poetry, but rather poetry becomes an answer when the poet is more willing, as in more willing to receive. We recall that Marion’s notion of giving of gift has intense receiving language, for gift is received through distance. To understand Heidegger’s ‘more willing’ness, to understand poetry as reception, and to ultimately show distance in Heidgger’s thoughts, we shall look briefly to Heidgger’s elaborated thoughts on this notion in his essay, “Poetically Man Dwells.”

Early on in “Poetically Man Dwells,” Heidegger writes, “Poetry does not fly above and surmount the earth in order to escape it and hover over it. Poetry is what first brings man onto the earth, making him belong to it, and thus bringing him into dwelling.” Such a statement is not
surprising given the ability that we have seen thus far of the poet to transform the world into world, to imbue the transcendent into the earthly, to expose the heart space and turn man towards the Open, and in this way be a poet for the destitute time. The poet allows man to do so first and formally by “listen[ing] to the appeal of language.” Notice, this is not a self-willing, self-assertive production or creation of language. This appeal of language seems to have no origin, rather it is a call to the poet out of some unknown. The poem then is the response to this call of mysterious language.

Heidegger, in this essay, places mystery in the sky, the sky which exists within the world. Man possess the unique ability to be on earth yet look up at the sky—“man is allowed to look up, out of it, through it, towards the divinities.” In this upward glance, man “spans the between of sky and earth.” Indeed, man’s being is defined by “an upward-looking measure-taking of the dimension in which the sky belongs just as much as the earth.” Yet while all men possess the ability to span this distance simply by means of their being man, it is the poet, called by the mystery of the sky, who truly looks up and takes measure. In this way, “Poetry is a measuring,” or, “In poetry, the taking of measure occurs.” What precisely does the poet do in this measuring? Heidegger answers, “Measure-taking gauges the between, which brings the two, heaven and earth to one another.” The poet sees the spanning of earth and sky and uses it as the measure against which he takes in the world, and in this way the finite is brought to the infinite, the divine brought to the mortal. The power of poetic creation is that it takes the finite world and saturates it with the mystery of the sky, allowing the mystery of the world to well up in the beings of the world, without being hindered by self-assertive willing. The poet, in being more willing to receive rather than self-willing, says what he hears, which is the call of language given within the dimension of sky and earth. The claim that being places on man allows man see the stretch of the earth and sky and therefore to be opened to the invisible.
In order for the gods to ever return to the world, they must be able to make themselves manifest, yet if God “were unknown, how could he, being unknown, ever be the measure?” To rephrase this sentiment, how could God ever manifest if he is perpetually unknown? Heidegger responds “God’s *manifestness*—not only he himself—is mysterious.” The poet is then inclined to question further, “Is he manifest like the sky?” The poet concedes that he would believe so, and Heidegger validates this answer by stating, “The measure consists in the way in which the god who remains unknown, is revealed *as* such by the sky.” Since we have already established the poet’s ability to span the earth and sky thereby allowing the mystery of the sky to arise in the beings of the world, we can see now that what the poet is truly doing is allowing the mystery of an unknown, absolute God, as seen in Marion, as manifest in the sky to arise in the beings of the world. Now with this mystery saturated into the world itself, man has the potential, through the language of the poem, to see things not as objects but as things in their thingness, beings in their being—a thingness and being now filled with divinity. This new view on world, a receiving through dimension, exposes the human heart and turns man to the Open. Thus, the divine does not only manifest in the things, but also imprints himself on the human heart, settling both major qualms of destitution by allowing a space for gods to reenter the world and exposing humankind to loss of beings through the innermost heart space but so too to the true love of those beings.

Poets allow for the advent of a world in which humankind can be exposed to the Open, love, Being, and the world, and in this way turn away from their modern destitution. Poetry, when one lets it in, sets a stage in the heart for the gods to appear, and, using dimension as distance, does so through the discourse of praise as laid out by Marion. They are the hinge between the gods and the destitute time, because they bring the mysterious divine into the world. Poets allow the invisible to arise in the visible, as does Marion’s Icon. Poets do so through the dimension of earth and sky, a
dimension which I posit lines up precisely with Marion’s notion of distance. This similarity between
distance and dimension is most poignantly seen by the giving which occurs only through this
phenomenological space. Love is given as gift in praise, and thereby returned to the gods, and
language is given in dimension and returned through poetry. But through this language, love is
given to, for in poetry, man comes to open the heart, to live in world as world, and, in this process,
dare his own being and save the world.

We see Marion’s notion of distance in Heidegger’s notion of the poet’s spanning of the
dimension between earth and sky. Through this dimension, the poet receives language. On this
notion of reception, when Rilke turns toward the Angels at the beginning of the elegies, he realizes
himself incapable of receiving. But, he does fully receive the ability of transformation, and thus a
re-divination of the world, and is given over to praise in the final elegies.

We can conclude now that the fundamental qualities of Marion’s praise are upheld by Rilke,
in fact beautifully elaborated upon in Rilke’s poetry. Predicative language is replaced by a daring,
more rigorous language, a language which Rilke himself calls praise in his Ninth Elegy.
Additionally, such language is given through the dimension of earth and sky, a strikingly similar
concept to Marion’s distance in which the divine appears as the divine. Through this distance, when
it is held open through appropriate language, gifts are given and received, gifts such as love,
opening of the heart, and a return from destitution. Poets, in being the ‘more willing’ are praising.

Before drawing this discussion of Heidegger’s Poet as praiser to a close, I find it meaningful
to mention that Heidegger neglects to include in his essay is that the ‘say’ing which Rilke does to the
Angel is in fact qualified, by the poet himself, as praise. In the elegy, which Heidegger only
references in pieces, rather than as a whole, Rilke states that he indeed praises, praises of the world
to the Angel. Rilke’s notion of praise seems to intricately line up with Marion’s model of praise.
The alignment of Marion’s discourse of praise and Heidegger’s Poet proves substantial enough to contend that Heidegger’s reading of Rilke as a poet for the destitute time is a reading of a poet who praises, of a poet who brings the world through a transformation only realized fully through praise. Should one still believe that Rilke is not a poet who praises, I’d like to conclude with a powerful piece of Rilke’s which illustrates what he understands the purpose of the poet to be:

O tell me Poet what you do? – I praise.
But the deathly and the monstrous,
How do you accept them, bear them? – I praise.
But the nameless, the anonymous.
How, Poet, can you still invoke it? – I praise.
Under every costume, every mask of us,
What right have you to be true? – I praise.
Or that the calm and the impetuous
Should know you, as star and storm? – Because I praise.132

The main goal of the poet, for Rilke, is to praise. We have seen in this chapter that Rilke’s notion of praise resembles the model of praise set forth by the theologian Marion. Should Heidegger wish to use Rilke as an exemplar poet in the destitute time, what Heidegger truly advocates for is praise. Why is praise needed in a destitute time? Because praise takes man out of the self-assertive will to will and ventures man as willing into Being, it allows the heart to be open, and it transforms the world into something divine. The discourse of praise, deeply manifest in Rilke’s poetry, succeeds in alleviating the world of its destitute time.
CHAPTER III: Is All Poetry Praise? Confession and Modern Poetry

Having now experienced the intricate connections between Marion’s discourse of praise and Heidegger’s poet as perceived through Rilke, we now must ask what such an understanding of poetry means for an evaluation of the poetic field as a whole. Heidegger seems to think that very few poets are truly poets for the destitute time. However, we are inclined now to ask: Is all inspired poetry praise? Further, are there any poets currently living who meet Heidegger’s requirements for being a poet for a destitute time, which I contend merits that the poets praise? How does one tell apart such poets?

To explore these questions, I will delve first into examples of poetry that do not praise under Marion’s conception of praise, poetry that would therefore not meet the qualifications of Heidegger’s poet for a destitute time. For this task, I have chosen to explore the genre of Confessional poetry, which includes famous poets such as Robert Lowell and Sylvia Plath as these poets display qualities that are in stark contrast, ironically, given the name of the genre, to the sense of praise laid forth by Marion. In order to understand the contrast to Marion’s praise in full, I must first explain one final thing about praise: the performance of praise.

This performance of praise will be examined in Marion’s text In the Self’s Place and will briefly explore Augustine’s Confessions, and will then lead into the discussion of Confessional poets. After this exploration, I will look at a currently active poet, Ross Gay, to reveal that even in our newly modern time, there are still poets that would classify as poets for a destitute time, poets who may even save the world. Ultimately, this chapter will reveal that not all poetry praises for poetry that fails both in the discourse of praise and the performance of praise is not poetry for the destitute time; however, there are still poets who do praise successfully, and in this way modern day are poets for the destitute time.
Praise’s Performance in Confession: A Triangular Model

In the model of confession as put forth through Jean-Luc Marion’s reading of Augustine’s *Confessiones* in his work *In the Self’s Place*, we find that praise stands as one, and ultimately the most, significant factor defining Augustine’s work as confession. In the confession of praise, one speaks to God, the act of which creates a relation between the confessor and God. In addressing God, the speaker orients himself towards God in such a way that he enters into dialogue with God rather than simply presenting a monologue himself. In other words, confession opens the individual before God in a way that allows God to reach out to the individual. This reaching becomes an example of the giving phenomenon perceived in the discourse of praise. This exposing dialogue ultimately holds significance in the model for performance of praise which Marion lays out which includes the relations between the confessor (or praiser), God, and the other who witnesses the praise. We come to understand the complexities of performing praise, of actually using the discourse of praise as laid out in *The Idol and Distance*, complexities whose disregard by poets leads to a failure of praise in their works.

Marion shows Augustine’s confession to be “twofold, confession of sins and confession of praise.”133 That is, the two main qualities of confession are admittance of sin before God and offering of praise to God. Of these two qualities, praise becomes the ultimate means through which sin can be confessed, and thus praise becomes the main operation of confession. Marion shows the fundamental role of praise in confession when he states, “The *Confessiones* are intended to be set forth as, and in fact are set forth as, a praising text, a praise become text, more exactly a text that gives itself to be read as it was written—performance of praise, text to praise, which utters (and consigns) an uninterrupted appeal to God.”134 In this way, the Confession can be seen nearly
entirely as praise. Praise becomes the vessel through which confession of sin, the second substantive quality of confession, is possible as included in confession.

On the importance of praise as the fundamental mode of confession, Marion concludes, “praise fully operates the confessio.” Confession would not be confession without praise. We note now that *Confessiones* itself as a text begins with what can only be seen as praise. As Marion brings to light, Augustine begins, “You are great, O Lord, eminently worthy of praise: great your strength and your wisdom without number. And to praise you, this is what man, one of the parts of your creation, wants.” Confession begins with praising God in his greatness, and these types of statements do not cease throughout the entirety of *Confessiones*. Marion writes of the frequency of praise in confession that praise is “repeated incessantly, to the point that the readers will have their fill of it.” One may see that “The *Confessiones* are defined,” as a whole, “in the same what that they are launched: by a confession of praise.” The term ‘confession of praise’ may seem extraneous to the reader, for, in the modern vernacular, one simply praises God, one does not confess praise to God.

Contrary to the colloquial use of ‘praise’ as separate from the term ‘confess’, Marion notices that it is “straightforward to say that one can only confess a praise.” For one to “truly praise what one praises, it is obviously necessary to praise it openly, with an opening that is not only public, before all but also intimate, with all one’s heart, in both cases without reserve or reservation.” In short, praise which remains within the individual and not put out, indeed not confessed, would not be praise. As Marion notes, “A praise that would remain unconfessed simply would not be one.” Therefore, praise must be confessed to be praise. Praise must be expressed as language, for only in this way does it fall under the discourse of praise.
Marion continues now in the determining how praise manifests in this specific context, as confession. He writes:

For to speak with praise implies...that first of all I speak to God, even before saying anything whatsoever about God. Indeed, it means that I speak to God without saying anything about God, because I no longer predicate anything whatsoever about him. The radical difference between these two language games cannot be overemphasized. Speaking to God (as in the case of confessing praise par excellence) demands that the word spoken be referred to what it intends, the eminence that does not speak, therefore referring the locator to his interlocutor, or more exactly passing from the rank of locator (in relation to God) to the rank of interlocutor (he whom God approached as interloqué). In contrast, to speak of God amounts to speaking a word measured by and starting from the locator, who is precisely not God; it thereby amounts to submitting God to the conditions of the utterance, in fact the predication of he who speaks.  

We see here two distinct modes of speaking—to God and of God. To speak of God implies, for Marion, a limiting of conversation to the speaker himself, a monologue echoing strongly the predicative language which fails as praise as seen in *The Idol and Distance*. In speaking of God, God becomes separated from the conversation because God exists as the subject of conversation, a conversation held solely within the requestant as the words stem from the individual and go no further than his own personal assumptions, assertions, and predications. This way of speaking therefore does not include God except to limit him by the language of the individual, a subjective language which objectifies, which is perpetually insufficient. Indeed, speaking of God is not truly praise but rather exists as a God-less monologue. Marion confirms the harsh reality that speaking of God negates any distance-traversing to gain an closer relation with the absolute as well as any sense of giving, both a key features of the discourse of praise, when he writes, “To speak of God would mean in the end speaking of him but without, indeed against, him.”

Contrarily, speaking to God is to engage him in the conversation so as not to limit God with personal language and speak against him. Praise becomes praise only in speaking to God. In speaking to God, the speaker transcends the monologue, the role of simply locator, that is the
speaker before God, into an interlocutor, or a speaker with God. In speaking to God, the confessor establishes a dialogue, a dialogue where God approaches the speaker because the speaker has oriented and opened himself to this possibility. On this, Marion confirms that in “speaking to God, as the confessing praise does, implies first of all turning one’s face to God so that he can come over me, claim me, and call me starting from himself, well beyond what I could say, predict, or predicate of him starting from myself alone.” In this statement, we see the notion of giving, wherein the requestant and the Requisite are bound in an eternal giving and receiving of gift through praise, fully realized within Marion’s thought.

To be sure that praise to God exists throughout Confessiones, Marion confirms that within Augustine’s text:

> praise no longer pretends to say anything about God but signifies precisely that I am saying nothing about God…. From now on, each time that praise is repeated throughout the Confessiones (and it will be repeated incessantly, to the point that the readers will have their fill of it), Saint Augustine will therefore say and say again, to be convinced of it himself, what he says to God, who has no need to learn it from anybody: God, you, you are God, name of God.

One simply cannot confess in the style of Augustine without praise simply because Augustine praises so heavily, praises directly to God by stating his names and continually using ‘you’ in his confession. Augustine indeed follows the notion of an anonymous discourse of praise through his use of polyonymy throughout Confessiones, and additionally through his constant admittance that he does not understand the absolute nature of God. By speaking to God, one establishes a relation with him, a relation opened up through constant giving traversing a held-open distance. In doing so, the language used in praise becomes the language of God in so much as it is not confined to the mind of the individual, but becomes unlimited in God’s approach to the speaker as an interlocutor.

But Marion notes that the conversation, indeed the performance of praise, occurring in Confessions is not only a dialogue between confessor and God. Rather, the performance of praise
takes on a triangular structure, a triangular structure that makes confessions not only a dialogue, but a trialogue between the confessor, God, and the other who reads or bears witness to the confession. This other comes to be known as the *alii*. Importantly, Marion notes that *Confessiones*, in its structure, is “a collective repetition (by the readers, therefore by us) of the at first individual *confessio* (that of Augustine)” which “mobilize not two interlocutors (*ego* and God) but three (*ego, alii, and God").” When we have three evident relations in confession one can “put in place a system, a complex one for that matter, of relations,” each of which proves “double and reciprocal.” Understanding the relations within the triangular structure will aid us in our contemplation of how best to perform praise.

The first relation “remains strictly internal to the *ego*” to the “I” of the confessor, and “is defined at once by the ascending relation toward God…and by the descending relation.” This dual relationship, the confessor’s approach toward God through praise and God’s descending engagement in the opened dialogue, becomes the double confession to which Marion refers. Marion notes of this first relation, “I have established that the first relation, that of the *ego* to God, defines the *Confessiones* so radically that not only does the *ego* not speak *about* God but it doesn’t say anything, not even about itself, except in speaking first and radically *to* God—more exactly in responding to him by repetition of the initial word that God dispensed to the *ego* in advance.”

What is more, the *ego*, in this speaking to and the response to reception, “could not, particularly not in the *Confessiones*, have as its intention to say something about itself or for itself to anybody whatsoever, since it aims only at saying itself to God by responding to him.” Who is this “anybody” to which Marion refers?

The anybody, the readers or witnesses of confession, are known as the *alii*, and the relationship between the *ego* and the *alii* is considered the second relation of the triangular model of
Confessions. Marion writes, “The second relation, this time intersubjective, relates man to man: the ego relates itself to the alii as to witnesses of its double confession, which is now repeated: “in stilo autem meo coram multis testibus” (also in writing before many witnesses) (X, 1, 1, 14, 140).”

The confessor remains one who confesses, but now, in this relation, he confesses in a way other than direct verbal language, through writing. In this second relation, there is also a reciprocity like the double confession, on which, Marion writes:

This relation aims at a goal that, this time, passes beyond, and by far, the ego alone: one does not justify oneself before the public by pleading one’s case and winning the sympathy of readers but by naked exposure of sins and especially of the pardon that annuls them, awakening in the readers too an intelligence and love (humanus intellectus et affectus) directed to God. Literary success (pleasing, placer et pacuisse) keeps its importance, be it only so as to retain the attention of the alii, but its necessity is always subordinate to its function as means—means to lead the alii toward the same double confession that Augustine addresses to God…The Confessiones thus appear in their basic function: a machine to make a confession made by each of its readers by inciting in them the human intellectus and affectus for God.

The relation between ego and alii is truly a relation which orients the alii, which is all of the readers, to God, to the divine. Therefore, a performance of praise which follows the confessional model laid out by Marion will encourage further praise to the absolute from those who read and engage with the praise of the confessor.

The relation between alii and God, which is hinted at indirectly in the second relation, is the third relation which completes the triangular model of praise. This third relation mirrors the first relation in its doubleness, an ascending and descending confession which is a direct dialogue.

However, not much can be said of this third relation as it remains inaccessible to the confessor who is writing. This inaccessibility occurs because confessions are “always written from the point of view of the author ego,” and “they can neither describe it nor say it in place of the alii. That is, the last relation remains, first of all, inaccessible to the ego, who does not enter into it…because the
relation of the others to God concern son the other and God and would no longer be *their own.*”  
One who praises then can never praise for someone else because the *alii* relation with God remains unknown to the *ego*, yet the *ego* aims in his two relations (to God and to *alii*) to inspire the formation of this third relation between *alii* and God, and consequently, the third relation remains a vital aspect in the performance of praise within a triangular model.

Understanding Augustine to be a performer of the discourse of praise through a triangular model, we are inclined to ask: what is gained from understanding *Confessions* as the performance of praise? Primarily, we are inclined to understand *how* one can utilize the discourse of praise, *how* one can carry out the discourse of praise through the enacting of praise. We can also understand ways in which a deviation of this model, in addition to a deviation from the actual discourse of praise itself, can results in failed praise. We will now endeavor to explore such deviations in poetry, and see that not all poets can be poets for a destitute time.

**The Perversion of Praise in Confessional Poetry**

The American Academy of Poets defines Confessional poetry as “the poetry of the personal or ‘I,’” and contained “Private experiences with and feelings about death, trauma, depression, and relationships…often in an autobiographical manner.” The genre rose to popularity in America within the 1950’s and 1960’s. In his book *The Confessional Poets*, Robert Phillips notes that, “A true confessional poet places few barriers, if any, between his self and direct expression of that self, however painful that expression may prove.” The self becomes of special focus in confessional poetry for, as Phillips continues, “It uses the self as a poetic symbol around which is woven a personal mythology.” However, having examined various and complex notions of selfhood, contained in the notion of willing, receiving, and gift, already in this thesis, we must ask if the self
with which the Confessional poet writes is indeed the given self that finds the invisible in the visible through praise, or if this Confessional poet self rather resembles Heidegger’s understanding of the self-willing modern man, so much so that such poets do not succeed in becoming poets for the destitute time because the praise structure is warped in such works.

For such an examination of the Confessional poet, I will turn to Sylvia Plath’s iconic poem, “Daddy.” This poem, having become one of her most famous works and a work which undeniably fits the confessional genre, will serve as an excellent way to examine questions of the complexities of praise. Phillips notes that, “Daddy” uses the iconic language of Confessional poetry when he writes, “The language of the confessional poem is that of ordinary speech, whether in blank verse, or free, rhymed or no. ‘Daddy, Daddy you bastard, I’m through’ Sylvia Plath shouts, and through this realistic, idiomatic language the poet gets closer to the realities of American life.” Already, this description of the Confessional poem raises red flags with regard to praise, deviating from the use of ‘daring language’ as seen in Rilke, to a common language which keeps in line with the known, modern world. What is further, Marion’s own discourse praise, one which Rilke follows in his poetry, requires an entirely new discourse, for praise is the only language rigorously suited to hold open distance. For such reasons, we already see a minor fault in Confessional poetry as a genre, for praise extends beyond normal language. But there are many other qualities of praise which must be addressed, and to discuss these we shall turn now to Plath’s text.

Plath’s poem is addressed to her father, whom she calls “Daddy” throughout. Much as Marion and Heidegger view basic language as failing in some respect, Plath too experience a failure of language in the poem, specifically when addressing her father,

I never could talk to you.
The tongue stuck in my jaw.

It stuck in a barb wire snare.
Ich, ich, ich, ich,
I could hardly speak.
I thought every German was you.
And the language obscene.\textsuperscript{158}

The speaker of this poem cannot use language to address the Requisite, which is in this case her father. The father takes on a perverted sense of a divine Requisite in the second stanza line when Plath describes her father as “a bag full of God.”\textsuperscript{159} But there is no language which suits ‘Daddy,’ and hence the requestant could never talk the Requisite directly (“I could never talk to you”), could never begin a dialogue with the Requisite. This lack of dialogue marks a breakdown of the triangular model of the performance of praise, showing another mark against viewing Plath’s work as praise.

The degradation of language is discussed further by Plath scholar Susan Bassnett in her book on \textit{Sylvia Plath: An Introduction to the Poetry} when she comments that the poem further degrades language by using “broken sentences, incomplete sentences, sentences without main verbs, repetition of certain words, use of German words,” all which create the effect of “furious energy.”\textsuperscript{160} Clearly, language here is not something which communicates to a divine Requisite. Rather, it seems an attempt to gather up, perhaps even an attempt to control, the self, (something which Augustine tried to do, only to realize that all he could do was give himself over to God) as evidenced by the repeated “ich” meaning “I” in German, and by abstraction being itself ‘obscene.’ We shall see if this attempt is successful at the end of the poem.

The final lines of the poem reveal additional problems with the model of praise applying to the Confessional poets. Bassnett notes of the ending that, after the speaker stabs her father with a stake, “The years of fear and pain are at an end, the evil male figure’s reign of terror has been terminated…The poem ends with a maenad-like shriek of triumph.”\textsuperscript{161} But how triumphant indeed is this shriek?
They always knew it was you.
Daddy, daddy, you bastard, I’m through.\textsuperscript{162}

The speaker ends in some sort of overcoming, but is left still calling out to the father, predicating him with the term ‘bastard.’ In the work \textit{Sylvia Plath: Poetry and Existence} by David Holbrook, this final line is read as the speaker seeming to “declare her independence.”\textsuperscript{163} But Holbrook continues, “the energy of her hate” in these final lines, “is but a tribute to her need to go on hating.”\textsuperscript{164} Therefore the end is not a triumph but a harsh acceptance of a forced individuality, isolated from the other’s, the “They,” who always were aware of Plath’s pain but never intervened, isolated from the father around whom she had previously based much of her “I” and left grasping at the straws of a self through hateful words manifesting indeed not as praise. In addition to the already seen breakdown of the relation of \textit{ego} and Requisite in the triangular performance model of praise within this poem, one may also be inclined to view a breakdown of the third relation between \textit{alii} and Requisite for truly Plath’s final line, a culmination of hate and abuse, does not encourage, above all else, praise of the Requisite. While one may be hard pressed to say that Plath should praise and encourage others to praise her father, without doing so, she fails in the performance of praise and fails to be a poet for the destitute time.

I believe Holbrook makes a substantial conclusion on Plath’s goal in writing “Daddy” and using the poem as a way to contemplate the death of her father and it’s impending meaning for her own self when he writes, “She wants…to find a living relationship in love, that could give her substance, and help her see the world in a real way, not in fear.”\textsuperscript{165} A relationship in love that provides new vision towards the world, indeed this is language that we have seen used to describe praise and the poetry of praise. Although this may be Plath’s goal, her perversion of the discourse of praise through hate, a desire to cling to a self-made self, and the inability to perform praise to the Requisite and in a way that inspires others to praise all show that she ultimately fails at the goal of
living in love. Such love as we’ve seen in poets that praise, such as Rilke, require the angelic acceptance of love and death as one, but the anger and hatred associated with the death “Daddy,” truly show that Sylvia Plath does not praise, failing in both discourse or performance, and does not emerge as a poet for the destitute time.

The acceptance of death and love, indeed in a way that opens the heart space to loss, and which remains a large component of marking a poet as a poet for the destitute time, is a notion that the Confessional poets do not seem to grasp. Death is certainly explored inherently in the Confessional poems, but the acceptance through praise as gift simply does not occur in these works, so the notion of death is never accepted. In this way, these poets are trapped just as Heidegger’s modern man is, within the enclosed heart, unable to truly embrace the invisible and allow mystery to rise in the world. Rather, these poets block themselves from death and loss and contribute to the destitution of the world in their lack of praise. This lack of opening the heart space to death can be seen clearly in Robert Lowell’s Life Studies, a poetic work which defined his career and which we will now briefly explore.

Life Studies is a collection of poems which, according to Robert Phillips, “deals with the past—the writer’s childhood impressions of relatives, especially grandparents, and with the writer’s ‘nervous breakdown,’ which may or may not have been ‘caused’ by the past.” I believe that there is a significant weight to the fact that Lowell begins the Studies with a funeral poem about the death of his uncle entitled, “My Last Afternoon with Uncle Devereux Winslow,” as this immediately centers the collection around the notion of death and loss. This poem reveals “the horror” of “the five-year-old boy in his frivolous milieu, the sight of the young uncle already a walking corpse.” The boy is held between life and death, a place where in, rather than acceptance experiences terror, the for the poem states,
I cowered in terror.  
I wasn’t a child at all—  
Unseen and all-seeing  
My hands were warm, then cool, on the piles  
of earth and lime,  
a black pile and a white pile…  
Uncle Devereux would blend to the one color.\textsuperscript{168}

Yet does the poet, in his head on encounter with death and loss in his poems, ever reach a sense of acceptance, ever allow himself to be exposed to the Open by opening his heart space to loss and death, and therefore life and love as well? We shall turn briefly to the final poem in Life Studies, “Skunk Hour.” Phillips notes of “Skunk Hour” that it is “one of the most famous poems of the confessional movement, and justifiably so. Posing as it does the question of personal survival in the modern world, it is one of the best single poems in the volume.”\textsuperscript{169} Let us examine what this modern world survival looks like for the Confessional poet.

One dark night,  
my Tudor Ford climbed the hill’s skull;  
I watched for love-cars. Lights turned down,  
they lay together, hull to hull,  
where the graveyard shelves on the town. . . .  
My mind’s not right.

A car radio bleats,  
“Love, O careless Love. . . .” I hear  
my ill-spirit sob in each blood cell,  
as if my hand were at its throat. . . .  
I myself am hell;  
nobody’s here—

only skunks, that search  
in the moonlight for a bite to eat.  
They march on their soles up Main Street:  
white stripes, moonstruck eyes’ red fire  
under the chalk-dry and spar spire  
of the Trinitarian Church.\textsuperscript{170}
Just as in Plath’s poetry, there seems to be a keen sense of searching for love. The speaker “watched for love,” but this love coming in cars resides in the same place as “where the graveyard shelves on the town.” After this conclusion, that love and death reside in the same place, Lowell reveals, “My mind’s not right.” He notices an inherent discomfort with this simultaneous residing remains isolated on the hill he himself becoming hell, a line that may be read as the self which could be given over to gift and love and the ab-solute God rather becoming it’s opposite, a devastating self of hate, alone (nobody’s here), hellish. It seems as if personal survival in the modern world according to Lowell takes the form of something strictly anti-divine, for he is stranded with the foulest animals in the dark shadow of the Church, but more so, something which is a discomfort and a disdain for the self and the world. Such a disdain for the world also breaks down the third relation of the performance structure of praise as the others who read Lowell’s poem are not inspired to praise anything in particular, and are rather presented with many dark and disturbing images (the hill is a skull, love is careless, the skunks are about). Although Lowell’s poem does not reveal a perversion of the praise performance and discourse as strongly as Plath’s, “Daddy,” his work in Life Studies illuminates the Confessional poetry genre trend to explore complex notions of death but ultimately, rather than accepting loss and opening the heart space as does Rilke and other poets of praise, lives incapable of allowing death and love to exist simultaneously and becomes an isolated self of hate in a world devoid of love, indeed a world of destitution.

Confession poets can be viewed as poets who fail at praising, and therefore fail to be poets for the destitute time. Thus, their title as Confessional poets can be seen as starkly ironic, for where, in Marion’s reading, Augustine receives himself and love through his confession of praise, these poets grasp at the self, attempting to create one out of the pangs of emotion and devastation of death and trauma they experience, and ultimately fail to experience love. Such an attempt, as we have
seen in both Plath and Lowell, do not produce a world which can be filled with the invisible, can be saturated with love in the wake of death and loss. These poets do not follow Rilke’s poetic tradition of praise.

I believe Rita Horvath in her book, *Confessional Poetry and the Construction of the Self* states the ultimate failure of these poets well when she says, “the Confessionals invented a new mode of writing in the hope of self-cure. None of them succeeded.”171 She points out Plath’s suicide as a result of this failing, as well as Lowell’s “resignation and self-destructive behavior,” ultimately noting that “Confessional poetry thus failed in its therapeutic aim of creating integrated, unified selves.”172 Confessional poetry did not condone a self of praise, a self which is constantly given as was Augustine and as is Rilke when he praises. Confessional poetry does not receive, does not allow the invisible to be viewed in the visible, does not allow death and life to be one in the realm of the heart, does not allow man to come into the Open. Confessional poetry constructs a self, a self ultimately of isolation and hatred, and is therefore a strong manifestation of Heidegger’s self-willing metaphysical modern man. Confessional poetry is not for the destitute times for it propagates the times. Confessional poetry is not praise.

But what poetry, if any, in our current time still continues Rilke’s praise tradition and qualifies as Heidegger’s poet for a destitute time? Do we have any examples of modern, living poets who succeed in praising, who succeed in continuing the tradition of Heidegger’s poet for a destitute time, a poet who allows the world to be returned from its destitution? To answer such questions, I will turn now to Ross Gay, who, I contend, is a poet who praises, who is a living poet for the destitute time.
A Living Poet for the Destitute Time: Modern Poetic Praise

We have come to understand that not all poets can function as poets who praise. We are inclined then to ask, for the sake of our modern world, do any current poets function as praising poets for a destitute time? Do poets still exist who are more daring, who venture, who understand the simultaneous presence of life and death to open the heart space, who can save the world from destitution? To satiate these questions, I turn to a living poet: Ross Gay. Gay is a critically acclaimed American poet and professor whose most recent collection, *Catalogue of Unabashed Gratitude*, published in 2015, will allow us to explore what modern praise poetry looks like, and indeed reveal if such poetry adheres to Heidegger’s notion of poetic work for the destitute time.

In the title of the collection alone, we see that Gay is intent on praising. Like Lowell of the Confessional poets, Gay also meditates on death. In his poem, “Burial,” Gay describes distributing his father’s ashes over a garden.

```plaintext
out back I took the jar which has become
my father’s house,
and lonely for him and hoping to coax him back
for my mother as much as me,
poured some of him in the planting holes
and he dove in glad for the robust air,
saddling a slight gust
into my nose and mouth,
chuckling as I coughed
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Gay clearly feels the absence, the loss of his father, feels this death for he writes that he felt “lonely for him,” and that he wanted to coax him back into the realm of the living. Such longing and pain mirror that which Lowell felt at the death of his uncle, and Lowell could never embrace this death and open his heart space, and therefore could not live in love and could not give successful praise. Yet, in Gay’s poem, we see early on a sense of levity and joy. For as the ash of his father splashes back from the ground, causing him to cough, the speaker begins to chuckle.
We comprehend, by the end of the poem, that Gay indeed does accept death and pain for, in sprinkling his father’s ashes and metaphorically releasing his father from his grasp, from his keeping him as an object in an urn, Gay returns his father to the earth. In the earth, the father grows and takes on a new sense of life now in his death, for his father exists

almost dancing now in the plum,  
in the tree, the way he did as a person,  
bent over and biting his lip  
and chucking the one hip out  
then the other with his elbows cocked  
and fists loosely made  
and eyes closed and mouth made trumpet  
when he knew he could make you happy  
just by being a little silly  
and sweet.¹⁷⁴

Gay’s father, both alive and dead, inhabits such a paradox in a way that makes the speaker “happy,” for it is “a little silly/ and sweet.” To this embrace of death, Gay opens his heart space and maintains its opening through praise, a praise which allows love to reenter the world, even in the presence of loss. In an NPR book review, poet critic Tess Taylor notes specifically the praise, in the form of ‘thank you’ and the immense love in Gay’s poem when she states, “In the poem "Burial," Gay sprinkles his father's ashes on the roots of new trees, both hoping to coax him back and celebrating the magic dust our bodies become. Thank you for what inside my friends' love bursts like a throng of roadside goldenrod, he writes.”¹⁷⁵ In both an acceptance of death and life which gives Gay over to love and praise, celebration of the mysterious magic dust that is worldly death—what a sharp contrast to the denial and objectification of modern man and the Confessional poets—Gay indeed can be shown as Heidegger’s poet.

We understand a more precise praise in the titular poem of this collection, “Catalogue of Unabashed Gratitude” which is precisely as it sounds: thanking a list of things for which Gay is grateful. Each stanza begins, “and thank you, too,” which could be said to be an direct appropriation
of Marion’s praise “as” structure in the modern vernacular. Clearly, Gay sets himself up in each of his stanzas to praise. This praise does not appear to be malicious, warped, or perverted as in the Confessional poets, but adheres rather to Marion’s ideas of praise. Such praise is significantly noted in the following lines:

and thank you, too, this knuckleheaded heart, this pelican heart, this gap-toothed heart flinging open its gaudy maw to the sky

In these lines, several words stick out in significance within the realm of this thesis: heart, open, and sky. In setting himself up for praise by the introductory ‘thank you’ Ross proceeds to praise his heart which is currently ‘flinging open’ towards the ‘sky.’ The connections to Rilke’s poetry and Heidegger’s vision of the poet, as one who’s heart remains open, as one who receives from the distancing sky, are undeniable. What is more so, a sense of anonymity of praise arises in this particular work for it is unclear to whom the ‘thank you’ is given. The ‘thank you’ indeed seems to be directed at the things themselves in the poem, at the heart, but this ambiguity is substantial in the realm of anonymous praise.

The poem concludes wonderfully:

which is precisely what the child in my dream said, holding my hand, pointing at the roiling sea and the sky hurting our way like so many buffalo, who said it’s much worse than we think, and sooner; to whom I said no duh child in my dreams, what do you think this singing and shuddering is, what this screaming and reaching and dancing and crying is, other than loving what every second goes away? Goodbye, I mean to say. And thank you. Every day.

In these ending lines we are drawn to the intertwining of human actions both wonderful and horrible: “singing, “shuddering,” “screaming,” “reaching,” “dancing,” and “crying.” The singing
and reaching strike me as particularly Heideggarian words, for the poet sings of existence and reaches daringly into the abyss of being. But, more importantly, more Heideggarian-ly, and more Marion-ly, all of the ‘ings’ is not ‘other than loving.’ Each of the actions is indeed a form of loving. Heidegger’s exposure to the Open through the heart space allows love to flow into the world, just as Marion’s praise allows endless love through gift. What is more, Gay’s ‘loving’ is towards that which “every second goes away.” This line alone marks Gay as a poet for a destitute time, for clearly, Gay is a poet who is not shielded to loss, who is not closed off in a self-assertive manner, is not objectifying. Rather, Gay is given over to praise and to love in his poetry. The incorporation of both “Goodbye” and a final “thank you,” an acceptance of loss and yet an endless praise within such, reveals Gay as a poet for the destitute time even further.

Ross Gay provides an example of a modern poet who can be viewed as a Heideggarian poet, as a poet who praises. Gay praises in a modern way, with novel language, much as did Rilke. In this way he dares language. Such daring is mentioned by Tess Taylor when she says, “Like one big celebration bursting with joy . . . Gay's poems burst forth in leggy, unexpected ways.”178 In contrast to the Confessional poets, Gay’s poetry is wrought with acceptance, joy, and gratitude for what is received in the world. Where the Confessional poets fail to praise, Gay succeeds. Gay, as a living poet, becomes a poet for the destitute time and indeed is a poet who praises.
CONCLUSIONS

How do poets return the world from destitution? They praise.

Marion’s discourse of praise remains a language suitable to discuss the divine in a way that the divine, the invisible, can saturate the visible world through gift and love. Elements of this discourse can be seen throughout Heidegger’s essays on poetry and the world, particularly in an analysis of Rilke, who can be seen, even in his own works, as a poet who indeed praises. Through a co-reading of these two authors, we come to see that poets become poets for the destitute time because they praise.

When exploring the performance of praise as described by Marion, we discover that some poets, the Confessional poets, fail to be poets for the destitute time because they fail in using the discourse of praise, both fundamentally in their language and in the way they utilize this language in their works. However, where some poets fail, others succeed, and Ross Gay stands out as an example of a poet for the destitute times, for he praises truly, in our current year. How does Gay succeed in writing ‘useful’ poetry, poetry that has the potential to return the world from destitution, to save the world? He continues to praise in our modern times.

It is worth noting briefly that a major challenge of this project was the combined use of Heidegger and Marion. Due to Marion’s harsh disapproval of Heidegger’s focus on Being in his works—Marion chooses instead to focus on a God of love who is not within the realm of Being—one may argue that Marion and Heidegger are entirely irreconcilable. The presentation of these thinkers and their work as a co-reading hopes to explore the notion of how the divine re-enters the world, not necessarily the complexity of precisely from ‘where’ the divine comes. Such a co-reading is justified in the comparable structure of both thinker’s worlds, worlds which become intricately related to a transcendent divine. Additionally, the co-reading only hopes to expand
Heidegger’s thoughts through a look at Marion, not disrupt or rewrite these thoughts, and it encourages only that one’s thoughts when reading Heidegger be oriented towards something more tangible, the discourse and performance of praise.

This project has several future directions which I would like to pursue. Primarily, with the heavy discussion of language through both Marion and Heidegger, I am inclined to look further into the religious notion of *Logos*. Marion references the term for religious ‘word’ or ‘reason’ preceding his discussion of praise and makes appeals to the use of scripture. Heidegger also has essays on language which were not explored in this thesis but may help, again in conjunction with Marion’s thoughts, extend and enhance the discussion of the poet as the one who praises. Additionally, I would like to explore the notion of interiority, a concept that is brought up in discussion of the Angel and the heart and which also can be elaborated upon in Augustine’s *Confessions*. Such a discussion may hopefully lead to a more in depth analogy of Heidegger’s structure of the divine: the Fourfold. The Fourfold is the complex relationship between the divine and the worldly, a concept which did not enter within this thesis but which could be extended upon in my discussion of Heidegger and the divine in the future. Finally, I would like to explore more poetic form, much as in the same way I endeavored into the Confessional poets in a genre sense. The form of an ode, for example, has been traditionally noted as a poetic form of praise. Such conversation could also include an elaboration on specific language devices in poetry such as metaphor and simile, for simile, using always an ‘as’ or ‘like’ seems to draw us into Marion’s linguistic praise structure.

Let us return briefly to the current notion, as stated in the *Atlantic*, that “Poetry is useless.” Clearly, if we adhere to Heidegger’s notion that poets offer the potential for the world to turn from self-assertive modernity and return from its destitute time, poetry becomes incredibly useful. How
does one write useful poetry? How does one save the world? One dares language through the
discourse and performance of praise. One praises.
Endnotes


2 Noah Berlatsky.

3 Ibid.


6 Joseph Epstein, 13.

7 Ibid., 20.


9 Martin Heidegger, 89.

10 Ibid., 89.

11 Ibid., 129.

12 Ibid.


14 Jean-Luc Marion, 10.

15 Ibid., 12.

16 Ibid, 14.

17 Ibid., 17.

18 Ibid., 3.


20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., 48.

22 Ibid., 97.

23 Ibid.


26 Jean-Luc Marion, 139.

27 Ibid., 140.

28 Ibid..

29 Ibid., 141.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., 183.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., 184.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., 185.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., 186.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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49 Ibid.
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52 Ibid.
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56 Ibid., 190.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 191.
59 Ibid.
61 Marting Heidegger, 96.
62 Ibid., 97.

64 Martin Heidegger, 98.
65 Ibid., 98
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78 Martin Heidegger, 127.
80 Martin Heidegger, 178.
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102 Christopher P. Smith, 17.
106 Julian Young, 95.
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123 Martin Heidegger, 214.

124 Ibid., 218.

125 Ibid.

126 Ibid., 219.

127 Ibid.

128 Ibid., 220.

129 Ibid.

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131 Ibid.


134 Jean-Luc Marion, 19.

135 Ibid., 13.

136 Ibid.

137 Ibid., 19.

138 Ibid., 15.

139 Ibid., 16.

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142 Ibid., 18

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144 Ibid., 19.

145 Ibid., 19-20.

146 Ibid., 40-41.

147 Ibid., 41.

148 Ibid.

149 Ibid., 43.

150 Ibid.

151 Ibid., 41.

152 Ibid., 41-42.

153 Ibid., 42.


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