Understanding the Role of Identity in State-Perpetrated Mass Atrocities in Myanmar and Turkey:

An Economic Approach

Elle Marie Boyd

MESAN Minor Capstone

Washington and Lee University

Advisors: Professor Shikha Silwal and Professor Kameliya Atanasova

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Abstract

Ethnic and religious diversity in the face of national identity formation can result in the violent suppression of minority groups. In the most extreme cases, the state may carry out genocide and mass atrocities against target groups. Two examples of groups in the Middle East and South Asia region that have been subject to state-perpetrated mass atrocities include the Rohingya in Myanmar and the Kurds in Turkey. In both countries, state-dissemination of propaganda dehumanizes the minority group and can manipulate identity-related beliefs held by majority-group members about minority groups. I apply a market-based economic framework to highlight the role that identity beliefs play in these atrocities and to analyze how changes in identity preferences can influence ordinary people to demand hatred. This analysis suggests that demand-side policies aimed at changing identity beliefs and consumer preferences—often overlooked in economics—may prove more effective at reducing inter-group hatred than supply-side policies that target the state.

Keywords: identity economics, state-perpetrated mass atrocity, identity formation, nationalism, market for hatred.
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I.   Introduction

"Mass atrocity" serves as an umbrella term for genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass killings, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Such crimes occur with high frequency and severity. Occurring on every continent except for Antarctica, state-perpetrated mass atrocities since 1900 have resulted in up to 200 million estimated casualties, and the number of state-perpetrated mass atrocities with at least 1,000 civilian deaths since 1900 more than triples the number of interstate wars over the same time period (Anderton and Brauer, 2016). The region collectively referred to as the Middle East and South Asia (MESA) stretches from the Maghreb in North Africa across the Arabian Peninsula to India and to insular Southeast Asian countries, including Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Diverse in terms of geography, religion, ethnicity, and language, the countries in this region have multifaceted political and cultural histories. Commerce, religion, diplomacy, and imperial expansion have historically facilitated interactions and encounters of people of various backgrounds and identities both in the MESA region and between the MESA region and other global regions. While the Silk Roads connected East Asia to the northern Arabian Peninsula and modern-day Turkey, the maritime Silk Roads (also referred to as the Spice Routes) connected Southeastern Asian countries to India, the Arabian Peninsula, and the east coast of Africa (UNESCO, 2022). Luxury goods like spices, incense, and jewels were exchanged for agricultural products like grain and rice. Physical goods were not the only things exchanged along the Silk Roads. Merchants exposed their language, culture, and religion to those that they encountered on their travels. Indeed, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Zoroastrianism spread along the trade routes (UNESCO, 2022).

Today, many MESA countries specialize in trade with the rest of the world. Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar collectively produce about one-third of the world's oil, and Saudi Arabia is the largest producer within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (Puri-Mirza, 2021). South and Southeast Asian countries export natural resources like timber and rice, in addition to textiles. India was the world's leading exporter of diamonds and rice in 2019 (OEC, 2022). Individuals in the MESA region also export their labor to other countries in the

region. The International Monetary Fund viewed intra-regional labor movements in the Middle East and North Africa in the late 1990s as the major driver of regional economic integration (Chauffour et al., 1996). Workers from South and Southeast Asian countries (such as the Philippines) also work in Middle Eastern countries. Remittances from migrant workers flow across the MESA region, and migrant workers encounter individuals of various cultures, religions, and languages—just as merchants along the Silk Road did.

As colonial power and imperial spheres of influence in the MESA region began to weaken in the mid-to-late twentieth century, some nations sought to define themselves in terms of different identities, including ethnicity, religion, language, and culture. As a result, we tend to regard countries in the MESA region as relatively homogenous in terms of religion and ethnicity. For instance, following the partition of British India, the world regards India's population as predominantly Hindu and Pakistan's population as predominantly Muslim. Yet, this categorization overlooks religious and ethnic minority groups who lived in the region for centuries prior to the formation of the nation-states and continue to do so.

While efforts to consolidate national power and to define citizenship in terms of identity may aid in unifying a collective group, they may simultaneously result in the violent and systematic oppression of an "out-group" that does not align with the national group identity. The subsequent "in-group" versus "out-group" dynamic can lead to systematic discrimination, social and economic inequalities, violence, and even mass atrocities. In the context of state-perpetrated mass atrocities, government officials and the military perpetrate violence against out-groups, and the public also participates in the atrocities through active discrimination or through passive bystanding while leaders carry out atrocities (Anderton and Carter, 2019). Two cases of state-perpetrated mass atrocities in the MESA region are those committed against the Rohingya in Myanmar and against the Kurds in Turkey.

What are the dynamics of state-perpetrated atrocities in Myanmar and Turkey? Are there any commonalities across the two countries? How are "ordinary people" in these countries influenced by the state to participate in or to allow mass atrocities to occur? Instead of concluding that civilians simply "lost their moral compass" during genocides or mass killings, economics allows for the examination of

deliberate choices made by the state and by the public during periods of mass atrocities. The role that resource constraints, trade-offs, and incentives play in decision-making lies at the heart of economics. Therefore, the application of economic concepts within the mass atrocity framework provides insight into how individuals make decisions and how the state can change the perceived costs and benefits of these decisions. In the cases of Myanmar and Turkey, beliefs about religious and ethnic identity inform the public's preferences for state-perpetrated violence and hatred of the Rohingya and the Kurds, respectively. Specifically, the states' constructed nationalist narratives of "incompatible identities" influence the public's support of discriminatory policies and demand for violence against the minority groups at a given time. In this way, the states of Myanmar and Turkey—the atrocity architects—manipulate the public's beliefs about national identity, which in turn affects the decisions made by the public in the mass atrocity context. Thus, the interaction between the state and the public determines the nature of the violence towards and hatred of the targeted minority group.

Following previous mass atrocity literature, I propose a model that captures a domestic "market for hatred" of an out-group in Myanmar and Turkey. The market-based framework provides an economic lens through which I analyze the role that identity plays in the interaction between the state and the public as producers and consumers in the market. The pervasiveness of mass atrocities in Myanmar and Turkey severely impacts the well-being of the people within these countries. As most research and political discourse on state-perpetrated mass atrocities focus on the state's actions (i.e., the "supply side"), the public's demand for hatred and the consequent implications for meaningful change and lasting peace are overlooked. The application of the economic model to the mass atrocities in Myanmar and Turkey suggests that changes in identity beliefs serve as mechanisms through which the demand for hatred can be reduced, which not only highlights the importance of local policy initiatives aimed at meaningful interactions between groups but also offers hope for atrocity prevention and recovery.

The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. I begin by providing background in Section II. Specifically, I review the formation of national identity within Myanmar and Turkey and describe the means through which these states carry out mass atrocities. I frame this as an economic

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problem in Section III, and I discuss the economic model's implications for peace in Section IV. Finally, I conclude with Section X.

II.   Religious, Ethnic, and Political Background

Two aspects of self that may inform one's perception of group-identity are religion and ethnicity. Often, inter-group violence in the Middle East and South Asia is attributed to religious and ethnic tension; however, religious and ethnic diversity does not necessarily result in conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The Pew Research Center estimates that about 93% of the population in the Middle East and North Africa in 2010 identified as Muslim and that Islam is the world's fastest-growing religion. In the Asia-Pacific region, Hindus and Muslims each comprised about 25% of the population in 2010 (Pew Research Center, 2015). Table 1 contains population estimates by religious groups for select MESA countries in 1950, 1990, and 2010. Many of the countries included in the table are predominantly Muslim, with the exception of Myanmar, which is predominantly Buddhist.

Even where the populations of these countries appear religiously homogenous, they differ significantly by ethnic diversity. One measure of a country's ethnic heterogeneity is ethnic fractionalization. The ethnic fractionalization index reflects the probability that two individuals within a country are from different ethnic groups (Drazanova, 2019). An index value of zero reflects complete ethnic homogeneity, while an index value of one reflects complete ethnic heterogeneity. As shown in Figure 2, Afghanistan and Pakistan have relatively high ethnic fractionalization compared to Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, countries like Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia have experienced relatively constant ethnic fractionalization over the years, while Turkey's ethnic fractionalization rises sharply over the decades. As Drazanova (2020) emphasizes, definitions of who belongs within a given ethnic category are not static and can change depending on the politics and science popular at the time. The state or surveying entity may not include certain ethnicities as categories when collecting ethnicity data, and individuals may be less likely to identify as a member of an ethnic group when groups are afforded different rights based on ethnicity and race. For instance, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, some African Americans passed as white as a means to escape intense discrimination.

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European and North American influence and presence in the MESA region from the sixteenth to the twentieth century certainly impacted the inter-group dynamics of religious and ethnic groups in the region, though the impact on religious and ethnic group determination is complex. Not all areas of the MESA region were subject to formal colonial domination, and the transition between periods of informal imperialism, formal colonization, neo-colonialism, and post-colonialism differ for each case (Cole and Kandiyoti, 2002). During formal colonial rule, some colonial governments employed locals of specific backgrounds or identities as officials, such as Indian Muslims in Burma or Christian Filipinos in the Philippines. During their occupation of India, the British defined and granted political representation to local groups based on religious identity (Dalrymple, 2015). Scholars argue that the division and rule of the colonized population according to particular identity divisions tended to create hostilities between local groups. However, not all agree that the identity divisions used during colonial rule caused violence along identity divisions in post-colonial periods. For example, some scholars believe that Partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 was not inevitable following the British's divide-and-rule policy but instead occurred because of conflicting visions of a unified nation (Dalrymple, 2015).

Following the independence of areas from colonial rule, group leaders often incorporated ethnic, linguistic, and religious identities into nationalist ideals as they sought to gain political power in their new state. Even in the absence of colonialism, pressures from foreign powers in the twentieth century may have incentivized the use of nationalist rhetoric to create a unified nation. Nationalism involves "a set of changing discursive and institutional practices that differ from pre-modern self-conceptions and political arrangements…[that] always involves the constitution of those outside the nation as Other" (Cole and Kandiyoti 2002, pp. 190). Nationalists claim common descent, common religion, or common language that they believe sets them apart from another group. Nationalist sentiment can also be institutionalized in the form of citizenship laws. In this way, rights are reserved only for those who seemingly belong in the country (the in-group), and those who do belong not fit within the bounds of identity can lead to the formation of out-groups within. The exclusion of a group from citizenship also leads to inequality and class divisions.

Some scholars of racial and ethno-nationalism argue that ethnic divisions have come to replace religious divisions as key dividing features within societies (Selod and Embrick, 2013). During the colonial period, non-Christians were often looked down upon as inferior and even barbaric, which reflects an extension of Orientalist and anti-Semitic beliefs from earlier periods. Moreover, some believed that non-Christians, such as Jews and Muslims, differed biologically from Christians. This helped create the perceived "otherness" of non-Christians. In this way, European imperialists justified their colonization of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa through the creation and imposition of racial and religious differences between populations (Selod and Embrick, 2013). Over time—though not uniformly—groups have used ethnic identity to both divide and unite, especially in the context of the post-colonial era and the rise of nationalism (Natali, 2005). Nationalist leaders in both Myanmar and Turkey have invoked religious and ethno-nationalist narratives in their efforts to define who belongs in the nations since their independence in the early-to-mid twentieth century.

A. National Identity Formation

i. Myanmar

Pictures of overcrowded boats carrying Rohingya migrants from Myanmar to other South Asian countries shared by various media outlets in 2015 drew global attention to the plight of the Rohingya. Countries around the world have condemned Myanmar's government for the mass atrocities perpetrated against the Rohingya. Most recently, the United States government formally recognized the crimes against the Rohingya as a genocide in March of 2022. However, the mass atrocities have been occurring for decades. Many Rohingya practice Islam, while others observe Hinduism. Thus, in the predominantly-Buddhist and ethnically-diverse country of Myanmar (previously Burma), the Rohingya are both a religious and ethnic minority.

The British colonization of Burma and the subsequent nationalist movement around the country's independence informed the narratives and conceptualization of the Rohingya as an out-group in Myanmar. As a province of British India, Burma experienced an influx of Indian workers into the area (International Crisis Group, 2020). As previously mentioned, the British often awarded official positions

to Indian migrants rather than to Burmese officials, which contributed to anti-immigrant sentiment and social tensions within communities. Furthermore, inequalities between "a cast of landowners and *chettyar* money-lenders of Indian descent (greatly contributing to the growing impoverishment of rural farmers during the world economic recession of the late 1920s) …fueled the growing tide of Burmese nationalism and political consciousness during the 1930s" (Smith 1991, pp. 43-4). In the years leading up to World War II, various religious and ethnic cultural and political movements began to form, such as the Young Men's Buddhist Association and the Karen National Association. Simultaneously, the British recruited members of certain ethnic groups, such as the Karen and Chin, into their army. This preferential treatment of certain ethnic groups from the British and from American and European missionaries led to the suspicion of Burman nationalists (Smith, 1991).

Ethnic divisions persisted despite Burma's independence from British India. The Constitution of 1947 divided power between a Burman state and other ethnic states (Smith, 1991). In 1948, a citizenship law was passed that attempted to define those who belonged in the new country. While the law described indigenous races as groups that had lived in Burma prior to 1823, the law did not include a list of such groups. Still, the discussion of citizenship in terms of race emphasizes that ethnicity and race were central to the political and national narrative of who belonged in newly-independent Burma (International Crisis Group, 2020). Leaders in Myanmar also debated the role that religion should play in the newly-independent state. In 1962, a coup led by Ne Win resulted in the military gaining control of the state. Under military rule, Buddhism gradually became the state religion. Without one homogenous ethnic identity, leaders tended to view Buddhism as the mark of being a true Burmese national (Ibrahim, 2016).

ii. Turkey

Though Turkey was never formally colonized like Myanmar was, the impending threat of European powers and rebellions by various groups in the Ottoman Empire influenced the aggressive Turkish nationalism that took root following the Turkish War of Independence. The Turkish nationalist movement, led by individuals like Enver and Kemal Pasha, used nationalist ideas based on race and ethnic-cultural groups. Turkish Republican nationalism, also referred to as *Kemalism*, aimed to achieve a

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homogenous culture with one Turkish language, one ethnic identity, and one shared history within its

borders through forced assimilation of minority groups, a process known as *Turkification* (Gunes, 2012).

This vision of a secular, ethnically-homogenous modern Turkish nation sharply contrasts with the

religious and ethnically-diverse Ottoman Empire.

Turkish attitude towards the Kurds, members of an ethnic minority group in Turkey (as well as in

Iran, Iraq, and Syria), has been dynamic in nature throughout history. Though differing ethnic identities

were recognized within the Ottoman Empire, religion generally determined group identity. The empire's

millet system organized members of different ethnic, linguistic, and tribal groups into one political

community (Natali, 2005). Muslim groups—specifically Sunni Muslims—were given more privilege than

non-Muslim groups in the empire. Some Sunni Kurdish communities sometimes benefited under the

caliphate. For example, in the late nineteenth century, as the empire started to lose control, the central

government (or *Sublime Porte*) began to replace local rulers with governors appointed by the Porte in an

effort to reclaim central power in the empire; however, the Porte did not replace leaders in the Kurdish

provinces (Natali, 2005). Indeed, Natali (2005) argues that "uneven centralization policies reinforced the

role of Kurdish *shaykhs* and tribal chiefs by ensuring that the Kurdish traditional stratum…would remain

prominent in Kurdish society" (pp. 5). Thus, the Kurds arguably fared better than non-Muslim groups—

such as Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians, who suffered genocide and ethnic cleansing—during the time

of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP).

As the Ottoman Empire began to weaken from external threats and internal fragmentation in the

late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, groups began to use nationalist claims that cited ethnic

differences. During the Turkish nationalist movement, the Constitution of 1921 granted local autonomy to

the Kurds and recognized it as an ethnic group with shared interests with other ethnic groups in the

nation. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, considered the founder of the Republic of Turkey and Turkey's first

president, proclaimed that the Kurdish provinces would be ruled autonomously and that both Kurds and

Turks would serve as deputies in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Yegen, 2009). However, the

1924 Constitution revoked the right of autonomy of non-Turk ethnic groups. While the state recognized

that people of other races inhabited the country, it refused to grant rights to these people who claim non-Turk racial status (Yegen, 2009). Subsequently, the state has employed dehumanizing narratives, policies of assimilation, and military violence to repress Kurdish identity and to enforce its nationalist goals.

B. State Mechanisms for Mass Atrocities in Myanmar and Turkey

The mass atrocities committed by the states against the Rohingya and the Kurds respectively have each been considered by some scholars as genocide. Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term *genocide*, outlines eight techniques that the Nazis used during the Holocaust to describe his conceptual framework of genocide; political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral techniques aim to disrupt and destroy the targeted group (Moses, 2012). Arguably, each technique has been used by Myanmar against the Rohingya and by Turkey against the Kurds at one point in the long, dynamic cycle of violence against the groups in the twentieth century. Additionally, both states have used various political instruments to attempt to erase the group identity of the Rohingya and the Kurds. I categorize these mechanisms into two broad groups: governance and forced removal. Governance encompasses the use of laws and propaganda to oppress the minority group and to erase it from national collective thought. Forced removal includes policies of displacement and acquisition of minority-owned land for state or private use.

i. Governance

a. Laws

Through citizenship laws, minority groups can be excluded, adding to the notion that these groups do not belong in the country since they are not true citizens. As previously mentioned, the 1948 citizenship law in Myanmar placed ethnic identity at the center of citizenship (International Crisis Group, 2020). The 1982 citizenship law defined three tiers of citizenship: citizen by birth or descent, associate citizen, and naturalized citizen. Groups in the first tier were awarded more rights than groups in the other tiers. Both the 1948 and 1982 laws did not provide a concrete list of ethnic groups considered indigenous. A list of the 135 national races was published in 1990, which excludes the Rohingya. More recently, the government has tried to coerce the Rohingya into accepting National Verification Cards (NVCs) using

violence harassment, and manipulation. The NVC states that the Rohingya cardholder a Bengali, implying that the Rohingya are from Bangladesh and illegally reside in Myanmar (Human Rights Council, 2019). Those without an NVC are denied access to health care and education, as well as the ability to conduct business, but holding a NVC means accepting that the Rohingya do not belong in Myanmar.

In contrast to the Rohingya, the Kurds have not always been excluded from citizenship. According to Turkey's 1924 Constitution, discussed above, those belonging to the Turkish nation were recognized as citizens. That is, while the state no longer recognized separate ethnic groups, individuals who "assimilated" into Turkish culture—through not claiming another ethnic background, taking Turkish names, and speaking Turkish—were considered citizens. With Turkishness as a category of citizenship, Kuzu (2016) argues that some people of different (i.e., non-Turk) ethnic backgrounds refused to identify as non-Turk and thus as a minority. Yet, much of the Kurdish assimilation was compulsory and dictated by the state. Atatürk instituted anti-Kurdish policies as a way to achieve perceived ethnic and cultural homogeneity in the country (Işik and Üngör, 2021). Subsequent Turkish leaders continued Kemal's efforts of social engineering and homogenization.

b. Narratives, Propaganda, and Erasure

Governments spread disinformation and propaganda about the out-groups to create a national narrative of who belongs in the nation and who does not. Leaders in Myanmar have promoted the narrative that non-Buddhist, non-Burman minorities threaten the security of the Buddhist-Burman majority and, thus, pose a threat to the nation. The government pushes a false version of history that privileges members of the Burman ethnic group over other ethnic groups (Progressive Voice, 2020). Politicians, such as the National League for Democracy's (NLD) Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, also emphasize the need to protect Buddhism from other religions like Islam. The Burman Human Rights Network (2017) argues that the NLD received pressure from the Buddhist nationalist lobby to not permit Muslim candidates to run for the NLD in 2015 elections.

Both nationalist groups and the military spread disinformation about Islam and the Rohingya in Myanmar. Buddhist nationalists claim that Muslims have higher birth rates than the rest of the population

in Myanmar and warn that Myanmar could become predominantly Muslim like the nearby countries of Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia (Progressive Voice, 2020). Military officials are also responsible for inciting hatred against the Rohingya. In 2018, reports from former military and civilian officials exposed the Myanmar military's involvement in a five-year propaganda campaign on Facebook that spread false information about Muslims and the Rohingya. Members of the military created fake accounts—of pop stars, models, and a beauty queen—and promoted anti-Rohingya narratives, including false images and stories about Rohingya-incited massacres and rape of Buddhists by Muslims. Facebook confirmed that Myanmar's military ran these pages, and the company recognized the military's attempts to spread anti-Rohingya propaganda (Mozur, 2018). The military's systematic efforts to incite national fear of Muslims and the Rohingya resulted in the use of social media as a way to achieve ethnic cleansing.

State officials in Turkey spread propaganda against the Kurds in the form of speeches, especially after Kurdish rebellions. In his 1936 speech, Atatürk proclaimed that the Kurdish region of Dersim—a "wound" and "terrifying abscess" that needed to be removed and cleansed at whatever cost—was Turkey's most pressing domestic problem (Aras 2013, pp. 135). Over the next two years, the military would launch attacks on Dersim, resulting in mass killings and bombing of villages. Anti-Kurdish ideology inspired by the state also figures prominently in Turkish media. When framing Kurdish issues in state media, journalists often use words like violence, terrorism, and separatism, and they frame Kurdish political demands as irrational (Çelebi, 2021). The framing of the Kurds in the media as foreign elements that pose a threat to the Turkish nation reflects the state's influence from its efforts to emphasize the otherness of non-Turk ethnic groups and to eradicate them from the public sphere.

Turkey has employed a variety of methods aimed at erasing Kurdish identity. During the early years of the Turkish Republic, boarding schools were used as places of forced assimilation in terms of culture and language. Because mothers were seen as carriers of Kurdish national identity, Turkish leaders saw the necessity for girls to be placed in boarding schools (Işik and Üngör, 2021). Kurdish villages were also renamed with Turkish names. Moreover, until the 1980s and 1990s, the state referred to the Kurds as *Mountain Turks*, refusing to recognize Kurdish identity (Gunes, 2012).

ii.   Movement Restrictions and Forced Removal

The militaries in Myanmar and Turkey carry out and enforce movement restrictions and policies of displacement. Following a period of violence in in Rakhine state in 2012, the Myanmar government displaced over 140,000 people—many of whom were Rohingya—into camps as internally displaced persons (Human Rights Council, 2019). Other Rohingya fled to nearby countries like Bangladesh where they sought refuge from the violence in Rakhine. In 2016 and 2017, the government launched clearance operations during which the military, local police forces, and armed civilians burned down villages, raped Rohingya women and killed children and adults (Human Rights Council, 2019; Fortify Rights, 2017). After the attacks of Rakhine villages and forced deportations of the Rohingya from northern Rakhine, the government confiscated the land of those displaced or killed. The profits from that land go into Myanmar's national budget (Human Rights Council, 2019). Soldiers and police officers also monitor and restrict the movement of the Rohingya through threats of arrest, checkpoints, and curfews. In addition to increased difficulty in carrying out daily activities, curfews—which do not allow for gatherings with more than four people—interfere with Muslim Rohingya's ability to gather for congregational prayers, weddings, and funerals. As a result of the government's clearance operations, the lives of the Rohingya are extremely disrupted.

Similarly, the government of Turkey has ordered compulsory re-settlement of Kurdish inhabitants at various times through the twentieth century. Prior to the 1940s, some Kurds were forced to move to areas with a large population of Turks in an effort to force them to assimilate into Turkish culture (Yegen, 2009). In 1934, the Settlement Law defined three settlement zones based on their perceived Turkishness. The first zone represents regions of mostly Turks, the second region represents areas in which the out-group could be resettled and then assimilate into Turkish culture, and the third zone prohibited residence due to high populations of non-Turks (Yegen, 2009). Other Kurds are internally-displaced by violence, such as the burning of Kurdish villages by the military in 1990, which forced many Kurds to leave their homes. The forced displacement and resettlement of Kurds subject them to increased levels of violence and economic insecurity.

III. Economic Approach to Understanding State-Perpetrated Mass Atrocities

How does the state's efforts to dehumanize an out-group convince seemingly "ordinary people" to participate in mass atrocities, genocides, and other crimes? How can neighbors be influenced to turn in other neighbors to the government or to turn a blind eye to the violence? The public—whether actively participating in violence or passively bystanding—and atrocity architects make a choice to engage (or not to engage) in the violence against an out-group. Economics provides a framework through which agents' choices and their decision-making process can be analyzed. Rational choice theory in economics assumes that agents have preferences over alternatives or choices they are confronted with and, given particular resources and constraints, the agents consider the cost and benefit of different decisions in making the most optimal decision. Violence and mass atrocities directly impact the wellbeing of individuals within the given country, which in turn affects the economic development of communities and of the nation as a whole. Therefore, violence and economic development are interlinked, and economics provides a way to gain insight into and to explain the decisions that atrocity architects and the public make during mass atrocities.

In the case of state-perpetrated mass atrocities in Myanmar and Turkey, the state and the public have beliefs about religious and ethnic identity; in turn, these preferences inform the choices that the agents make in the mass atrocity framework. Moreover, as an atrocity architect, the state can manipulate the publics beliefs about identity and enforce a perceived hierarchy of identities (Anderton and Carter, 2018). Thus, I use a modified rational choice model that accounts for identity-related preferences to analyze how hatred and violence against an out-group can become socially acceptable and to explore how the state's manipulation of identity-related beliefs can change individual's preferences towards hatred and violence in the context of mass atrocities.

Anti-Rohingya sentiment in Myanmar and anti-Kurdish sentiment in Turkey are the product of state narratives that promote Rohingya and Kurdish identity as incompatible with national identity, just as anti-Semitism in Germany, anti-black hatred in America, and anti-Americanism in some Middle Eastern countries have been spread and fostered by false, hate-filled stories (Glaeser, 2004). As disseminators and

producers of narratives of hatred against the Rohingya and the Kurds, the states can be viewed as suppliers of hatred to the public. The public—specifically civilian majority group members—consume these stories, and they can demand more hatred against the minority group based on previous government messaging as well as prior personal interactions with members of the minority group. Therefore, I argue that there exists a domestic market for hatred in the context of state-perpetrated mass atrocities where the government represents the supply-side and non-minority group members represent the demand side. I assume that within a state, there is a majority group (or in-group) and a minority group (or out-group) along some identity division (e.g., religion, ethnicity, language, etc.). Consumers possess beliefs about the identity that are informed by both personal interactions and messaging from the state, and these beliefs inform their preferences between hatred and other consumption goods.

This market-based framework generates new insights into the role that the public plays in state-perpetrated mass atrocities, which provides an explanation for why mass atrocities are so pervasive and successful from the state's point of view. A market has three key components: the physical good, the buyers, and the suppliers. Buyers have motivations to demand the good, including preferences and utility that they gain from the good, but are constrained by their budget. Similarly, suppliers also have costs that they incur to supply to good, which determines the quantity of the good they are willing and able to supply at various prices. In the remainder of Section III, I will discuss each of these key components in turn. Once these components are identified, I will the interaction of suppliers and consumers in the markets, which determines market equilibrium quantity and price. Then, comparative static analysis will allow for an understanding of the dynamics of the market and offers suggestions for appropriate policy responses.

A. Hatred as a "Good"

The interaction between the state and the public in the domestic market for hatred determines the equilibrium level of hatred of the minority group at a given point in time. Viewed in this light, hatred functions as a good that can be produced and consumed in the marketplace (i.e., the country). Using economic concepts like opportunity costs, preferences, and rational choice, economists have described

markets for intangible goods and services like crime, terrorism, and suicide. For instance, Laurence Iannaccone (2006) proposes a "market for martyrs," and Edward Glaeser (2004) develops a model of the political economy of hatred, in which politicians supply hate-filled stories, and voters differ in their willingness to listen to these stories. Economists differentiate between private and public goods, whether tangible or intangible. Private goods, like candy at a gas station, are excludable (that is, those who are unwilling or unable to pay for the good are prevented from consuming the good) and rival (the consumption of a good by one person reduces the amount available for another person in the market). Public goods, such as national defense, are non-rival and non-excludable. With public goods, anyone can consume them—even those who do not pay for them—so there are incentives to free-ride.

Further, economists classify public goods that are actually harmful to society (and thus, not *good* in the traditional sense of the word) but that are still non-rivalrous and non-excludable as "public bads." Therefore, hatred against the out-group is a "public bad," in the sense that one majority member's consumption of hatred about the minority does not reduce the amount of hatred that another majority member can consume, and even those majority members who do not actively "consume" hatred can benefit freely off of the production of hatred of the out-group. As members of the in-group, passive members who do not vote for hate-spreading politicians or who do not actively consume disinformation about the minority still "benefit" from hatred by belonging to a group that is socially and politically superior and thus, receiving privileges that members of the out-group do not have. For example, white Americans during the twentieth century who did not actively discriminate against African Americans and did not vote for politicians who promoted policies of segregation still "free-rode" off of discriminatory practices because they received privileges as white individuals, which makes it harder to exclude those individuals from benefitting freely.

The description of a "market" for hatred implies that there exists a price mechanism that, under a set of conditions, helps to regulate the supply and demand of hatred. The suppliers must receive something in exchange for hatred, and the consumers must give up something when they consume hatred. However, like the "market for martyrs" proposed by Iannaconne (2006) to explain violent extremism, the

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market for hatred in the context of state-perpetrated mass atrocities may bear little resemblance to other economic markets. It is useful to frame the price that the government receives in terms of a benefit and to think of the what the consumer pays in terms of alternatives that must be given up. For instance, when majority members pay by voting for officials who align with their beliefs about the minority, as Glaeser (2004) suggests, they give up voting for other candidates and forego the policies that the other candidate supports. In return, officials get elected and their policies gain support. Further, Myanmar and Turkey frame the existence of the Rohingya and the Kurds within the country as a dangerous threat to the security of majority group members and to the unity of the nation. Therefore, to majority members, the expected damage from the out-group is high, making the price of *not* demanding hatred extremely costly (Glaeser, 2004). For a more in-depth discussion of the benefits and motivations for politicians and soldiers to supply hatred, see Section III.B below.

In addition to payment by voting, majority members also pay by giving up their agency when they buy (i.e., accept) into the government's disinformation about the minority without seeking the "truth" by questioning the state discourse. In his model of the political economy of hatred, Glaeser (2004) argues that finding out the "truth" about minority members entails some costs. These search costs can be monetary (having to pay money to purchase other sources of news) or social (facing ostracization from other majority members or even facing punishment from the government). The more geographically isolated the group is, the higher the cost of association. With high search costs, consumers have little incentive to question the state narrative. In the context of Myanmar and Turkey, citizens face extremely high search costs, as their efforts to search for the truth could result in harm, accusations of treason, threats of imprisonment, and antipathy from neighbors.

B. Supply of Hatred

In state-perpetrated mass atrocities, the government (including both politicians and the military) supplies hatred of the minority group to the majority group. In this sense, the government serves as a firm that produces hatred in exchange for benefits—like public support, elections, and non-resistance—from majority group members who consume hatred. In Myanmar and Turkey, the production of hatred is

evident through each of the policy instruments discussed above. Through laws that deny citizenship and property rights to the minority group, the dissemination of false narratives about the minority, the use of forced removal and displacement policies, and attempts to homogenize the population and erase the minority group's cultural identity, the government provides hatred to the public by promoting the notion that minority identity is incompatible with national identity. These mechanisms, in addition to labor, serve as the atrocity architect's inputs in their production function (Anderton and Carter, 2019). Income from taxes serve as a revenue base for the government, and the government's expenses include military expenditure and marketing expenses, such as the cost of broadcasting and disseminating dis-information about the minority group. In exchange for the production of hatred, the government receives public support for military campaigns or the passage of laws, majority members buy into false narratives about the out-group, and individuals passively allow the production of hatred to occur without protest.

Laborers, specifically politicians and soldiers, have motivations for participating in the production of hatred and in mass atrocities. The narrative of uniting against a "threat" to national stability and unity can perpetuate the sense of a national identity and can encourage laborers to help eliminate the "threat" posed by the minority. Politicians seek public support from voters, political parties seek to have their laws passed in legislative bodies, and national leaders seek to reduce the likelihood of being overthrown. Politicians can spread hate-filled stories and help pass laws that discriminate against members of the minority, and soldiers in the state military can spread hatred in the form of violence against members of the minority. Iannaccone (2006) argues that often, socially constructed benefits—including status, honor, and a shared sense of uniting against the enemy—are important motivators for effective soldiers. This idea of socially constructed benefits serves as one explanation of why military and political members of the government participate in the production of hatred. Benefits to laborers of participating in the production of hatred include election, gaining popular support, feeling more secure and safe from the minority's real or perceived threats, and feeling unified as a nation.

C. **Demand for Hatred**

Arguably, most of the research on state-perpetrated mass atrocities focuses on the state's mechanisms for achieving mass atrocities, which are supply-side factors. For example, much of the body of literature on the violence against the Rohingya in Myanmar and the Kurds in Turkey deals with the historical conduct of the military, policy programs aimed to economically and socially weaken the minority groups, and the narrative techniques that political leaders use to dehumanize both the Rohingya and the Kurds. However, given the prevalence of the mass atrocities in these countries in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, policies that target the supply side—including sanctions and global reprimanding—do not appear effective or permanent solutions. For instance, even with economic sanctions and some countries refusing to engage in trade, Myanmar can find other countries who will supply arms to them, such as North Korea. The lack of public resistance to mass atrocity campaigns against the Kurds and the Rohingya implies the existence of some sort of demand for hatred from the public in Myanmar and Turkey, which has been largely overlooked in the literature (Anderton and Brauer, 2018).

Members of the majority group ("the public") consume hatred produced by the government. To simplify the model, I consider a composite good (C), which represents all other goods that the consumer could consume other than hatred. In this way, I can consider only two goods when modeling consumer preferences. Consumers demand for hatred depends upon their income (I), the prices of hatred (P_H) and of the composite good (P_C), and upon their preferences about hatred and the composite good. In terms of preferences, we assume that consumers gain some amount of utility or happiness from the consumption of the good. Consumers seek to maximize their utility by consuming a bundle of goods—in this case hatred and the composite good—while staying within their budget. Therefore, I introduce the public's budget constraint and a utility function to demonstrate the role that identity beliefs play in the public's demand for hatred.

The public's budget constraint can be represented by $P_H Q_H + P_C Q_C \leq I$, where H represents hatred, C represents all other consumer goods, and I represents the mean income of the public/majority group. Solving for the quantity of hatred, we obtain $Q_H = (I/P_H) - (P_C/P_H)Q_c$. Further, assuming that

majority group members have monotonic and convex preferences in addition to identity-related beliefs about the out-group, I model consumers' preferences by a Cobb-Douglass utility function $u(C, H) = C^{1-i}H^i$, where i ($0 \leq i \leq 1$) is a number that encompasses identity-related beliefs about the out-group. Alternatively, i can be thought about as an identity parameter that "represents the person's strength of preferences" for hatred against the out-group (Anderton and Carter 2017, 179). If $i = 0$, the individual only achieves utility from the composite good, so no hatred is demanded. In order for the public to prefer more units of hatred over the composite consumer good with the Cobb-Douglas indifference curves given by $u(C, H) = C^{1-i}H^i$, i must be greater than $\frac{1}{2}$. Therefore, as the majority group views the minority group as more of a threat, i increases. As i approaches 1, consumers gain more utility from hatred relative to the utility they gain from the composite good.

Graphically, a consumer's optimal consumption bundle of hatred and the composite good occurs at the point of tangency between the indifference curve and the budget line (as shown in figure 3). With budget line

$$P_H Q_H + P_C Q_C = I,$$

and with Cobb-Douglas indifference curves given by $u(C, H) = C^{1-i}H^i$, the Cobb-Douglas demand functions for hatred and the composite good, respectively, are

$$H = i \times \left(\frac{I}{P_H}\right) \text{ and } C = (1 - i) \times \left(\frac{I}{P_C}\right).$$

Notice that the demand functions for both hatred and the composite good depend upon the price of the respective good, the consumer's income, and the identity parameter i. The fraction of income that the consumer spends on hatred is given by i, and the fraction of income that the consumer spends on the composite good is 1-i (Varian 2020, 84). Therefore, the consumer's demand for each good alters with changes in income, prices, and the identity parameter.

i. Identity Parameter in Consumer Demand

The identity parameter (i) alters the preferences of the public and thus their quantity of hatred demanded. Group members know that they differ from the other group's members by some identity (e.g.,

religion, ethnicity), and group members possess beliefs about this difference in identity. For instance, they might view the minority group's religious practices as immoral or in direct conflict with their own religious practices. In the case of ethnicity, majority members may hold beliefs—informed by history and historical narratives—that the minority ethnic group threatens society in some way (culturally, developmentally, etc.). Indeed, hatred between groups is often based upon stories of crimes of the hated group (Glaeser, 2004). State discourse and other anti-minority narratives can also lead majority group members to believe that minority group members are inherently violent and pose a physical threat to themselves, their family, and the nation as a whole. Thus, they would be more willing to pay the government for hatred in the hopes of self-protection. Alternatively, if they believe that they will benefit from the weakening of the minority through the production of hatred (by being uplifted over the minority economically or socially), they are willing to pay for hatred.

When considering the components of the identity parameter, it is important to recognize that demand for hatred in the current period is informed by the government's actions, which we also consider as inputs in the production of hatred above, as well as by individual beliefs and personal encounters with the minority group. This complicates the model of demand and supply and necessitates an introduction of time periods into the model. To incorporate this temporal aspect into the model, I define T as the current time period (or period of interest). Then $T-1$ denotes the time period before the current time period. I now define the identity parameter as a function of government messaging or actions in the period before that influence the public's perception of the minority (G_{T-1}) and beliefs about the minority that are informed by personal experiences (B_{T-1}), such that $i_T(G_{T-1}, B_{T-1})$. This functional representation of the identity parameter represents my assumption that there is a dialect between institutional and personal influences on the public's beliefs in the context of state-perpetrated mass atrocities. Moreover, the temporal dimension allows for the incorporation of the dynamic nature of the mass atrocities in Myanmar and Turkey over time.

D. Equilibrium and Shocks

The interaction between the supply of hatred from the government and demand for hatred from majority group members determines the equilibrium level of hatred of an out-group in the country at a given time (Figure 4). When supply or demand changes, the equilibrium level of hatred also changes. In the context of Turkey, both Kurdish insurgency or Kurdish political strength in Syria or Iraq may amplify Turkish security doctrines that aim to prevent cross-border Kurdish unity, therefore shifting Turkey's supply curve out (Işik and Üngör 2021, pp. 32). All else equal, the equilibrium quantity of hatred of the Kurds in the domestic market would increase. Additionally, if other countries or global organizations remove economic sanctions or remove peacekeepers from the country, the cost to the government to produce hatred falls, so they are willing to supply more hatred at any given price, and the supply curve shifts out.

As emphasized by the functional form of the identity parameter, demand can change from government mechanisms and from changes in personal beliefs about the minority group. All else equal, an increase in the volume of propaganda in the previous time period (a high value of G_{T-1}) corresponds to an increase in i_T. Therefore, the consumer's indifference curves get steeper, increasing the optimal quantity of hatred in the current time period, and the demand curve shifts out. Similarly, changes in personal beliefs about the minority group (B_{T-1}), result in the public's greater demand for hatred. An attack by an Islamic extremist within a country may lead to increased Islamophobia within the country and the public may place pressure on the government to respond. The increase in B results in a higher i_T, again altering consumer preferences towards higher quantities of hatred and shifting the demand curve out. Finally, if the mean income (I) of the majority group increases, the budget line shifts outwards. Intuitively, the more resources one has, the more he or she can spend on both hatred and the composite good. Therefore, given an increase in the income of the majority group, the quantity demanded for both goods rise.

E. Application to Myanmar and Turkey

In 2018, Facebook discovered that Myanmar's military posed as celebrities, fans of pop stars, and other civilians to run a systematic anti-Rohingya propaganda campaign dating back to at least 2013. Let

us consider the demand for hatred in the next time period, say $T = 2019$. The use of propaganda represents an increase in G_{T-1}, which in turn increases the identity parameter i_T. Non-Rohingya civilians have an increased preference for hatred against the Rohingya, and their utility curve grows steeper (as shown in Figure 5a). The optimal consumption bundle now contains higher levels of hatred and lower levels of the composite good. Holding prices and income constant, the higher value of i results in a greater demand for hatred at any price. This is reflected in a shift out of the demand curve, as shown in Figure 5b. The shifts in the figures can also be described from the use of anti-Kurdish propaganda in Turkey. The speech given by Atatürk in 1936, during which he described the predominantly-Kurdish region of Dersim as a grave internal problem, represents an increase in hate-creating stories disseminated by the Turkish state. In the next time period, $T = 1937$, i_T increases (since G_{T-1} increased). Therefore, Turkish citizens prefer more anti-Kurdish hatred compared to the composite good (Figure 5a). All else equal, the Turkish citizens demand more hatred against the Kurds, and the demand curve shifts out.

IV. Implications for Peace

The state, as the supplier of hatred in the modified rational choice model, has many substitutes for inputs into their production function. For example, if it becomes "costly" to perpetrate mass murder due to the enforcement of human rights laws, sanctions, or other punishments, the state can substitute the input of mass murder with increased dissemination of propaganda or by enforcing curfews of ethnic and religious groups. Further, some states still carry out mass atrocities regardless of sanctions and global reprimand, indicating that the supply-side policies aimed at reducing or stopping state-perpetrated mass atrocities may prove ineffective. Therefore, when looking for ways to reduce the market equilibrium level of hatred so that mass atrocities are less likely to occur, demand-side policies offer more possibilities than the supply-side and is often overlooked. Even in neoclassical economics, policies for changing preferences are overlooked. Studies rarely consider where the preferences come from. Instead, models assume certain preferences without questioning their origins. The identity-modified rational choice model provides alternatives in that it focuses on preferences and their manipulation. Just as atrocity architects

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can manipulate preferences to their advantage, architects of peace can alter preferences to ensure peaceful outcomes.

As discussed in Section II, increases in the identity parameter (i) results in an increase in the public's preference for hatred. In turn, the identity parameter changes with government messaging (G) and personal experiences/beliefs about the minority (B). Since reducing government messaging proves just as challenging as reducing the supply of hatred, I turn to solutions that could influence the personal beliefs and experiences parameter as a way to reduce the public's preference and demand for hatred. The literature suggests several conditions that can contribute to peace in multi-ethnic or multi-religious states.

Saumitra Jha (2007) provides a framework for overcoming hatred and supporting ethnic tolerance in ethnically-diverse regions. While the violent legacy of the Partition in India may make tolerance between Hindus and Muslims in India appear impossible, Hindu and Muslim traders in medieval ports maintained inter-group tolerance for centuries. The ports developed institutions and norms that punished the replication of other groups' specializations, including *Kaala-paani*, which "punished Hindus who traded across the ocean with loss of caste and ostracism" (Jha 2013, pp. 90). Additionally, guild organizations helped to encourage joint commercial endeavors between the two groups. Joint festivals also contributed to peaceful interactions between Hindus and Muslims.

Tolerance between Hindus and Muslims in medieval India supports a theoretical model for the maintenance of peaceful coexistence between ethnic groups (Jha, 2007). He argues that three conditions are necessary. First, groups must have complementarities—in contrast to competition—such that each group gains from the cultural or physical exchange. With mutual gains, incentives are lowered for inter-group violence. Second, there must be a high cost of replication of the other group's specialization. If the cost of replication was low—for instance, if there were no repercussions for Hindus to trade across the ocean in medieval India—then group members could simply take over the production of the complementarity, possibly leading to non-peaceful conditions. Third, there must be an income redistribution mechanism in place. Otherwise, wealth inequalities could incentivize either group to attack the other group or their means of trade.

Though state-perpetrated mass atrocities are carried out "top-down," the economic model of hatred suggests that a "bottom-up" approach, starting with meaningful connections between majority and minority group members, could influence the public's identity preferences. At the local level, grass-root or NGO-led interactions and discussions between the two groups could lead to the acceptance and recognition of the minority group members as "human" rather than as a threat to society. Roots, a grassroots initiative, focuses on building connections between Israelis and Palestinians with the aims of mutual recognition and respect of each group's identity.[1] Such interactions could lead to common value formation and vested interests, which Brauer and Dunne (2012) argue make peace more feasible. Once the norm of acceptance and respect becomes widespread, then the personal beliefs parameter (B) could fall, reducing the demand for hatred, resulting in a fall in the price (or benefit that the government receives) of hatred. Thus, the government could be incentivized to produce less hatred.

The recognition and acceptance of minority group identity appeals to the notion of "cultural rights," which groups like the Kurdistan Democrat Party of Turkey (TKDP) advocated for in the 1970s. Such rights include the recognition of the Kurdish language as an official language in predominantly-Kurdish areas. The establishment of cultural rights may also help pave the way for political and economic rights of minority groups.[2] Kurdish regions in Eastern Turkey were viewed as a zone of deprivation, and Kurdish activists in the 1960s drew attention to the state's negligence of the region, demonstrated by the state's lack of investment in education and health infrastructure (Gunes, 2012). Rakhine State, where many of the Rohingya in Myanmar live, has been destroyed by the violence from the state and from armed ethnic groups. Further, the Rohingya are restricted from access to health care and education. For true equality, rights to health care and education must be granted to all minority groups, and the state must take an active role in investing in the infrastructure of Rakhine.

V. Conclusion

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[1] More information about Roots can be found at https://www.friendsofroots.net/.
[2] It should be noted that the Rohingya and Kurds are diverse populations. Neither group has uniform political goals, and not everyone within these groups may support ethno-politics (Kuzu, 2016).

The state-perpetrated mass atrocities committed by Myanmar and Turkey against the Rohingya and the Kurds, respectively, have commonalities both in the mechanisms through which the state perpetrates hatred and in the role of identity in the formation of "in-group vs. out-group" dynamics. While the state produces hatred for members of the in-group to consume, the in-group also demands hatred from the government due to beliefs about the harm that the out-group poses to personal and national security. By including an identity parameter in the model of consumer preferences, I explain how beliefs about identity can influence "ordinary people" to be complicit in mass atrocities. I argue that changing beliefs about identity on the demand-side of the "domestic market for hatred" may provide more permanent solutions to reducing hatred than supply-side solutions. By promoting a norm of recognition and acceptance of different identities at the local level, demand for hatred could fall in a way that makes the production of hatred unprofitable for the state.

While this study applies a market-based framework to the hatred of minority groups within a country, the equilibrium quantity of which I argue is determined by the interaction between the state and the majority group, the model of hatred put forth in this paper does not consider non-state actors—such as non-state media sources and rebel groups—as producers of hatred. Additionally, given my focus on the influence of state discourse and state-disseminated propaganda on the public's beliefs about group identity, the model overlooks other mechanisms used by states to carry out mass atrocities, including the cultural destruction of monuments and artifacts. Finally, the static nature of the model fails to account the dynamic nature of the mass atrocities in Myanmar and Turkey. Future research should incorporate non-state suppliers of hatred and the use of cultural destruction mechanisms into the analysis of mass atrocities in Myanmar and Turkey.

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List of Tables and Figures

Figure 1. Location of Turkey and Myanmar Within the MESA Region

Notes: This map was made using the World Countries boundaries data on ArcGIS. Myanmar and Turkey are shaded in light purple.

Figure 2. Countries in the MESA Region Experience Varying Degrees of Ethnic Heterogeneity
Notes: This graph shows the Ethnic Fractionalization Index for select MESA countries from 1945 to 2013. The data comes from the Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization (HIEF) Dataset, which was created by Lenka Drazanova (2019, 2020). The ethnic fractionalization index reflects "the likelihood that two people chosen at random within a given country will be from different ethnic groups" (Drazanova 2019). The index value ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 representing no ethnic fractionalization—that is, all members in a country belong to the same ethnic group—and 1 representing complete ethnic fractionalization.

Table 1. Religious Composition of Select MESA Countries Over Time

	1950	**1990**	**2010**
Afghanistan			
Shi'a Muslim	12.81%	15.25%	16.60%
Sunni Muslim	87.19%	82.65%	79.88%
Other	0%	2.10%	3.52%
Bangladesh			
Muslim	-	85.63%	86.55%
Hindu	-	13.34%	12.09%
Buddhist	-	0.60%	0.59%
Christian	-	0.42%	0.77%
Myanmar			
Muslim	4.46%	3.52%	3.12%
Hindu	3.01%	1.30%	0.85%
Buddhist	87.09%	84.24%	82.63%
Christian	2.17%	4.78%	7.01%
Traditional	3.19%	2.21%	1.84%
Other	0.08%	3.95%	4.54%
Pakistan			
Muslim	84.67%	96.67%	96.27%
Hindu	14.69%	1.35%	0.38%
Christian	0.64%	1.97%	3.36%
Saudi Arabia			
Shi'a Muslim	0.84%	4.95%	11.35%
Sunni Muslim	98.68%	93.31%	85.42%
Christian	0.49%	1.74%	3.22%
Turkey			
Shi'a Muslim	8.17%	16.21%	22.06%
Sunni Muslim	90.48%	83.05%	77.35%
Christian	0.95%	0.33%	0.19%
Jewish	0.40%	0.40%	0.40%

Note: This table contains population estimates (proportion of population) by religious group in a select number of MESA countries for the years 1950, 1990, and 2010. The data comes from The Composition of Religious and Ethnic Groups (CREG) Project. Since Bangladesh did not gain independence until 1971, there are no population estimates for Bangladesh for the year 1950.

Figure 3. Consumer Indifference Curve and Budget Line

Notes: Consumers hold preferences about their consumption of the composite good relative to hatred, which is represented by their utility function. Consumers are also constrained by their income, and we assume that consumers spend their all of their income on some combination of the composite good and hatred. The consumer's optimal bundle lies at the point of tangency between their utility function and their budget line. At this point, they have achieved maximum utility while staying within their budget constraint.

Price of Hatred (P_H)

Supply of Hatred

P_H^*

Demand for Hatred: $H = i \times (\frac{I}{P_H})$

$\frac{1}{a+b/i} \cdot I \times \frac{1}{H}$

H^*

Hatred (H)

Figure 4. The Market for Hatred

Notes: The interaction between the supply and demand for hatred determines the market equilibrium quantity and price of hatred.

Figure 5a. Increases in Identity Beliefs Lead to an Increased Preference for Hatred

Notes: An increase in the state's dissemination of propaganda (G_{T-1}) or a negative personal experience with of the out-group (B_{T-1}) in the previous time period increases i_T, the identity parameter in consumer utility. This increases the preference of hatred against the out-group, resulting in a steeper indifference/utility curve (represented by the green utility curve in the figure). The change in preferences results in an optimal consumption bundle that contains more units of hatred and fewer units of the composite good compared to the optimal consumption bundle in the previous period.

Figure 5b. Consumer Demand Responds to Changes in Preferences

Notes: The increased identity parameter and thus increased preference for hatred relative to the composite good from Figure 5a resulted in an optimal consumption bundle that contained more units of hatred compared to the original consumption bundle. Therefore, all else equal, the consumer demands more hatred at any given price of hatred. Thus, the demand curve shifts outwards (represented by the movement from the black to green demand curve in the figure).