

~~ARCH
128.3
A938p~~

Philosophy, Psychology,
and Psychoanalysis

T. Austin

Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychoanalysis

Terry Austin

Philosophy 296 / Thesis

Spring, 1970

Table of Contents

	Page
I. The Problem of Methodology	1
II. The Impasse of Psychology as Natural Science	16
III. Philosophical Foundations for an Analysis of Consciousness	30
IV. Philosophy and Psychology	43
V. Being and Essence	81
Footnotes	88
Bibliography	96

I The Problem of Methodology

The fundamental issue is how man, as a unique being which has the capacity to think and place himself before himself, as self-conscious, is to go about the analysis of his existence without distorting the essential nature of that existence (i.e. that it is endowed with this potential for self-awareness). We must keep in mind throughout that the problem is especially subtle and difficult because the manner or method in which the investigation proceeds, presupposes some conception of the terms in which one puts forth the problem, (a point which will be illuminated as the inquiry continues). This issue has been important throughout much of the history of psychology and of philosophy, and in that they have respectively emphasized different aspects of the problem, it determines whether that relation be one of mutual support or contradiction.

Generally speaking, psychology and philosophy have both recognized the unique nature of the human mind in its capacity for

self-consciousness; but the former has emphasized the necessity for "scientific validity," whereas the latter has emphasized the "innate" or "a priori" structure of the mind. In other terms, philosophy has attempted to discover the transcendental truths of the mind which are eternal or not subject to change through time, in contrast to the particular changes which do occur in individual, finite, minds. I will speak of this last distinction in terms of "Man," as defined by his essential truth as a thinking being (i.e. as defined by the transcendental truth of his individual existence as a being which has the capacity to think), and "man," as that particular, individual, finite thinker. The distinctions Man/man and mind/body are similar in that both recognize the unique nature of thought as opposed to man's other characteristics and capacities; but differ in that the former has been used by philosophers and theologians to emphasize the transcendental nature and essential truth of man, whereas the latter is a derivative historically and conceptually of the former and resulted from the attempt to objectify the mind according to the requirements deemed necessary by Descartes for a methodological, deductive science of philosophy comparable in "objectivity" to mathematics. Psychology has, primarily, established its method of investigation assuming the validity of this mind/body distinction. In fact, schools of philosophy have arisen in the polemics over the epistemological questions raised given the assumption of this bifurcation of mind and physical nature. The contrast between the distinctions: mind/body and Man/man will be further elucidated as we continue our inquiry into psychological

and philosophical methodologies for analyzing man as a thinking being.

The problem remains: how is the essential nature of man to be dealt with without falsifying that essential nature in the process. "Man" as defined by the transcendental nature of thought versus a finite, individual, human being; and mind versus body as comparable categories of objects existing through time to be objectively investigated: these are the distinctions which must be dealt with if we are to approach the problem of a methodology for philosophy and psychology which is appropriate to man as a being which has the capacity to think or is implicitly self-conscious. These dualistic distinctions are first apparent in the writings of Plato, proceed through the Neoplatonist thought of Saint Augustine as he attempts to reconcile introspection and revelation, and are most clearly apparent in the work of Rene Descartes. Let us begin then an analysis of the thought of the latter two in hope of extracting significant contributions toward a proper methodology of investigating man's consciousness and exposing as inadequate those arguments which lead to anything contrary thereof.

Descartes method consists of starting with axioms that are "clear and distinct." The ideal method as put forth in the second chapter of Discourse and Method² involves: (1) not to accept as true anything of which we have not a clear and distinct idea, (2) to analyze the problem, (3) to start from simple and certain thoughts and proceed from them to the more complex, and (4) to review the field so thoroughly that no considerations are emitted. To deal with the

problem of what ideas are clear and distinct Descartes employs the method of doubt, a form of skepticism whereby one sets aside anything that can be supposed false until we arrive at something which cannot be false. This involves self-reflective intuition not only on the part of Descartes, but of anyone who is to enter into the philosophic endeavor and thereby perceive those ideas which cannot be doubted. This involves the most significant presupposition that if one is to enter into the investigation of consciousness or the truth of reality one must engage in self-reflective intuition. It further presupposes that it is the nature of consciousness to be endowed with the capacity for just this activity; that is, that consciousness is implicitly self-conscious. These notions of the transcendental nature of the mind become clearer when Descartes speaks of all clear and distinct ideas of the mind as "innate." Innate ideas do not denote specific concepts or ideas but rather, as Descartes said in response to such an accusation: "I never wrote or concluded that the mind required innate ideas which were in some way different from the faculty of thinking."³ In other words, we have a faculty of thinking and this faculty, owing to its innate constitution conceives things in a certain way; "they are virtually present in the sense that by reason of its innate constitution the mind thinks in these ways."⁴ Descartes mentions how two things equal to a third thing must themselves be equal to one another, and this principle is derived from a universal principle while speaking of particular objects. Elsewhere he also mentions other common notions on "eternal

truths" which "have their seat in the mind."⁵ However, it is one thing to institute a methodology of doubting based on an ontological presupposition about the innate structure, capacities, and propensities of human consciousness, and quite another thing to suppose that certain propositions arrived at through this intuitional analysis are themselves axioms upon which an objective, deductive system can be established. The resulting methodologies would obviously be quite different: the first would be a method of systematic doubt, the second would be an objective, deductive logic. Descartes bases his ideal for philosophy on the latter methodology and fails to realize the significance of the former.

Descartes thought that he could claim "certainty" for a science of the mind based on the outcome of Cartesian doubt. Obviously the original act of doubting itself entails some statement about the mind and the structure of thinking as peculiar to a rational being. Because he failed to recognize the act of doubting itself his proposition cogito ergo sum is supposed to be an axiom on the basis of which the mind is opened to investigation as an existing entity comparable, though distinct from, existing material entities. That is to say, once this axiom is posited as ineducible or "clear and distinct," the act of doubting itself -- the method by which the proposition was derived -- is ignored. The insight into the nature of consciousness that according to its own nature it is open to appropriate investigation only through self-referential reflection is thereby supplanted by the positing of the mind in relation to the

body from another standpoint. It is this shift to another standpoint which allows the objectification of the mind and its mode of investigation.

It is apparent why the cogito, in the context of Meditations is ambiguous. Taken out of context the proposition "I think, therefore I exist" could be taken to be stating the transcendental nature of thought. It would be a transcendental proposition in that Descartes' "innate ideas" is analogous to Kant's concept of the a priori forms of the mind, and because it would be necessary for each man to take on the project of intuition himself if such "innate ideas" were to be corroborated. But Descartes arrives at his axiom cogito ergo sum as the completion of the process of doubting when in order for it to be referring to the mind as transcendental it would have to precede, and be supportive of, the method of doubt itself. That is to say, in order for "I think therefore I exist" to be a transcendental proposition about the being of thought rather than a statement which refers to the mind as an object, it must be verified by the act of self-referential thought, or doubt itself. This approach is negated by Descartes' taking a non-subjective position and placing the world of thought in a category comparable to the world of temporal material existence: "I am a substance which thinks." Both are taken as objects existing in the world through time; the only distinction made is that the mind is unextended and thinking whereas the body is extended and non-thinking.

Let us attempt a brief restatement to clarify the divergence be-

tween an appropriate analysis of consciousness based on Cartesian doubt and the analysis offered by Descartes. The Meditations begins with the presentation of a method of doubt which presupposes the appropriateness of this subjective process of doubt to the analysis of man's consciousness and his reality. He fails to carry through on this insight, however, by claiming that his method of doubt is merely the means for discovering axioms from which philosophy can be systematically objectified. And this objectification is performed by taking a second viewpoint from which Descartes posits the contrasting categories of mind and body as analogous in that both are comparable modes of temporal being in the world. The fundamental problem of Cartesian dualism is not the dichotomy of mind viewed as transcendental thought versus the existing individual thinker but rather the negation of this distinction when Descartes supposes the "existence" of mind and body to be comparable attributes of temporal being. By this move the attribute of thought is reduced to the concept of mind as composed by mental "states" which are comparable to the states through which a material object is said to exist rather than reduced to purity of its transcendental continuity. This transcendental continuity can only be analyzed by a method appropriate to it, not by the concept of it as an object.

Once Descartes' mind/body distinction and the viewpoint from which it is posited is taken up, philosophy and psychology assume different tasks. Philosophy tries to reunite man as a thinking being and the world of which he is aware. Psychology analyzes these "mental

states" and the laws governing their relation to empirical events. The task thereby ignored, which should reunite philosophy^{AND PSYCHOLOGY} in a mutual endeavor, is the establishment of a methodology of analysis of mind which is appropriate to the essential insight into the nature of consciousness, i.e. appropriate to the simple phenomena of its transcendental continuity. Mind or purely transcendental thought is not an entity existing through time. A transcendental analysis of consciousness, then, says nothing about any particular, existent, individual human mind, but attempts to elucidate the essence of man's mind and reality as constituted by thought. The question remaining then, to which we should and shall direct our attention, is the meaning and significance of the relation between transcendental thought and individual, human consciousness.

We have the clearest presentation of man's suspension between the antinomies of eternal (i.e. atemporal) truth and temporal, finite, existence in the work of Saint Augustine. He inherits from Plato the ostensibly dualistic view that the possibility of knowledge of nature rests on the intelligibility of the eternal Forms that empirical things imitate, but anticipates Descartes cogito and the emphasis upon the exigency of self-referential reflection in the analysis of man's reality by his proposition si fallur sum.⁶ Augustine's use of this insight differs from Descartes' however. He states the proposition quoted above in the beginning of his analysis of consciousness and is an hypostasis which is essential for that investigation to take place, whereas Descartes posits the proposition cogito ergo sum

as a conclusion of the process of doubting. According to Augustine, it is a necessary presupposition that I exist as a thinking being in order for the process of thinking to take place. By realizing that si fallur sum is the fundamental principle for the act of inquiry instead of an axiom on which a deductive system is based, Augustine avoids making the Cartesian move to any objectifying viewpoint. He does however claim that there is one law which is immutable, according to which all other laws are changed, and to which man relates himself through free will. This "eternal law" is "that law by which it is just that everything be ordered in the highest degree." Therefore, "although there is one law according to which all the temporal laws for governing men are changed, the eternal law itself cannot be changed."⁷

Through the will to understand, which is free in man and not necessarily divine reason can attain through that endeavor itself the highest virtue of "being in accord with nature," or this eternal law. And it is only as such that man is freed from the bonds of the temporal, those things which can be lost without one's will, and hence freed from all lower existences which "in comparison to this higher life would be death."⁸ This is not to claim the possibility for an individual mind to become immutable. If truth were equated with our finite minds it would be changeable; rather, it "transcends our minds and remains unchangeable in its own truth, . . . is whole and uncorrupted."⁹ This appears dualistic but is mediated by the fact that man has the ability to direct his will in accordance with

reason and further by the fact that the eternal law is presupposed and corroborated by the act of inquiry itself. That is to say, by raising the question of a rational order in nature in a rational manner, one in some sense answers the question by the act of positing it. By this circularity in Augustine's Neoplatonic argumentation, freedom of the will is conjoined with eternal law; "Our freedom consists in submission to the truth;" whereby, "It is God himself who frees us from death."¹⁰ Moreover, man as a psychological being in the world is infused with the eternality, the atemporality, of transcendental being; i.e. the immutability of the transcendental and ontological foundation of consciousness, as it is reflected in the finite process of individual minds. In this we see that truth is not man as an individual, yet men "partake" of truth in so far as they are implicitly, through not singularly, constituted by thought, or constituted according to the "eternal law" that it is just that things be ordered in the highest degree.

Plato presents in a myth, the creation story in Timaeus, this view of the world which Augustine presents in terms of Christian theology. In it he represents the spacio-temporal world or mutable nature being created after the model of eternally unchanging Forms. The world is divine creation, even though deficient, and displays the fecundity of the Creator. "This is the initial version of the 'great chain of being,'"¹¹ which is analogous to Augustines idea that all nature partakes of God and is merely various manifestations of the one truth, the "light by which objects are seen." For

Augustine, "the Nature which is immutable is called Creator."¹² However, unlike the medieval theologians for whom things predicated of the eternal were to be interpreted analogically, Plato maintained (Timaeus 298) that discourse about the eternal is to be understood in the strict sense of the words it employs.¹³ This was the project Descartes set out to do by way of making philosophy deductively systematical, and he began with the contrast, as presented by Augustine, between immutable mathematical truths and the changeability of empirical existence. He supplanted however, "I believe so that I may understand," an awareness of initial "will" in the endeavor itself, with "I will understand so that I may believe." Obviously the distinction in Plato between the transcendental nature of Man and the temporal existence of man was transformed in its translation to Descartes.

Even though Augustine avoided the pitfalls awaiting Descartes, his Christian terminology did not clarify what Plato meant, in the context of Socratic dialogue, by the claim that discourse about the eternal is to be understood in the strict sense of the words it employs. And this is the problem: that of instituting a mode of analysis of consciousness which is appropriate to the nature thereof such that what is said "can be taken in the strict sense of the words it employs." Even though carrying dualism to its logical conclusion failed in this effort, let us briefly review its approach to the problem so that we may avoid the impasse to which it brought philosophy and psychology in its recasting of the task to be brought be-

fore those sciences in the investigation of the mind and its reality.

The problem, as originally posed by Plato and taken up latter by the Neoplatonists such as Plotinus and the Christian theologian Augustine, is how to reconcile the transcendental truth of man as thought which is itself free from temporal causality with the existence of man as a being in the world. Descartes confuses the distinction by applying the term "existence" to thought so as to imply a correspondence between the temporal existence of thought and the temporal existence of an object in the physical world. By doing so he lays the ground for solipsism, psychology as a "natural science," and the problem of traditional epistemology -- which presupposes the abyss between the subject and the "other" which constitutes his world as an "objective" reality. This is the basis of the claim for objectivity as the term is used by the natural sciences. This was obviously not the emphasis in Augustine, for the possibility of objectivity is mediated by the concept of the will and the degree to which that will is in accord with nature, or the eternal law that nature is ordered in the highest degree regardless of what the particulars of that order may be. That is to say, the purest consciousness, which would be the will to always obey the "rules of wisdom" or eternal order, and the lowest consciousness of basic carnal impulses, are mediated by the concept of the human will which is free to do either and in fact does both. Dualism on a purely temporal level of existence is avoided because no attempt is made to compare the two categories of thought and physical existence on one and the

same level of being as Descartes attempted to do. Man, as possessing a free will, is viewed as the mediation between pure consciousness or the atemporal truth of man which he as a finite being never becomes, and the state of an evil will which is so degenerate that it is unable to see wisdom even if it wills and unable to will itself to obey the commands of wisdom because of its submersion in the lusts of the senses. It must be emphasized that Augustine's eternal truth is not "objective" in the sense in which Descartes posited from a dualistic viewpoint, as is Descartes' axiom for a science of "certainty." God, or truth, is shown to exist "beyond human minds" but is shown as such through the investigation of consciousness itself. The real mediation of the eternal and the temporal is the participation in the investigation itself. Wisdom cannot be attained except by the reconsiliation of one's own soul to the nature of eternal law, and this is accomplished only by an act of will to do so. "Unless you believe you shall not understand."¹⁴

Since the individual man is the mediation, through participation in inquiry, between the atemporal and temporal, the investigation of consciousness will not be directed toward the psychological states of individual minds objectified as existing through time. This would be to fall back into the impasse of Cartesian dualism whereby the mode of investigation, a deductive systematization from a third, non-reflective position, is inadequate to consciousness being a self-reflective continuity. Objectivity or eternal truth, for Saint Augustine is beyond the human mind as a finite being, but is also

in some sense inseparable from the very activity of consciousness or reason in that the investigation, or the will to participate in the investigation, is the substantiation of the eternal law, which is itself the transcendental ground for the possibility of that investigation. God is not distant, but is Being itself in its highest form as the transcendental principle of mans existence as a thinking being.

Man, conceived as a being whose essence it is to reason, is in this way investigated without the objectification of mind into finite mental states comparable to empirical physical states. Augustine realizes that man as an individual is not only thought, and states that his existence as a thinking being entails also his existence as a sinuous animal and a physical object. But the power of will lies in the will itself, and cannot be lost except by one's own willing of it -- in contrast to temporal objects which may at any time be forfeiting according to the vicissitudes of empirical events. Man is not singularly truth, but in so far as he is Man, in so far as he is constituted by his essential nature of rational being, he partakes of or reflects the atemporality of the truth therein. If one believes, he will understand; for what is to be understood, is the will to understand.

I hope that it is obvious why it would not be appropriate to posit objective, deductively validated conclusions derived from Descartes' clear and distinct ideas, or even to try to reunite the distinctions made between mind and body as objects, or "substances,"

existing through time. Hopefully, some indication has been made of a methodology of investigating consciousness and its reality, which is more appropriate to the nature of the object of investigation. Before extending an analysis of this latter mode of investigation, let us focus our attention on the problems confronted by a psychology which strives to substantiate scientism, and the significance of philosophy in relation to such a psychology.

II The Impasse of Psychology as Natural Science

The intent of this chapter is to discuss Sigmund Freud's theory of the unconscious, the role this concept has played as descriptive and explanatory of psychic phenomena, and the philosophical implications of the ways this concept has been so employed. I am not attempting to determine the validity of Freud's theory for psychological therapy, but rather to inquire into the philosophic significance of its various interpretations. The "unconscious" is a concept which is at the core of the problem of dualism -- expressed in psychoanalysis as the dichotomy of consciousness and unconsciousness. In philosophy we have already noted the dichotomy between mental events and material events. I hope that I may to some degree prove successful in determining the similar foundations from which these problems arise and thereby be in a better position to establish a significant relationship between philosophy and psychology.

In regard to Freud's original investigation of the mind, A. C.

MacIntyre states:

The most obvious realm in which to seek causal explanations of conscious mental activity is that of the neurologist. It was on account of the weakness and failures of the neurological explanations provided by his teachers and contemporaries that he proceeded to advance an alternative type of explanation. Areas paralyzed in cases of hysteria corresponded not to any objectively definable anatomical or physiological area but to the patient's subjective notions.¹

Thus Freud had to deal, not with physiological disorder, but with the disorder and aberrations in the life of the subject's mental activity, his reactions to and conceptions of himself and the world. The claim here is not that of mental events over material events. This will be dealt with when we consider Freud's theory in general. Let us say now only that no physiological disorder could be correlated to the symptoms of neuroses. Freud thus developed his own vocabulary for substantiating and developing his theories. I do not wish to emphasize Freud's theories per se but rather the way in which he put these forth, i.e. what exactly the concepts involved were interpreted to be, or what function they were expected to have. MacIntyre states that, "although Freud abandoned finally and decisively the attempt at neurological explanation . . . it is my con-

tention and the most important contention in this part of my argument that Freud preserved the view of the mind as a piece of machinery. . . ."2 "It is clear that the neurological distinction between primary and secondary processes has here been transferred from the physical to the mental without any great change except that we are no longer in the realm of the observable."3 The unconscious is the realm of repressed memories and emotions and of the realm MacIntyre quotes Freud's own explanation as follows:

'The unconscious' is the name of a system of mental acts. The justification for the belief in the existence of the system is twofold: first, we are able to account for behavior which cannot be accounted for in terms of conscious intentions; secondly, if we assume in psychoanalytic practice the existence of the unconscious we are able to bring into consciousness contents of which the patient was unaware and in so doing we help bring about the healing of his mental disorder.4

What is important to note here is (1) that the "unconscious" seems to be treated as an existent entity or "system of mental acts" (mental acts themselves not being defined), and (2) that the concept is equally emphasized as having significance because of its justification, i.e. because of its usefulness as a scientific hypothesis whether or not the question of its reality is dealt with. This state of affairs reflects the "materialist" view of nature which permeates science and much of philosophy from Newton until the present. Freud does not think of man possessing rational self-knowledge, the mind having its own acts "manifest to it with a pellucid and

intuitive self-confidence,"⁵ in his ordinary consciousness "and in so far as he does not do this he rejects the Cartesian picture of the mind. But Freud retains from the Cartesian picture the idea of the mind as something distinct and apart, a place or a realm which can be inhabited by such entities as ideas."⁶

Freud's theories fall halfway between two opposing attempts to account for human behavior, which have both attempted to correct the Cartesian theory of mind. These two are "'behavior-theorists' such as Tolman and Hull whose various theories of learning seek to exhibit behavior as consisting in a set of responses to external stimuli, the nature and quality of the response being determined by predisposing causal factors,"⁷ and the French existentialists, e.g. Sartre, for which "all important human behavior is the fruit of human decision."⁸ Freud uses the central notion of each, causality and purpose, in a single theory. The concept MacIntyre emphasizes for explication is that of intention, though he states that "the dilemma is not merely about the word 'intention' and its application; it extends to all those words which have to do with the intentional and purposive aspects of human behavior. 'Purpose,' 'motive,' 'wish,' 'desire,' all have this double interpretation"⁹ : intention as demonstrated in behavior versus the 'intention' which one says he has. Now we are in a position to understand the significance of the concept of the unconscious. "Freud argues that certain types of neurotic behavior are the result of unconscious motivation. The neurotic has purpose and intentions of which he is unaware. Since he is unaware of them,

he cannot avow them."¹⁰ Thus a patient's, or any person's, intention or purpose is not taken merely to be either dispositions evidenced in behavior or as what the subject declares his intention to be. Rather it is "something which both is betrayed in his behavior and is what he would, if he were not prevented by his disorder, avow."¹¹ MacIntyre goes on: "The difference between neurotic motives and purposes and non-neurotic ones is a difference in the conditions which would have to be fulfilled in order for the agent to be able to avow his motives and purposes. But in the end, an intention is something that must be capable of being avowed."¹² It is important to note here that intention or 'purpose' is not something that exists in itself, i.e. regardless of whether or not the subject affirms or negates it, but only in so far as it is something "capable of being avowed." And thus MacIntyre concludes: "The fact that his intention may not actually occur as a piece of conscious mental activity is irrelevant. What matters is what would happen if the agent were to be pressed on the matter."¹³ When the motive and the memory of the event originally repressed is "unconscious" emotion is released in forms of neurotic symptoms. This originate repression is of the event which caused great pain by the blocking of primary processes which are those primordial desires of attachment to mother, etc., which Freud subsumes under the rubric "pleasure principle," which are contrasted by the blocking forces of what he terms the "reality principle." However, when this event is recalled and made conscious, the patient by identifying the purpose of his action as abreaction or catharsis can now avow his

intentions -- neurotic symptoms cease, and he is free, as MacIntyre claims, to "alter his behavior in the light of his new self-knowledge."¹⁴ The significance of the concept of the unconscious as operative between two extremes is again obvious. When intention or purpose is unconscious, "when the patient is unable by ordinary means to acknowledge it" there is a causal link introduced (in theory) between the repressed childhood experience and the behavior interpreted as neurotic symptoms -- "unconscious motive" is, then, "the driving force behind the act;" it is causal. When the motive is made conscious, however, the patient is free to designate or redirect his "motives" as rational purposes or intentions. This opposition of motive ascribing causes versus motive ascribing purposes is analogous to the dichotomy mentioned earlier of behaviorism and existentialism. The important point is that the causal chain activated by repression is not lessened by the variation of catharsis, but by the bringing into consciousness of the repressed memory. "Unconsciousness" designates the realm of repressed memories, and as such is the medium or hypostasis of the causal chain.

MacIntyre's insights on this proposition I feel are perspicacious. He points out that the unconscious is either "an inaccessible realm of inaccessible entities existing in its own right or it is a theoretical and unobservable entity introduced to explain and relate a number of otherwise inexplicable phenomena."¹⁵ The first alternative is cancelled; "ex-hypothesis it cannot be observed and so we cannot possibly have evidence of its existence,"¹⁶ which would be necessary

for the credibility of such an entity. The second alternative is more interesting. We have seen that Freud's theoretical constructs offer a logically coherent and therapeutically feasible framework of interrelated concepts. They seem to be accurate in describing a good deal of previously observed yet inexplicable behavior. But we must ask whether Freud is describing behavior in a new light purely for the purpose of reinterpreting methods of treatment and analysis, or whether he supposes that he is explaining behavior by describing existent entities which really function and act upon consciousness and which were hitherto undiscovered. I hope that an analysis of this problem will indicate the importance of Freud's theories to philosophy as well as the essentiality of a philosophical foundation to the success of psychology. MacIntyre's thesis is that:

Insofar as Freud uses the concept of the unconscious as an explanatory concept, he fails, if not to justify it, at least to make clear its justification. He gives us causal explanations certainly; but these can and apparently must stand or fall on their own feet without reference to it. He has a legitimate concept of unconscious mental activity, certainly; but this he uses to describe behavior, not to explain it.¹⁷

Being in agreement with this thesis, I hope to expand upon it and to indicate how Freud may have found relief from the pessimistic dilemma in which he found himself, due (as will be seen) to his confusion over just this problem. In order to do this I must draw upon the arguments of other philosophers, but it is just my contention that

this dependency of psychology upon philosophy is natural and unavoidable.

Philosophy as well as the sciences was strongly influenced by the Newtonian concept that the foundation of nature is the material entity. The influence of this idea upon Freud was noted earlier, as was also its influence on Descartes. It is my thesis that this dualism between mind and the body is analogous, or stems from the same misconceptions, as the dichotomies of: (1) behaviorism versus existentialism, (2) motive ascribing causes or causal chain versus motives ascribing purpose or the capacity for directing one's action, (3) the unconscious functioning as an inaccessible existent entity versus its functioning as an unobservable theoretic entity permitting the description of behavior in a new light, and (4) consciousness versus unconsciousness. It has been shown how Freud's theories operated midway between the opposing factors in the first and second dichotomies -- the first being mediated by "intention" and the second by "the unconscious." With number three we begin talking about Freud's theories outside the range of what he made clear, i.e. he was himself apparently confused as to the function his concepts were to play. The confusion arising in the third dichotomy will result, MacIntyre notes, in "reduplicating the Cartesian substantial conscious mind by a substantial unconscious mind."¹⁸ It is not that one alternative of the dichotomy is more accurately descriptive or appropriate than the other, but that the entire proposition itself (like those before it) is misleading -- neither alternative is suf-

ficient. The question is not whether the "unconscious" is an inaccessible entity or a theoretic entity, but whether it is an entity at all.

Norman Malcolm directs his attention to the problem when he states¹⁹ that pain, or any sensation, is not a "thing" at all, and thus is not the kind of object towards which one can direct his attention as one does towards an object in the empirical world. The mistake involved in doing so is most succinctly stated by U. T. Place's definition of the "phenomenological fallacy" as "the mistake of supposing that when the subject describes his experience, he is describing the literal properties of object and events on a peculiar sort of internal cinema or television screen."²⁰ It has been argued that Freud's concepts serve as descriptions of human behavior in that they offer a logical hypothesis of the operation of mental activity without which certain phenomena could not be explained, but do not explain in the sense of discovering new realities or causal chains. As MacIntyre puts it, "when Freud 'explains' a dream, what he does essentially is to decode it. Freud saw what he was doing here with perfect clarity sometimes but at other times he confused it with giving the cause of the dream."²¹ This type of causality is analogous to the determination of the behaviorists, with the substitution of an unconscious as the realm of dispositional factors. And the fate of those who accept the presuppositions thereof; i.e. of materially existent entities causally functioning within a given field, is just as much an inescapable dilemma.

Judging from his later works, this is apparently the dilemma into which Freud fell towards the end of his life. What need be remembered is the necessity in Freud's own definition of intention for the element of avowal. As MacIntyre interprets: "A patient's intention or purpose in his neurotic behavior is something which both is betrayed in his behavior and is what he would, if he were not prevented by his disorder, avow."²² A dream is merely a piece of intentional behavior, the purpose of which he cannot avow. Freud offers an interpretation which does not disclose the cause of the dream, but allows the patient to supply the missing avowal of intention. MacIntyre's point, if I interpret him correctly, is that neurotic symptoms are overcome not by discovering entities in the unconscious, but by an avowal in the present of past intention which then allows the redirection of behavior. The dⁱchotomy between the patient's mental activity in the past and his capacity for decisions in the present and future is mediated by the awareness that a necessary, definitive element of intention is the act of avowal, as well as the categorical reference to behavior. We must go further, however, than just to note the necessity of avowal, for intention still appears to be something substantial or in itself capable of residing in the unconscious or consciousness. And to begin speaking of the unconscious versus the conscious as entities or realms from which and into which ideas move is to fall into the same dychotomy of which Freud's theories were originally a mediating factor.

Freud supposed that neurotic symptoms are expurgated by the re-

membering of childhood events, the bringing of repressed emotions into consciousness, which along with the avowal thereof, allows redirection of behavior and release from the causal effect of those childhood events upon adult behavior. If this is taken literally, we must note that repressed memories are not only indeterminate and limitless in number but may also extend back in time as far as the traumatic experience of birth. The resultant view of nature, as Freud contested, is that man is caught in an inescapable tragedy -- fate playing itself out recurringly, generation after generation. What must be seen is that neurotic symptoms, which we are indebted to Freud for describing, are overcome not by the breaking of a causal chain, but in seeing that the causal chain is non-existent. To say "we must break the causal chain" is only to attempt a solution to a problem the statement of which is the problem itself -- i.e. if one asks, "how do I affirm my intentions?," the problem is that one cannot affirm "intentions" because they are not a "thing" which one can affirm or negate. Rather as Wittgenstein says of sensation, the identification of such "defines its identity."²³ It was in the materialist tradition, however, that Freud first hypothesized his theories in response to the question of unexplained behavior, and in his theory he reinterpreted the question to be "how can my ego liberate itself?" The danger in his theories is the way in which the problem is itself stated. Freud caught himself in his own statement of the problem. By positing the question such that "ego" became an entity he presupposed the problem in the question, i.e. there can be

no such question because there is no such "entity" as "the ego."

Alan Watts puts the dilemma as follows:

The point is not that the problem has no solution, but that it is so meaningless that it need not be felt as a problem.²⁴ By asking the question one engages himself in a game in which he can never win. But in the moment of defeat he sees what this means; that he, the agent cannot act, does not act, and never did act.²⁵

That is to say, the agent never acted as "ego," never was a static "entity." There is not a "thing" acting -- only action. There is no "ego" to overcome because there is no "ego" as such. Alfred North Whitehead terms this concept nature "organic mechanism" in contrast to the Newtonian "mechanistic theory of nature."²⁶ To view the foundation of human experience as "material" and capable of total objectivity is to commit the previously mentioned error which U. T. Place calls the "phenomenological fallacy," i.e. the mistake of supposing experience of an individual to be a "thing" or "entity."

When it is seen that mental activity is not made up of entities whose forces are calculated, psychoanalysis takes its proper role in regard to the concept of the unconscious by utilizing it as an unobservable theoretic concept permitting the description of behavior in a new light; escaping the misconception of the unconscious being an entity and explanatory of behavior thereby. But the real significance of the theory is its function in the therapeutic treatment of patients. MacIntyre makes a most interesting statement concerning

this matter:

It is a commonplace observation, anyway, that what matters most of all in psychotherapy is what sort of person you [the analyst] are, not what theories you hold.²⁷ What the concept of the unconscious does for the analyst is to provide him with a canvas large enough for any human behavior to find a place in it.²⁸

This statement implies that interaction between analyst and patient has its therapeutic power not in what is explained (viz. by describing entities) but in the interaction, or action, itself; e.g., as described by Alan Watts in the previous quotation. This obviously corresponds to Freud's similar notion of the importance of avowal in the analysis of intention, and moreover to my thesis that neurosis is cured not in relation to the number of childhood events remembered and avowed but in correspondence to the degree to which the patient overcomes the idea of "himself" existing as a self-alienated entity, and resultingly achieves self-acceptance or what is called "psychological integration." Complete explication is not appropriate here but I would like to note that the idea of present action or involvement being inseparable from the notation and meaning of "objective" data has become extremely significant in physics and other sciences as well as in psychology. This "organic" theory of nature as previously mentioned in reference to Whitehead replaces the Newtonian, materialist concept of nature under the influence of which Freud first began the development of his theories.

The impasse to which psychology will come if it structures itself after the method of investigation of the natural sciences, has become clear. It is a pessimistic, if not tragic, notion that man is controlled by forces beyond his control and comprehension. I hope that the function of philosophy in criticizing the abstractions of psychology has also become more apparent. It is in that capacity that it serves as, and will further substantiate itself as an essential foundation of any investigation of man. Before expanding upon the alternative directions open to psychoanalysis in light of the insights presented heretofore, let us elucidate a philosophical analysis of consciousness which emphasizes the essence of consciousness as being self-consciousness, and the contrast of this analysis of consciousness to that of the natural sciences. G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind is just such an analysis of human being.

III Philosophical Foundations for an Analysis of Consciousness

The philosophy of George Hegel has been a central issue in the polemics of political, sociological, and philosophical thinkers throughout the nineteen and twentieth centuries. At the heart of the problem is the interpretation to be given to the relationship between the concept of the Absolute and existential man, or man as a finite personality; and analogously the relationship between metaphysical philosophy and anthropological sciences (e.g. sociological, physical, and psychological sciences) understood collectively as comprising what I will term the "natural" sciences. My project is not so much the ambitious task of deciphering the innumerable insights of Hegel's thought, but rather the perhaps more fundamental and necessary task of illuminating the significance of these specified relationships to the comprehension of any of the particular components and insights thereof. It will become apparent, hopefully, that in contradiction to critics such as Plamenatz and G. H.

Sabine any attempt to understand Hegel's political, social, or psychological insights without comprehension of his metaphysics will be inadequate, if not pernicious; and further, that any attempt to understand man as a social or psychological being will be abortive if it is not infused with a comprehension of man as a thinking, a potentially philosophical, being. It is the contrast and diremption of these two approaches which I believe is at the foundation of much of the controversy and misapplication of the Hegelian system.

If we are to undertake this project it is necessary that we analyze the relationship of Subject/Object as it is fundamental to Hegel's own philosophy and his central theme of dialectical process. Please persevere through what may be considered any tedious exposition of Hegelian metaphysics in light of the fact that an understanding of such may be an essential prerequisite for any further analysis. One popular but inadequate interpretation of the Phenomenology of Mind (Geist) is that it is an attempt to join subject and object by one eating up the other or being synthesized into a third stance at the expense of obliterating the original distinction. Hence it must be emphasized from the very beginning that the dialectic is not a description of a temporal process whereby conflicting concepts are progressively reconciled into syntheses in a movement toward an absolute stasis or state of ultimate balance and reconciliation. Rather, each moment in the non-temporal development of the consciousness of the imaginary figure, Herbie Geist, is a reflection of a fundamental insight into the nature of human consciousness and

the reality of Man -- i.e. each moment in the development of consciousness reflects the principles, the moving force, of the process of dialectic itself -- Reason. As Plamenatz in his History of Philosophy takes notice, this rational consciousness at first constructs its objects without knowing that it is doing so; it does not realize that in apprehending reality it takes on a certain mode of consciousness toward that reality which in turn then affects the apprehension of reality ad infinium, such that a new reality and new mode of consciousness is continually being created without ever itself being aware of its creation. It is under this condition that consciousness supposes reality to be distinct and separate from itself -- and this is the stance characteristically taken by the natural sciences which suppose reality to be "out there," open for observation and waiting for consciousness to "discover" its universal, objective, natural laws. Only upon reflection does it realize its world to be a product of itself, its own reason. It is at this point that it realizes that it is self-sufficient, that it exists unto itself and is its own purpose, and that its truth is its own being in its self-conscious immediacy. Moreover it is now seen that each moment of consciousness which is still caught in the temporal dialectical development of contextual concepts reflects this atemporal being of the entire process in that both reflect and presuppose a truth about consciousness in general -- that it is implicitly self-consciousness. That is to say, that consciousness or man as a thinking being, is in essence

rational or self-conscious in that its object, its world, is of its own design. It is with this awareness that Herbie Geist transcends his merely temporal development and attains the self-conscious freedom which is presupposed in his very first moment of thought and in the readers very reading of the Phenomenology itself. This is the freedom which is inevitable in that it is a presupposition of man viewed as a rational animal, and atemporal in that it transcends the merely temporal, dialectical process of particular moments; the truth of which is the reflection of this implicit potential or exposition of thought as rational, self-conscious, and thereby incapable of being reduced to a mere object existing in some form of objective time -- i.e. as eternal and ultimately real. We are now perhaps in a better position to see the distortion in reducing the essence of Hegel's dialectic to the temporal process of "thesis, antithesis, synthesis" as Sabine, Plamenatz and other critics are so fond of doing.

We have also seen that there is quite a distinction between the stance of natural sciences, which view man as a consciousness distinct and irreconcilably apart from objective, "natural" reality, and as a being existing through time as an object is thought to exist through time; and the stance of the philosophic understanding and comprehension of man as a thinking, self-conscious being. Most philosophers from the time of Descartes, attempt to overcome Subject/Object, Man/Nature dualism by defending either Kantian other-worldliness of pure matter or a type of Berkeleyian total subjectivity;

presupposing the duality in their very approach. This Subject/Object relationship is ingredient in Hegelian dialectic but is taken up in the unity of consciousness as it sets its own object before itself. The distinction between subject and object remains apparent, contrary to the interpretation of many Hegelian critics, but as such it is "seen through," or becomes a "transparent moment" in the development of a single consciousness. The presupposition in this transcendence of the subjective stance, however, is that man is a rational being, and that the truth of man is his being constituted by thought. And here is the element of confusion and controversy -- the distinction between man as an existent personality open to all of the capriciousness, lusts, and emotions involved therein, and Man as what Hegel terms "thought qua thought," or Man in his essential truth as a thinking being.

It is just this distinction which explains how Hegel can speak of an infinite mind and yet deny that there is any self-conscious and rational mind apart from finite minds. We see that this is possible because minds are not things, logically manipulatable predicates, or anthropomorphic data. Rather Hegel is referring to consciousness; its fundamental nature as being rational and its capacities as reflected and manifested in individual thoughts, ideas, and actions. It is this distinction between Man and man which Plato reconciled in the dramatic presentation of the life of Socrates, the constant effort towards discursive clarity in light of continual and presupposed failure. This is what Hegel saw as the essence of

Plato and that which he claims to have portrayed in the principle of "pure negativity," or the ability of consciousness to reflect upon itself and set itself as its own object before itself as the moving force of the dialectical process. In order to better understand this relationship of Man and man, the truth of Man as thought versus man as existent personality, and hence he is in a better position to grasp the significance of metaphysical philosophy for social, physical, and psychological sciences, let us again look at Hegel's notions of transcendence and progress.

As Sidney Hook states in his history From Hegel to Marx, the dialectical process has spiritual presuppositions; "If all being and existence is implicit self-consciousness, then all their modes must literally strive to transcend their particularity. Striving is only possible when there is something to overcome. What is to be overcome is the 'fetter' -- the past progress which stands in the way of present progress."¹ That is to say, when something realizes that its own deeper nature is involved in some systematic whole which extends further than its own limits, then those (its own) limits become "fetters." They impede self-development and growth and must be burst. As Hegel states in his Logic; "In order that the limit applying to something in general should also be a fetter, something must pass over into itself beyond the limit; it must referring to itself, relate itself to it as something which is not [is no longer itself]."² And this is Hegel's fundamental insight into the nature of consciousness as it constitutes the

Reality of Man, as thought proper or existent man as individual personality: progress is not, ontologically speaking, an overcoming of nature, a journey towards control over one's natural environment or any other goal "out there" or "in the future;" but rather is the "necessary" movement of reason and rational beings, whether it be objectively actualized in society and state, or remains latent in a non-reflective individual.³ Progress is the dilemma of eternal penultimateness; consciousness which is forever "fettered" by and attempting to transcend, its own previous content. This illuminates the insight that consciousness is immanently self-consciousness -- setting itself before itself as its reality and yet continually attempting to transcend and break the limits of that self-imposed reality because it sees not only that reality but the greater whole or process of which it is a mere moment. This is the insight in accord with which nature, social progress, and history is understood as Spirit. Again we note how such a conception of Reality is divergent from a naturalistic view of the world which seeks to discover objective laws of nature apart from an analysis or understanding of the consciousness of man, and progresses toward the ideal of completing the system of natural law.

Obviously, any translation of Hegelian terminology from his metaphysical system into these sciences of nature will distort the essential insights of the dialectic; and this is what has happened with its reduction to the terms of thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Not only have his political insights been distorted, but his in-

sights into the consciousness of man have been ignored or superficially treated. At the heart of what has been ignored or misunderstood, and which is most relevant to the sciences if they are to reassess their validity and function in light of these insights into their failings, is the ambivalent or perhaps paradoxical nature of the ideas of progress and transcendence -- an ambivalence which "natural" sciences are, in their present stance, incapable of coping with.

The paradox appears in the fact that man is destined to be eternally penultimate, in which case progress is seen as necessary in that consciousness, by being implicitly self-conscious, continually seeks to burst its own self-created and imposed fetters, not seeking any goal except the release from its own past; in contrast to the fact that the awareness of this fact is itself the grounds for man's existence as an atemporal being, for metaphysical transcendence. Because man can conceive of the whole process of which each moment of thought is a part, he is forced to seek escape from his own particular past actions which are, as such, limiting "fetters;" but this is also the grounds for the fact that man sees into himself, sets himself before himself as his own object and reality, and as such transcends himself metaphysically by already being outside of himself, is not liable to being reduced to a mere object existing through time and is hence, in this sense, eternal or immortal. The essence of temporal transcendence, the development of dialectic, is its reflection of man as self-conscious, which is the grounds for

his metaphysical transcendence or essential freedom. This is a paradox that natural science cannot account for if it persists in comprehending man solely from the anthropological viewpoint, as a being existing through history like any other physical object in the world.

Hegel posits the insight that the Mind/Body problem of opposing appearance versus truth, which is at the core of the natural sciences attempt to establish an objective reality, is really still caught up in appearances -- i.e. imagistic thinking. It is this problem, like that of the subjective stance mentioned earlier, that Hegel claims to have overcome by the presentation of thinking, or "thought proper," as dialectical. Religion is also inadequate, even though it expresses all of the ideas of Hegel, because its "barbaristic dissolution" of the Subject/Object distinction takes place only imagistically and not in the form of dialectic or, as Hegel says, "thought qua thought." The fact remains, however, that this distinction is overcome by Hegel only when man is dealt with in his pure essence, as thought proper, and not as a personality. As noted in the Phenomenology, man is self-conscious because he is aware of the genera, aware of the principles of Reason as the reality of Man, rather than because of an individual's consciousness of his own problems, etc. Hence we are again made aware of the possibility of Hegel speaking of an infinite mind and simultaneously the necessity of finite minds for the expression of self-consciousness. In an attempt to clarify this problematic relation of existent individual and the truth of man as a rational being, and thereby be in a better position to understand the relation of indivi-

duals to higher objectifications of his truth, as e.g. the state, let us restate the problem through an analysis of the controversial topic of the Hegelian Absolute.

The Absolute embodies both the temporal and metaphysical notions of transcendence since it is the process of dividing itself into moments and simultaneously realizing that it maintains its unity precisely through this process of diremption. It divides itself solely for the purpose of maintaining its unity and as such metaphysically transcends the fluctuation of empirical or temporal diremption and transcendence. But this metaphysical transcendence, the Absolute, is not itself a moment of dialectical progress. It is instead the grounds of the very possibility of the process itself -- it is the whole reflected in each moment and reflecting within itself all of the particular moments: All of which reflects through the mode of thought in its development the necessary presupposition that man is rational, is self-conscious, and hence self-transcendent. It is in this essence that the will is constituted as free and rational, whether an individual man chooses to recognize and develop it as such or not.

But this is not to say, as so many of his followers did say, that freedom is or can be attained in history, as men existing in time -- and here again, on a more concrete level is the paradox. Man is, in his essence or ontologically, free being; and yet this freedom is not a goal or any temporal state to be attained. The grounds and truth of all thought is its self-sufficiency, its being

its own purpose for its own sake; yet the individual is destined, by the very same facticity of his being self-conscious, to continue unendingly in the progression of dialectical movement. It is now apparent why Hegel felt that philosophy, as the medium in which thought is in its proper dialectical form, is the highest expression of the truth of man, and should not be expected "to do" anything; it is self-sufficient and its own purpose. As he states, "It does not come to reform, but to understand."⁴ It would be to the enlightenment of all scientific endeavors; however, if philosophy served to remind those seeking the objectification of truth of the necessarily unending nature of the process of dialectic or any endeavor by man as a self-conscious being, and in the face of fatalism, of man's immortality, his metaphysical transcendence of the fluctuations of temporal existence in so far as he is in his essence self-consciousness.

Of course one might now raise the objection, to which Hegel would agree, that an individual as a personality which is subject to death, never merely pure "thought proper." Plato's Dialogues more clearly emphasize an awareness and response to this dilemma of man. It is an awareness of the impossibility of objectifying man's relationship to the world which is expressed by Socratic ignorance. The further expression of the dialogues however is what happens in light of this awareness. The virtues and epistemological terms which cannot be defined objectively are played upon dramatically through continued endeavor portrayed in the life of Socrates. Thus the distinction is drawn between the objective knowledge which turns out to

be more fluctuating of opinions, and the self-referential knowledge reflected in Soctares' commitment to rational inquiry without appeal to definitive values or truths outside of that immediate endeavor itself. It is made apparent that the distinction between the two types of knowledge analogous in Hegel to the Subject/Object, dualistic stance of natural science, Kantian other-worldliness, or Berkeleyian total subjectivity and the dialectical process as the medium appropriate to the investigation of man as a rational, self-conscious being, has great significance when applied to individual commitment. Hegel on the other hand, even though he as clearly showed the incapacity of any logical system to account for its own premises, was not concerned with the dilemma of an individual's coming to terms with the problem. Psychology he considered inadequate because it attempted to establish objective laws for understanding man's mind rather than establishing a science in the medium appropriate to the truth of consciousness, which would be of course, dialectic. We must realize however, that this is in perfect agreement with his philosophy that man should only be dealt with in a method appropriate to his reality. And it was within this mode that Hegel did deal with man in many of his various levels of thought: individualistic, social, political, and religious. We can, needless to say, do justice to his insights thereof only in light of his philosophic, metaphysical understanding of the nature and reality of man. To do otherwise would be as distorting to Hegel's insights as to attempt to understand Plato as though his works were presented in mono-

logue. We must be aware of the fact that to present Hegel's insight into the proper methodology of philosophy or Plato's distinction between "opinion" and "knowledge" in a non-dialectic or non-self-referential form -- as we have done heretofore -- is itself inimical to those ideas.

Hegel states that philosophy "cannot consist of teaching the state what it ought to be; it can only show how the State, the ethical universe, is to be understood."⁵ And he reminds his readers that they should not look for hints how to change the world in his work. It must be emphasized that consideration or investigation of mundane problems, whether they be psychological or socio-political, are valid, according to Hegel, only when they reflect the essence of consciousness as portrayed through dialectic. Viable solutions will be found only to the degree to which man's essential nature is understood.

But the reaction to Hegel's systematic presentation of the essence of consciousness, and the truth of man as consciousness, has been most severe; and must also be considered before returning to the subject of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy.

IV Philosophy and Psychology

The fictitious world of subject, substance, 'reason,' etc., is needed --: there is in us a power to order, simplify, falsify, artificially distinguish. 'Truth' is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations: -- to classify phenomena into definite categories. In this we start from a belief in the 'in-itself' of things (we take phenomena as real).

The character of the world in a state of becoming as incapable of formulation, as 'false,' as 'self-contradictory.' Knowledge and being exclude one another. Consequently, 'knowledge' must be something else: there must first be a will to make knowable, a kind of becoming must itself create the deception of beings.¹

(1)

Could it be that in the presentation of the truth, the essence, of man as a thinking being, as the potential of thought qua thought, the real truth of man -- the awareness that he is a being who at every moment faces the abyss, the nothingness concretely manifested in the facticity of his own imminent death, and the facticity of his finite perspective which precludes the possibility of a consummate totality of being through transcendence even though he tastes of such notions in ecstatic flights of imagination -- is thereby masterfully concealed?

Hegel's system professed to have overcome the abhorrent dualism of traditional epistemology predominating philosophy from Descartes to Kant in an ontological unity of thought and being. But all the errors of Hegel, according to Kierkegaard, arise in the end -- or rather, in the beginning -- from ignoring the fact that thought implies a thinker, a concrete, individual, existing thinker, having his being in time, in becoming.² Hegel claims to have incorporated in his system the recognition of the identity of thought and being; Kierkegaard opposingly claims that he has incorporated only the idea of existence. His system has left out of sight the existence of the human thinker and has dealt only with thought. This fact has been previously made apparent, to the degree that it was emphasized as an essential characteristic of the significance and purpose of the system. This transcendental nature of the Phenomenology of Mind is

brought up here as the object of criticism so that we have a better prospective on the problems as well as the insights ingredient in such an approach. The apparent dichotomy between the truth of man as transcendental thought and the truth of man as an existential being is at the foundation of the dilemma faced by both psychology and philosophy. Being and coeval transcendence of being is the paradoxical fulcrum at which the two sciences conjoin in the respective analyses of a philosophical ontology of being and psycho-analytic therapy toward liberation.

Kierkegaard claims, as the antithesis of Hegel, that "existence itself keeps the two moments of thought and being apart, so . . . reflection presents . . . two alternatives. For an objective reflection the truth becomes an object, and thought must be pointed away from the subject. For a subjective reflection the truth becomes a matter of appropriation, of inwardness, of subjectivity, and thought must probe more and more deeply into the subject and his subjectivity."³ This latter is still philosophizing, but does not forget that, as thought, it is not itself existence. It is an evident conclusion from this statement that while "a logical system is possible; an existential system is impossible."⁴ Natural sciences, then, are purely "abstract" and their necessity belongs to them as "thought-constructions," not as existence. Hegel and Kierkegaard would agree that psychology as a natural science which would treat man as an object, determinable according to discoverable static laws, is an inadequate science or mode of investigation of man. However,

whereas Hegel would say that dialectic is the only mode which takes into account the essential, transcendental nature of man's power of pure negativity, Kierkegaard would retort that within such a systematic mode, subjectivity has vanished in a boundless objectivity. Subjectivity must sufficiently allow for the specific quality of the object to which all men as existential beings are related; the object which presents itself to the subjectivity, the faith, of man as the paradox that there is more truth in man's immediate relationship to the world than in all of the "objective" knowledge accumulable, or in Christian terminology, that the Eternal came into being at a definite moment in time as an individual man.⁵ As Kierkegaard says, "Faith is precisely the contradiction between the infinite passion of the individuals inwardness and the objective uncertainty! Faith is subjectivity in its highest exercise, not because it has no object, but because its object is the paradox. . . ."⁶ Here we see that the epistemological question of what we can and cannot know within the relationship of subject and object has significance for ontological statements about man's relationship to the world and statements about the truth of that relationship. Even though Hegel's metaphysical system was concerned with the transcendental essence of man and not the problems of finite beings in the world, such a presentation still has implications for investigating the ontological being of man. It is quite unlikely that any statement or presentation of the essence of man could be completely divorced from statements concerning the essence of man's being in the world as compared

to other beings in the world. If psychology is to investigate man in a mode appropriate to his fundamental nature, it must take into consideration not only the transcendental essence of consciousness as being self-consciousness or pure negativity, but also the essence of man's unique being as he exists in the world, in his finitude, in the facticity of his imminent nothingness. Only with an understanding, a reconciliation, of man's infinite subjective inwardness or transcendental atemporality and his objective being in the world will therapy toward psychological liberation make any sense. Having dealt with Hegel's statement of the transcendental notion of man, let us turn to the dilemma of man's being in the world.

Jean-Paul Sartre presents us with the most emphatic statement of the freedom and responsibility involved in existence. As he states in Being and Nothingness, "Freedom is existence, and in it existence precedes essence." In contrast to Hegel, Sartre is asserting that "there would be no essences -- no truth, no structure in reality, no logical form, no God, no logos, nor any morality -- except as man in affirming his freedom makes these truths."⁷ This statement looks as though a justifiable conclusion would be the proposition that, since all essences are preceded by existence, "only immediate sensation and immediate cognition cannot deceive," as Kierkegaard asserted in Philosophical Fragments.⁸ In criticism of this statement, however, is the fact that it does not indicate the implications of the assertion it entails about the fundamental nature of man as Kierkegaard made explicit, i.e. that man not only

exists but that he makes his own existence; he has the power to create himself. The implication of further question which must be asked is how such a power is possible and how it must be structured; and to answer this we need a fully developed existentialist doctrine. Obviously, Hegel's Phenomenology is not so distant or irrelevant to the problem of human existence as it may at first have appeared. The difference in approaches however is that whereas Hegel portrayed the transcendental grounds for the possibility of freedom, Sartre emphasizes the dilemma of the impossibility of a finite individual attaining the totality of being entailed in such a transcendental condition.

Sartre characterizes this effort by the statement that man's fundamental project is to become God. The fact that we desire indicates man's fundamental lack; we are never singularly or totally that which we are but are instead, always in a state of becoming. We desire to be in ourselves what we are for ourselves, a self-conscious cosmos which would be the foundation of its own being-in-itself by the mere consciousness it takes of itself. This is the apex of Hegelian pure negativity, and as he emphasized through the presentation of dialectic, it is an impossible state to attain; not because it is unattainable but because it simply is not a state. This is analogous to Husserl's transcendental deduction in that, as Merleau-Ponty states, "One of the most significant insights of the transcendental reduction is that it is impossible to complete."⁹ Sartre communicates the honor of the necessity to perpetually create

one's own values and meaning in life in Nausea. No matter what we do with our mind, our body, or our environment, we shall never attain being-in-ourselves, a state of self-sufficient being which is constituted by our being-for-ourselves, or self-conscious being. As Medard Boss states in his analysis of "Man's Fundamental Engagement"¹⁰ as long as man lives he is essentially and inevitably in debt (Schuld, which is equivalent to both "debt" and "guilt"). He is always in arrears in that: (1) finite man can exist only in one of the world-relations of which he is constituted at any given time, and all other possibilities of "caring" for something remain unfulfilled at that moment, and (2) man's whole future waits for him, there is no release from the constant presentation of new possibilities. "All actual, concrete feelings of guilt and pangs of conscience are grounded in this existential 'being-in-debt' (Schuldigsein) toward his whole existence, lasting all through life, no matter how grotesquely they sometimes appear, and how far from their source they may have been driven in various neurotic conditions."¹¹ Every concrete desire; eating, sleeping, creating a work of art, helping others, expresses the personal project of a man to realize, what Sartre calls, his being-in-itself -- for itself, the self-conscious cosmos which constitutes its state of being purely by the consciousness it takes of itself. But since the consumation of this project is impossible, Sartre proclaims that "man is a useless passion."¹²

Though the consumation of the project is impossible, the burden of it is inevitable. It is the fundamental nature of man that free-

dom is existence; man's choice is only whether or not to make his own existence with that freedom. In Hegelian terms, while man may establish the content of existence, the dialectic of pure negativity is the transcendental essence of reality itself.

Sartre's Orestes of Les Mouches expresses the awesome reality of freedom when he exclaims:

Suddenly freedom dashed upon me and penetrated me: there was no longer anything in heaven, neither good nor evil, nor anybody to give me orders. . . . I am condemned to have no other law than my own. For I am a man, and each man has to invent his own way.¹³

The goal of the project, if taken up, is not mesmerized tranquility or absence of anxiety, but rather, "authentic" existence. As Orestes later proclaims defiantly, "Men are free, and human life begins on the other side of despair."¹⁴ Hence it may be argued, as does Alfred Stern in Sartre, His Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, that "Freud's empirical psychoanalysis tries to deliver us from anxiety, [while] Sartre's Existential psychoanalysis tries to give us anxiety, the anxiety of an authentic life. Consequently Existential psychoanalysis cannot be considered a therapy."¹⁵ To support this thesis Mr. Stern presents the case study of pathological existential anxiety and guilt in a young girl. Rena, the patient, took on the burden of existential responsibility for her actions to the degree that she was incapable of any action whatsoever, she was frozen in fear with the awareness of her actions' inadequacy to the totality of being of all human

reality. She was, unlike "normal" adults, incapable of distracting herself, of residing in bad faith even for a moment, and the result was "total madness" (Stern's term). The problem was alleviated momentarily when her nurse convinced her that there was a mechanical organization responsible for the whole world, the quintessence of bad faith.

This is a perfect example of the divergence between traditional Freudian analysis and the approach of psychoanalysts who ground themselves, or their method of therapy, in existential concepts. The Freudian approach seeks to free the patient from anxiety, and the success of this effort is the determining factor in consideration of the success of therapy. The contrasting view is that the general idea of "cure" such as well-adjusted longevity, themselves deny Dasein, a Heideggerian term designating the essential nature of man's being-in-the-world in contrast to other animal or inanimate beings-in-the-world. Assimilation to culture, according to this view, "cures" at the cost of sacrificing being -- the potential and freedom which, as was earlier indicated, is the primordial cause of anxiety. The goal of therapy should be, instead, that the patient experience his existence. Cure of symptoms is secondary and, if therapy is successful, will follow of itself. The Freudian ideal of the new man liberated from guilt by psychoanalysis is an antiquated myth and incapable of realization since man is, as an essential characteristic, guilt. Moreover, such an approach to therapy is pernicious because it attempts to conceal rather than elucidate the cause

of anxiety. It would have the patient reside in the bad faith of cultural anonymity in order to avoid the awareness of the imminence of his own death; which is, as such, the most obvious form of the threat of non-being or total nothingness. The result would be loss of potential through conformity, a vapid, unreal, non-self-aware existence -- the dissolution of the freedom, as well as the responsibility, which Sartre would say, is existence. Freud's error was that he interpreted ontological truths of man -- that he is a being which is self-conscious or self-aware and thereby burdened with the anxiety inveterate in the awareness of: (1) his own inadequacy as a finite being in relation to the totality of transcendental being, and (2) his burden of freedom to create himself in light of new possibilities ever presenting themselves -- in a manner inappropriate to that fundamental nature of man's existence. He, perhaps disingenuously, interpreted man's nature as a rational, in the sense of self-aware, being, with technical reason, and thereby reduced the ontological truths of man to psychological mechanisms. It is still incumbent upon us, then, to establish a science which would take into account simultaneously man's transcendental essence as a self-conscious or rational being, and his existential essence as a real being in the world burdened unto death with the responsibility of his own inescapable, though avoidable, freedom of self-creation.

(2)

It is the distinction between Man as "thought proper"¹⁶ and man as a finite being existing in the "common sense" world,¹⁷ as originally presented in the beginning of this thesis, or as just stated, man as a self-conscious and thereby transcendent being versus existential freedom, which I shall now delineate by the distinction of transcendental idealism versus realism. The unique claim of Husserlean phenomenology, according to recent existentialistic interpretation, is to have overcome this classical opposition. In order to make clear the validity of this claim and its significance for psychology as well as philosophy, we must elucidate: Husserl's philosophy of transcendental idealism, the relation between transcendental philosophy and phenomenological psychology, the relation between phenomenological psychology and empirical psychology, and the interconnections of psychology and phenomenology according to existentialistic interpretations.

In Section 41 of Cartesian Meditations, Husserl states that the traditional epistemological difficulty of subject over against "objective" reality is a quasi-problem.

When I apperceive myself as a natural man, I have already apperceived the spacial world and constructed myself in space, where I already have an Outside Me. Therefore the validity of world-apperception has already been presupposed, has already entered into the sense assumed in asking the question. . . . Manifestly the conscious execution of phenomenological reduction is needed in order to

attain that Ego and conscious life by which transcendental questions . . . can be asked.¹⁸

The attempt to conceive the universe of true being as something lying outside the universe of possible consciousness, possible knowledge, possible evidence, the two being related to one another merely externally by a rigid law, is nonsensical.¹⁹

As to that conscious life which must be attained in order to even ask transcendental questions, Husserl adds: "Every imaginable sense, every imaginable being, whether the latter is called immanent or transcendent, falls within the domain of transcendental subjectivity, on the subjectivity which constitutes all sense and being."²⁰ There is only one absolute concretion: transcendental subjectivity. Obviously, according to this proposition, a traditional epistemology with inferences from a supposed immanence to a supposed transcendence, or "being-in-itself" can no longer operate. Rather it can only operate, as Husserl projects, "as a transcendental phenomenology which tries to clarify systematically our cognitive achievements as essentially intentional achievements, constituting their intended objects; which thus shows that every kind of being, real or ideal, becomes understandable only as a product of transcendental subjectivity."²¹ From this view phenomenology is eo ipso transcendental idealism, but not, I would like to note, a "psychological idealism" which tries to take immediate sense-data and imbue it with meaning according to some pre-structured, a priori, framework of paramechanical concepts. On the contrary, Husserl claims that we have here, "a kind of idealism which is nothing more than a consequently

performed self-explication in the form of a systematic, egological science, as it has just been specified."²²

The confusion over Husserl arises from his claim for discovering, through the phenomenological reduction, an Ego which is transcendental, in the sense that it is the presupposition and necessary grounds for the empirical, "common sense," or "natural" view of the world, and yet also existential in that it must actually be experienced, as it retains its unique and distinctive essence, in order for the descriptive science to manifest itself or for transcendental questions to be asked, and answered appropriately, i.e. phenomenologically. The noteworthy aspect of this situation, as Joseph Kockelmans says in his article, "Transcendental Idealism"²³ and as Merleau-Ponty indicated by his previously quoted remark, is that "none of the solutions so far advocated [in response to this confusion] has been satisfactory, and the discussion goes on." However, the insights presented by various interpretations of Husserl's position on this problem have led to a greater integration of philosophical and psychological concepts of an appropriate method of investigating and analyzing human beings. Let us continue, therefore, to elucidate the problem so as to be in position to grasp the philosophical foundations and the significance of the methods of psychotherapy offered in response.

Husserl often argues explicitly that phenomenology in the first place deals with "things themselves, with Being as such." Experience would hence occupy a most important place in our contact with things.

Although reality consists in meaning for consciousness only, he also argues that every meaning is founded on an act of seeing; thus intuition seems to be the original approach to Being. But in many instances, as Mr. Kockelmans notes, "it is impossible that intentionality be conceived as an ontological relationship; it turns out to be the experience of meaning rather than an original Being-in-the-world: consciousness then is no longer proposed as an openness to the world. Otherwise, Husserl never speaks of Dasein, of encounter, openness, etc., but always of consciousness and subjectivity. Encounter is not the primary datum, but consciousness itself. Only transcendental consciousness is absolute."²⁴ It is significant to note that it was because of the emphasis that Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty considered Husserl's doctrine to be an inadmissible form of idealism.

It has been argued, however, by Paul Ricoeur in Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology that Husserlian phenomenology became more and more existential to the degree that the problem of perception took precedence over all other problems. In explanation of this claim we must point out that it was in Husserl's first works, from the Logical Investigations to the Cartesian Meditations that consciousness is defined not by perception, that is to say, by its very presence to things, but rather by its distance and absence which are the power of signifying, of "meaning" as previously indicated. In the works and manuscripts of the last ten years, Ricoeur claims, "perception is described as the initial basis and genetic

origin of all operations of consciousness. This is the consciousness which gives, which sees, which effects presences, and it supports and founds the consciousness which signifies, which judges, and which speaks."²⁵ It is this shift in accent which marks the passage to existential philosophy. We see then that Husserl writes with three attitudes: (1) the "natural attitude" of empirical realism inasmuch as he makes a pre-given objective world prevail over a consciousness which in the last resort is passive in respect to the world (as in Ideen, Vol. I, pp. 57-68); (2) the "phenomenological sphere" or the point of view which could be called "existential" to the extent that in such, consciousness and world are perfectly correlative (Ideen, Vol. II, pp. 1-297); and (3) the "transcendental sphere" in which consciousness as a transcendental subjectivity appears as the only absolute reality, while the world proves to be no more than a product of achievement for, in, and through the consciousness.²⁶ Mr. Kockelmans feels that the last of these attitudes is most prevalent in Husserl's phenomenology and therefore, as such, is unacceptable. He adds that the second sphere, however, is of lasting importance if "the idea of intentionality is interpreted in an ontological way and if the phenomenological reduction is understood merely as a reduction of the world of culture to the original Lebenswelt,"²⁷ i.e. the world of our immediate life experience. We will return to this existentialist interpretation of phenomenology, but let us first indicate Husserl's views on phenomenological psychology and its relationship to transcendental philosophy and empiri-

cal psychology.

As we have seen, Husserl considered the phenomenological, or transcendental reduction the necessary condition for finding that realm of being which is apodictically evident. The existential status of the "natural" real world is secondary; it continually presupposes the realm of "transcendental" being: pure consciousness and its pure cogitata.²⁸ As previously stated, transcendental subjectivity is immanent, constituted within the ego, and constitutes all sense and being. Kockelmans notes, however, that phenomenological psychology remains within the realm of the "natural attitude" and studies "lived experiences" intentional, "objective" ways of behavior which are reduced to "unities of subjective sense as real psychological entities in the real world."²⁹ Mr. Kockelmans indicates the relationship between these two realms, a relationship the importance of which will become clearer as the thesis progresses, in the following passage:

Transcendental subjectivity . . . is not a part of the objective world, but that subjective conscious life itself, wherein the world and all its contents are constituted for me. Within the realm of the transcendental reduction I, this man "spiritually" and "bodily" existing in the world, am, therefore only an appearance unto myself as transcendental ego [my italics], so that the "I" which I apprehend here, presupposes a hidden ego to whom the former is "present."²⁹

We will return to this issue of one ego being transcended by a more fundamental ego, but let us only note at the present time that the

transcendental reduction is purely philosophical, whereas phenomenological psychology remains in the natural world and seeks primarily to delineate that without which the psychical as such cannot be thought of. Only secondarily does it strive to understand empirical psychological facticity. Phenomenological psychology, then, tries to formulate the a priori laws without which empirical psychology cannot attain complete "scientific validity," and is itself a reduction which is different and distinct from the transcendental reduction. The former, however, if carried far enough will, as Husserl states in Krisis, "fade into the latter where it has its ultimate foundation."³⁰

Moreover, psychologists must themselves perform the transcendental reduction in order to understand how communication between psychic beings, in a world common to all, is possible. One must then return to the world of immediate experience and apply there his insights to the realities of man in mundane situations. Husserl would take great pains to not have us condense the two worlds, however. Phenomenology is a science of consciousness, distinguished completely from natural sciences. Traditional psychology has been concerned, especially to the date at which Husserl wrote, with consciousness of an empirical being in the world; phenomenology is concerned with "pure" consciousness. What has constantly vitiated empirical psychology since its beginnings in the eighteenth century, is the deceptive idea of a scientific method modeled after that of the psychophysical sciences. The fundamental insight of Husserlian phenom-

ology, as with Hegelian phenomenology, is that, as Husserl states, "the true method has to follow the nature of the things to be investigated, not our prejudices and preconceptions."³¹

Keeping in mind, then, both the importance of appropriate method of investigation as emphasized by transcendental phenomenological philosophy, and the goal of psychology to alleviate the anxiety of the conflict between being and nothingness, life and death, without loss of individual potential and awareness, we see the significance of Husserl's claim that phenomenological psychology will fill the gap between philosophy and empirical psychology. It must be emphasized again that within the domain of empirical psychology as an objective science of facts, it is absolutely impossible to constitute a pure empirical science of the psychical, because as Husserl notes, in empirical psychology, which has to deal with concrete, real, beings, a reference to the psychophysical and the physical seems to be essential and necessary.³² But a pure psychology is necessary, and Husserl claims possible, for the establishing of a truly empirical psychology. The project for such a science is that it delineates the universal and necessary essential forms of the psychical as such, and an indispensable factor in such a project, as should by now be obvious, is a determinate, appropriate method.

The inadequacy of traditional psychology, as we have seen, arises from its attempt to imitate the natural sciences, and this attempt, accordingly, derives from the equating of immanent temporality and objective, real time: the reduction of man to the

level of an object existing through time. This pernicious error has haunted philosophy and psychology since the cogito of Rene Descartes. It was the unique characteristic of Hegelian dialectic to emphasize the transcendental and atemporal essence of man's consciousness as self-consciousness, as a being which transcends, stands outside of, its own being through and by the essence of its being, as reflected by the process of pure negativity or dialectic. Analogously, Husserl claims that "to realize a full phenomenological experience in order to bring consciousness into a universal investigation, we must eliminate as non-psychic being the real world as a whole (the being-value of which is accepted a priori in 'natural' life) from the theme of investigation."³³ The consciousness-ego as well as the transcendental Ego is affected since every real human aspect of a being in the world is suspended. My being-a-man in the real world and my mundane life is maintained only as a "meant;" that is, as that toward which the intentional conscious acts are and continue to be oriented.³⁴ Husserl, in these concepts of intentionality and empirical ego versus transcendental ego, is presenting a thesis which conjoins the transcendental, atemporal essence of man as self-consciousness and the reality of his being in the world in the sense that the phenomenological reduction is actually performed. It is at this juncture that an existentialistic interpretation of phenomenology purports to transcend the opposition of these concepts. If such is the case, the future of phenomenological, or existentialistic-phenomenological, psychology may be signifi-

cantly enhanced.

In Husserl's philosophy, every object appears only as being determined by the structure of thinking itself. When he speaks about transcendency, he never supposes the reality of the object in question, but only the existence of a sense concept. And it is the aim of the phenomenological, or transcendental, reduction to determine what a consciousness, which is essentially intentional, really is in itself. We are then, as Joseph Kockelmans states "not speaking about the intentionality of an act, but about the proper Being of intentionality itself. It appears that consciousness [as being essentially intentional], and thus the ego, is nothing but openness, relatedness to the other, negation of a being based in and on itself, and hence at least in one way nothing other than negativity."³⁵ That is to say, consciousness relates to its intentional objects, whether they be transcendent or immanent, as the power of negativity, or the power which constitutes the relation itself, and is thereby outside or transcendent of the object of its attention or any particular moment constituting the content of its being. Consciousness appears, then, not as pure interiority; it has to be understood as a "coming-to-light," as Heidegger would say, as a being-open-to, as a going-out-of-itself, as an ek-sistence or that existence which stands outside of its existence.

If consciousness is nothing in and through itself, i.e. not merely any one of its moments, and the Being of consciousness consists in opening itself and in directing-itself-to-the-other, then

consciousness cannot be considered merely an inner quality, nor an unchangeable and unexteriorized self-possession. As Sartre terms it, consciousness is a "divine absence." The "openness" which consciousness is, is best disclosed, Mr. Kockelmans purports, by that to which it opens itself. Consciousness cannot however, as previously noted, be open to the totality of all reality, but is defined in everyone by a factual limitation -- and this fact, in contrast to the transcendental essence of consciousness as pure negativity, constitutes precisely our human, existential, facticity. A philosophy of a complete reflection, an openness to the totality of being which is virtually not excluded but factually impossible, a philosophy of an absolute knowledge such as Hegel's Phenomenology, is excluded from an ontology of man to the degree to which intentionality appears historical and temporalizing. That is to say, it is excluded to the degree to which it does not realize that a philosophy which is to take account of consciousness as intentionality, or pure negativity, is successful only to the degree to which the participants take up the project, for it is only they, as individual existent beings or ek-sistences, who are the essence, the atemporal transcendence, of intentionality. Consciousness is able to manifest itself to itself and to others only by the act in which, as Kockelmans states, "it factually discloses its view on the things and, at the same time, impresses its shape upon them."³⁶ Hence the proper being of consciousness cannot be defined directly and in itself, because it is determined by intentionality, the act of essen-

tial negativity. It can be defined, then, only by being related to a dimension of reality which has arisen from facticity itself, which is precisely consciousness itself as existing and as "presence" to itself and to the other. This is the only way of attaining, and "attaining" here is to be taken literally, the definitive meaning of intentionality. This is why intentionality, according to this existentialistic interpretation to which we shall adhere, does not refer to the "consciousness" of Descartes res cogitans, but rather to existence, encounter, or the Heideggerian term for man as a unique being-in-the-world: Dasein.

This interpretation of intentionality accounts for the claim that Husserlian phenomenology transcends the realist-idealist opposition, and explains why Husserl sometimes spoke in one way and at other times in another. It is the ambivalent nature of consciousness that it manifests itself as a being in the world and can simultaneously transcend that being in the world by being aware of, or outside of, that being. A man, as a conscious being, is not merely either one of these beings in itself; it is thus that Sartre says that consciousness, "in its most immediate being, in the inner structure of the prereflective cogito, must be what it is not and not be what it is."³⁷

This raises the problem of which psychology need be concerned: the identity of the ego. According to Sartre's non-egological conception of consciousness, the subject reflecting upon the act he experiences, ascertains that this act is his; but this only means that

this act in question has its place in the complex of acts which derives its unity and coherence from the very acts that enter into it.³⁸ That is to say, the act is brought into relation to an object, which we call the ego, which did not appear before the act was grasped or reflected upon, since as his interpretation of consciousness as intentionality purports, no ego appears in a non-reflective intentional act of consciousness. Reflection, Sartre claims, is what superinduces a new object, and is over and above the necessary condition of the constitution and existence of this object, viz. the ego.³⁹ The world and self are unified in that both are constituted by the act of transcending, which is itself non-egological, not a determinate being in the world; but is in some sense experienceable by individuals, as it is the goal of the phenomenological reduction. Whether it be totally experienceable is a moot question. The relation between this transcending of consciousness, Husserl's "pure ego," and the "empirical ego" may be, as Merleau-Ponty notes, analogous to the relation between an abstract law of physics and that law as experimentally observed.

If eidetic psychology is a reading of the invariable structure of our experience based on examples, the empirical psychology which uses induction is also a reading of the essential structure of a multiplicity of cases. . . . The intuition of essences does not involve anymore difficulties or 'mystical' secrets than perception.⁴⁰

As such, reality and truth may not be so different that they cannot have intelligible relations. Here lies the opportunity for psychology

to play the integrating role; and this is precisely the aim of psychology which founds itself on the philosophical concepts presented heretofore.

(3)

The impetus for traditional psychoanalysis, as noted in the previous section dealing with Freudian psychoanalysis, was the observation that there was a gap between the psychopathology of the brain and the clinical symptoms of neuroses and the demonstration that traumatic neuroses resulted from so-called "reminiscences," i.e. from the unconscious representation of the trauma. The impetus for phenomenology, or phenomenological psychology; however, was the growing awareness of certain psychiatrists that the classical psychological frame of reference, inherited from the eighteenth century, was no longer adequate for the exploration of many psychopathological conditions. The concepts which were to become the tools for this further exploration, however, are philosophical, rather than scientific in the classical sense of the term, and are the basis of a wider frame of reference because they consider man's problematic uniqueness as an existential self-consciousness. Moreover, these concepts also emphasize the importance, and method, of an appropriate mode of investigation or analysis of man, whether it be theoretic or therapeutic. The necessity of a new science of man, or re-evaluation of the approach and validity of the traditional scientific method as applied to man, which stems from the Cartesian emphasis upon the mind-body distinction in conjunction with the influence of Newtonian, materialistic science of the eighteenth century, was obvious due to the impasse of both Cartesian philosophic dualism and Freudian psychoanalysis

of consciousness versus unconsciousness.

Philosophically, this impasse is inherent to the distinction previously mentioned of essence versus existence. As Rollo May states in his article on the "Origins of the Existential Movement in Psychology," laws formed on essences are based on selections which fit as the criterion, and often systems can be built completely separated from human reality.⁴¹ Existential psychotherapists and philosophers, however, contend that it is possible to have a rigorous science which studies human beings in their reality without alienating and fragmentizing the subject. What must be emphasized as the basis of this new, dynamic, science is the formulation of truth-as-relationship. As Kierkegaard states:

When the question of truth is raised in an objective manner, reflection is directed objectively to the truth. . . . If only the object to which he is related, the subject is accounted to be in the truth. When the question of the truth is raised subjectively, reflection is directed subjectively to the nature of the individuals relationship; if only the mode of this relationship is in the truth, the individual is in the truth, even if he should happen to be thus related to what is not true.⁴²

This is to say that the subject, man, can never be separated from the object which he observes, and no truth has reality by itself, but is always dependent on the immediate relationship. This is not, of course, to deny the independence of subject and object, but only to emphasize the point that, as stated in Gestalt Therapy, by Perls, Hefferline, and Goodman:

It is meaningless to define a breather without air, a walker without gravity and ground, an irascible without obstacles and so on for every animal function. The definition of an organism is the definition of an organism/environment field; and the contact-boundary is, so to speak, the specific organ of awareness of the novel situation in the field. . . .⁴³

The implication of this concept pertains to the scientific endeavor in that, as Aron Gurwitch purports: "In regard to material things thinking in terms of substantiality gave way to thinking in terms of functions and relations, so, I submit, it will have to do in all fields of experience."⁴⁴ But moreover, as is stated in his article "The Non-egological Conception of Consciousness":

Whatever we know or believe we know about the ego -- our own or other persons -- and be this knowledge grounded upon a single apprehension or upon a certain number of apprehensions, however great, this knowledge is permanently in need of being confirmed by further apprehensions and is only valid under the condition that further apprehensions do confirm it. In the sense the ego's being carries with it a certain character of provisionalness. It partakes of the dubitability or, better, relativity, which is the essential and existential condition of all transcendental existents.⁴⁵

This is to say that man's being is constituted by both his existence in the world and his capacity for transcendence, which taken together substantiate the paradox of his objective uncertainty and coeval infinite subjectivity.

The significance of this philosophical insight for psychoanalysis is that man as a species, or an individual, can no longer be approached

as an object to which one directs their attention. Blondel, a French philosopher, noted in La Conscience Morbide (Alean, Paris, 1914) that while the traditional definitions of subjective psychotic experiences were not untrue, they are unable to convey to us anything of how a mental patient actually experiences an hallucination or a delusion. And even worse, they give the analysts the false impression that they really do, or can by such methods of objectification, understand the patient. Phenomenologists believe, in response, that they have found an alternative approach which allows a better grasp of the subjective experience of the patient. Existential analysis is also originated in this way, but is analysis based on existential philosophy and attempts to integrate phenomenology as a part of its total system.

The importance of Husserl's phenomenology, then, is that it is basically a methodological principle, intended to provide a firm basis for the foundation of a new psychology and a universal philosophy. The radicalism of such an attempt is apparent in that it purports to establish both the fundamental principles for the analysis of the individual psyche, and a universal philosophy -- universal in that solipsism is possible only from the "naturalistic" standpoint whereby the individual is viewed over and against his environment or outer reality. Such an unbiased contemplation of phenomena lays aside, or "brackets," all such intellectualized abstractions and proclaims "to the things themselves." This is not a regression of consciousness but a "seeing through" the illusions of the natural standpoint and all of its a priori presuppositions. This methodological principle

applied to therapy is analogous to Freud's "basic rule" by which the subject must verbalize everything thought spontaneously, putting aside consideration of shame, guilt, etc.; but goes further in that it abstains from one-sided, natural-scientific mechanicalism which has the penchant to conclude and pass judgement rather than let something speak for itself. The notion that each patient, or individual, lives in a distinct subjective world which the analyst must discover and empathize with in order to establish communication and let this world show itself, reflects the ontological thesis that the basic constitution or structure of existence is being-in-the-world.

What must be emphasized, however, is the identification of being-in-the-world and transcendence. It is through the concept of being-in-the-world as transcendence that the fatal defect of all psychology, the theory of a dichotomy of world into subject and object, has been overcome. This concept, as presented in the philosophy of Heidegger and employed by Ludwig Binswager in his article "The Existential Analysis School of Thought," returns us to a point prior to, by seeing through the abstraction of, the subject/object dichotomy of knowledge. It eliminates the gap between self and world by elucidating the structure of subjectivity as transcendence, or the being-in-the-world of man as ek-sistence. As previously mentioned, world and self are unified in that both are constituted by the act of transcending. It is through this act of man as essentially self-consciousness, as it is manifested through all of his modes of being-

in-the-world: creating, thinking, loving, eating, etc., that man constitutes both his being as an empirical ego and the empirical world as that to which he relates himself.

With this definition of being-in-the-world as transcendence, and with the awareness that this condition is at once both the freedom and the responsibility which constitutes the original and infinitely variable anxiety of man, we realize that by analyzing the structure of being-in-the-world we can apprehend and explore psychoses and neuroses; and realize further that we have to understand them as specific modes of transcending. As Boss states in Psychoanalysis and Daseinanalysis,

Contrary to 'having' perceptions as 'subject', the person is . . . nothing but in and as this or that perceiving; instinctual, impulsive, emotional, imaginative, dreaming, thinking, acting, willing, or wishing relationship toward the things which he encounters. His existence is originally a 'being-in-the-world, . . . not as a subject 'within' space, but only on the basis of an actual being with something can man experience closeness as well as remoteness.⁴⁶

Only when we reflect and interpret our own being as objects do we posit an "ego," a "psyche," or a "psychic apparatus." And in doing so we are creating an artificial riddle which will continue to remain insolvable because of the contradiction inherent in the attempt to identify this "ego" with our transcendent, and transcending, being.

It must be emphasized that this fundamental potential for transcendence which constitutes man as Dasein, a being distinct from other

beings, is not, according to the existential interpretation we have adopted, an a priori structure in some supersensual realm. Heidegger's concern was to overcome this very type of metaphysics, and accordingly he emphasized the point that one must not picture the essential condition of Dasein as something which exists in itself, forms a background, or is the nature of a design which has to be deduced by logical procedures from observable human phenomena which always fall short of the design itself. On the contrary, as Boss states, what Heidegger terms the existentialia of man -- e.g. his being-in-the-world, primary comprehending, luminating, etc. -- always characterize the immediate "essence" of factually observable, concrete behavior of human beings.⁴⁷

Human being and what appears in the light of human existence are mutually dependent on each other to such an extent that, 'What and where were the things before there were men?', and 'what will become of the things when men no longer exist?', are completely meaningless in the context of analysis of Dasein.⁴⁸

We must not confuse this "immediate being" and "openness-to-things" with objective space and time, however, for here arises confusion over the transcendental nature of this concept of consciousness. While Dasein is constituted by its immediacy and existent transcendence, it is not extant. Spaciality of Dasein refers to the fact that "at any given moment, Dasein is extended ekstatically within the sphere composed of all its possibilities of relating to the thing it encounters and discloses. . . ." ⁴⁹ And accordingly:

Original temporality always refers to a meaningful caring for something or disclosing of something -- i.e., to the concrete happenings as the unfolding (and coming into being) of man's own existence actually takes place. From this is derived objective time and means of measuring it. . . . Man, Dasein, is the light without which no 'phenomena' can appear.⁵⁰

The methodological insights of Hegel's transcendental account of man's being as essentially self-consciousness are, then, appropriate to an existential-phenomenological analysis of man, and in agreement with the insight that transcendence is not an attribute, but given in the ontological nature of man. It is this capacity which allows man to relate himself either to the freedom which is his existence or to his own imminent non-existence, each of which is claimed by Sartre and Heidegger respectively to be the fundamental relationship of man which determines the authenticity of his existence. This apparent divergence of emphasis is lessened, however, if we realize that the potential to create our own values in freedom is made intensifyingly meaningful only with an awareness of the finite character of all existence; and the imminence of one's own death is likewise meaningful only because we have the potential and freedom to create our lives in the interim in view of this facticity of life. In any case anxiety, or dread, is ontological; is manifested by what man is, not what he has. Anxiety demonstrates that some potentiality, or new possibility of freedom is present, but not actualized; and it is intensified with the issue of ful-

filling these potentialities. Ontological guilt is likewise universal since no one fails to distort the all-embracing reality of other men and no one fulfills his own potential. Guilt and anxiety arise, then, purely from self-awareness, in that one sees himself capable of choice -- their source is existence itself. Neurotic and psychotic guilt and anxiety, as Rollo May states, are the "end-product of unfaced normal ontological anxiety, unfronted ontological guilt."⁵¹ The goal of analysis, then, is to permit the individual to confront and accept the reality of his own existence -- his freedom, his responsibility, and the imminence of non-being -- to accept all his life-possibilities and to appropriate and assemble them to a free authentic self no longer caught in the narrowed-down mentality of anonymity or escape from freedom. As Boss says: "Man's freedom consists in becoming ready for accepting and letting be all that is, to let it shine forth in the world-openness as which he exists."⁵²

The methodological principles of investigation and analysis of human being presented heretofore are, obviously, not strict rules which one follows or abstract constructs to which one relates empirical experience. Rather, this approach only emphasizes the attempt to understand man as man, in no other mode except that which is appropriate to his being as existential self-consciousness. Accordingly, existential analysis maintains that psychoanalytic technique follows understanding; understanding does not, and cannot, follow the mere application of technical rationality. The particular tech-

nique chosen should be that which functions within the variable project of illuminating the patients being-in-the-world; of helping him recognize, accept, and experience his own particular existence at this particular time. Psychological dynamisms always take their meaning from the existent situation of the individuals involved, the patients own immediate life put on an ontological basis in that each behavior is seen in light of the existence of the patient as a human being, as Dasein. Drives, motives, etc., are thereby viewed as potentialities for existence, not as the causal play of irreconcilable forces. The affect of such an approach is freer communication, or a relationship based on the immediate "presence" of the individuals as self-conscious beings-with-the-world, as one existence communicating with another. It is imperative that the analyst maintain this awareness of, and respect for, the existence of human being, for it is to the analyst in his immediate presence that the analysand relates and reacts. The dilemma of the patient is ameliorated not by explanation but by an "encounter" whereby the inner experience resulting from the meeting of two individuals, changes one's weltanschauung. This does not mean that the patient changes his personality in order to copy the model of the analyst, but that the model serves as a catalyst in whose presence he comes to realize his latent and best abilities and can thereby, as Jung states, progress in his "individuation." As such, the therapist is what Socrates calls a midwife -- he is there in order to "bring birth" to something within the patient. As May aptly puts it, the analyst must like an

artist keep his vision: "the creative process, which should absorb him, transcending the subject/object split, lest he only be dealing with objects, and himself as a manipulator of objects."⁵³ The goal throughout is not "cure" of neuroses viewed as some mechanistic structure, resulting in well-adjusted longevity; but the experiencing of the patients own existence, a bringing-to-light of his essential spontaneous being as transcendence, as manifested, Binswanger states, in the most general sense of the modes of act and love.

The attempt to "cure" ontological anxiety indicates the source of the problem itself. The idea of an "ego" structured in relation to some reality and which can be manipulated into well-adjustment reflects the illusion that the individual is constituted by a being-as-an-object rather than a being-as-transcendence. The more one attempts to catch, analyze, objectify, cure, or identify with this ego-object, the more one remains alienated from himself, and the world, as they are constituted by the essence of man, by being as existent transcendence. This dilemma which has historically perplexed psychology and philosophy, Alan Watts in Psychotherapy East and West, calls the "double bind." The more seriously "cure" is considered, the more serious and inescapable the problem becomes.

The approach of Daseinanalysis is, accordingly, not to "cure", but as Boss says, to "elucidate the past, present, future of a patients life to the point where he becomes thoroughly aware of his existential being-in-debt. This in turn enables him to acknowledge his debt, to say 'yes' to it and take it upon himself."⁵⁴ He will

then no longer have neurotic feelings of guilt and anxiety, which resulted in being caught up in the vicious circle of acquired moralistic concepts demanding a mode of living as an "ego" which is essentially foreign to him. And, as Watts states:

At this point the patient simply stops pretending. He does not learn to 'be himself' as if that were something which one can do; he learns rather that there is nothing he can do not to be himself. But this is just another way of saying that he has ceased to identify himself with his ego, with the image of himself which society has forced upon him. As a result of the therapists challenge to the patient's two premises, his voluntary behavior and his involuntary behavior come together as one, and he finds out that his total behavior, his organism, is both and neither: it is spontaneous. One may call this integration of the 'personality,' actualization of the 'self,' or even the development of a new ego structure'; but it does not correspond at all to the normal sense of ego or self as the directive agent behind action.⁵⁵

If the individual reaches this goal of accepting his debt to existence, and thereby transcends the dichotomy between being and nothingness, life and death, he reaches the goal of psychoanalysis as also posited by Freud: the full capacity for work and enjoyment. But, as such, he will no longer use these capacities in the service of egoistic power or pleasure tendencies, since the illusionary foundations of such ego-structures have been seen through; they are transparent moments, culturally enforced abstractions which are taken up in the being-as-transcendence which is aware of itself as such. The individual will then be in a position to let all his

possibilities of relating to the world be used as the luminated realm into which all he encounters may come into full emergence, into its genuine being, and there unfold in its meaning to the fullest possible extent. This corresponds to a realm of being in its fulfillment no narrower than Norman O. Brown's concept of "polymorphous perversity."

A man's authenticity is commensurate to his decision to respond or not to respond to this universal, ontological potential for being, and is, likewise, the very core of human freedom. This Daseinanalytic understanding of man's existence reveals its deep and inexhaustible meaningfulness, and defines man's basic morality, or better, humanity. All acts of transcending or modes of being-in-the-world would lose their character of urgency, necessity, selfishness, once the abstraction of being-as-ego is seen as an objectification which presupposes transcendence, and is thereby an inadequate representation of man's being-in-the-world. Once again, it is not that the problem of man's ego is solvable or insolvable, but that it is not an appropriate statement of man's being at all. As such, it is the statement of a problem which presupposes the problem. Once this is realized, acts of transcending, or modes of being-in-the-world, take on the playful, selfless character of being which manifests itself by being beyond itself. Man's ethic becomes evident once man manifests his being in a mode or method appropriate to his essential being -- no ethical values need be added a posteriori.

It must be emphasized, however, that in accordance with the insights presented heretofore, this presentation is not, in itself, an adequate response to the duality or alienation of human being. It is hoped that, while it may not resolve the dilemma, it may at least elucidate my total incapability to do so.

V Being and Essence

The impasse of philosophy and psychology has been, not the difficulty of the problem which they have posed for themselves, but the fact that the problem is itself posited in a manner which presupposes an absurd, irreconcilible alienation of man from himself and nature. This dualistic concept of man is surreptitiously imposed upon, and imbedded into culture and individuals, as is reflected by the structure of language itself. L. L. White, in his account of the way in which the duality of the human nervous system became the conflicting dualism of reason against instinct, writes:

Intellectual man had no choice but to follow the path which facilitated the development of his faculty of thought, and thought could only clarify itself by separating out static concepts which, in becoming static, ceased to conform to their organic matrix or to the general forms of nature. . . . European languages in general begin with a subject-noun whose action is expressed in an action verb. Some apparently permanent element is separated from the general process, treated as an entity and endowed with active responsibility for a given occurrence. This procedure is so paradoxical that only long acquaintance with it conceals its absurdity.¹

Regardless of its origins, this duality of subject/object, reason/instinct, consciousness/unconsciousness, is undermined philosophically by the insight that the objectification of an empirical ego presupposes the intentionality or transcendence of consciousness. This is, then, the fundamental nature of man which, when taken into consideration in the methodological investigation of man as Dasein, constitutes the uniqueness of man's consciousness as self-consciousness as reflected in Hegelian dialectical phenomenology, and avoids the one-sided naturalistic fallacy of treating man as a temporal being-in-the-world commensurate to the being of objects in the world. In psychoanalysis, this dilemma of alienated and objectified subject arises when, in quest of liberation from the problem, the individual goes to the psychotherapist with questions such as: "What shall I do to be saved?" "How can I get out of these extreme depressions?" etc. Obviously, an objective answer would be no more satisfactory here than in philosophy since that would only intensify the patient's attempt to have his "ego" be in control, which is exactly the source of the problem.

The only thing that a therapist can do is to persuade the patient to act upon his false premise in certain consistent directions until he sees his mistake, which entails a self-referential awareness that the essence of one's being is not any tangible, static, empirical ego, but transcendence. The problem is always that acceptance of oneself can never be a deliberate, i.e. ego-centered and motivated, act; it is as paradoxical as kissing one's own lips. This indicates

the significance of Saint Augustine's proposition that grace cannot be "gotten" or "achieved," but only "suddenly there." It is interesting, also, that Husserl's entire philosophical scheme is based on the "laying aside" of considerations about the empirical ego, the "natural" viewpoint; after which the essence of all psychic and material, noetic and noematic, experience presents itself. The underlying feature of various psychotherapeutic techniques, disregarding theoretic postulates: Jungian, Freudian, Existential, Dasein-analytic, is that the analyst allow the analysand to experience, and accept, his spontaneous transcendent acts of willing, desiring, creating, etc. -- even anxiety itself. It is most interesting, and highly significant, that the Existential and Daseinanalytic assertions that one must confront and accept one's own freedom and death, themselves presuppose the validity of the belief that there is an "ego" which is free and dies, etc. These methods are effective then, only because they carry this belief, which itself is the source of the problem, to its furthest extremes, its most intense manifestation and confrontation, and thereby put the individual in the position to realize his essential, spontaneous, transcending self.

Another method of challenging the presupposition or belief that man is a being existing in the world comparable to any other inanimate or animalistic being, is dialogic dialectic. This form of interlocution not only performs the psychotherapeutic function adumbrated, but also most vividly demonstrates the mode of existence, and methodological principle of investigation, most appropriate to

man as a "transcendent existent." The celebrated Madhyamika system of Nagarjuna (cir. A.D. 200) resembles in form the dialogues of Socrates (470?-399 B.C.). It appears at first sight to be a purely philosophical and intellectual tour de force, the object of which is merely to refute any point of view that may be proposed. Because language is dualistic or relational, any affirmation or denial whatsoever can have meaning only in relation to its opposite. Socratic dialectic uses this as an infallible method for pointing out the relativity of any metaphysical premise, or the impossibility of attaining any objective, definitive, or systematic categorization of truth. Thus even to engage such a dialectician in argument is inevitably to play a losing game.

The genus of the dialectic of Socrates, however, is not that it reduces all arguments to naught. Rather, it is the apex of the philosophic endeavor and psychotherapeutic liberation -- it is the reconciliation of the rational portrayal of methodological principle of investigation or mode of existence appropriate to the essence of man as self-conscious, self-transcending, and the existential proposition that there is more truth in man's relationship to the world, his capacity to understand or at least investigate it, than in all the objective knowledge accumulable. The effectiveness of all therapeutic techniques depends upon the analyst's capacity to force the individual to act upon the "double bind" of his belief in his ego as his proper being or essence. This is not done by being in a superior intellectual position to win arguments, but by not

being able to lose an argument because he has transcended, winning and losing. By not identifying his proper being or essence with his ego, the analyst has no position to advance, nothing to prove, nothing to win or lose. The necessity of the self-referential movement Socrates demonstrates by confessing his own "ignorance" or inability to solve the objective problem, or presentation of the problem, of truth. The point being, again, not that the problem is too difficult, but that such a statement of the problem is itself the problem which must be seen through.

Socrates, or the dialectician, whoever it may be, methodically brings the individual to a position in which he may grasp the appropriate being of man as self-consciousness by refuting all of the metaphysical premises proposed. When the defense fails, dependent on the degree to which the individual is dependent upon his opinion, his reputation for winning arguments, or any other consideration depending on an "egological" view of man, he begins to feel insecure -- not just intellectually, but psychologically and emotionally. After each succeeding proposition is refuted, he begins to feel a kind of vertigo; he has no where to stand, no where to be. It is at this point that Socrates usually offers, as the climax of the dialogue, the alternative: "Now that we realize our ignorance shall we inquire further into the nature of truth together?" This proposition reflects the position of a self-referential awareness of the proper being of man as self-conscious, rational, transcending -- a commitment to the philosophic endeavor itself, or more generally the pheno-

menological unfolding of man as a thinking being -- which undermines all egological considerations of man. The only alternatives, then, is that he either "see" the point being made, in which case he would probably thank Socrates or whoever it may be confronting him and go on his way, literally with a new state of consciousness, or return to some form of "bad faith" in which reality and truth are viewed as something over and against man, as something toward which man strives but always, as a finite experiencing being, falls short of.

The former state would be the end of the alienation of man from himself and from nature. The cultural norms and morality which presuppose the belief that man's essential being is ego would be overcome, transcended. This means, however, that this individual represents a philosophy, a psychological state of being, other than that of society. This becomes a superior authority as it is shown that social authority contains a self-contradiction from which man in his proper being is free, and a self-contradiction so basic that its perpetuation must destroy society and drive men to insanity.

By inquiring into the impasse of philosophical and psychological dualism we have elucidated not only the methodology or mode of inquiry and analysis which is appropriate to man as a self-conscious, self-transcending being, but also that mode of being itself. Moreover, we have found that the mode of inquiry into man, proper to his highest being-in-the-world, is inseparable from that being-in-the-world. The attempt to totally objectify man's relation to the

world is inimical and contradictory to the being which is man.

Hence we must confess and affirm the ultimate and inevitable insufficiency of this thesis as an analysis of any problem whatsoever.

Footnotes

I The Problem of Methodology

1. Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc.; c 1964, Book II.
2. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards, Macmillan Co. and Free Press, N.Y., 1967; Vol. 5, p. 5.
3. From The Rationalists, Doubleday and Co., Inc., Garden City, N.Y., 1960, p. 46.
4. Notes Against a Programme - Descarte, 12, Adams & Tannery, Paris, 1897-1913, VII, 140-1.
5. History of Philosophy, F. Copleston, Doubleday and Company, Inc., N.Y., 1965, vol. 4, p. 95.
6. Principles of Philosophy, 1, 49, Adams & Tannery, Paris, 1897-1913, VIII, 23-4.
7. On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., N.Y., c 1964, p. 40.
8. Ibid., p. 15.
9. Ibid., p. 64.
10. Ibid., p. 64.
11. Ibid., p. 64.
12. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards, Macmillan Co. and Free Press, N.Y., 1967; Vol. 5, p. 455.
13. Epistolae -- Augustine, 18, Sec. 2, ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 454.
15. On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., N.Y., c 1964, p. 5.

Footnotes

II Psychology as 'Natural Science'

1. The Unconscious, by A. C. MacIntyre; Humanities Press, London c 1958, p. 8.
2. Ibid., p. 22.
3. Ibid., p. 27.
4. Ibid., p. 33.
5. Ibid., p. 45.
6. Ibid., p. 45.
7. Ibid., p. 50.
8. Ibid., p. 51.
9. Ibid., p. 55.
10. Ibid., p. 56.
11. Ibid., p. 57.
12. Ibid., p. 59.
13. Ibid., p. 59.
14. Ibid., p. 56.
15. Ibid., p. 71.
16. Ibid., p. 71.
17. Ibid., p. 73.
18. Ibid., p. 73.
19. "Wittgensteins Philosophical Investigations" by N. Malcolm; from The Philosophy of Mind, edit. by V. C. Chappell c 1962 by Prentice Hall Inc., N.J.
20. "Is Consciousness a Brain Process" by U. T. Place; from The Philosophy of Mind, edit. by V. C. Chappell c 1962 by Prentice Hall Inc., N.J., p. 107.

Footnotes - continued

II

21. The Unconscious, A. C. MacIntyre; Humanities Press, London
c 1958, p. 73.
22. Ibid., p. 57.
23. "Wittgensteins Philosophical Investigations" by N. Malcolm; from
The Philosophy of Mind, edit. by V. C. Chappell c 1962 by
Prentice Hall Inc., N.Y., p. 100.
24. Psychotherapy East and West, Alan Watts; c 1961 by Pantheon Books,
N.Y., N.Y., p. 29.
25. Ibid., p. 111.
26. Science and the Modern World, A. N. Whitehead; c 1967 by Free
Press, N.Y., p. 50.
27. The Unconscious, A. C. MacIntyre; Humanities Press, London
c 1958, p. 83.
28. Ibid., p. 87.

Footnotes

III Philosophical Foundations for an Analysis of Consciousness

1. Hegel to Marx, Sidney Hooker (N. Y., Humanities Press, 1958), p. 70.
2. Ibid., p. 145-6.
3. "Necessary" being used here to denote the "self-consciousness" of rationality reflected in any given moment of thought.
4. Hegel to Marx, Sidney Hooker (N.Y., Humanities Press, 1958), p. 70.
5. Philosophy of the Right, G. W. F. Hegel, p. 11.

Footnotes

-IV Philosophy and Psychology

1. The Will to Power, Fredrich Nietzsche, edited by W. Kaufmann, Vintage Books, N.Y., 1967, p. 280.
2. Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Buber, and Barth, Brown, p. 38.
3. Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard, p. 171.
4. Ibid., p. 99.
5. Ibid., p. 512.
6. Ibid., p. 512.
7. Existential Psychoanalysis, Jean-Paul Sartre, H. Regnery Co., Chicago, 1962, p. 6.
8. Ibid., p. 66.
9. Phenomenology de la Perception, Merleau-Ponty, Ballinand, Paris, 1945, p. viii.
10. Psychoanalysis and Daseinanalysis, Boss, Basic Books, Inc., N.Y., 1963, p. 47.
11. H. M. Boss, "Anxiety, Guilt, and Psychotherapudic Liberation" in Review of Existential Psychology; Psychiatry, Vol. II, No. 3, 1962.
12. Being and Nothingness, Sartre, Washington Square Press, N.Y., 1953, p. 708.
13. Les Mouches, pp. 100-101.
14. Ibid., p. 102.
15. Sartre, His Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, A. Stern, Liberal Arts Press, N.Y., 1953, p. 185.
16. This term being used as it pertains to Hegelian metaphysics.
17. This term being used to refer to the view of the world of Husserl's "natural man."
18. Cartesian Meditations, Edmund Husserl (Nijhoff, the Hague, Netherlands, 1960), p. 53.

19. Ibid., p. 84.
20. Ibid., p. 84.
21. Ibid., pp. 83-85.
22. Ibid., pp. 86-88.
23. From the book, Phenomenology, edited by J. J. Kockelmans, Doubleday & Co., N.Y., 1967, p. 186.
24. Ibid., pp. 188-189.
25. Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, by Paul Ricoeur, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1967, p. 204.
26. Phenomenology, ed. by Kockelmans, Doubleday & Co., N.Y., 1967 -- article by editor "Transcendental Idealism," p. 193.
27. Cartesian Meditations, E. Husserl, pp. 48-63.
28. Phenomenology, quote is from the article "Husserl's Original View on Phenomenological Psychology" by J. Kockelmans, p. 445.
29. Ibid., p. 446.
30. Krisis, Edmund Husserl, pp. 238-260; quoted from, ibid., p. 449.
31. Philosophy As a Rigorous Science, by E. Husserl, Harper & Row, N.Y., 1965, pp. 90-110.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. From Phenomenology, p. 437.
35. A First Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology, J. J. Kockelmans Duquesne University Press, 1967, p. 345.
36. Ibid., p. 346.
37. Existential Psychoanalysis, Sartre, p. 201.
38. "Non-egological Conception of Consciousness" from Studies in Phenomenology & Psychology, Gurwitch, Northwestern U. Press, 1966, p. 287.

Footnotes - continued

IV

39. Ibid., p. 289.
40. "The Interconnections of Psychology and Phenomenology," from Phenomenology, article by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, p. 485.
41. From Existence, edited by Rollo May, Simon and Schuster, N.Y., 1958, p. 3.
42. Quoted from the "Concluding Unscientific Postscript," in A Kierkegaard Anthology, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1951, pp. 210-24.
43. Gestalt Therapy, F. S. Perls, R. F. Hefferline, and P. Goodman, Julian Press, N.Y., 1951, p. 259.
44. Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology, Aron Gurwitsch, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1966, p. 299.
45. Ibid., p. 300.
46. Psychoanalysis and Daseinanalysis, M. Boss (Basic Books, U.S.A., 1963).
47. Ibid., p. 40.
48. Ibid., p. 42.
49. Ibid., p. 43.
50. Ibid., p. 46.
51. Existence, edited by Rollo May, Simon and Schuster, N.Y., 1958, p. 55.
52. Psychoanalysis and Daseinanalysis, Boss, p. 48.
53. Existence, p. 84.
54. Psychoanalysis and Daseinanalysis, Boss, p. 27.
55. Psychotherapy East and West, Alan Watts, Pantheon Books, N.Y., 1961, p. 128.

Footnotes

V Being and Essence

1. The Next Development of Man, L. L. White (Hold, N.Y., 1948), pp. 57, 67.

Bibliography

- Augustine, Saint. On Free Choice of the Will. N. Y. : Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1964.
- Barnes, Hazel E. The Literature of Possibility. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1959.
- Boss, Medard. Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis. N. Y.: Basic Books, Inc., 1963.
- Bretall, Robert (ed.). A Kierkegaard Anthology. N.Y.: Random House, 1946.
- Brown, James. Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Buber and Barth. N.Y.: Collins Books, 1955.
- Brown, Norman O. Life Against Death. N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1959.
- Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays. N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1955.
- Chappell, V.C. (ed.). The Philosophy of Mind. N.Y.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962.
- Copleston, S. J. A History of Philosophy. N.Y. : Image Books, 1965.
- Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy. N.Y.: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1960.
- Dempsey, Peter. The Psychology of Sartre. Oxford: Cork University Press, 1950.
- Freud, Sigmund. The Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis. Gateway Editions, 1965.
- Gurwitsch, Aron. Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966.
- Hegel, G.W.F. The Phenomenology of Mind. N.Y.: Humanities Press, 1967.
- Heidegger, Martin. Discourse on Thinking. N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1966.
- Husserl, Edmund. Cartesian Meditations. Netherlands: The Hague, 1960.
- _____. Ideas. N.Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1952.
- _____. Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy. N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1965.

- Kaam, Adrian van. Existential Foundations of Psychology. N.Y.: Image Books, 1969.
- Kaufmann, Walter (ed.). Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre. N.Y.: Meridian Books, 1956.
- _____. The Portable Nietzsche. N.Y.: Viking Press, 1954.
- Kierkegaard, Soren. Fear and Trembling and Sickness Unto Death. N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1954.
- Kingston, Temple. French Existentialism. Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1961.
- Kockelmans, Joseph. A First Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology. Louvain: Duquesne University Press, 1967.
- _____. (ed.). Phenomenology. N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967.
- Laszle, Violet. The Basic Writings of C. G. Jung. N.Y.: Yale University Press, 1959.
- Lee, Edward and Mandelbaum, Maurice. Phenomenology and Existentialism. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967.
- MacIntyre, A.C. The Unconscious. N.Y.: Humanities Press, 1967.
- May, Rollo (ed.). Existence. N.Y.: Basic Books, 1958.
- Nietzsche, Fredrich. The Will to Power. N.Y.: Vantage Books, 1967.
- Plato. The Collected Dialogues. (ed. by Hamilton and Cairns). N.Y.: Pantheon Books, 1961.
- Ricoeur, Paul. Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. N.Y.: Washington Square Press, 1953.
- _____. Existentialism and Human Emotions. N.Y.: Wisdom Library, 1957.
- _____. Transcendence of the Ego. N.Y.: Noonday Press, 1957.

Stern, Alfred. Sartre: His Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. N.Y.: Liberal Arts Press, 1953.

Wittgenstein, L. Lectures and Conversations (ed. by Cyril Barrett). Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967.

Whitehead, Alfred North. Science and the Modern World. N.Y.: Free Press, 1925.

Watts, Alan. Psychotherapy East and West. N.Y.: Pantheon Books, 1961.