

WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY

HISTORIANS FOR ALL TIME: THUCYDIDES, WINSTON S.
CHURCHILL AND THEIR GREAT WARS

BY

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PREFACE

Some of my earliest recollections are of playing with toy soldiers and reenacting battles of long ago. After watching such movies as The Longest Day, Where Eagles Dare and numerous reruns of Hogan's Heroes, I loved to pretend that I was commanding an outnumbered battalion of American G. I.s bravely repulsing a determined onslaught of German Tigers and SS panzergrenadiers. As I grew older, my interest spread to other periods of military history, especially the War Between the States, and eventually to most aspects of European history from ancient times to the Twentieth Century. I came to greatly admire the wonderful achievements of Western Civilization, and I lamented the numerous wars that slowed or stopped its evolution.

In particular, I believed that World War One had severely damaged Western intellectual progress, previously racing forward at breakneck speed, by taking millions of young and promising lives, by diverting precious capital away from research and exploration to the forced rebuilding of a shattered continent, by causing a civil war in Russia that placed an authoritarian regime in power determined to export bloody revolution and by allowing Nazis and Fascists in Germany and Italy to crush free speech and thought, murder real or imagined enemies, and to push the world into another life or death struggle.

When I happened to read about the war that brought the Golden Age of Classical Greece to an end, something clicked in my brain. The more I studied the Peloponnesian War between the Athenian Empire and Sparta and her allies, the more I found striking parallels between it and World War One. Both conflicts, for example, caused Western Civilization to lose its vitality and dominance. Also, both wars allowed peripheral states such as Macedonia and Japan to establish huge empires at the expense of once mighty nations like Persia and Great Britain. Furthermore, both wars started after hostile alliance systems grew increasingly rigid, thereby destroying any hope of diplomacy maintaining the peace. There are also many other similarities between the two wars, but these are the most fascinating to me.

In the Spring Term of 1989, I asked Professor Barry F. Machado about the possibility of doing a senior honors thesis combining the Peloponnesian War and World War One. He encouraged me to pursue my interest in these fields and suggested that I talk to Professor Sanders about refining my topic. Professor Taylor Sanders recommended that I compare Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War with Winston S. Churchill's account of the First World War, The World Crisis. After browsing through these two interesting books, I agreed to analyze Thucydides and Churchill as historians and to determine the influence of the History of the Peloponnesian War on the writing of The World Crisis. In

particular, I hoped to find a letter or note from Churchill claiming that he had modelled his work after the example of his ancient Greek predecessor, Thucydides, or had even read the book.

During the preparatory stages of this thesis I had the pleasure of eating lunch at the GHQ and discussing my topic with Professor Sanders and Christopher Pelling, a visiting ancient historian from Oxford. Professor Pelling was not only the editor of The Journal of Roman Studies and a leading authority on Plutarch, but he was also very interested in and knowledgeable about Winston Churchill. Although he found the topic of my thesis fascinating and worthy of careful examination, he warned me that I might have trouble finding a quote from Churchill acknowledging his heavy debt to Thucydides. Professor Pelling explained that finding such a connection between the two authors was unlikely since Churchill had despised Greek and Latin while at Harrow. Nevertheless, he urged me to undertake my investigation by citing Plutarch's claim that much can be learned about history by studying the lives of great men from different time periods.¹

Plutarch's main goal was to determine the true worth of great public figures, such as Julius Caesar and Alexander the Great of Macedon, by examining their arete or "virtue" and kakia or "badness." Plutarch organizes his biographies in pairs of an illustrious Greek statesman generally followed by a Roman. After a narration of their careers,

Plutarch would have a sunkrisis or comparison of his subjects' respective arete or kakia.²

I also sought to compare the similarities between the lives of Thucydides and Churchill, especially their family, intellectual and political backgrounds. I could then discuss how these parallels influenced each author's composition of his history. I hoped that such a study would help me determine the worth of these two great historical works. I had hoped to tie the entire paper together with some acknowledgement by Churchill of his indebtedness to the Thucydides and the History of the Peloponnesian War for the development of his own historiographical style.

Unfortunately, as Professor Pelling warned, I could not find any mention of Thucydides in Churchill's books or the letters collected in Randolph Churchill's companion volumes to Martin Gilbert's monumental biography Winston S. Churchill. Although certain scholars, such as William Manchester, compare Churchill the historian with Thucydides, none puts forth any evidence that Churchill himself saw these similarities. Therefore, I was forced to rely entirely on my own inferences concerning the often striking parallels between the History of the Peloponnesian War and The World Crisis.

I did, however, find one important link between the ancient Athenian strategos and the Twentieth Century British Prime Minister in the works of Thomas Babbington, Lord Macaulay. Macaulay wrote about the superiority of

Thucydides as a historian, and a young Winston Churchill voraciously read and even memorized the Victorian historian's books. Furthermore, an older Churchill would copy Macaulay's style in his own literary endeavors.³

Without the invaluable assistance of many people, I could never have written this thesis. I would like to thank Professor Barry F. Machado for encouraging me to write an Honors Thesis in the first place, for suggesting Martin Gilbert's extremely helpful work on Churchill and for struggling through the unpolished earlier drafts. I would also like to acknowledge the help of Professor Jefferson Davis Futch, III in refining my topic, for recommending pertinent sources and for reading the last drafts. I am also grateful to my grandmother, Mrs. E. P. West, Jr., for procuring numerous books for me at the Virginia State Library and to my fiancee, Irma Bateman, for reading many drafts of this paper and for putting up with me during its composition. Finally, I would like to thank Professor Taylor Sanders for first suggesting a comparison of Thucydides and Churchill as historians, for his guidance in all stages and every aspect of this project and for carefully critiquing every draft of my thesis.

May 1990

Charles E. Adams

Endnotes

¹Professor Christopher Pelling of Oxford University and Professor Taylor Sanders of Washington and Lee University, interview by author, Conversation, GHQ, Lexington, May 1989.

²Alan Wardman, Plutarch's Lives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 1-5.

³Thomas Babbington, Lord Macaulay, Critical and Historical Essays, vol 1 (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1901), 245-246.; William Manchester, The Last Lion Winston Spencer Churchill: Visions of Glory 1874-1932 (New York: Dell Publishing, 1983), 17, 29, 261, 288; Maurice Ashley, Churchill As Historian (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), 23, 73.

CHAPTER ONE

THE STRAITS: A PASSAGE THROUGH HISTORY

During the Bronze Age, at Aulis in Mycenaean Greece, a father mournfully slit the pretty throat of his virginal daughter Iphigenia on the altar of Artemis. As the maiden's blood stained the earth, a contrary wind shifted and allowed a thousand ships filled with Achaean warriors to sail for the fabled city of Troy. The mighty expedition at last arrived at its destination, but found the Trojans fully prepared for battle on the shore. Encumbered by their heavy weapons and armor, the Greeks struggled through the surf in an attempt to grapple with their foes. Protesilaus reached the beach first, but paid the ultimate price for the honor. Hector, the mightiest champion of Illium, greeted the invader with a mortal wound from his deftly-thrown spear. In an act repeated countless times in the region around the Dardanelles over the next three millennia, Protesilaus fell, never to rise again.¹

Homer's Iliad and other ancient sources, such as Herodotus' The Histories, claim that the Achaeans sacked Troy in revenge for the abduction of Helen, the wife of the Spartan king, by Prince Paris. King Agamemnon of Mycenae commanded a besieging force comprised of men and ships from cities throughout Greece.² According to the blind poet, Agamemnon maintained a hegemony over the other Greek kings because he possessed a scepter wrought by the god

Hephaestos. This scepter insured "that over many islands and all Argos he should be lord."³ Thucydides, the great Athenian historian of the Fifth Century B.C., also wrote that a powerful King Agamemnon had led the cities of Greece in their first united action against Troy. In contrast to Homer, however, Thucydides explained that this Agamemnon had undertaken the expedition primarily to increase his power over the Aegean world and, consequently, Mycenae's wealth.⁴

Despite the discrepancies between Homer, Herodotus and Thucydides regarding the Trojan War, all agreed that the siege took place near the Hellespont.⁵ The Hellespont separates Europe and Asia with an extremely narrow channel of water connecting the Sea of Marmara with the Aegean Sea.⁶ Approximately eight centuries after the legendary sack of Troy, this region witnessed another great expedition marching in search of conquest.

In 480 B.C., the Persians under Xerxes invaded Greece with more than one and three-quarter million soldiers and 1,200 warships across this strait. Although the factious Greeks could never assemble more than 40,000 hoplites and 378 ships against this gigantic threat, by 479 B.C., they had miraculously repulsed the Persian incursion.⁷ The Greeks achieved their great victory by uniting in a common cause, but peace, the lack of an external threat, and the aggressiveness of certain city-states like Athens and Corinth soon destroyed any hope of further cooperation. By 431 B.C., the Greek world had split into two warring camps

led by the chief combatants Athens and Sparta.⁸ Few Greeks of the period escaped choosing sides in this conflagration. Indeed, Thucydides, the chief historian of the Peloponnesian War, served Athens as one of the ten annually elected strategoi or generals.⁹

Fate drew Thucydides to the area around the Dardanelles. His involvement in the region forever changed his future, just as it had altered Agamenon's destiny.¹⁰ Thucydides also came to this region at the head of a large military expedition. He commanded the Athenian land and sea forces in Northwestern Greece and the Northern Aegean. In contrast to the mythical Bronze Age monarch, however, Thucydides failed to achieve a victory. The Spartan Brasidas seized the city of Amphipolis, only about 170 miles from the Dardanelles, before the Athenian general could react. Consequently, the courts of Athens banished the future historian from the city.¹¹ In fact, Thucydides' expatriation represents the primary catalyst behind the writing of the History of the Peloponnesian War.¹²

Thucydides' exile allowed him to travel extensively throughout the Greek world and to interview participants from both sides of the war.¹³ Without these contrasting opinions, the author could never have even hoped to compose his relatively unbiased and impressively thorough history of the conflagration between Athens and Sparta that eventually engulfed the entire Hellenic World.¹⁴ Although Thucydides'

account remains "a model of objective history writing," his narrative does briefly mention his own participation in the Peloponnesian War.¹⁵ Thucydides did not, however, allow the passions evoked by the life or death struggle between Classical Greece's 'superpowers' to sway either his narration or his analysis of its events. Even the author's account of his own exile following the Amphipolis debacle remains laudably objective.¹⁶ He claims to have gone to great difficulty to ensure that no partiality, either his own or that of an eye-witnesses, would diminish the accuracy and influence of his work:

And with regard to my factual reporting of the events of war I have made it a principle not to write down the first story that came my way, and not even to be guided by my own general impressions; either I was present myself at the events which I have described or else I heard of them from eye-witnesses whose reports I have checked with as much thoroughness as possible.¹⁷

Thucydides sought to create through his combination of extremely stringent standards of accuracy and objectivity with careful and thought-provoking analysis a work that would be "judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future."¹⁸ Lord Macaulay, the Nineteenth Century British historian, judged Thucydides' efforts a success when he proclaimed him the 'greatest historian who ever lived.'¹⁹ Indeed, Sallust laments that Athenian renown exceeded that of Rome during

his lifetime not because of superior deeds, but because of her historians' unsurpassed eloquence, i.e. Thucydides and Herodotus.²⁰ Although certain modern scholars, such as the eminent classicist Michael Grant, disagree with Lord Macaulay's assessment, none deny that Thucydides far surpassed Herodotus and founded Western 'scientific' historiography.²¹ Thucydides greatest innovation in the field of history, among many, remains his decision to write about events which were occurring during his life, i.e. contemporary history.²² Consequently, modern scholars vigorously debate whether Thucydides wrote the text of the History of the Peloponnesian War during the actual course of the conflict or after its conclusion. If the former alternative proves to be correct, then the changing fortunes of war might have caused the author's perception and portrayal of events to evolve over time.²³ Conversely, Thucydides may have written his account after the experiences of the entire war had allowed him to formulate a final historical view of his subject.²⁴ In any case, as a contemporary historian, he did not need to utilize the subjective postulating of Herodotus. Instead, Thucydides had either personally witnessed the episodes he chronicled or else cross-examined someone who had.²⁵

Almost two and a half millennia after Thucydides, another commanding general in the region of Troy and the Dardanelles also recorded the events transpiring around him

in yet another "great war . . . more worth writing about than any of those which had taken place before."²⁶ In fact, this author even mentions Thucydides in his preface while justifying his failures and those of his compatriots. This commander, Sir Ian Hamilton of the British Army, kept his journal both as an accurate record of the battle for posterity, and because the act of writing calmed him during times of crisis and stress.²⁷ Unfortunately for those under his command, Hamilton spent too much time writing in his diary and too little effort actively directing the Allied efforts at Gallipoli, on the European side of the Straits.²⁸

While Sir Ian pondered the ramifications of each potential course of action, his counterpart, a German Field Marshall Liman von Sanders, mobilized his few ill-equipped units of Turkish infantry and artillery and prepared to repulse the British assaults at all costs.²⁹ The Turks under von Sanders succeeded, and the British were eventually forced to evacuate their troops after suffering heavy casualties. British and French losses exceeded 252,000, and the Turks lost anywhere between 251,000 and 350,000 dead, wounded and missing. Worst of all for the Allied Powers, this devastating defeat left Russia permanently isolated from Britain and France.³⁰

Sir Ian Hamilton's superiors had attempted to salvage the deteriorating situation at Gallipoli by replacing him with an officer from the Western Front, Sir Charles Monro. Despite Hamilton's disassociation with the operation, his

reputation was nevertheless destroyed following the evacuation on January 8-9, 1916. Although Hamilton had commanded the troops in the field, Great Britain found another more highly visible scapegoat for this monumental disaster: First Lord of the Admiralty and future Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill.³¹

The failure in the Dardanelles had forced Prime Minister Herbert Asquith to form a coalition government with the Conservatives. Consequently, the Conservatives demanded that Churchill, a former member of their party and hence a political 'traitor,' be demoted to the lowest cabinet position, the chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster. Future Prime Minister Lloyd George described the post as, "generally reserved either for beginners in the Cabinet or for the final stages of unmistakable decrepitude."³² In fact, Churchill's only responsibility in this office was to appoint new county magistrates. The former First Lord quickly realized that the Duchy of Lancaster held no interest for him, and he resigned from the Cabinet in November, 1915. Upon his resignation, Churchill sought command of a division or at least a brigade in the Balkans. Instead, the one-time director of the greatest navy in the world received only a lieutenant colonel's commission and joined the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers in the blood and mud of France.³³

Although Winston Churchill had not conceived of the plan for forcing the Straits, he had been its primary

sponsor. Indeed, the plan's original architect, First Sea Lord John Fisher, had threatened to resign when the War Council agreed to undertake the operation on January 28, 1915.³⁴ Fisher had steadfastly disagreed with Churchill's assessment that the ships of the Royal Navy were more expendable than the British lives being lost in the senseless attrition of the Western Front.³⁵ Most historians now agree that Churchill's Dardanelles gambit could have shortened the war and saved countless lives by knocking Turkey and then Austria-Hungary out of the war. These early victories might have prevented Russia's collapse and subsequent revolution and forced an early settlement on an unsupported Germany. The problem stemmed not from Churchill's basic scheme, but rather from his subordinates' execution of the operation.³⁶

Despite Churchill's questionable responsibility for the Gallipoli fiasco, his political career would not fully recover until the outbreak of the Second World War. He did, however, receive more positions in the government prior to 1929. For example, Churchill became minister of munitions on July 17, 1917 in spite of the frenzied Conservative protest. Churchill then showed his ability to adapt to changing circumstances as he passionately cut military expenditures while secretary of war immediately following the Armistice. In 1922, the Turks once again brought about Churchill's downfall as they advanced on Chanak and the Dardanelles neutral zone. The move threatened to ignite a

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new war in the Balkans and caused Lloyd George's coalition government to collapse.³⁷ Churchill lost not only his cabinet position in the Colonial Office in this year, but also his seat in the House of Commons. An emergency appendectomy had prevented him from actively campaigning for Dundee's seat until it was too late. Consequently, the former First Lord garnered only a paltry 14 percent of the vote, and was completely out of politics for the first time since the turn of the century.³⁸

Although Churchill would return to the government for five years in 1924 as Chancellor of the Exchequer under Stanley Baldwin, he spent most of the years prior to the Second World War either painting or writing. Painting served as a balm to the soul during the darkest hours for this ever restless and often depressed man.³⁹ Writing also relaxed Churchill, but, more importantly, it paid the bills. Any newspaper or journal article written by Churchill during this time commanded a handsome fee. Surprisingly enough, the Strand even paid this author and amateur artist 1,000 pounds for his essay "Painting as a Pastime" and color illustrations of his landscapes.⁴⁰

Like Thucydides, Churchill used his frequent 'exiles' from political office to complete the most enduring and important of his many books, The World Crisis.⁴¹ During his tenure as First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill had begun keeping public documents and personal correspondence relating to his part in the war. He explained to his wife,

Clementine, in a letter on July 17, 1915, "Someday I sh(oul)d like the truth to be known."⁴² After Lord Esher's The Tragedy of Lord Kitchener had accused the First Lord of mishandling the defense of Antwerp, Churchill decided to publish his own account of various controversial episodes. Although only intended at first to be a two-volume record of his years at the Admiralty, The World Crisis evolved into five books of 2,517 pages covering the entire war. Churchill completed most of the first four volumes during the years between his posts as Colonial Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer. While out of office again in 1931, he wrote a supplemental volume, The Eastern Front, covering in depth the Russian Front and Revolution.⁴³

The World Crisis differs from The History of the Peloponnesian War because it seeks to justify the author's actions during the war. Churchill understood his compromised position and explained, "It is not for me with my record and special point of view to pronounce a final conclusion."⁴⁴ Rather, Churchill sought to produce a comprehensive account of the Great War that included insights drawn from his privileged position in the British government.⁴⁵ Churchill, like Thucydides, attempted to maintain a high standard of accuracy by inspecting the actual battlefields with expert guidance, interviewing eye-witnesses to events in which he had not participated and including lengthy sections of pertinent official documents and letters. He also believed that his work could be a tool

for future historians in understanding the events of the war and in recognizing the repeating pattern of history. In contrast to almost all other historians, Winston Churchill and Thucydides were able to combine their unique positions as important participants and knowledgeable spectators with the skillful application of historiography to produce unsurpassed contemporary histories.⁴⁶

In a letter to Eddie Marsh, Churchill's private secretary and confidant, the famed T. E. Lawrence once wrote, "I suppose (Churchill) realizes that he's the only person since Thucydides . . . who has put his generation imaginatively in his debt."⁴⁷ William Manchester, a recent biographer of Churchill, has also noted the similar greatness of the two authors, but extraordinarily proclaimed Macaulay's 'greatest historian' to be of lesser consequence.⁴⁸

If Churchill and Thucydides are truly the greatest contemporary historians of all time, then how did these two men separated by thousands of years come to share this elite status in the annals of historiography? They must have more in common than simply a catastrophic military failure in the region around the Dardanelles that resulted in an 'exile' which facilitated the writing of their histories. Certainly their personal backgrounds, the societies in which they lived and the political events igniting the Peloponnesian and Great Wars must have shaped their outlook on the world in a similar way. If this in turn is true, then The History

of the Peloponnesian War and The World Crisis must portray in an analogous manner such eternal topics as the causes of wars, the events surrounding personal military failures, the experience of combat and revolutions. Hence, this thesis will compare and contrast two of the greatest contemporary historians, Sir Winston S. Churchill and Thucydides, because their link is a profound one.

³Homer, The Iliad, trans. by Andrew Lang, Walter Leaf and Earnest Myers (New York: The Modern Library, 1950), 1950; Tuchman, 43-44; Wood, 145-168.

⁴Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. by Rex Warner (New York: Viking Penguin Books, Inc., 1988), 39-41; John Boardman, Jasper Griffin and Oswyn Murray, eds., The Oxford History of the Classical World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 78-79.

⁵Wood, 19.

⁶Brigadier-General S.L.A. Marshall, The American Heritage History of World War One (New York: American Heritage/Bonanza Books, 1982), 85; William Manchester, The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill: Visions of Glory 1874-1932 (New York: Dell Publishing, 1984), 312.

⁷The Dardanelles and their Story (London: Andrew Melrose, Ltd., 1915), 32-35; Herodotus, 452; Boardman, 188.

⁸William G. Sinnigen and Charles Alexander Robinson, Jr., Ancient History (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1981), 161, 170, 185-187.

⁹John H. Finley, Jr., Thucydides (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), 5, 12.

¹⁰Agamemnon's success in sacking Troy eventually brought about his own murder. Clytemnestra, his wife and queen, killed Agamemnon upon his return to Mycenae for murdering their daughter Iphigenia and taking the Trojan Cassandra as a concubine. Aeschylus, Agamemnon, trans. by Robert Browning (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1877), 113-127.

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³Homer, The Iliad, trans. by Andrew Lang, Walter Leaf and Earnest Myers (New York: The Modern Library, 1950), 1950; Tuchman, 43-44; Wood, 145-168.

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⁶Brigadier-General S.L.A. Marshall, The American Heritage History of World War One (New York: American Heritage/ Bonanza Books, 1982), 85; William Manchester, The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill; Visions of Glory 1874-1932 (New York: Dell Publishing, 1984), 512.

⁷The Dardanelles and their Story (London: Andrew Melrose, Ltd., 1915), 32-35; Herodotus, 452; Boardman, 188.

⁸William G. Sinnigen and Charles Alexander Robinson, Jr., Ancient History (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1981), 161, 170, 185-187.

⁹John H. Finley, Jr., Thucydides (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), 9, 17.

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- ¹¹John Warry, Warfare in the Classical World (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 41; Finley, 9, 17, 32.
- ¹²Bernard W. Henderson, The Great War Between Athens and Sparta (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927), 276.
- ¹³Finley, 8.
- ¹⁴Sinnigen and Robinson, 185; Thucydides, 9-10; Warry, 41.
- ¹⁵Crane Brinton, John B. Christopher and Robert Lee Wolff, A History of Civilization (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1967), 74; Finley, 8.
- ¹⁶Michael Grant, The Classical Greeks (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989), 158-159.
- ¹⁷Thucydides, 11-12, 48.
- ¹⁸Ibid., 48.
- ¹⁹Grant, 162.
- ²⁰J. C. Rolfe, trans., Sallust (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 15.
- ²¹Grant, 158-162; Boardman, Griffin and Murray, 194-195.
- ²²Grant, 158.
- ²³Thucydides, 11-12.
- ²⁴Finley, 77-80.
- ²⁵J. M. Marincola, "Thucydides," Classical Philology 84, no. 3 (July 1989): 219-223.
- ²⁶Thucydides, 35; Marshall, 85-86.
- ²⁷Sir Ian Hamilton, Gallipoli Diary (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1920), 1:v-ix.
- ²⁸J. F. C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, vol. III, From the American Civil War to the End of World War II (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1957), 258; Marshall, 85-86.
- ²⁹Ibid.; Fuller, 258.

³⁰R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History: From 3500 B. C. to the Present (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1986), 953-955; Eric Bush, Gallipoli (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), 318.

³¹Manchester, 562, 571, 608; Dupuy, 955; Fuller, 260.

³²Manchester, 562-564; Fuller, 260.

³³Manchester, 564, 573-574.

³⁴Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, vol. 2, 1915 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), 162-163; Manchester, 520-524; Marshall, 84.

³⁵Trumbull Higgins, Winston Churchill and the Dardanelles (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), 81-82.

³⁶B. H. Liddell-Hart, Strategy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), 192-195; Fuller, 264; Manchester, 15.

³⁷Manchester, 617, 671-673, 708-714, 748.

³⁸Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, vol. IV, The Stricken World 1916-1922 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1975), 865-866, 878-880, 890-892; Manchester, 738, 741-745.

³⁹Manchester, 756, 782.

⁴⁰Maurice Ashley, Churchill as Historian (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), 33; Manchester, 756, 766.

⁴¹Ashley, 69.

⁴²Manchester, 767.

⁴³Ibid; Gilbert, 750-754; Ashley, 69, 121.

⁴⁴Churchill, vii; Ashley, 69-70.

⁴⁵Manchester, 768-769; Gilbert, 750-759.

⁴⁶Ashley, 19-21, 32, 34; Manchester, 769; Thucydides, 48-49.

⁴⁷Ashley, 104.

⁴⁸Manchester, 769.

CHAPTER TWO

PARALLEL LIVES?

In October, 1827, a number of warships flying the ensigns of Great Britain, France and Imperial Russia rendezvoused off the Greek port of Navarino. Although only twelve years after Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo, these recently warring nations had decided to put aside their past animosities and unite in common action against the Turkish repression of Greek independence. On July 26, French and Russian diplomats had met with their British colleagues at London and demanded that the Ottoman Empire and her Egyptian allies cease military operations against the Greek revolutionaries. The governments of Turkey and Egypt had quickly denounced the ultimatum and continued their savage reprisals against the Hellenic resistance fighters.¹

Consequently, the combined British-French-Russian fleet under the command of Admiral Sir Edward Codrington sailed into the harbor of Navarino and anchored among the Turkish and Egyptian vessels. After a Turkish ship fired on a British dispatch boat, a powerful volley from Codrington's ships-of-the-line smashed Tahir Pasha's Turkish-Egyptian fleet. Ottoman Turkey's hope to maintain their yoke over the birthplace of democracy sank into the sea with the battered hulks of her navy. The Treaty of London officially established an independent Kingdom of Greece on May 7, 1832.²

Even before Great Britain intervened with her French and Russian allies in 1827, many of her most renowned subjects had already joined in the Greek War of Independence as private citizens. The European aristocracy, and the English upper classes especially, had received an education primarily based on the art and literature of the Classical Age of Greece and Rome. Therefore, many felt a sentimental desire to aid the descendants of Leonidas and Pericles in achieving their freedom from that despotic empire of the East.³ Lord Byron, perhaps the greatest of the Romantic poets, had rushed to the Balkans in 1822 to fight the Turkish oppressors, but he had succumbed to disease at Missolonghi in 1824 without firing a shot. Despite Byron's rather pitiful end, other prominent Englishmen had eagerly followed his example. For example, General Sir George Church and Admiral Lord Cochrane had commanded the Greek Army and Navy respectively during the disastrous siege of the Acropolis in May and early June of 1825.⁴

Although Great Britain joined France in an alliance with the Ottoman Empire against Imperial Russia during the Crimean War of 1853-1856, most English politicians maintained their traditional pro-Hellenic sympathies.⁵ In fact, only the strong and justified fears of Russian territorial ambitions in South-Eastern Europe overcame British philhellenism in the middle decade of the Nineteenth Century and allowed cooperation with the Turk.⁶ Great Britain even allowed her traditional affection for Greece

and consequent scorn for 'the Sick Man of Europe' to adversely affect her foreign policy judgements during the crucial years prior to the First World War.⁷ For example, in 1911, the Ottoman Empire had allied itself with no major power and had sought a military agreement with the English. Despite Turkey's strategic location controlling maritime traffic between the Black and Mediterranean Seas, Winston Churchill had haughtily responded to their overture by accusing them of having ideas 'above their station.'⁸ Furthermore, the First Lord of the Admiralty's seizure of the Turkish warships Sultan Osman and Reshadieh in 1914 eventually drove the Ottoman Empire into an alliance with the Central Powers.⁹

Unlike many of his contemporaries, however, Winston Churchill neither loved the Greeks nor hated the Turks enough to alter his political judgement. Churchill viewed the Balkans and the Near East purely from a pragmatic geopolitical standpoint.¹⁰ Consequently, he severely criticized the pro-Greek policy of Prime Minister David Lloyd George which prevented Britain from making peace with Turkey immediately following the First World War. Lloyd George not only refused to negotiate with General Mustapha Kemal or Ataturk, but he also gave Smyrna, Thrace and the Ottoman Empire's Aegean islands to Greece, Turkey's ancient enemy.¹¹ This philhellenism angered Moslems throughout the British Empire, and it forged the unlikely alliance between Hindus and the Followers of the Prophet in a civil

disobedience campaign led by Gandhi in India.¹² In a
December 11, 1920 memorandum Churchill recommended:

We should make a definite change in our policy in the direction of procuring a real peace with the Moslem world and so relieving ourselves of the disastrous reaction both military and financial to which our anti-Turk policy has exposed us in the Middle East and India.¹³

Winston Churchill's lack of the pro-Hellenic bias held by many of his peers may have resulted from his bad experiences with Greek and Latin during his years as a schoolboy. In a letter of May 30, 1885, a young Winston admitted being "rather backward in Greek, but I suppose I must know it to get into (Eton) so I will try and work it up."¹⁴ When Winston did indeed take his entrance examination on March 16, 1888, at Harrow and not Eton, the poor lad utterly failed in his attempts at translating Greek and Roman passages. Harrow accepted Winston only because he was the son of Lord Randolph Churchill, a former cabinet member.¹⁵ Winston's lack of proficiency in the classics relegated him to the remedial English class for students too dull to master Greek and Latin. Although a severe insult to his pride at the time, a mature Churchill reflected upon the beneficial effects of the class: "When in after years my schoolfellows who had won prizes and distinction for writing such beautiful and pithy Greek epigrams had to come down again to common English, to earn their living or make their way, I did not feel myself at any disadvantage."¹⁶

The classics that formed the education of the governing classes of Great Britain also affected how they saw and reacted to events in the Eastern Mediterranean and elsewhere. Since Churchill's experiences with Greek and Latin had almost always been bad, he probably did not possess the romantic visions of the Golden Age of Greece which swayed the judgement of his predecessors and contemporaries.¹⁷

One of Churchill's predecessors, the great Benjamin Disraeli, not only lacked a pro-Hellenic bias, but he professed to be enamored with the East and especially Turkey after his sojourn to that region in 1830 and 1831. Furthermore, unlike most Members of Parliament in the Nineteenth Century, Disraeli had never attended a public school like Harrow or Eton or a university like Oxford or Cambridge which stressed the classical education. Consequently, Disraeli never became an avid classicist, but he could cite Virgil during discourse in the House of Commons when necessary. Disraeli's favorable prejudice toward Turkey expressed itself in policy of supporting the crumbling Ottoman Empire.¹⁸

If men like Disraeli allow their personal background, education and the like to influence decisions determining the future course of history, then these factors must also affect the way men perceive and, as a result, record history. For example, F. E. Smith, the Earl of Birkenhead, a good friend of Churchill, served in David Lloyd George's

coalition government as lord chancellor in 1919 and he later wrote a history book, Turning Points of History. As a strong imperialist, Birkenhead believed in the positive effects of generated when a 'civilized' nation conquers a more primitive people. Consequently, he portrays the Norman Conquest as a blessing to backward Anglo-Saxon England in his book. Therefore, the families, education, key events and political outlooks of Churchill and Thucydides must be examined to ascertain their impact on the History of the Peloponnesian War and The World Crisis.¹⁹

Both Thucydides and Winston Churchill came from aristocratic families at the center of events in a great maritime empire. As the son of Olorus, Thucydides possessed ties of kinship to the extremely wealthy and conservative clan of Philaidae. Although a member of one of Athens' most noble clans, Thucydides could trace a foreign ancestry through his father. The name Olorus is unheard of in Attica and must be Thracian in origin.²⁰ Other illustrious members of this clan included Miltiades, the victor of Marathon, and his son Cimon, a leading advocate of cooperation with Sparta. The Philaidae, like most Athenian nobles, resisted the drift toward pure democracy. By 461 B. C., Athens had ostracized Cimon, and the aristocratic Areopagus had lost its preeminent political power to the popular juries.²¹ Athens ostensibly became a democracy ruled by all her male citizens, but, in reality, the real authority resided with one man, Pericles. In order to maintain support for his

regime, Pericles ensured that the poorest Athenian citizens earned a living serving on the public courts and in the fleet. Cimon's eventual return to Athens marked the only interruption in the reign of Pericles until his death from the plague in 429 B. C.²²

Lord Macaulay's History of England describes Sir Winston Churchill, Winston's first noteworthy ancestor, as an ardent cavalier who languished in the asylum of his mother-in-law's estate during Cromwell's Protectorate. Although knighted by Charles II after the Restoration, a MP from Weymouth and a fellow of the Royal Society, Sir Winston's greatest achievement was raising his son, John.²³ On August 13, 1704, John Churchill defeated Louis XIV's French Army at Blenheim and gained eternal fame as the Duke of Marlborough. Therefore, Churchill's family could also claim a great military leader on a par with Miltiades. With the money Parliament rewarded him for his great victory, the Duke built the lavish Blenheim Palace, the birthplace of a Winston Spencer Churchill on November 30, 1874.²⁴

As with Thucydides, Winston Churchill could trace a mixed ancestry. His mother, Jennie, was the daughter of the wealthy New York financier Leonard W. Jerome. Lady Randolph was not only an American, but, to the great delight of Winston, her grandmother had been a full-blooded Iroquois Indian.²⁵ Churchill's family also had a strong conservative bent, and his father, Lord Randolph Churchill, became a leading member of the Tory Party during the latter part of

the nineteenth century. In 1884, the National Union of Conservative Associations had elected Lord Randolph as its chairman. He received his first office with his appointment as secretary of state for India under Lord Salisbury in 1885 and later became leader of the House of Commons and Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1886.²⁶ Like Cimon, Lord Randolph faced 'ostracism' from public life after the failure of his budget forced his resignation from the government on December 23, 1886. A syphilis-induced degenerative condition affecting his speech and gait had helped prematurely end his political career and eventually took his very life on January 24, 1895.²⁷

As in Athens before the Peloponnesian War, the conservative Tories lost control of the government to the more radical Liberal Party under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in 1906. Between 1906 and 1914, the Liberal Party of Campbell-Bannerman and Herbert Asquith began introducing Great Britain to socialism and laying the foundations for a future welfare state. England would increasingly protect its poorer citizens from the dangers of unemployment, industrial accidents, child labor and other related problems through a variety of social programs. By the 1920's, David Lloyd George had gone even further than ancient Athenians by extending suffrage to all eligible adult men and women in Britain.²⁸

Despite his connection with the conservative aristocracy of Athens, Thucydides developed a strong

admiration for Pericles, the moderate democratic government he established and the empire necessary to maintain it.²⁹ Like Pericles, Thucydides realized that only the tribute of an empire could finance the massive public works projects that paid Athenian citizens a daily living for serving on juries and in the fleet. Thucydides also believed that Athens must continue the policy of maintenance advocated by Pericles and not undertake the aggressive actions promoted by the more radical democrats.³⁰ As a boy and young man, he witnessed the dynamic growth of the Athenian Empire, and he was understandably impressed. Therefore, Thucydides eventually came to see the political conservatism of his family as the relic of a bygone era never to return.³¹ As a strong advocate of Pericles' regime and a member of the service-minded Philaidae clan, Thucydides naturally sought public office to help defend his city from her enemies during the Peloponnesian War. In 425 B. C., he was elected as one of Athens' ten strategoi or generals. Since his family probably owned property and a gold mine in Thrace, Thucydides assumed command of the Athenian military and naval forces in Northwestern Greece and the Northern Aegean.³²

As with Thucydides, the Churchills' reputation for public service and especially Lord Randolph's meteoric political career deeply influenced young Winston during his formative years. Between Winston's tenth and twelfth birthdays, 1884 to 1886, his father's name appeared in print

constantly as 'Gladstone's great adversary.' Winston filled up numerous scrapbooks with newspaper stories and political cartoons about his father, and he came to believe Lord Randolph "own(ed) the key to everything or almost everything worth having."³³ Nothing could certainly be grander, a young Winston mused, than to stand as leader in the House of Commons and determine the history of England and the British Empire. The idea of swaying an audience's political opinions with a moving and powerful speech, as his father was famous for doing, completely captivated the future prime minister.³⁴ Consequently, by the time Lord Randolph's death in 1895, Winston knew he would follow in his father's political footsteps.³⁵

On October 1, 1900, Winston Churchill won election to the Oldham seat in the House of Commons as a Conservative by only twenty-two votes! The Conservatives had made the Boer War a strong campaign issue in this so-called 'khaki election,' and Winston's brave exploits in that conflict had certainly aided his voter appeal.³⁶ Churchill had denigrated the Liberals during the election by stating that their party was "hiding from the public view like a toad in a hole, but when it stands forth in all its hideousness the Tories will have to hew the filthy object limb from limb."³⁷ Nevertheless, he became quickly disenchanted with the Conservatives' political stance, and, like his father before him, an increasingly radical Churchill began criticizing his party comrades. After Joseph Chamberlain's strong advocacy

of a tariff began pulling the Tories apart, Churchill, a staunch free trader, defected to the Liberal Party on May 30, 1904.³⁸

When Herbert Asquith succeeded a dying Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman as Prime Minister in January, 1908, Churchill received his first position of cabinet rank as the President of the Board of Trade. He quickly exemplified his new liberalism by establishing government programs providing free meals and medical attention to schoolchildren.³⁹

Churchill's most renowned social reforms at the Board of Trade included the creation of the labor exchanges in 1909, the Miners Accident Act of 1910 and, most importantly of all, the National Insurance Act of 1911.⁴⁰ Therefore, the once virtually reactionary Tory from Oldham had helped push England away from its traditional laissez-faire to a form of limited socialism.⁴¹

After his magnificent achievements at the Board of Trade, Asquith rewarded Churchill with a promotion to the post of Home Secretary on February 14, 1910. Unfortunately for Churchill, a wave of violent industrial disorder crested with a nationwide rail strike in August of 1911. The Home Secretary's use of fifty thousand soldiers to suppress this outburst drew wide criticism from members of his own party as well as from Labourites such as Ramsay MacDonald.⁴² Despite his fiasco in the Home Office, Churchill effectively campaigned for and received in October, 1911 an appointment as First Lord of the Admiralty. The Agadir Incident of

July, 1911 convinced Churchill that Britain must join France in resisting an aggressive Imperial Germany, and he threw himself into preparing the Royal Navy for the coming struggle with a passion.⁴³

Winston Churchill's actions during the rail strike of 1911 caused many people from both the Right and Left to question his true political philosophy. Furthermore, his increasingly vocal advocacy for war with Germany also raised many eyebrows. Many of his contemporaries believed Churchill was returning once again to his conservative roots. Churchill's own opinion on his shifting political allegiances closely resembled that echoed by Robert E. Lee under similar circumstances: "True patriotism sometimes requires of men to act contrary, at one period, to that which it does at another."⁴⁴

Thucydides has also had scholars accuse him of harboring both conservative and radical biases. His account of the Funeral Oration certainly extolls Periclean Athens as the most vigorous and brilliant city in world.⁴⁵ In contrast, however, Thucydides also praises the Spartan military system and even Brasidas, the man responsible for both his ignominious debacle at Amphipolis and subsequent exile.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the History faithfully cites Athenian atrocities, such as the complete destruction of Melos in 415.⁴⁷

Other historians claim the author expresses a decidedly conservative, anti-democratic bias. G. Herman suggests that

Thucydides purposefully failed to charge Nicias, a fellow aristocrat, for his failure at Cydonia in 428 B. C. As a victim of exile himself, Thucydides may have feared that revealing such a great mistake to the popular demos could endanger not only the men themselves, but also their innocent families and descendants.⁴⁸

As with Churchill, Thucydides did eventually return to the more conservative political outlook of his aristocratic family. His undeserved exile following Amphipolis and the natural tendencies of aging pushed him increasingly away from the democratic and imperialistic views of his youth.⁴⁹ Also, Thucydides witnessed radical imperialists seize power following Pericles' death and lead Athens to ruin at the siege of Syracuse in 413.⁵⁰ Therefore, Thucydides openly praises the oligarchic Constitution of the Five Thousand established in 411 B. C.:

Indeed, during the first period of this new regime the Athenians appear to have had a better government than ever before, at least in my time. There was a reasonable and moderate blending of the few and the many, and it was this. . . that made it possible for the city to recover from the bad state into which he affairs had fallen.⁵¹

The intellectual movements of Athens also strongly influenced Thucydides' view of the world and how he portrayed it in his History.⁵² During the Fifth Century B. C., Hippocrates pushed medicine to a level almost approaching that of modern scientific disciplines.⁵³ Also, the Sophists began teaching an essentially secular philosophy based upon reason and rationality. They claimed

to be able to teach a man, for a fee, the arts of oration and politics so necessary for success in Athens. Therefore, Sophism had become the dominant force shaping Athenian political thought by the time of the Peloponnesian War.⁵⁴

Before the Sixth Century, Greek science had failed to progress very far because empirical observation always lagged behind theory. When the early Ionian scientist-philosophers increasingly relied upon observed phenomena, however, this disability began to fade away. The popularity of athletics in the Sixth Century further improved Greek science by inspiring a greater understanding of the body. Consequently, Croton, Cos, Cnidus, Rhodes and Cyrene established medical schools. Medical writers, like Hippocrates in his Corpus Hippocraticum, attack non-rational ways of thinking. Hippocrates completely disregards religious dogma and philosophic theory for the symptoms and circumstances related to a particular disease.⁵⁵ Furthermore, disciples of the Hippocratic school believed that a general conclusion regarding some illness could only be obtained after a detailed and careful analysis of its particulars.⁵⁶

Alcmaeon, founder of Croton's medical school, made an early comparison between the human body and communities. His analogy stated that good health stems from isonomia or 'equal rights' and disease from 'tyranny' or monarchia.⁵⁷ On a more a more practical level, Hippocrates' Airs, Waters and Places analyzed the of environmental conditions upon the

body. He further elaborated on this thesis by explaining how the differing geographical, climatic and demographic circumstances in Europe and Asia resulted in the disparate characters of Greeks and Asiatic barbarians.⁵⁸

Thucydides' extension of these connections between nature, the human body and societies in his *Archaeology* exemplifies the impact of the Hippocratic school upon his work. The fertile soil of Boeotia, Thessaly and the Peloponnese, Thucydides explains in the Hippocratic tradition, caused internal strife and attracted foreign invaders. Consequently, these areas witnessed the rise and fall of many different peoples and states. Attica, on the other hand, possessed poor soil and "was remarkably free of political disunity (and) has always been inhabited by the same race of people."⁵⁹ Thucydides' description of the plague that ravaged Athens in 430 B.C. certainly shows the *History's* Hippocratic roots. With both the plague and the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides sought to diagnose the actual causes and distinguish them from mere symptoms. Therefore, he shared the medical writers ideal of prognosis, attention to specifics and standards of accuracy because general conclusions are achievable only by an intensive study of the particulars.⁶⁰

The advances in medical science during the Fifth Century increased the skepticism regarding religion and traditional philosophy. This skepticism became an integral part of the Sophistic doctrines first espoused by

Protagoras, a Thracian from Abdera. As the Peloponnesian War began to take an ever increasing toll on Greek civilization, Sophists began emphasizing the contrast between physis or nature and nomos, the laws and customs of individual city-states. Although nature remains absolute and right, human legal and social systems are always arbitrary and transitory.⁶¹ Therefore, they dismissed morality and justice as irrelevant and only possible if all parties commanded power.⁶² Their materialistic and secular outlook gave little credence to ideals drawn from the social and religious dogmas of earlier days. Instead, they perceived the world through a mechanistic view in which natural stresses determined human behavior. In keeping with their focus on the generic, Sophists applied these stresses to classes of people and not to individuals.⁶³

The growth of Athenian democracy and imperialism under Pericles forced the city's aristocrats to practice greater skills of oratory and statecraft if they wished to maintain their power and prestige. Also, middle class citizens now had access to high positions if they could seize sufficient popular support.⁶⁴ The Sophists provided these men with a means to obtain and maintain political power. Since the chief path to this goal was through skillful oratory, they taught their students how to speak and to persuade. Those Athenians trained by Sophists learned which arguments to utilize in the various public debate and discussions.⁶⁵

The Sophists believed that a well-trained orator could argue from any point of view, right or wrong. Consequently, Athenians of the Fifth Century grew increasingly skeptical and relativistic.⁶⁶ This Sophistic skepticism influenced Thucydides as well as his countrymen. Although he does not state that he is an atheist, his History cites no examples of divine intervention in the affairs of man. For example, the Plataeans, the Melians and Nicias all beseech the gods for assistance, but they all are destroyed anyway. Nevertheless, Thucydides was not a moral relativist, and he condemns incidents of wanton violence such as the civil war at Corcyra.⁶⁷

Another famous example of the Sophistic influence upon Thucydides involves his use of paired speeches. The speeches by Cleon and Diodotus over Mytilene exemplify Thucydides method of explaining, in an unbiased way, contrasting points of view. Therefore, these speeches show the evolution of strategic policy on both sides, and why the courses of action were ultimately chosen or rejected. From the time of Protagoras, this form of antithetical debate taught by the Sophists represented the common manner of oration throughout the Greek world. Only those city-states out of the cultural mainstream, like Sparta, Corinth and Syracuse, failed to follow this widespread trend.⁶⁸

Thucydides also made use of the Sophistic belief that natural stresses determined the behavior of different classes. Since certain classes of people usually react in a

given way to certain circumstances, their behavior can be predicted. Thucydides puts this concept to work in his theorizing about early Greece in the Archaeology and in his explanation of Revolution at Mytilene and Civil War on Corcyra.⁶⁹

Although Winston Churchill never professed to have been influenced by any revolutionary philosophic or scientific schools of thought, he nevertheless reached many of the same conclusions as Thucydides about historiography by reading voraciously, especially on military subjects.⁷⁰ Since Winston had attended the Royal Military College at Sandhurst and not a regular university, he felt compelled to read a great deal on his own to complete his education. His interests leaned toward history on a grand scale, such as Edward Gibbon's incomparable Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, but the young Winston read a plethora of works on a great variety of subjects. In fact, during the winter of 1896, Winston "resolved to read history, philosophy, economics, and things like that; and I wrote to my mother asking for such books as I had heard of on these topics."⁷¹ Churchill later regretted not having attended an academic college because he could have learned many things which he had to laboriously teach himself from books and from penetrating conversations with others more knowledgeable than himself. In fact, he had actually considered doing so after the service, but his ineptitude in and hatred for Latin prose forestalled any such ideas.⁷²

Winston Churchill's passionate interest in history stemmed from his belief that the subject mainly recounted past politics, and politics was certainly his first love. Churchill, as a man of deep family loyalty, had also been drawn to history as a means to revel in his proud ancestral background. Lord Moran, a close friend, once wrote: "One wonders whether, if the personal slant had been wanting, Winston would have troubled to write history."⁷³ Maurice Ashley, who helped research The Life and Times of Marlborough and other books, believes that Churchill's desire to write history did indeed go further than such egocentric concerns. Like Thucydides, Churchill sought "to explore the causes and the nature of political events and to describe how (these) things happen."⁷⁴

The lessons learned by Churchill from reading and writing history expressed themselves in his conduct of political affairs. For example, his conception of the Grand Alliance in the Second World War derived from his knowledge of the coalition that had successfully resisted Louis XIV with the aid of his ancestor, the Duke of Marlborough.⁷⁵ Also, Churchill based his strategic policies in both World Wars on three eternal principles garnered from his avid study of military history: Victory in war demands that the primary emphasis be especially placed on national unity during periods of adversity. Also, in both politics and military enterprises, chance often plays the dominant role. As Churchill once said on the subject, "Sometimes right

things turn out wrong, and quite often wrong things turn out right."⁷⁶ Finally, Churchill emphatically believed that the liberal democracies must necessarily face constraints on their war efforts based on universal moral concerns.⁷⁷

Winston Churchill will always be remembered, first and foremost, as one of the preeminent politicians of the Twentieth Century. As such, he could easily argue both sides of a case. Churchill once told Maurice Ashley, "Give me the facts, . . . and I will twist them the way I want to suit my argument."⁷⁸ Therefore, although both Thucydides and Churchill employed a sophistic reasoning while writing their histories, they did moralize about man's terrible actions taken under the stresses of war and revolution.⁷⁹

The historical works of Churchill also show other similarities with Thucydides' History. Neither author possessed a strong religious faith, and they both believed that men and not divine forces primarily determined the course of history. Consequently, great men, such as the Duke of Marlborough and Pericles, play an extremely important role in their books.⁸⁰

Like Thucydides, Churchill does not draw out an elaborate analysis for his reader, but allows the narrative to speak for itself.⁸¹ Churchill also unconsciously followed the example of his ancient predecessor by wanting to either witness an event personally or either intensively interrogate a participant. For example, he either saw each battle chronicled in his works take place or closely

examined the battlefield under expert guidance.⁸² Most importantly of all, both Churchill and Thucydides wanted their works to serve as a guide to their subjects for practical politicians, historians and students infinitely into the future. For this reason, they saw themselves more as investigative scholars explaining the the course of events rather than as historians in the traditional sense.⁸³

Despite the similarities between the two great authors, some differences are readily apparent. For one thing, Churchill's documentation far surpasses that found in the History of the Peloponnesian War. In fact, Churchill's historical works contain numerous dispatches and documents still classified at the time of publication.⁸⁴ It must be remembered, however, that Thucydides had no earlier authors on which to model his documentation. Although Thucydides had only scanty references to his sources, he founded the Western historical tradition followed by Churchill in this regard.⁸⁵ Bonar Law, an adversary in the House of Commons, even charged Churchill with breaking his privy councillor's oath by utilizing these secret state papers.⁸⁶ Also, Churchill's primary consideration, in direct contrast to Thucydides, was to write a book which his readers would buy and also enjoy.⁸⁷

When analyzing the similarities and differences between the History of the Peloponnesian War and The World Crisis, the eternal cycle of historiography must be considered. Although Churchill never explicitly credits Thucydides with

influencing his historical style, he does claim to have imitated Thomas Macaulay's works.⁸⁸ Lord Macaulay, in turn, lauds Thucydides as "the greatest historian who ever lived."⁸⁹ Therefore, the personal background and experiences of Thucydides indirectly, at least, affected how Churchill composed The World Crisis.

⁸⁸ Adams, 85; Dupuy, 777.

⁸⁹ Adams, 85.

⁹⁰ The Greek army proved itself incapable of following Cochrane and Church's simple and sound defensive strategy. On June 3, 1825, the Greek garrison surrendered to the Turks, but their British officers escaped to friendly warships off the Piraeus. During their subsequent occupation of Athens, the Turks stored gunpowder in the Parthenon to protect it from Greek the resistance. Nevertheless, partisans blew up this magazine anyway and damaged the greatest monument to Classical Greece. Donald M^cCormick, The Mask of Merlin: A Critical Biography of David Lloyd George (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), 212-223; Adams, 85; Dupuy, 776-777.

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⁹³ Adams, 330, 334.

⁹⁴ William Manchester, The Last Lion: Winston Spencor Churchill: Visions of Glory 1874-1912 (New York: Dell Publishing, 1984), 470.

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⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 708; M^cCormick, 212-213.

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⁸⁹Grant, 162. CHAPTER THREE

HISTORIES FOR ALL TIME

On August 27, 413 B.C., a full lunar eclipse blackened the sky over the island of Sicily. The Athenian general Nicias, "who was rather over-inclined to divination and such things," saw the eclipse as an ill omen for his expedition's impending evacuation.¹ After consulting soothsayers, the commander postponed the departure for 27 days. This crucial delay allowed the Spartan Gylippus and his Syracusan allies to close the Great Harbor and block the Athenian escape route. The Athenians attempted to retreat into the island's interior, but the Syracusans annihilated this force of more than 50,000 soldiers and sailors.² Seven thousand Athenians survived the campaign, but they spent the remainder of their days as slaves in the stone quarries. Nicias did not live long enough to reflect upon his blunder. Shortly after his surrender to Gylippus, the Syracusans condemned and executed Nicias and the other Athenian generals.³

Thucydides describes Athens after the disaster at Syracuse as "utterly and entirely defeated; their losses were... total; army, navy, everything was destroyed."⁴ Athens struggled to hold her disintegrating empire together, but the revolts among her subject states and Persian intervention on the Peloponnesian side sealed her fate.⁵ By September, 404 B.C., Sparta had forced Athens to pull down her walls and reduce her navy to a dozen impotent ships.

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Athens lost not only her war-making capacity, but also the freedom to determine her form of government. The victorious Peloponnesians installed the Thirty Tyrants, a pro-Spartan oligarchy, to ensure Athenian fidelity and subservience to her conquerors.⁶

Only a year before the debacle at Sicily, Athens had stood on the threshold of total victory.⁷ In May of 414, the Athenians and their allies under Nicias and Lamachus launched a summer campaign intended to bring about the ultimate capture of Syracuse. The Athenians used a nocturnal naval movement to surprise the Syracusans manning the city's outer defenses and forced them to take refuge within the city itself. With the countryside under Attic control, the Athenian generals began building a siege wall around Syracuse's landward side.⁸ In the Fifth Century B. C., a large and strongly fortified city like Syracuse offered an enemy little hope of storming its walls. Effective siege machinery for such an imposing task did not really develop until the inventions of Alexander the Great and the successor King Demetrius of Macedon in the early Third Century.⁹

The Athenians besieging Syracuse realized their inherent deficiencies in this form of warfare and understood that they must starve the great Sicilian metropolis into surrender. Only a huge combined naval and military operation would suffice to cut off a well defended port such as Syracuse. By the late spring of 414 B. C., Athenian

triremes had completely blockaded the city's harbor, and only a very short section of the siege wall between the village of Trogilus and the Bay of Thapsus remained incomplete.¹⁰ After the death of the energetic and capable Lamachus, however, the Athenian expedition under the command of the hesitating Nicias lost its offensive momentum and never completed its circumventing siege works. Consequently, the Spartan relief force under Gyllipus slipped through the gap in the Athenian fortifications at Trogilus and saved Syracuse and Peloponnesian hopes for victory.¹¹

Shortly before Gyllipus' arrival, Syracuse held little hope for even withstanding the siege much longer and none for the overwhelming triumph of 413 B. C. Although the Athenians had not yet completely encircled the city by land, the Syracusan attempts at counter-walling had failed miserably.¹² Once the Athenians had destroyed the underground pipes bringing vital water to the city, the leaders of Syracuse believed that capitulation on terms was the only possible salvation from complete annihilation. An assembly to discuss the acceptable conditions of surrender had convened when news arrived that a lone Corinthian ship had broken through the Athenian naval blockade. The vessel's commander, Gongylus, assured the despairing inhabitants that Gyllipus would arrive shortly and deliver them from their Attic enemy. Gyllipus brought only a few highly-trained and disciplined Peloponnesian hoplites to

Sicily, but the mere presence of a renowned Spartan general gave war-weary Syracuse and its allies the resolve to continue the struggle.¹³

The arrival of Gongylus' unnamed trireme in the Great Harbor certainly shifted the fortunes of war on Sicily and throughout the entire Hellenic world into Sparta's favor. If Athens had successfully besieged Syracuse, she would have crushed her Peloponnesian enemies and gained preeminence throughout Greece and the Mediterranean. Indeed, an Athenian victory might have altered the entire course of history:

Greece, and not Rome, might have conquered Carthage; Greek instead of Latin might have been at this day the principal element of the language of Spain, of France, and of Italy; and the laws of Athens, rather than Rome, might be the foundation of the law of the civilized world.¹⁴

Athens did not, however, win the Peloponnesian War, and the empires of Alexander the Great and then Rome would eventually dominate Athens as she had the members of the Delian League.¹⁵ Although Athens' losses at Syracuse were indeed great, the entire force of approximately 50,000 soldiers and sailors and 216 warships was wiped out, she could have probably staved off complete disaster through a spirited defense of Attica. Nevertheless, the radical popular demos demanded that Athens continue the aggressive actions necessary to maintain her empire, and the most brilliant city in Greece eventually fell prostrate at the feet of the slow but sure Spartans.¹⁶

Many historians have realized the importance of Gongylus and his trireme in the ultimate outcome of the Peloponnesian War, and one has even compared the impact of his voyage with that of another vessel during the crucial month of August, 1914.¹⁷ According to this scholar, Bernard Henderson, these two warships directly contributed to the lengthening of their respective wars and the resultant costs in lives, property destruction and state treasure.¹⁸

This other ship, the German battlecruiser Goeben, eluded numerous British warships during the early days of the Great War and safely arrived at Constantinople on August 10. The Kaiser transferred the Goeben along with the light cruiser Breslau to the Turkish Navy and the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers. Turkey's entry into the war severed Russia's ties to her western allies and doomed her to a bloody defeat at the hands of Germany and eventual revolution. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, noted that the Goeben brought "more slaughter, more misery and more ruin than has ever before been borne within the compass of a ship."¹⁹

Historians often compare the terrible destructive effects of the Peloponnesian War and World War One upon Western Civilization.²⁰ For example, Barbara Tuchman relates the similarity between the social chaos resulting from the Black Death of 1348-1350 A. D. and that recorded by Thucydides during the plague in Athens in 430 B. C. Furthermore, the author elaborates on the issue by

explaining that similar conditions erupted in Europe and following the end of the Great War in 1918.²¹ In another book, Tuchman states that Europeans never again possessed the same confidence in their civilization's achievements and capabilities nor the same certainty about a better future after the war of 1914-1918.²²

The Athenian playwright Sophocles portrays similar feelings of doubt about society and the future in his play Oedipus Tyrannus about the hopeless human struggle against nemesis. Shortly before the play was performed, the plague had killed many Athenians, paralyzed their war effort and threatened the city's very existence.²³ It cannot be overlooked that this great tragedian had a great influence on his contemporary Thucydides. In fact, as John H. Finley, Jr. explains, "(Thucydides') work resembles the bounded but intense plays of Sophocles, which take an action at its height and illuminate in swift succession the latent natures of all who are involved in it."²⁴

Military historians also make numerous comparisons between the wars of the Fifth Century B. C. and the Twentieth Century A. D. Obviously, both conflagrations involved fighting over most of the known world between two alliances of the greatest nations in the world at that time. Also, the primary power in one league, i. e. Germany and Sparta, possessed the strongest army while its major adversary had a naval empire like Great Britain and Athens. Furthermore, in both wars, the great land power was pulled

into war by its ties to its chief ally, i. e. Corinth and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The ultimatums that commenced both wars proposed terms that both sides knew were unacceptable and would definitely provoke hostilities.²⁵

One of the most interesting analogies involves the siege of Syracuse between 415 and 413 B. C. and the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915 and 1916. As explained above, a single ship, either the trireme of Gongylus or the Goeben, played an extremely crucial role in both episodes. Also, the failures of both expeditions prolonged the wars and brought much death and destruction to both combatants and noncombatants alike. Furthermore, these operations exposed the inherent problems of conducting a war in a democracy.²⁶ Winston Churchill explains, "No man had the power to give clear, brutal orders which would command unquestioning respect. . . (since) power was widely disseminated."²⁷

Churchill places the majority of the blame for the Gallipoli failure on Rear Admiral John de Robeck's decision to break off the naval action against the Turkish forts guarding the Straits on March 18, 1915.²⁸ While at the Admiralty before the war, the First Lord had lamented that the Royal Navy had "a frightful dearth of first class men in the (Admiral's) list."²⁹ Although these men had served numerous years at sea, they had very few opportunities in the Late Victorian and Edwardian periods to see actual combat. These officers often spent many long years on the same ships, and, consequently, they came to see their

vessels as more than simple instruments of war. Furthermore, as battleships became prohibitively expensive after the launching of the HMS Dreadnought on February 10, 1906, their captains became very reluctant to risk losing them. This reluctance contributed immensely not only to the British naval defeat in the Dardanelles, but also to the indecisive Battle of Jutland in 1916.²⁹

Instead of engaging in actual combat, the officers of the Royal Navy prepared for the future Great War through elaborate manoeuvres and by studying naval history. Interestingly enough, they turned primarily to texts describing the war at sea in Classical times, such as Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War. Since steam-engines allowed modern warships to disregard the wind, tide and current, dreadnoughts shared very little in common with the sailing vessels in the age of 'wooden ships and iron men.' Naval theorists believed that these ships most closely resembled the oar-powered galleys of Greece and Rome. The ramming tactics of the ancient navies even became popular for a time after an Austrian man-of-war sank the Italian flagship Re d'Italia using these techniques at the Battle of Lissa in 1866.³¹

Ancient Greek and Roman history certainly influenced the decisions of both the classically-educated statesmen of Western Europe and their subordinates in the military in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, but this realization does not explain the numerous analogies drawn by

scholars between the Peloponnesian War and World War One.³² Certain comparisons, such as the similarity between the maritime empires of Athens and Great Britain and the military might of Sparta and Germany, are fairly obvious even to amateur historians.³³ Nevertheless, others, like the parallel between the failures of democratic governments at Gallipoli and Syracuse, are much harder to grasp.³⁴

The myriad of comparisons between these two tragic wars might have arisen from the frequent reliance of Great War historians upon Winston Churchill's The World Crisis. Although many scholars relied upon Churchill's work shortly after the war because it contained many unpublished and classified documents, Paul Guinn still cited this venerable source no less than thirty-eight times in his British Strategy and Politics 1914-1918 published in 1965.³⁴ As discussed in the last chapter, similar personal backgrounds combined with their separate links to Lord Macaulay to produce comparable historical styles in the works of Thucydides and Churchill.³⁵ Modern historians, especially those knowledgeable of both authors such as J. F. C. Fuller, often seem to be drawn, either consciously or subconsciously, to their analogies under the influence of stylistically similar portrayals of these two wars by Thucydides and Churchill.³⁶

Scholars might also notice that both historians build up to a climactic campaign and event which alters the course of the war. During the siege of Syracuse, the citizens are

almost ready to surrender when Gongylus arrives promising help. Consequently, the Athenian expedition is utterly destroyed and Athens' hopes for victory dashed with it.³⁷ On the 18th of March, 1915, after having pounded the Turkish forts guarding the Straits into submission, Rear Admiral de Robeck's fleet is on the verge of forcing Constantinople to surrender when disaster strikes. Hidden mines mortally damage three battleships, and all hopes for an early and less bloody Allied triumph sink with them.³⁸

Indeed, a reader can readily detect the intriguing similarities between the History of the Peloponnesian War and The World Crisis after perusing only their first few pages. Both Thucydides and Churchill begin by claiming that their subjects were the greatest wars ever experienced by humanity up to that time:

Thucydides the Athenian wrote the history of the war fought between Athens and Sparta. . . in the belief that it was going to be a great war and more worth writing about than any of those which had taken place in the past. My belief was based on the fact that the two sides were at the very height of their power and preparedness, and I saw, too, that the rest of the Hellenic world was committed to one side or another. This was the greatest disturbance in the history of the Hellenes. . . and, I might also say, the whole of mankind.³⁹

Churchill, in a remarkably analogous fashion, writes:

The Great War through which we have passed differed from all ancient wars in the immense power of the combatants and their fearful agencies of destruction, and from all modern wars in their utter ruthlessness with which it was fought. All the horrors of the ages were brought together.⁴⁰

The introductions to the History of the Peloponnesian War and The World Crisis also yield further comparisons between Thucydides' and Churchill's approach to reconstructing the past. For example, Thucydides explains that his theory that events in the past will often repeat themselves in the present and future because of unchanging human nature.⁴¹ Likewise, Churchill states: "It seemed inconceivable that the same series of tremendous events through which since the days of Queen Elizabeth (England) had three times made (her) way successfully, should be repeated a fourth time."⁴²

Chance appears as another important factor in the History of the Peloponnesian War and The World Crisis because Thucydides and Churchill shared a belief that blind fate sometimes plays a bigger role than man in determining the course of history.⁴³ Thucydides, for example, gives the majority of credit for the Athenian victory on Pylos in 425 B. C. to an accidental fire that was caught by a gusting wind and consumed a dense forest concealing a large force of Spartan hoplites. Previously Demosthenes, the Athenian commander, had believed that far fewer Peloponnesians were on the island. The good fortune of the fire allowed the Athenians to alter their plans and defeat their enemy.⁴⁴ Churchill's account of the Dardanelles campaign cites bad luck as the determining factor in a number of crucial episodes including the Russian refusal to consent to Greek

cooperation in the operation and Rear Admiral de Robeck's decision to stop the naval assault of March 18.⁴⁵

Thucydides' and Churchill's explorations of the causes of the Peloponnesian War and World War One do differ in some respects. Although both authors thoroughly examine the progression of events leading to the outbreak of hostilities, Thucydides specifically cites the one major reason for the conflict: "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta."⁴⁶ In contrast, Churchill sees the beginning of the Great War as the culmination of a series of events commencing with Prussian defeat of France in 1871 and culminating in the German violation of Belgium neutrality on August 4, 1914. While Churchill does not state that war was inevitable, he does note that the peace was only maintained through a very fragile system of personal diplomacy:

A polite, discreet, pacific, and on the whole sincere diplomacy spread its web of over. . . (Europe). A sentence in a dispatch, a cryptic phrase in parliament seemed sufficient to adjust from day to day the balance of the prodigious structure (of the balance of power). Words counted, and even whispers. A nod could be made to tell.⁴⁷

Churchill does portray the dismissal of Otto von Bismarck in 1890 as the key occurrence starting Europe's march to war. After Bismarck's fall, Kaiser Wilhelm II abandoned the Iron Chancellor's system of alliances and treaties intended to maintain the general peace in Europe. Instead, the Kaiser allowed Russia to join France in a defensive agreement and provoked hostilities with Great

Britain by challenging her supremacy on the sea with the Fleet Law of 1900. Consequently, Europe became an armed camp awaiting the spark that would ignite the greatest conflagration in human history.⁴⁸

Although both the History of the Peloponnesian War and The World Crisis examine their subjects primarily from a detached, grand strategical perspective, they nevertheless contain some very stirring accounts of men under the stresses of combat.⁴⁹ Unlike his predecessor Herodotus, Thucydides does not portray war as a great and noble undertaking. Instead, the History concentrates on how the psychology of the combatants generally determines the outcome of a given battle.⁵⁰ Thucydides realized that factors such as the noise and confusion of combat, the death of comrades and the intense emotions generated by a life-or-death struggle stretched any man's ability to stand and fight to the limit. Even the highly disciplined Spartan hoplites, famous then as now for their gallant last stand at Thermopylae against Xerxes' Persians, surrendered at Sphacteria in 425 B. C. after they were surrounded and unable to defend themselves. Thucydides' narrative of the crucial point in this battle vividly conveys the terrible and unromanticized side of warfare:

Things now began to go hard with the Spartans; their felt helmets could not keep out the arrows; when they were hit with spears the broken shafts stuck in their armor, and they themselves, unable to see what was in front of them, had no means of fighting back; words of command were inaudible, being drowned by the shouting of the enemy; danger was on every side, and they could see

no possible way either of defending themselves or of escaping.⁵¹

As an historian, Winston Churchill almost always wrote about military subjects, and many scholars have misconstrued this fascination as a love for war.⁵² In truth, Churchill's early works do generally portray battle as exciting and glorious, such as his personal account of the charge of the 21st Lancers at Omdurman on September 2, 1898.⁵³ The carnage and destruction of the Great War, however, completely altered Churchill's perception of combat. Although the author often praises brave actions by an individual or a unit, he realized that modern war was gory, senseless and threatened mankind's very existence.⁵⁴

Neither Churchill nor any sentient human being can possibly think of an engagement like the Battle of the Somme as glorious or heroic. In this engagement, 419,654 British, 200,000 French and an equal number of German soldiers were shot or shelled in a sea of mud.⁵⁵ Like the Spartans at Sphacteria, the combatants on both sides of this contest were unable to defend themselves from a common enemy, the unseen artillery. Churchill's record of this horrific battle exemplifies his understanding of war:

For month after month the ceaseless cannonade continued at its utmost intensity, and month after month the gallant divisions of human beings were torn to pieces. . . At last the legs of men could no longer move; they wallowed and floundered helplessly in the slime.⁵⁶

Thucydides and Churchill certainly portray organized fighting between states with grim and often shocking realism, but their accounts of civil war are understandably

much worse. Thucydides expresses his disgust for the civil war in 427 between the democrats and oligarchs of Corcyra by relating how all general laws of humanity were broken. For example, people murdered fellow citizens in the sanctity of the temple, and fathers even killed their own sons. Although similar in many respects, Thucydides' discussion of internecine strife at Corcyra does differ from The World of Crisis in that the former paints a general picture of all such events throughout the war.⁵⁷ As the author explains, "In the various cities (such) revolutions of many calamities-as happens as always will happen while human nature is what it is, though there may be different degrees of savagery. . . . as different circumstances arise."⁵⁸

In contrast to Thucydides, Churchill intended for his description of civil war to be specific to the Russian Revolution. Whereas Thucydides saw the social degeneration at Corcyra as indicative of human nature under the stresses of war, Churchill believed that the Russian Revolution could be primarily blamed on the failures in leadership of Czar Nicholas II.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, Churchill does not propose that a constitutional monarchy with a strong elected legislature could have saved Russia from the Bolsheviks.⁶⁰ The author summed up his abhorrence of the situation in Russia after 1917 by describing it as "a war of few casualties and unnumbered executions," but, unlike Thucydides on Corcyra, he does not see the Russian Revolution as the beginning of the collapse of Western

civilization.⁶¹ Furthermore, Churchill recounts a moving episode of personal involvement in this tragedy. At the War Office in July, 1919, Churchill had been forced to refuse a request by some citizens of Archangel for British protection. He later learned that almost all of them had died facing Bolshevik firing squads.⁶²

One of the sharpest divergences between the History of the Peloponnesian War and The World Crisis involves their authors' portrayal of the episodes which brought their political ruin. Thucydides' objectivity on this matter sets an extremely high standard for any participant writing about his actions in an historical context. He does not try to justify his loss of Amphipolis in 424 and even praises the military skill of his Spartan counterpart Brasidas.⁶³ Furthermore, Thucydides had saved another city, Eion, and was not given sufficient warning to counter the Spartan march on Amphipolis. His exile from Athens by the popular demos merely represents the crucial importance of this Thracian city and not complete culpability for its capture. The Athenians needed some scapegoat for the disaster which helped force them to accept the Peace of Nicias.⁶⁴

Although many historians have praised Churchill's courage in presenting a reasonably objective picture of the Dardanelles debacle, they have also criticized his attempts to shirk almost all accountability for the operation's failure.⁶⁵ For example, he alternately blames Field Marshall Kitchener, First Sea Lord John Fisher and Rear

Admiral de Robeck for the disaster at Gallipoli.⁶⁶ While scholars have verified many of Churchill's conclusions about the Dardanelles, such as de Robeck's costly withdrawal on March 18, 1915, a First Lord of the Admiralty must at least bear partial responsibility for any campaign's mistakes. Furthermore, Churchill was probably to blame for certain blunders such as the improper loading of the supply ships.⁶⁷

When comparing and contrasting the particulars of The History of the Peloponnesian War and The World Crisis, one can sometimes forget the great general similarities between Thucydides and Churchill as historians. Both these authors were upper echelon government officials writing about contemporary events in which they had often participated.⁶⁸ As a result of his exile following Amphipolis, Thucydides gained access to eyewitnesses and other sources from both sides of the conflict. He employed this information in speeches to explain the reasons behind each side's actions.⁶⁹ Likewise, Churchill employed his high social status and position in the government to gather secret documents and information unavailable to almost anyone else.⁷⁰ Scholars have criticized both historians for 'editing' the speeches and documents to follow their chosen line of reasoning.⁷¹ Although other notables, such as Julius Caesar in ancient times and Kaiser Wilhelm II in the Twentieth Century, wrote about their activities shaping the course of history, only Thucydides, Churchill and perhaps a very few others combined their expert insight with the

highest application of sound historical method to compose eternal literary masterpieces.⁷²

Neither Churchill nor Thucydides, however, saw their histories as the complete and final word on their subjects. Rather, they both realized that the best understanding of the Peloponnesian War and World War One would only arise after a sufficient passage of time allowed future scholars to examine rigorously all available evidence from these two cataclysms. They hoped that their works would prove useful to these historians in their contemplation of past events.⁷³ Although Churchill only states in his preface that he intends for his book to defend his actions during the war, he told Maurice Ashley his deeper purposes:

I set myself at every stage to answer the questions 'What happened, and Why?' I seek to guide the reader to those points where the course of events is being decided, whether on a battlefield, in a conning tower, in Council, in Parliament, in a lobby, a laboratory, or a workshop. Such a method is no substitute for history, but it may be an aid both to the writing and to the study of history.⁷⁴

Thucydides and Churchill wanted their histories to illuminate the repeating patterns of history to future generations.⁷⁵ Therefore, Winston Churchill undoubtedly agreed with his ancient Greek predecessor's justification for consulting with Clio:

It will be enough for me. . . if these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future.⁷⁶

Endnotes

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²Regan, 35.

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⁸J. F. C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, vol. I, From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Lepanto (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1986), 65-66; Thucydides, 471-477.

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⁵⁹Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, vol. 5, The Unknown War: The Eastern Front (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931), 374-375.

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⁶⁴Thucydides, 10, 329-330, 364; Peter R. Pouncey, The Necessities of War: A Study of Thucydides' Pessimism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 5; Cheryl Anne Cox, "Incest, Inheritance and the Political Forum in Fifth-Century Athens," The Classical Journal vol. 85, no. 1 (October-November 1989): 34-46; Finley, 17.

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⁶⁶Churchill, 145-147, 180-188, 246-247, 312-317; Prior, 275-280.

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⁶⁸David Garnett, ed., The Selected Letters of T. E. Lawrence (London: The Reprint Society, 1941), 239; Ashley, 103, Thucydides, 16.

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⁷⁵Ashley, 20-21; Thucydides, 48; Churchill, I:2.

⁷⁶Thucydides, 48.

CONCLUSION AND *σύγκρισις*

As a boy, Winston Churchill loved above all other things to play with toy soldiers. He conducted elaborate battles with his younger brother Jack using peas and pebbles to inflict casualties on brightly colored regiments and batteries of miniature cavalry, infantry and artillery.¹ Although Lord Randolph spent little time with his son, he could not help noticing his son's ardent interest in martial matters. This realization combined with Randolph's amazingly low opinion of his son's intelligence to convince him that Winston was most suited for a military career. Randolph believed that Winston was not nearly bright enough for the Bar.²

Had it not been for Winston's love of metal soldiers and Randolph's misconceptions about his son's intellectual prowess, perhaps Churchill would have never gained the fame as a war hero that allowed him to become a public figure before his thirtieth birthday and First Lord of the Admiralty by 1911.³ Consequently, Churchill could have never composed The World Crisis with the insight and knowledge of the war's conduct at the highest level that has made this work so enduring and valuable to historians. Even more importantly, Great Britain might not have withstood Nazi Germany during the dark days of 1940 without the dogged

determination of a Prime Minister who since childhood had been a natural strategist.⁴

Churchill and his ancient counterpart, Thucydides, the Athenian strategos, understood that the course of history could be altered by such chance and trivial events as a Victorian child reenacting the Battle of Balaklava on his rumpled bedspread or an unintentional fire on Pylos in 425 B. C.⁵ After taking into account the uncertainties inherent in human affairs and the ravages inflicted upon Western civilization during the terrible wars of the Fifth Century B. C. and the Twentieth Century A. D., Thucydides and Churchill could have understandably conveyed a strong sense of pessimism in their works. Indeed, the History of the Peloponnesian War does communicate the author's dark view of Greece's future.⁶ After World War I, Churchill also expressed strong doubts about the society's survival if it had to endure another such world war. Yet, he concludes The World Crisis on a positive and hopeful note.⁷

Thucydides' pessimism comes through to the reader not only in his description of Hellenic society's moral degeneration under the stresses of war and revolution, but also through his literary style. In the original Greek, Thucydides' text is choppy and even somewhat archaic for Fifth Century Athens.⁸ It is also extremely difficult Greek.⁹ The eminent classicist Michael Grant also describes Thucydides' writing as "severe, grave and terrifyingly intense. . . (and) press(ing) on with inexorable

rapidity."¹⁰ Thucydides skillfully uses style to make his audience feel the author's own disillusionment and despair as he witnessed the rapidly escalating and unstoppable self-destruction of his beloved Athens and, indeed, Greek civilization during the Peloponnesian War.¹¹ His pessimism becomes especially clear in the History's account of the civil war at Corcyra in 427 B. C. Thucydides believed that the complete breakdown of law and order that eventually engulfed the entire Hellenic world first appeared during this tragic incident. The author's explanation of the Corcyraeans' actions exemplifies his bleak view of man's true, innate character:

With the ordinary conventions of civilized life thrown into confusion, human nature, always ready to offend even where laws exist, showed itself proudly in its true colors, as something incapable of controlling passion, insubordinate to the idea of justice, the enemy to anything superior to itself.¹²

In his opening chapter, Winston Churchill also portrays the Great War as a moral descent of Western society almost into the abyss. In fact, Churchill entitled his second chapter "Milestones to Armageddon." He sees mankind inflicting upon itself almost every possible means of death and destruction on the battlefields, above and under the seas and in the air. The efforts to harm civilians through starvation, the bombardment of cities and unannounced attacks against merchant ships by submarines are even more repulsive to the author. Looking back on the First World War, Churchill laments, "When all was over, Torture and

Cannibalism were the only two expedients that the civilized, scientific, Christian states had been able to deny themselves; and these were of doubtful utility."¹³

Furthermore, he predicts in his volume The Aftermath that the next war would definitely have none of the glory or gallantry known to Alexander, Caesar or Napoleon, but will simply be a contest to exterminate the civilian populations of the warring nations.¹⁴ A modern Thucydides might have grimly agreed with the Briton.

As the former First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill saves much of his strongest moralizing against the state of modern man for Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare. The author admits that, in early 1914, he believed that no civilized state, even Imperial Germany, would engage in undeclared attacks on unarmed merchant ships without any provisions for rescuing passengers and crew. At the time, Churchill thought that such horrible actions would be "abhorrent to the immemorial law and practice of the sea."¹⁵ Furthermore, Churchill predicted at the Admiralty that such an immoral campaign would force neutral nations to war against the offending power because of its submarines' inability to distinguish between belligerent and non-belligerent shipping.¹⁶ He later explains that his suppositions had been correct because Germany's sinking of neutral ships helped mightily to bring the United States into the war on the Allied side.¹⁷

Although Churchill had time to reflect at length upon the ravages of the First World War and their impact upon Western civilization, Thucydides did not have a similar opportunity. The great ancient historian died before he finished his History, and the book ends in mid-sentence.¹⁸ If Thucydides had survived to see the final Athenian defeat and peace, however, it is extremely unlikely that he would have altered his pessimistic assessment of humanity in general and Greek society in particular. The victorious Spartan's hegemony over Greece rivalled the Athenian Empire for its harsh and high-handed treatment of subject states and the animosity this policy naturally provoked. Furthermore, the Great King of Persia once again interfered with the city-states of Hellas and regained control of the Ionian Greeks, making the heroics of the Persian War irrelevant. Skillful Persian diplomacy and copious donations of gold kept Greece weak by promoting internal fighting.¹⁹

Unlike Thucydides, however, Churchill does have a positive message to deliver to his readers, especially at the end of The Aftermath. Indeed, Churchill had reason to express a measured optimism; after all Great Britain, unlike Athens, won its Great War. Even when commenting on the self-inflicted miseries of the conflict, the author praises man's ability to endure any torment or danger:

Nothing daunted the valiant heart of man. . . He met the awful and self-inflicted agony with new reserves of fortitude. . . He marched to his death with sombre

dignity. His nervous system was found in the Twentieth Century of enduring physical and moral stresses before which the simpler nature of primeval times would have collapsed. . . And withal, as an individual, persevered through these torments the glories of a reasonable and compassionate mind.²⁰

Therefore, Churchill's The World Crisis, in contrast to the History of the Peloponnesian War, states that humanity had maintained its inherent civility and morality through the stresses of a terrible war.²¹

In contrast, Thucydides states that the Greek leader who possessed the greatest virtue and morality, Nicias, was destroyed by the Peloponnesian War. After the Athenian defeat outside of Syracuse in 413 B. C., the Syracusans demanded his execution. The author laments his death and explains that Nicias was, "of all the Hellenes in my time, least deserved to come to so miserable an end, since the whole of his life had been devoted to the study and the practice of virtue."²² One imagines that Nicias marched to his death with the same 'sombre dignity' of Churchill's common fighting man in the First World War.

At the end of The Aftermath, published in 1929, Churchill again expresses an optimistic picture of mankind's future. He admits that in 1922 the hopes for a lasting peace looked bleak indeed. No existing treaty either satisfied a defeated but proud Germany or protected France from an eventual Teutonic riposte. Also, Central and Southern Europe had disintegrated into nationalistic fragments of antagonistic ethnic blocs. Furthermore, Churchill believed that the Soviet Union had turned its back

on the civilized nations and had subjected its people to the harshest tyranny ever seen in Asia.²³

Despite Europe's dreadful condition following the Armistice, an optimistic Churchill believed that the promise of peace was great for future generations. In 1925, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and the lesser European Powers promised in the Treaty of Locarno to refrain from war and to act jointly against any aggressor nation that broke the peace. Also, the Treaty of Washington of 1922 that limited the naval armaments of Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France and Italy forestalled the possibility of a Pacific war that might engulf the Western world. According to Churchill, these two agreements and the League of Nations gave assurances to the continuity of civilization. "Since Locarno," Churchill wrote,

Hope rests on surer foundations. The period of repulsion from the horrors of war will be long-lasting; and in this blessed interval the great nations may take their forward steps to world organization with the conviction that the difficulties they have yet to master will not be greater than those they have already overcome.²⁴

Although Churchill and Thucydides arrived at different conclusions about mankind's character and its future, these differences must be viewed primarily in light of Athens' defeat and Great Britain's victory.

In other respects, The World Crisis and the History of the Peloponnesian War exhibit a remarkable number of similarities. For example, in the introductions, both authors laud their subject as the greatest event in human

history up to their times.²⁵ Both Thucydides and Churchill also believed that history often repeats itself in a similar yet not completely precise manner.²⁶ Furthermore, neither can disregard the great impact of blind fate in overturning the most carefully laid plans of men and ultimately determining the outcome of a given event.²⁷

While Churchill never makes the unmitigated claim, as Thucydides does, that his great war was inevitable, he does portray the events leading to August, 1914 as dark and almost driven by some hidden, supernatural force:

There was the actual visible world with its peaceful activities and cosmopolitan aims; and there was a hypothetical world, a world "beneath the threshold," as it were, a world at one moment utterly fantastic, at the next seeming about to leap into reality - a world of monstrous shadows moving in convulsive combinations through vistas of fathomless catastrophe.²⁸

Even the descriptions of combat between hoplite phalanxes and oared-powered triremes by Thucydides closely resemble those written by Churchill about war fought with the most modern and deadly of weapons in the sky as well as on the land and sea. Both historians realized that war at any time is terrible for society and tests man's endurance to the utmost.²⁹

The more important differences between Thucydides and Churchill probably arose because Thucydides died before finishing his work, but Churchill lived on to experience victory and its aftermath. For example, both authors lament the tragic and horrible suffering caused by civil war. Thucydides analyzed one at Corcyra, and Churchill discusses

the Russian Revolution after 1917. The History's account of internecine strife differs from The World Crisis in that it portrays the Corcyraean civil war as representative of many such events destroying Greek civilization.³⁰ Churchill only sees the Russian Revolution only as a particular and distinct episode, and he does not claim that it will destroy Western society. The reason for the disparity between the two historians is that Churchill understood by 1931 that the conflagration in Russia would not engulf the remainder of Europe and destroy Christian civilization.³¹

Thucydides' early death may explain the difference between his account of Amphipolis and Churchill's narration of the Dardanelles fiasco. Thucydides does not shirk the blame for Brasidas' capture of Amphipolis because he had already been exiled for his mistake.³² He had just returned from this ostracism in 404 B. C. when he died. Thucydides might also have accused others of culpability in this military disaster if he had lived to seek political office in the Fourth Century.³³ Likewise, Churchill needed to defend his actions during the Gallipoli operation because he sought to clear his reputation and regain high public office.³⁴

The similarities between Churchill and Thucydides as historians arose from two major reasons: analogous family, personal and political backgrounds and the historiographical tradition founded by Thucydides and stretching from ancient times to the Twentieth Century. Both men came from

conservative, aristocratic families with a strong tradition of public service. The Philaidae, Thucydides' clan, included Miltiades, the victor of Marathon and his son Cimon, a conservative politician advocating friendly relations with Sparta.³⁵ In comparison, Winston Churchill could trace his ancestry to the first Duke of Marlborough, and his father, Lord Randolph, had been leader of the House of Commons and Chancellor of the Exchequer for the Tory party.³⁶ Furthermore, Thucydides had Thracian blood on his father's side, and Churchill's mother, Jennie, was an American citizen whose grandmother was a full-blooded Iroquois Indian.³⁷

Although scholars have not cited the mixed ancestry of Thucydides and Churchill as a major reason for their historical objectivity, it is possible that this heterogeneity helped heighten detachment. Since historians do not have a complete record of Thucydides' background, they do not know if the author had any communication with his Thracian relatives and his family's Spartan friends. If he did, perhaps they gave him a detached perspective from which to view of the war between Athens and Sparta and allowed him to see the harshness of Athenian imperialism from the eyes of her subjects.

In Churchill's case, however, most Americans at least sympathized with the Allied cause, even if they did not openly advocate hostilities against Germany. Consequently, Churchill, unlike Thucydides, does not express any remorse

over his nation's military actions and usually calls for stronger measures than those actually taken. Perhaps Churchill, much more than the Athenian, was convinced that his people, during their great war had right, morality and justice on their side.

Since both Thucydides and Churchill grew up in families closely connected with governing the state, they naturally sought to continue the tradition by seeking public office themselves. Perhaps their early exposure to domestic politics with the inherent intrigue and negotiation among politicians even contributed to their remarkable understanding of the nature of power politics between states. In 425 B. C., Thucydides gained election to the office of strategos or general.³⁸ Likewise, Churchill won the Oldham seat in the House of Commons on October 1, 1900.³⁹ Although both men came from extremely conservative backgrounds, they drifted to the left early in their political careers. As a strong supporter of Pericles and his democratic empire, Thucydides felt that the conservatism of the Philaidae was antiquated by the latter half of the Fifth Century.⁴⁰ In comparison, Winston had run for election on a conservative platform, but Joseph Chamberlain's support for a protective tariff pushed the young Churchill into the arms of the Liberal party.⁴¹

Perhaps most intriguing of all, both Churchill and Thucydides returned to their conservative roots after their military disasters. Thucydides' undeserved exile and the

suicidal policies of the radical imperialists following Pericles' death drew the author away from the views of his youth.⁴² Many of Churchill's contemporaries believed his vociferous advocacy of war before August 1914 with Imperial Germany was a bit reactionary. Nevertheless, Churchill did not really begin to alienate himself from the Liberals until after David Lloyd George, a close friend, excluded him from the government in late 1916.⁴³

While the intellectual background of Thucydides and the strong influence of the Hippocratic school and the Sophists on his History have been extremely well-documented, Churchill, a bluff Victorian man of action, never professed to have been strongly affected by any particular philosophy of his time or the past.⁴⁴ Although Winston read Malthus, William Lecky, Darwin, Aristotle and Plato, he spent most of his time perusing history, especially Edward Gibbon's The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire and anything by Lord Macaulay.⁴⁵

In fact, his love for these historians explains as well as anything the numerous similarities between The World Crisis and the History of the Peloponnesian War. Gibbon certainly relied heavily upon ancient historians, such as Tacitus, who followed Thucydides' example of objectivity, who investigated varied sources to recreate any important event, and who displayed a disregard for supernatural forces as crucial factors in human affairs.⁴⁶ Thomas Babbington, Lord Macaulay, had assuredly read Thucydides extensively and

praises him as the greatest of all historians.⁴⁷ Therefore, British authors such as Gibbon and Macaulay served to connect Churchill with the ancient Western historical tradition established by Thucydides. As Michael Grant notes, Churchill's declaration that a firm knowledge of the past will allow one to have a sound idea about the future was merely a continuation of classical convictions about history.⁴⁸

All such parallels and connections between Thucydides and Churchill would be unimportant except for the lasting significance of the History of the Peloponnesian War and The World Crisis. As T. E. Lawrence wrote to Eddie Marsh, Churchill's private secretary, only Thucydides and Churchill among countless politicians in high public office created works which will forever remain crucial for scholars studying these particular subjects.⁴⁹ Although all of the secret documents contained in The World Crisis have been declassified, historians still employ Churchill's masterpiece as a major source for their books, because it explains so well the intricacies of the decision-making process at the highest level.⁵⁰ Churchill's work must endure a very long time, however, to have the longevity and impact of Thucydides.⁵¹

Thucydides can, indeed, claim the title of greatest historian with as much or greater cause than any other person who ever lived. His extremely credible, accurate and relatively unbiased account of the Peloponnesian War remains

an unparalleled achievement in the field of history. Historians and political scientists from Machiavelli to Thomas Jefferson have used the History of the Peloponnesian War as a source of information on the application of power politics and as a guidebook for their own works. His History continues to influence even the policy makers of the Twentieth Century. General George C. Marshall noted shortly after the end of World War Two:

I doubt seriously whether a man can think with full wisdom and deep convictions regarding certain of the basic international issues today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War and the fall of Athens.⁵²

In the future, perhaps Churchill's The World Crisis might also serve as a classic manual on the dangers of conducting a total war in a democracy. In any case, it will remain an extremely important source on the Great War from the perspective of a high-ranking government official with a deep insight into the decision-making process and unequalled access to crucial documents. Still, the History of the Peloponnesian War will always be remembered as the foundation for a Western tradition of objective history of which Churchill's The World Crisis was a modern capstone.

Endnotes

¹William Manchester, The Last Lion Winston Spencer Churchill: Visions of Glory 1874-1932 (New York: Dell Publishing, 1983), 130; Randolph S. Churchill, ed., Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume I, Part I, 1874-1896 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), 111; Virginia Cowles, Winston Churchill: The Era and the Man (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1953), 32.

²Lewis Broad, Winston Churchill: 1874-1951 (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1952), 5-6; Manchester, 130.

³Ibid.; Broad, 5-6; Robert Rhodes James, Lord Randolph Churchill: Winston Churchill's Father (New York: A. S. Barnes and Company, Inc., 1960), 19; Manchester, 130.

⁴Robin Prior, Churchill's 'World Crisis' as History (London: Croom Helm, Ltd., 1983), x; Maurice Ashley, Churchill As Historian (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), 89, 104.

⁵Virginia J. Hunter, Thucydides the Artful Reporter (Toronto: A. M. Hakkert, Ltd., 1973), 7, 71-74; Lowell Edmunds, Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 2-3; Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. by Rex Warner (New York: Viking Penguin Books, Inc., 1988), 20-21, 284; Churchill, I:6; Prior, 278-279.

⁶Thucydides, 48, 244-245.

⁷Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, vol. 1, 1911-1914 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), 2-6; The World Crisis, vol. 4, The Aftermath: 1918-1928 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), 483-489.

⁸John H. Finley, Jr., Thucydides (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), 261, 265-266.

⁹Professor Taylor Sanders of Washington and Lee University, interview by author, Conversation, Lexington, May 1990.

¹⁰Michael Grant, The Ancient Historians (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), 94.

¹¹Peter R. Pouncey, The Necessities of War: A Study of Thucydides' Pessimism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), xiii, 11; Dennis Proctor, The Experience of Thucydides (Warminster: Aris and Phillips, Ltd., 1980), 204; Finley, 265-267; Grant, 93-94.

¹²Thucydides account of the wave of revolution and civil war sweeping through Greece also contains the elements that he believed pointed toward this moral collapse: "As a result of these revolutions, there was a general deterioration of character throughout the Greek World. The simple way of looking at things, which is so much the mark of a noble nature, was regarded as a ridiculous quality and soon ceased to exist. Society had become divided into two ideologically hostile camps, and each side viewed the other with suspicion. As for ending this state of affairs, no guarantee could be given that would be trusted, no oath sworn that people would fear to break; everyone had come to the conclusion that it was hopeless to expect a permanent settlement and so. . . they devoted their energies to providing against being injured themselves. As a rule those who were least remarkable for intelligence showed the greater powers of survival. Such people recognized their own deficiencies and the superior intelligence of their opponents; fearing that they might lose a debate or find themselves out-maneuvred in intrigue by their quick-witted enemies, they boldly launched straight into action; while their opponents, over-confident in their belief that they would see what was happening in advance, and not thinking it necessary to seize by force what they could secure by policy, were more easily destroyed because they were off their guard."; Thucydides, 244-245; Grant, 93-94.

¹³Churchill, I:2-3.

¹⁴Churchill, IV:479; Barbara Tuchman compares World War I and its aftermath to the social breakdown of the Black Death of 1348-1350. She cites as a major source James Westfall Thompson's article "The Aftermath of the Black Death and the Aftermath of the Great War" in the March, 1920 American Journal of Sociology as her main source for this comparison. Thompson notes that both periods saw widespread debauchery, social and religious hysteria, greed, maladministration and a general decay of manners. Tuchman draws out the analogy by linking the Black Death and World War One with lawlessness and debauchery that Thucydides describes as accompanying the plague in Athens in 430 B. C. Barbara Tuchman, A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century (New York: Ballantine Books, 1978), xiii, xiv, 100.

¹⁵Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, vol. 2, 1915 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), 288.

¹⁶Churchill, II:289.

¹⁷Ibid., 306; R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History: From 3500 B. C. to the Present (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1986), 968.

¹⁸Michael Grant, The Classical Greeks (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989), 157-158; Ashley, 69-71; Thucydides, 605.

¹⁹For example, the Great King financed the rebuilding of the Long Walls between Athens and her port of Piraeus that had been torn down by Sparta to prevent her enemy from ever resisting again. William G. Sinnigen and Charles Alexander Robinson, Jr., Ancient History: From Prehistoric Times to the Death of Justinian (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1981), 226-230; Peter Green, Armada From Athens (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970), 355-366.

²⁰Churchill, I:3.

²¹Ibid.

²²Thucydides, 536.

²³Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, vol. 5, The Unknown War: The Eastern Front (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931), 377; IV:483-484.

²⁴Ibid., 488-489.

²⁵Thucydides, 35; Churchill, I:2.

²⁶Thucydides, 48; Churchill, I:2.

²⁷Thucydides, 20-21; Churchill, I:6; Hunter, 7, 71-74; Prior, 278-279; Edmunds, 2-3.

²⁸Churchill, I:18; Thucydides, 49.

²⁹Grant, The Classical Greeks, 159-160; Thucydides, 286-288; Churchill, I:2-3.

³⁰Thucydides, 244-245; Pouncey, xiii, 11.

³¹Churchill, IV:483-489; V:374-377.

³²Thucydides, 326-344; Finley, 17, 32; Pouncey, 5.

³³Thucydides, 11.

³⁴Churchill, I:vi-viii; Ashley, 87-89.

³⁵Finley, 9, 16-21.

³⁶Robert James Rhodes, Lord Randolph Churchill: Winston Churchill's Father (New York: A. S. Barnes and Company, Inc., 1960), 253-260, 372; Manchester, 93, 108, 146-148.

³⁷Thucydides, 9; Manchester, 98-101.

³⁸Finley, 17.

³⁹Manchester, 298-300.

⁴⁰Sinnigen and Robinson, 225; Finley, 23-29.

⁴¹Manchester, 404-405.

⁴²Robert Connor, Thucydides (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 228-229; Bernard Henderson, The Great War Between Athens and Sparta (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927), 273-276; Finley, 32.

⁴³Manchester, 429-431, 611-614.

⁴⁴Finley, 33, 37-38, 40, Grant, The Classical Greeks, 142; Manchester, 243-246.

⁴⁵Ibid., 244.

⁴⁶David P. Gordan, Gibbon and His Roman Empire (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971), 177-180; John Boardman, Jasper Griffin and Oswyn Murray, eds., The Oxford History of the Classical World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 194.

⁴⁷Thomas Babbington, Lord Macaulay, Critical and Historical Essays, vol 1 (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1901), 245-246.

⁴⁸Grant, The Ancient Historians, xv; Boardman, Griffin and Murray, 194.

⁴⁹David Garnett, Selected Letters of T. E. Lawrence (London: The Reprint Society, 1941), 239; Ashley, 104.

⁵⁰Prior, ix-x, 272-283; Ashley, 72-74.

⁵¹Crane Brinton, John Christopher and Robert Wolff, A History of Civilization (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1967), 73-74; Boardman, Griffin and Murray, 194-195.

⁵²Robert Campbell, "How A Democracy Died: A Fateful War Between Athens and Sparta Points Up the Dangers to Freedom Today," Life, 1 January 1951, 96; Brinton, Christopher and Wolff, 3.

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