# The Macedonian Question and Preventive Deployment: Lessons for US Foreign Policy

Catherine Bassett
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Advisors:
Professor Robert Strong
Professor Marshal Zeringue

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of Politics 5/14/97.

Robert D. Strong

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# **Introduction**

The end of the Cold War inspired new hope for international cooperation, what President George Bush called the "new world order." The decades of tension, fears of nuclear holocaust, and costly superpower competition receded as the promise of peace seemed to grow stronger. Our dreams were challenged almost immediately when Iraq invaded Kuwait, but after months of negotiations, the United Nations, led by the United States, mounted an international force which drove the Iraqis back to their own country. The overwhelming victory of UN forces in the Persian Gulf War further fed hopes of a new international climate in which aggression and conflict would not be tolerated.

Our hopes have not been entirely borne out. Although the threat of superpower conflict has receded, smaller conflicts have proliferated around the globe. Currently there are 192 countries in the world, with many new states struggling to emerge each year. Over 82 new conflicts have broken out in the past seven years, killing tens of thousands of people and forcing millions to flee their homes. While many countries may be enjoying greater peace and stability now than they have since the beginning of the century, other regions are increasingly falling victim to war.

While most of these conflicts bear little to no direct impact on the United States, their cumulative impact on US interests could be substantial. Conflict disrupts trade and can increase incidents of terrorism. Conflicts that do not affect the US may affect our allies and may strain our relations. Moreover, pictures of the slaughter that accompanies conflict can create strong domestic pressure to "do something" as passions become inflamed and sensibilities are offended. These domestic pressures are often contradictory. Public opinion polls indicated that Americans

wanted the US to help stop the mass rapes and genocide in Bosnia, but also showed that Americans did not want US troops placed in the region.

The rising tide of international chaos has spurred the search for new policies to address the post-Cold War era. The US needs to articulate a policy which defines our priorities and secures our country, our allies, and our interests. Several scholars and policy makers suggest that "preventive diplomacy" is an important tool to control a chaotic international environment.

While recent intervention failures in Somalia and Bosnia (before the Dayton Peace Accords) have caused some observers to conclude that interventions into unstable political and military situations will lead to foreign policy disasters, advocates of preventive diplomacy argue that the timing of the interventions was more responsible for policy failure than the tools used. They claim that intervening at an earlier stage of tensions would increase the likelihood of policy success. Moreover, the costs of early intervention would be significantly lower because there would be fewer problems to address and less drastic action would be sufficient to keep the peace. With this in mind, preventive diplomacy proponents have recommended a pro-active American policy which attempts to mollify trouble spots to avoid future conflict.

When tensions threaten to deteriorate into open armed conflict, a preventive deployment of foreign troops could be used to separate the combatants. Hopefully the presence of US or other forces would provide a sufficient deterrent to conflict. If not, the international troops would impose peace on the region once conflict broke out and perhaps punish the aggressor. The world's resolve in one conflict would act as a lesson to other potential aggressors that conflict would not be tolerated. For these reasons, preventive deployment has also been called a new collective security.

Making a convincing case for preventive deployment is more challenging than making a case for preventive diplomacy. In effect, proponents are retreating from their assertions that preventive diplomacy is a cheap and relatively risk-free means to cope with emerging tensions and conflict. Instead, we face a policy which involves considerable risks and costs, and that is before the fighting even starts. Should conflict break out in spite of a preventive deployment, the US has already committed itself to ending the war. If the US were to pull out instead of fight, our investment in peace comes to naught, the US looks weak and indecisive, and our intervention has lost any deterrent effect that it might have had on other potential conflicts and aggressors.

Seemingly the US has a lot to gain or lose with preventive deployment. We could decrease the outbreak of war, minimize the occurrence of humanitarian disasters, and salve our conscience in the process as we work to implement the "new world order." Or, we could experience policy overreach, suffer troop losses for no benefit, and continue a contentious foreign policy debate as we struggle to align our policies with our interests. Of course, we might end up somewhere in the middle with a mixture of successes and failures. Rarely, though, has the US contented itself with mediocrity and acceptance of the status quo.

Preventive diplomacy and deployment are part of a larger policy debate. The desire to do something, the fear of doing it wrong, and the inertia of doing nothing at all have surfaced now that changes in the international climate have forced changes in US foreign policy. We have alternatively heard calls for increasing interventionism now that the constraints of bipolarity are gone and increasing isolationism now that the threat of the Soviet Union has disappeared. Preventive diplomacy proponents contend that the policy recommendations offered thus far are too narrow and restrictive to cope with the changing security environment. They believe that

preventive diplomacy policies offer an alternative to extremes of intervention and isolation. They argue that their policies are tailored to an era of decreasing budgets and increasing demands. While the US would remain involved and engaged around the globe, it would do so at a considerably reduced cost.

Their argument is intriguing, especially when tested in its extreme forms (preventive deployment) and around the margin (in areas of questionable relevance to the US). Of the numerous conflicts and crises in the world, I have focused on one case to examine the application of preventive diplomacy, specifically preventive deployment. Unbeknownst to many Americans, in January 1997 the US had over 500 troops deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. At the beginning of the Yugoslavian wars of secession, the worst case scenario for many Western observers was a spread of hostilities southward to Macedonia. Remembering that the 19th century ended and the 20th century began with problems rooted in the geographic area of Macedonia, the United Nations deployed a preventive peacekeeping contingent along Macedonia's northern and western borders. Scholars and UN officials hailed the mission as the first preventive deployment in UN history.[1] The US contributed troops within several months of the mission's establishment.

Before one begins a case study of preventive deployment, it is essential to understand the policy's theoretical framework. Not only must we understand and evaluate the policy by what it aims to do, but also by the framework within which it can accomplish its stated goals. Chapter

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[1]For example, Stuart Kaufman, "Preventive Peacekeeping, Ethnic Violence, and Macedonia," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 19 (July 1996): 230; United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 871 (1993), 16 March 1994, 13. (S/1994/300).

One addresses many of the definitional problems of preventive diplomacy and preventive deployment. A survey of the pertinent literature details the argument as to preventive diplomacy's significance and compares the policy's advantages and disadvantages. As the nature of conflict in the post-Cold War era relates to the types of policies formulated to dissipate tensions, the fit of the catalyzing conflict with recommended policy tools is examined.

Chapter Two establishes the historical roots of the modern Macedonian problem. The background explains why Macedonia's neighbors—Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania—are currently interested in Macedonia's fate. In explaining the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, many writers offer Balkan history, particularly ethnic history, as the underlying cause for current tensions. With ethnic animosities dating back hundreds of years, some observers argue that the US should not involve itself in irreconcilable conflicts. An adequate history of Macedonia refutes the claim that Balkan tensions are ethnic tensions, at least in this case. Though ethnic tensions do exist, they mask basic state interests towards Macedonia and are used as an excuse for policy failure and to avoid an honest appraisal of our policy tools.

In Chapter Three, the US and UN decisions to deploy troops to Macedonia are analyzed. The hopes and fears of various domestic and international observers are examined to determine what effect our deployment was expected to have. Those initial concerns are compared with the deployment's status in early 1997, over four years into the mission. Finally, the tentative results of our deployment are compared to preventive diplomacy theory.

Why should we care about Macedonia? It is highly unlikely that power interests in Macedonia will lead to another systemic conflict like that which occurred in World War I. Clearly, though, the international community and the United States specifically is concerned

about post-Cold War conflict. The US has involved its troops in several conflicts thus far and may do so again in the future. Policy makers need to understand what preventive deployment can achieve realistically, and we should learn from the lessons of previous efforts, successful and unsuccessful, to formulate better policy in the future. Preventive diplomacy and deployment promise a better world; we need to know if reality can live up to that dream.

**<u>Chapter One: Theory of Preventive Diplomacy and Deployment</u>**

Preventive diplomacy is not entirely new to international relations. Dag Hammarskjöld

coined the term in 1960 while serving as United Nations Secretary-General. He advocated the

use of preventive diplomacy to avert conflicts which could lead to a superpower crisis or direct

confrontation.[1] With a few exceptions, preventive diplomacy applied to peripheral conflicts; as a

result, it remained a peripheral idea throughout the Cold War.

From its beginning, it was assumed, largely because of its author, that the United Nations

would be the primary agent in preventive diplomacy. The UN would have numerous tools at its

disposal, including mediation, fact-finding missions, economic incentives, and peace-keeping

forces. Whether the UN would become involved in a conflict hinged upon the likelihood of

superpower conflict, not the nature or extent of the catalyzing conflict itself.[2]

Another UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, resurrected the term after the

Cold War's end. His <u>Agenda for Peace</u>, written in 1992, envisioned preventive diplomacy as one

of three methods to cope with conflict (the other methods being peacekeeping and peacemaking).

Boutros-Ghali defined preventive diplomacy as "action to prevent disputes from arising between

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[1]Dag Hammarskjöld, "Introduction to United Nations," <u>Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization</u>, 16 June 1959-15 June 1960, United Nations General Assembly, 15th sess., supplement 1A; cited in Joel Larus, ed., <u>From Collective Security to Preventive Diplomacy: Readings in International Organization and the Maintenance of Peace</u> (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), 405; cited in Michael Lund, <u>Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy</u> (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1996), 3.

[2]Lund, 32-3.

parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur."[3]

The renewed interest in preventive diplomacy, combined with the United States' attempt to adjust our security framework to the post-Cold War era, has prompted US scholars to examine preventive diplomacy and its impact on US foreign policy. Though much of the literature surrounding preventive diplomacy focuses on multilateral organizations, the policy can be applied unilaterally. Even in multilateral deployments such as UN peacekeeping missions, individual states still must decide whether they will contribute troops. The current debate concerns not only US reservations towards the UN or other international organizations, but also addresses the fundamental assumptions on which preventive diplomacy is based.

The Department of State's Policy Planning Staff commissioned the Institute of Peace (USIP) in 1993 to examine the role preventive diplomacy could play in the United States' foreign policy. The State Department assumed that preventive diplomacy could deter conflict with the application of directed, but relatively limited, resources.[4] The USIP assembled a working group to study the issue, and Michael Lund's Preventing Violent Conflict resulted.

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[3]Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1995), 45.

[4]Lund, foreword by Richard H. Solomon, USIP, x.

**Preventive Diplomacy: Stages and Methods**

Lund began his work by narrowing the definition of what he would consider preventive diplomacy. In Boutros-Ghali's <u>Agenda for Peace</u>, any action that would prevent the escalation of a conflict, whether it involved controlling the underlying causes for dispute, preventing a dispute from becoming a conflict, or preventing a pre-existing conflict from spreading, is labeled preventive diplomacy. Boutros-Ghali's definition is so inclusive as to make preventive diplomacy a catch-all term. Policies ranging from income redistribution to prevent class conflict to the NATO bombing of Bosnian Serbs to prevent further violence in the Balkans would all qualify as preventive diplomacy. US policy makers, though, were specifically interested in the theory that limited resources could prevent armed conflict from starting. Lund narrowed the definition as follows:

> Action taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and international change.[5]

Lund characterizes this stage of possible conflict as unstable peace which is bounded by stable relations and crisis situations. Many countries experiencing a transition to democracy would lie within these parameters. The difficulties associated with drastic dual transitions in both the government and economy preclude stable relations, but do not necessarily drive states into crisis

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[5]Lund, 37.

situations.[6] The Cold War's end, with its dramatic political and economic ramifications affecting a large part of the world, is particularly ripe for a greater number of conflicts, as well as a policy designed to limit conflicts in spite of fewer resources.

Proponents of preventive diplomacy argue that once problems arise to move a country into unstable peace, tensions will continue to mount unless some group actively works to alleviate the problem. Lund believes that preventive diplomacy *can* counteract such effects.[7] With preventive diplomacy, policy makers utilize various methods, including diplomatic channels, observer missions, economic incentives, and peacekeeping, to alleviate tensions. The Clinton administration has also stressed the use of private and non-governmental organizations in negotiations and human rights advocacy. Recently, preventive deployment was added to the list of preventive policy options with the insertion of troops into Macedonia under the United Nations flag; it was the first time that an international organization used military force to avert a conflict before it broke out.[8] Preventive diplomacy and deployment proponents believe that these policies present a viable policy option between the extremes of interventionism and isolationism.

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[6]F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and Instability in the Balkans," in <u>Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace</u>, ed. Richard K. Betts (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1994), 294.

[7] "[M]any policy-level U.S. officials are understandably unaware that preventive diplomacy has been practiced in a number of places recently and that prima facie evidence suggests it has *sometimes* worked" (emphasis added). Lund, 29.

[8]Kaufman, 230.

Preventive diplomacy has two basic stages. Preventive diplomacy essentially attempts to offset problems either as they arise when tensions are relatively low (though the possibility of escalation does exist)[9], or as problems grow towards crisis proportions. These policies are called early and late preventions, respectively.[10]

Each stage corresponds to appropriate policy tools to help avert conflict, and both use a combination of rewards, penalties, and services to influence actors' behavior. Early prevention utilizes normal diplomatic channels which could involve international recognition or censure. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often conduct extensive "track two" diplomacy designed to mollify tensions and modify the perceptions of the parties involved in the conflict. International actors try to strengthen domestic institutions to combat disintegration momentum.

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[9]Attempting to predict impending conflicts is one of the most difficult steps in preventive diplomacy. There are any number of factors which could spark tensions: environmental disasters or degradation, economic decline, ethnic cleavages, political repression, or any type of drastic political or economic change (as seen in democratization). However, it is unclear whether states experiencing one or all of these conditions will experience civil unrest. Some states may immediately break down into civil war, war may break out years later in other states, and some states will never reach a crisis stage. Critics point to foreign policy experts' inability to predict the major changes of the past decade as proof of the unreliability of crisis detection. Stephen John Stedman, "Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling 'Preventive Diplomacy'," Foreign Affairs 74 (May 1995). Expanded Academic Index ASAP..

[10]Connie Peck, "Preventive Diplomacy: A more effective approach to international disputes," Ecumenical Review 47 (July 1995): 329. Michael Lund subdivides preventive diplomacy into three categories in his analysis. When tensions are just beginning to arise, he describes possible policy options as preconflict peace building. As tensions escalate, the situation calls for preemptive engagement. Finally, as tensions threaten to turn into armed conflict, Lund terms the policy options crisis prevention. Lund, 47.

Generally, policies aim to alleviate the socio-economic conditions that gave rise to tensions.[11] As such, preventive diplomacy addresses many internal characteristics of a state.

The development towards open armed conflict necessitates more drastic policies than in early prevention. The policy maker's first goal in a crisis situation is to address and dissipate the immediate causes for conflict. After the threat of imminent crisis passes, diplomats can focus on the underlying causes of tension by using the aforementioned tools. Thus late prevention uses peacekeeping to prevent a re-escalation of a conflict or preventive deployment to prevent an initial outbreak of conflict.

**Preventive Deployment**

While much of the scholarly literature about preventive deployment focuses on the role of the UN or other international organizations, the concept can be applied unilaterally or multilaterally. Considering the US' desire for policy latitude, administration officials have reserved the right to act unilaterally or multilaterally depending on the circumstances of each case. Lund differentiates between unilateral and multilateral force action by referring to the policies respectively as "specific deterrence provided by a powerful state" and "preventive peacekeeping."[12]

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[11]Lund, 44-5.

[12]Lund, 145.

Preventive deployment attempts to prevent armed conflict by inserting troops when conflict seems imminent. Hopefully the presence of US troops would convey to the parties involved the American commitment to preserving peace, if necessary by force, thereby deterring violence. Deterrence is provided by both political and military pressure. President Clinton stated that when used selectively, such military force can "provide a window of opportunity for a society—and diplomacy—to work."[13] Nonetheless, preventive deployment has the potential to become peacemaking. Because preventive deployment uses a credible threat of force to deter violence, it assumes that if deterrence fails, the US or international troops involved would impose peace on the country or region and perhaps punish the aggressor to prevent future disruptions. As troops would already be committed in the region, a response to aggression would be automatic.

Aspects of preventive deployment parallel collective security and have caused proponents and opponents alike to call preventive deployment a new collective security. Stephen John Stedman uses the terms collective security and new interventionism as a description of the aims of certain policy makers to halt the outbreak of conflict through preventive diplomacy. Stedman and his terminology draw comparisons with the League of Nations and the failed Wilsonian collective security of the interwar years. Like the hopes of policy makers after World War I,

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[13]_A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement_ (Washington, DC: The White House, February 1996), iii.

policy makers today hope that preventive diplomacy will help manage conflict; also like their peers eighty years ago, policy makers are probably overselling the policy's potential.[14]

Collective security is a system wherein any act of aggression against a state is considered an act of aggression against all states. By pledging to protect any state that suffers an act of aggression, preponderant power would reside with the states' defying aggression and would act as a deterrent to aggression. In practice, the system needs to be universal, automatic in its punishment, and have an agreed-upon definition of aggression.

Preventive deployment is not a system, and it does not rely on universal participation to work as it can be a unilateral or multilateral tool. Preventive deployment is not automatic. Lastly, preventive deployment broadens the field of actors and the sources of conflict by answering internal and external threats.

Nonetheless, parallels do exist between a collective security system and a preventive deployment tool which cause scholars to link the two. Both policies are often affiliated with the United Nations. While proponents disagree as to the appropriate timing for intervention, both policies clearly have as their goal the reduction of war. Preventive deployment tries to prevent conflict by interposing international troops before the outbreak of violence; by showing the world's (or an individual state's) resolve to prevent violence, future conflicts would be avoided. Collective security aims to punish an aggressor after violence has begun and, by means of the

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[14]Stephen John Stedman, "The New Interventionists: Civil Wars and Human Rights," Foreign Affairs 72 (Special Issue 1992/93). Expanded Academic Index ASAP; Stedman, "Alchemy...." Expanded Academic Index ASAP.

punishment, discourage future acts of aggression. Preventive deployment suggests that an early intervention will be more effective than a punishment after the fact.

The most obvious parallels between collective security and preventive deployment lie in the policies' failures. For example, acts of aggression can be difficult to define and agree upon, a problem which confounded the League of Nations. Preventive deployment further complicates the issue by enlarging the list of potential aggressors. Not only is the US concerned with international aggression, but preventive deployment can be used to halt internal conflict as well. Thus aggression remains largely undefined, the cases in which preventive deployment would be appropriate are ambiguous, and despite the ambitious goals both policies share, they devolve quickly to traditional balance of power politics.

Boutros-Ghali hypothesized several possible scenarios when preventive deployment could serve as a valuable tool of preventive diplomacy. He envisioned troops keeping peace in intrastate and interstate disputes when one or both parties invited UN participation.[15] A combination of air, naval, and ground forces as necessitated by circumstances would compose a preventive deployment. Though involved in a non-combat mission, they would be armed for combat in case deterrence failed.[16]

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[15]Boutros-Ghali, 49.

[16]John O.B. Sewall, "Adapting Conventional Military Forces to the New Environment," in U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post-Cold War World: New Challenges and New Responses, ed. Arnold Kanter and Linton F. Brooks (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), 88.

Proponents claim that preventive deployment addresses the American fear of mission creep and military quagmires growing out of our experiences in Vietnam.[17] While some policy-makers fear that low-level commitments almost inevitably lead to escalating commitments, preventive deployment proponents counter that low-level commitments actually decrease the likelihood of massive troop commitments by decreasing the likelihood of conflict or full-scale war. This leads some scholars and policy-makers to advocate extensive low-level interventions.[18] As such, preventive deployment really is not a choice between the extremes of interventionism and isolationism as policy advocates like Michael Lund or administration officials like Secretary of State Madeleine Albright argue. Preventive deployment is a pro-active, interventionist policy.

## Limitations of Preventive Diplomacy and Deployment

US policy tools of preventive diplomacy and preventive deployment are concerned largely with internal threats to peace and are aimed at shoring up domestic political institutions or forcibly imposing peace and stability on a region. Some might argue that such criticism of preventive diplomacy is misplaced. They would state that preventive diplomacy does not emphasize internal intervention, but rather addresses any type of conflict or threat thereof.

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[17]Ashley J. Tellis, "Terminating Intervention: Understanding Exit Strategy and US Involvement in Intrastate Conflicts," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 19 (April 1996): 118.

[18]Edward C. Luck, "The Case for Engagement: American Interests in UN Peace Operations," in Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, ed. Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 69.

Nonetheless, the type of conflict that the US is facing does affect the feasibility of our policies, and the nature of the conflict, inter- or intrastate, has important ramifications for policy making. The UN records 82 new conflicts which have emerged since the Cold War's end. Of these 82 conflicts, intrastate conflicts accounted for 79, interstate conflicts for a mere three. Included in those three interstate conflicts are the wars in Bosnia and Nagorno-Karabakh which many observers consider intrastate.[19] Though unstated in the preventive diplomacy literature, we are primarily considering intervention in civil unrest when discussing preventive deployment.

Lund only briefly addresses what type of conflict preventive diplomacy is supposed to counter. For the most part, he does not distinguish between interstate or intrastate conflicts for the policy's application, but he does address what conditions make success more likely. Lund finds that state and actor autonomy is necessary for a successful intervention. In intrastate conflicts, autonomy translates to "effective governing institutions" which control the military and security apparatus.[20] He states that a framework is necessary within which a dispute can be negotiated and finds that a government which is not party to the conflict (a nonpartisan government) and an established political process are the best alternatives. In fact, while Lund does not state that a country *must* have a functioning government for an external power to intervene effectively, he does not suggest any alternative framework which would work for negotiations.

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[19]Charles William Maynes, "Relearning Intervention," Foreign Policy (Spring 1995): 108.

[20]Lund, 103.

Lund's conclusion is that the US should intervene in intrastate conflicts when a effective governing institutions exists which can impose neutrality on the military. Under such conditions, the government would have the right to refuse an international intervention to help control internal tensions. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter embodies this principle: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Article 2(7) applies the same standards to the UN, stating that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially the domestic jurisdiction of any state." Though the sovereignty of states has been violated often since the Peace of Westphalia, nonintervention remains the international legal norm. Of course, if states request an international intervention, state sovereignty becomes a moot point. A nonpartisan government, which Lund finds essential to preventive diplomacy, may have less to lose if an external intervention occurs.

Lund's findings manifest several conceptual problems with preventive diplomacy, though. Preventive diplomacy and deployment are policies designed for the post-Cold War era in which many of the conflicts that arise will result from difficult transitions to democracy and free market economies. If established political processes are needed to make preventive deployment work, the policy would seem to be unfit to alleviate many of the most likely problems at hand.

Lund also requires a nonpartisan government for successful intervention. In civil conflict, though, it is difficult to imagine the state not being partisan. Even if not originally a party to or source of growing tensions, attempts by the state and/or the military to stop hostilities

between two groups operating within the state's borders could draw the government into the conflict. Moreover, a dispute often will occur between a government and a segment of the population, even in a democratic state that purports to represent the population. Lund argues that conflicts can be resolved if they focus on policies of the state, not the control of the state. However, he does not link the policies of a state with the governing elite at the time, so that disputes over policy often necessarily lead to disputes over control of the government.

Even if a government were truly uninvolved and inculpable, it is difficult to imagine a country which would admit to an inability to exercise and exert its sovereignty over internal matters because the state's reason and justification for existence would disappear. This hurdle could be cleared once the state's collapse became an imminent possibility. Under such conditions, a government could find it more advantageous to invite international support to quell conflict than to insist upon its sovereignty. But as preventive deployment tries to address problems before conflict occurs, a state may not be able to foresee whether any particular potential conflict could break apart the state.

Lund seems to recognize the severity of the restrictions he is placing on US policy and does not state that interventions should occur only in those cases which meet his criteria of a nonpartisan government and effective governing institutions. Rather, he appears to make an argument for preventive diplomacy and deployment based on minimum risk, realizing that many of the problems the US will encounter will not meet his sanitized conditions. In effect, Lund is putting preventive deployment's best face forward while implicitly acknowledging that politics and war are dirty businesses.

Lund's recommendations also avoid one major source of policy angst in the US, what we should do about conflicts within an undemocratic state. Steven Goldman states that US intervention is especially justified when a democratic, i.e. likely nonpartisan, government does not exist. He argues that countries without democracy are far more likely to experience serious internal tensions, and that those countries would not allow an external intervention to violate their state sovereignty. He concludes that undemocratic governments do not enjoy the same right to state sovereignty that democracies do, and that the US, as a democracy, has a legal and moral right to intervene in undemocratic states.[21] If Goldman is right that intrastate conflict occurs predominantly in undemocratic states, Lund's advice to intervene only in conflicts where the government is nonpartisan essentially eliminates preventive diplomacy as an option in nearly every likely intrastate conflict.

The criteria outlined thus far are necessary but not sufficient to provoke an international intervention in Lund's framework. What conditions would be sufficient for an intervention remain unclear. Hammarskjöld's definition, which hinged upon the Cold War balance of power, does not apply. He conceived preventive diplomacy's role as limiting the chance of direct superpower conflict. Preventive diplomacy today applies to conflicts which bear little or no direct impact on our immediate national interest. In fact, the precipitating probable conflicts are often minor events when measured by their effect on the US.[22] Lund found that the US has

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[21]Steven Goldman, "A Right of Intervention Based upon Impaired Sovereignty," World Affairs 15 (Winter 1994): 124-9.

[22]"Key Elements of the Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (May 1994), 1.

become involved in conflicts that pose either a wider regional or symbolic threat.[23] Such a loose definition of national interest (outlined in Presidential Decision Directive 25) causes some scholars to worry about US policy overstretch. They fear that without a clear definition of national interest it is easier for an incongruity to develop between policy goals and available resources.[24] Without the confines of a bipolar system, the US could be more inclined to intervene in more conflicts.

If the US can justify intervention, several practical problems still arise with the tools of choice. US policy has consistently stressed increasing reliance on multilateral action through the UN in spite of serious efficacy, efficiency, and command and control problems with UN deployments. Also, the "doctrine rationalization" (the military's modus operandi or convergence of aims and means) for the US and the UN is inappropriate to intrastate conflicts. The American "AirLand Battle" scenario adopted from the Cold War aims to employ overwhelming force for a decisive victory. Considering the complexity of civil war and the difficulty of finding a clear enemy, decisive victory can be difficult to attain.[25] The UN doctrine is also flawed as it

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[23]Lund, 80-2.

[24]Corr D. Blacker, "A Typology of Post-Cold War Conflicts," in U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post-Cold War World: New Challenges and New Responses, ed. Arnold Kanter and Linton F. Brooks (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), 55; William H. Lewis, "Challenge and Response: Coercive Intervention Issues," in U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post-Cold War World, ed. Arnold Kanter and Linton F. Brooks (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), 73.

[25]Problems with civil war arise when there are multiple contenders for power mixed in with an indigenous population making identification of the enemy difficult, especially for outside forces. In such cases with an unclear separation of combatants and civilians, AirLand Battle can be inappropriate. Sewall, 91.

presumes a false level of neutrality and impartiality in its missions. As a consequence, the UN

deploys a small number of lightly armed troops that must obey very restrictive engagement rules.

However, Boutros-Ghali envisioned future intrastate missions based on "the request of the

Government *or* all parties concerned...."(emphasis added).[26] Unless all parties request UN

intervention (which seems unlikely in a fragmented political environment where even one party

could benefit from instability or conflict), some parties will view a UN deployment as partisan.

The multilateral tools advocated by the administration therefore have a difficult time achieving

the desired goals, though current US military policy is equally unfit for preventive deployment.

In addition, the cost to the US of preventive diplomacy and deployment is debated.

Advocates believe that preventive diplomacy is a cost-effective means to avoid more conflicts

because we will intervene earlier in potential conflicts.[27] Opponents argue that the cost of such

operations is often higher than the numbers might indicate. For example, in addition to the

military costs of the Persian Gulf War, one should consider the debt forgiveness and arms

transfers/sales necessary to cement our alliance. These costs raised the price tag of the Gulf War

considerably. Moreover, although only $3 billion was spent on peacekeeping in 1992 (twice the

daily cost of the Persian Gulf War),[28] the UN peacekeeping budget is increasing while available

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[26]Boutros-Ghali's statement also reveals a definitional overlap. All cases of preventive peacekeeping are cases of preventive deployment, though not all preventive deployments are preventive peacekeeping. Peacekeeping of any type implies the consent of all parties involved to the conflict while preventive deployment requires only the government's permission, if even that much (depending on how rigorously sovereignty is respected). Boutros-Ghali, 49.

[27]Lund, 24.

[28]David C. Morrison, "Peace, Perhaps, But At A Considerable Expense," National Journal 24 (3 October 1992): 2253.

funding is decreasing. The US defense budget (which assumes the cost of US troops involved in

peacekeeping missions) has decreased by 40% in real terms between 1990-1997, while its UN

peacekeeping assessment has risen in both real and percentage terms.[29]  While the burden of

peacekeeping may not be excessive, increasing costs in an era of downsizing has provoked US

protestations at the UN and rising anti-UN sentiment in Congress.  It is virtually certain that

preventive diplomacy will be more expensive than proponents state, but the current lack of a

clear set of foreign policy priorities and widely defined US interests exacerbate that problem by

lending itself to a "shotgun" approach.  Depending on whose vision of preventive deployment is

used, costs could be a very significant factor (for advocates of wide-reaching interventions) or a

rather insignificant factor (for advocates whose criteria for preventive deployment is so

restrictive so as to be prohibitive in most cases).

Traditionally Americans hesitate to commit US troops abroad, and the administration

may find it difficult to rally public support for preventive deployment, especially considering the

possible cost burden.[30]  Once atrocities or humanitarian crises receive media attention, the public

may be more willing to support a deployment, but not necessarily: in Bosnia, public opinion

polls showed that Americans wanted to stop atrocities without direct involvement.  The same

conditions that might create public support for intervention also make intervention far less likely

to succeed.  Once atrocities have occurred, conflicts tend to veer towards mass-based violence

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[29]Blacker, 59.

[30]This is especially true in intrastate conflicts where no clear violation of international law or boundaries has occurred.  Stedman, "Alchemy...." Expanded Academic Index ASAP; Luck, 69-70.

(rather than elite-led), the desire for revenge increases, and popular passions are generally aroused. The range of problems which incited violence may grow, and the movement may become less centralized or controllable. Under these conditions, it is more difficult to slow or halt the descent to armed conflict. Moreover, if US intervention is based on humanitarian concerns, the US will give all parties involved in a conflict the incentive to exaggerate human rights abuses. Exaggeration would have the same effect on policy efficacy as actual atrocities by riling popular sentiment.[31]

In spite of the new name, preventive diplomacy is essentially normal diplomacy if parties are willing to negotiate. As such preventive diplomacy is not a novel concept for foreign policy except that it implies that the US or the UN should become more involved in the internal character of states. If parties are unwilling to negotiate, though, preventive deployment is necessary. Thus advocating a policy of preventive diplomacy means advocating a policy of assertive intervention. The US could be dealing with non-rational actors, if the actors would not conform to our expectation that threatened force would elicit a conciliatory response (which is risky), and would have to present a credible threat of collective security or peace enforcement if preventive diplomacy/deployment failed (which is again risky and very expensive).[32]

Lastly, preventive deployments are supposed to avoid conflict by forestalling conflict escalation and pressuring all sides to negotiate. President Clinton affirmed this goal when he

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[31]Christopher Layne, "Minding Our Own Business: The Case for American Non-Participation in International Peacekeeping/Peacemaking Operations," in Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, ed. Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 87.

[32]Stedman, "Alchemy...." Expanded Academic Index ASAP.

stated that outside military force can give a society and diplomacy the chance to work.[33]

Interposing UN troops can have the opposite effect, though, because each party may have less

fear of conflict if negotiation fails. Parties can advocate more extreme positions without too

much pressure to compromise; the greatest pressure the UN could use would be a threatened

withdrawal which defeats the original purpose of deployment. While the troop barrier may

prevent open conflict, it could also perpetuate the tensions that created the conflict situation.

Perpetual UN involvement as seen in Cyprus results.[34] US and UN peacekeepers in Croatia

before it seceded would have had a similar effect. Though our actions would have aimed to

encourage democracy and discourage war, international troops on the Croatian border would

have further assured Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia. We would have protected the

extremist stances we were attempting to overcome.

**American Policy and PDD-25**

Since the end of the Cold War, collective security and preventive diplomacy have found

new adherents in the American policy-making elite. President Bush pushed the UN towards

more multilateral action during and after the Persian Gulf War. As a presidential candidate, Bill

Clinton suggested that assertive multilateralism through the UN could best counter security

dilemmas in the new world order, including situations where the Bush administration had feared

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[33]A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, iii.

[34]See Blue Helmets, the UN's findings on this issue. David C. Morrison, "Make Peace - Or Else!," National Journal 24 (3 October 1992): 2252.

to tread.  President Clinton has retreated from his earlier policy recommendations, though he still shows a predilection for multilateral action.[35]  As then-NSA advisor Anthony Lake described the Clinton administration foreign policy, it practices "pragmatic Wilsonianism."  They prefer to pursue policy through international organizations because of a belief in the interdependence of people and states.[36]

This shift in policy preferences reflects the changing status of the United States in the international system.  The Soviet Union's collapse brought about the demise of a bipolar (or bipolycentric) system, leaving the US as the world's only remaining superpower.  However, our power relative to much of the world is steadily and unmistakably eroding.  The new emphasis on multilateralism acknowledges the limitations on American policy imposed by a world order and domestic pressures where we bear the duties of preeminent power, the costs of victory, and the American population's desire to enjoy a peace dividend.

Multilateralism reflects paradoxical tendencies in American political thought towards missionary crusading and avoiding international involvement.  Some political scientists who study cultural influence on foreign policy find that the US myth of "a city on a hill," built upon a feeling of religious and moral superiority, creates a missionary desire to reform the world through US foreign policy.[37]  Throughout our history, however, a parallel desire to avoid

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[35]Mark T. Clark, "The Trouble with Collective Security," Orbis 39 (Spring 1995): 237-8.

[36]John Gerard Ruggie, "Peacekeeping and U.S. Interests," Washington Quarterly 17 (Autumn 1994).  Lexis/Nexis.

[37]Richard J. Payne, The Clash with Distant Cultures: Values, Interests, and Force in American Foreign Policy (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 20, 25.

"entangling alliances" has also existed. Part of our moral superiority was drawn from the early US refusal to be drawn into European Great Power politics. Presidents dating back to George Washington have cautioned against the disastrous effect excessive foreign entanglements could have on our democratic experiment.

The period between World War I and World War II taught the US a lesson about the effects of American isolationism. Yet while few people today advocate withdrawing from the international arena, the US is anxious to defray the costs and minimize the burdens of American policy by pursuing our policies in conjunction with other countries. Our virtually unilateral leadership of the West throughout the Cold War left us saddled with a huge national debt, and now that a clear world enemy is lacking, the US is content to let other countries carry some of our burden. Though sharing costs necessitates sharing decision-making, the US has also found multilateral action a convenient cover to deflect criticism. Lastly, we view multilateralism as a means to pursue greater interventionism. As Madeleine Albright argued:

> We are also working with other countries to improve the UN's ability to respond rapidly to emergency situations. This serves our interests, because when the United States intervenes alone, we pay all the costs and run all of the risks. When the UN acts, we pay one-fourth of the costs and others provide the vast majority of the troops. So the more capable the UN becomes, the less likely it is that we will have to send our own forces overseas.[38]

In military terms, greater multilateral action serves as a force multiplier: We get more for less. We can potentially use fewer resources to affect more situations or use the same amount of resources and affect an even greater number of states.

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[38]Madeleine Albright, "The UN, the US, and the World," Department of State Dispatch 7 (23 Sept 1996): 474-5.

The US has utilized multilateral military action on several occasions over the past few years: in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and Macedonia. The UN has also sponsored an increasing number of military operations since the end of the Cold War, to which the US has contributed troops, tactical support, and/or financial backing.[39] The proliferation of missions, especially after the Somalian debacle in which US soldiers were killed and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, spurred the Clinton administration to adopt Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25). This document outlines the criteria the administration will consider before future deployments.[40]

PDD-25 describes a world in which small-scale conflicts including ethnic cleansing, civil wars, and collapsing governments could have a cumulative effect on US interests, even if no conflict directly affects American interests.[41] It first establishes criteria for voting for or against proposed peacekeeping operations. Secondly, stricter criteria for US participation in a UN or regional organization-led peace operation are outlined. For US troops to participate, the administration stipulates that the operation advances US interests; operational success depends on US participation; clear objectives and a foreseeable withdrawal are established; domestic support exists; and that the resources necessary for the mission are available.[42]

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[39]The US peacekeeping assessment in the United Nations' budget (in addition to regular dues) was increased from 30.4% to 31.7% after the dissolution of the USSR. The Clinton administration wants the US share decreased to 25%. Clark, 254.

[40]Clark, 249-50.

[41]"Key Elements...," The Clinton Administration's Policy..., 1. Policy statements by administration officials reinforce this view. See Madeleine Albright, "The United Nations, NATO, and Crisis Management," Department of State Dispatch (29 April 1996): 219.

[42]"Key Elements...," The Clinton Administration's Policy..., 3-5.

President Clinton's attempt to standardize US policy towards peace operations, including preventive deployment, resulted in disappointment on all sides. Interventionists argue that the policy is not innovative enough to respond to our changing world; isolationists counter that the policy leaves American interests too broadly defined which could lead to excessive entanglements.

## Preemptive Excuses and Understanding the Causes for Conflict

When Lund began writing his book in 1993, American troops were just landing in Macedonia. By the time he finished three years later, the deployment's preliminary results and tentative conclusions were being discussed. As the first application of preventive deployment, a number of policy makers and scholars anxiously awaited the outcome. While hoping for success, scholarly articles already began to appear which would justify a policy failure.

Stuart Kaufman authored one such article. He examined the application of preventive deployment (in his words, preventive peacekeeping) to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. He envisioned preventive peacekeeping as part of a broader strategy of preventive diplomacy to forestall violence, as laid out by Boutros-Ghali. Although optimistic about preventive peacekeeping's possible uses, Kaufman cautioned that the new policy did not alleviate all of the problems associated with peacekeeping in regions with ethnic tensions.

Kaufman implies in his theoretical framework for analysis that the problems in Macedonia result from ethnic tensions. Other writers have also drawn the same conclusions, and the supposed inevitable and intractable nature of ethnic/historical conflicts has led many policy

makers to wonder whether any outside intervention could succeed in preventing or halting ethnic war. For example, Robert Kaplan's provocative <u>Balkan Ghosts</u> argued persuasively that many tensions in the Balkans stemmed from historical ethnic animosities. Kaplan's argument was used as an excuse by some American policy makers to avoid involvement in the Bosnian conflict because success was impossible.

Kaufman does not support those policy makers who have already abandoned all hope of stopping ethnic conflict. Instead, he establishes a series of hurdles which must be cleared before a peacekeeping mission in an ethnic conflict has a chance of succeeding. In effect, Kaufman argues that peacekeeping missions in regions of ethnic instability face certain unique challenges for establishing peace.

Yet Kaufman fails to examine, and thereby determine, the true reasons for Macedonian tensions. The underlying reasons for conflict must be understood to evaluate the success of preventive deployment in Macedonia and its future application. If the problems in Macedonia do not stem from ethnicity, as the next chapter will argue, the excuse of "intractable" ethnic conflict is removed as a reason for policy success or failure. As a result, preventive deployment/ peacekeeping as a policy tool comes under direct scrutiny, rather than assigning responsibility to the nature of the precipitating conflict.

**Conclusion**

Without the constraint of bipolarity, the US could potentially intervene with impunity in a variety of conflicts. While the US does not want to inspire the world's condemnation and policy

makers do need domestic political support, we need not fear a possible superpower confrontation resulting from our interventions. As a result, both US and UN interventions have increased since the end of the Cold War.

The US has responded to the changing international environment by searching for new foreign policy tools. Preventive diplomacy and preventive deployment are two options which are receiving the close attention of prominent policy makers. Policy proponents, such as Michael Lund, argue that preventive diplomacy addresses the dichotomy of shrinking resources and increasing conflict with a minimal commitment of forces and financial resources. Policy opponents, such as Stephen John Stedman, counter that preventive diplomacy is being sold as a "cure-all" for our foreign policy woes without a true appreciation for the costs involved.

As the first case of an international organization deploying troops to avoid an initial outbreak of violence, Macedonia is an appropriate case study to examine the debate about preventive diplomacy's efficacy. Moreover, Macedonia is the only case study for preventive deployment. Essentially, it is the extreme form of preventive diplomacy, i.e. preventive deployment, that should interest policy makers. While other tools of preventive diplomacy closely parallel normal diplomacy, preventive deployment addresses volatile situations which we find increasingly in our world. Those crises demand a reexamination of US foreign policy to reflect a changing international system and domestic policy influences. A close study of the historic and modern reasons for the Macedonian conflict and an analysis of US reasons for deploying troops can shed light on preventive deployment's possible future role in our foreign policy.

## Chapter Two: The Macedonian Question

It is fitting that preventive deployment, a policy tool which some proponents hope will play a leading role in American foreign policy in the next century, is first tested in a region where instability ushered in and is currently ushering out this century. The Balkan region's historical volatility and its wide-reaching effects allow policy makers to advocate policy by analogy. Because World War I began when western Europe took tensions in the Balkans for granted, modern policy makers argue that we must not allow Balkan troubles to get out of control again. Clearly, resolve and forceful intervention would break the cycle of violence and spare Europe a return to history.

The analogy that most policy makers draw is fundamentally flawed, however. While we understand the possible repercussions of Balkan conflict, most observers have been satisfied with superficial analysis about the causes of conflict. If we truly seek to break the cycle of violence, an honest appraisal of underlying tensions must be made. For our policies to succeed, they must first address the correct problems.

The Macedonian question has played a prominent role in Balkan politics for over a century. It continues to influence not only the concept and creation of Macedonia, but also the relations among the southern Balkan states. Although current issues associated with Macedonian independence add a new dimension to the century old problem, insofar as Macedonia has never before existed as a sovereign state, historical precedent continues to guide states' political courses. But if one peels away the layers of myth, historiography, popular opinion, and excuses, what emerges is a basic tension over geo-strategic concerns which have not changed in one hundred years.

**The Birth of Balkan Nationalism**

From the 14<sup>th</sup> century until 1913, the Ottoman empire organized its territories into millets which were determined by religion rather than language or ethnicity. Christians, specifically Orthodox Christians, inhabited the millet encompassing geographic Macedonia.[1] Though the terms "Bulgarian" and "Greek" existed, they referred to social classes more than ethnic groups. "Bulgarian" denoted either the peasant class or all Slavs. "Greeks" composed the Orthodox Christian merchant class. If a peasant rose to the rank of a merchant, he was "Hellenized" and Greek, regardless of his ethnic background.[2]

Nationalism, born in the Enlightenment period, arrived in the Balkans in the late 18<sup>th</sup> to early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Greek nationalism emerged first which, though based on western thought, found its roots in 13<sup>th</sup> century Byzantium. Greek-speaking intellectuals expressed their nationalism through the uncanonical formation of an independent Orthodox church separate from

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[1]The term "geographic Macedonia" is used occasionally in this chapter to distinguish the larger geographic region of Macedonia from the smaller Macedonian state which emerged after World War II. Loring M. Danforth, <u>The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World</u> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 57-8.

[2]Ibid., 59.

the Constantinople Patriarchate (or Greek Patriarchate in Constantinople) in 1833.[3] Greece,

Serbia, and Romania emerged as independent states around this time.[4]

Bulgaria declared its own Orthodox Church in 1870, and the sultan approved the

arrangement to balance the Bulgarian and Greek churches against each other. Despite the

sultan's desire, the two autocephalous churches and the nationalisms that spawned them

disrupted the empire's millet system. Bulgarian nationalism expressed through a national church

led to a revolt within the decade. It concluded with the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano establishing

Bulgaria. The "imagined" community, which Benedict Anderson addresses in his work on

nationalism, devolved from an Orthodox Christian millet into smaller nationalist communities.[5]

This fragmentation occurred during the decline of the Ottoman empire; as Ottoman control

weakened, the Christian communities did not have to unite against a common foreign enemy and

instead competed against each other for territorial control.

The border states of the Ottoman empire experienced the nationalist thrust, while the

interior remained largely untouched. As intellectuals fostered the growing nationalism and a

thriving middle class fostered intellectuals, the poorer interior regions lagged behind the trade

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[3]Basil G. Gounaris, "Social Cleavages and National 'Awakening' in Ottoman Macedonia," Eastern European Quarterly 29 (Winter 1995): 409.

[4]The Serbian Patriarchate has existed since 1557. The only area not controlled by the Greek Patriarchate in Constantinople, until the founding of the Bulgarian Exarchate, was Serbia. Hugh Poulton, Who are the Macedonians? (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995), 37. Greece was recognized in 1830, Serbia was an autonomous principality in 1829 and fully independent in 1878, and Romania was a de facto state beginning in 1861 but did not receive recognition until 1878 (the Treaty of Berlin).

[5]Danforth, 58.

oriented exterior regions.[6] As the exterior regions broke away and formed independent states,

they attempted to expand their influence and territory into bordering areas still controlled by the

Ottomans, primarily Macedonia.

In this period of early nationalist awakenings, the Balkan states experienced a shortage of

weapons and funding. Because of this shortage and the resulting inability to unite forcibly a

population, the states relied heavily on ideology to evoke a sense of allegiance in the people.

Leaders based national rights on historical claims, because historical rights were more easily

propagated among the people than natural rights. As a result of historical interpretation, the

sense of national identity was tied to territory and ethnicity. In this manner, the intellectuals of

the 19th century created the Balkan "ethnic nations."[7]

Religion played a major role in justifying territorial claims during this contest, as

witnessed in the San Stefano Treaty. The treaty decreed that all parishes which had chosen the

vernacular (Slavic language) for service would belong to Greater Bulgaria. The Treaty of Berlin

undid the arrangement to curtail a strong, pro-Russian state in the Balkans, but also created

further competition for state influence.[8] The competing churches, primarily Bulgarian and

Greek, conducted propaganda campaigns among their followers to foster a national identity. As

each church won converts, the respective states could claim a percentage of the population as

rightfully belonging to their nation-state.[9]

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[6]Gounaris, 410.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Poulton, 38-9.

[9]Danforth, 58-9.

Initially, the people of geographic Macedonia tended to side with the Bulgarians. A linguistic chain of similar dialects stretching from Serbia to Bulgaria created a more natural bond with Bulgarians than with Greeks.[10] Some intellectuals even attempted to unify the dialects into one common language. After establishing the Bulgarian Exarchate, though, Bulgaria tried to impose an eastern Bulgarian dialect on Macedonia. Macedonian literary figures and school teachers resisted, and dictionaries began referring to a distinct "Slavo-Macedonian" or "Macedonian" language.[11]

In spite of these struggles, most Macedonian inhabitants did not claim any national affiliation unless pressured to do so. Macedonia was a tumultuous region within which three states fought their battles against each other. Either guerrilla bands would force peasants to assist them or peasants would take advantage of the larger conflict to fight local vendettas. Moreover, national preferences corresponded to social cleavages rather than ethnic groups. In both cases, professions of loyalty and nationality were fleeting.[12]

Leading up to the Balkan Wars, Serbia began campaigning actively for control of Macedonia. Though both Bulgarians and Serbs are Slavic, the term "Bulgarian" had been used

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[10]The "linguistic chain" from Serbia to Bulgaria was a series of Slavic dialects. The closer the dialects were to each other geographically, the closer they were linguistically. Thus someone in Macedonia could understand western Bulgarian though perhaps not eastern Bulgarian. Ibid., 67.

[11]Danforth argues that the distinction between a dialect and language is often political, not linguistic, and defines a language "as a dialect with an army and navy." As Macedonia lacked either an army or a navy until its inclusion in Yugoslavia, Greek historians claim that the Yugoslavian government falsely created the Macedonian language. Danforth, 62-4, 67.

[12]Gounaris, 420-1; Danforth, 59-60.

to describe all Slavs. The Serbs had to overcome that linguistic hurdle to establish themselves as the Slavic leader of Macedonia. To justify its claim, Serbia declared the Macedonians a "transitional group" which had not yet matured to nationhood. Nonetheless, the Serbs claimed that the Macedonians were "incipient Serbs" and should be incorporated into a Serbian state.[13] This effort lacked local support, though, and as the last group to claim Macedonia, the Serbs' position was considered tenuous at best. These factors would influence Serbian policy down through Tito's reign in Yugoslavia.

**Early Macedonian Nationalism**

Macedonian leaders did not initially realize the possible political repercussions of a distinct Macedonian language. Even after the publication of Krste Misirkov's <u>On Macedonian Matters</u> in 1903, most Macedonian leaders did not heed the call for a separate national identity. Perhaps only one organization, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO),[14] recognized the tentative development of an independent national identity before 1900. Ironically, VMRO's greatest failure occurred the same year that Misirkov published his book outlining the argument for an independent Macedonia.

The VMRO wanted to liberate Macedonia from Ottoman control. Beyond that, its aims were ambiguous. Though the organization included several pro-Bulgarian factions, the group

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[13]Henry R. Wilkinson, <u>Maps and Politics: A Review of the Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia</u> (Liverpool: At the University Press, 1951), 258; quoted in Danforth, 64.

[14]The "V" in VMRO stands for "inner" in Bulgarian.

consensus shied away from union with Bulgaria. The very nature of the VMRO's leaders, radical and socialist, created tensions with the Exarchate, a primary source of Bulgarian nationalism.[15]

In response, the Supreme Macedonian Committee was established in Sofia in 1895 with support from the Bulgarian government. While the second group clearly wanted Macedonian independence from the Ottoman empire, they saw it as a step towards Bulgaria's annexation of the region and a restoration of the San Stefano Treaty's Greater Bulgaria. The Supremacists, as they would later be known, also found support among the large Macedonian immigrant and refugee population in Sofia.[16]

Over the next several years, the Supremacists launched numerous failed uprisings against the Ottomans in Macedonia. Each time the peasant population bore the brunt of Ottoman reprisals. The Supremacists hoped the Ottoman repressions would spur the Great Powers to action. However, the Great Powers feared Balkan instability and Russian hegemony in the region and instead defended the status quo power arrangement.

These rebellions caused VMRO to hasten its plans for an uprising for fear that they would lose their revolutionary edge to the Supremacists. In August 1903, VMRO launched the Ilinden uprising which declared the short-lived Kruševo Republic. Unlike most nationalist movements at the time, the Kruševo Republic pledged to respect Christians and Muslims equally.[17]

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[15]Poulton, 55.

[16]Ibid., 53.

[17]Ibid., 57.

Nonetheless, violence occurred against the Muslim Turks and Albanians who organized for their own self-defense. Together with the Ottomans, they crushed the rebellion's last remains by October.

The VMRO failed to learn a valuable lesson from the Supremacist's earlier uprisings: they lacked peasant support. While intellectuals and radicals fought over Macedonia's fate, the peasant population exhibited virtually no national leanings and were tired of paying the price for continued rebellion. Moreover, the ability of the VMRO and Supremacists to elude Ottoman control caused the Greeks and Serbs to adopt similar guerilla tactics. In 1905 the Ottomans and Albanian Muslims also began using smaller units to retaliate against rebellious organizations. Violence and terrorism escalated in Macedonia.

The VMRO grew more pro-Bulgarian after the Ilinden uprising and lost much of its independent nationalist agenda. When Misirkov published his book calling for an independent Macedonia, the Bulgarian government exiled him to Russia.[18] The early Macedonian nationalist movement disappeared.

## The Balkan Wars

The Balkan Wars occurred because the independent Balkan states (Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece) acquired the necessary financial support and weaponry. For the first time, they could rely on traditional sources of state power to take full advantage of the Ottoman Empire's decline.

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[18]Ibid., 58.

They united against Turkey and almost pushed the Ottomans off of the European continent. Because of the war's geography, Greek and Serbian troops mostly fought in Macedonia while Bulgaria attacked on the Edirne front.

After the fighting ended, the Greeks and Serbs formed an alliance against Bulgaria thereby denying it the territory it should have gained in Macedonia by terms of the alliance. Having suffered the worst fighting against the Turks and anxious to regain Macedonia, Bulgaria struck back with a vengeance at its former allies. Unfortunately for Bulgaria, it ended up fighting a multi-front war as Turkey and Romania joined Greece and Serbia. The Bucharest Peace Treaty ending the Second Balkan War divided Macedonia into three regions, the smallest of which went to Bulgaria. Macedonia's borders as outlined in the treaty survived intact for most of the century.

The Balkan Wars were a turning point in Balkan history for several reasons, not the least of which was the denial of Macedonian territory to Bulgaria. Though Bulgaria had failed in its earlier subversive attempts to regain the region, Bulgarian leaders believed that open warfare would secure their goals.[19] The Balkan Wars indicated that their success was not guaranteed; in fact, Bulgaria would fail to regain Macedonia in both World War I and II. As Bulgarian success appeared less and less likely, the connections between Bulgaria and Macedonia faded.

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[19]Ibid., 73.

More importantly for current considerations, the Balkan Wars marked the first time that the post-Ottoman independent states used traditional sources of state power to gain state goals. The states used military strength to pursue strategic territorial acquisitions.[20]

Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece found Macedonia to be a convenient battleground to fight for regional hegemony as Macedonia was wedged between them. However, Macedonia's allure was much greater than that. Though a relatively poor land of wool, cotton, and wheat production, Macedonia straddled several main trading routes that connected the Austro-Hungarian Empire with the Balkan Peninsula and the Adriatic Sea with Constantinople.

The Greeks pioneered new trade routes as early as the 18th century to connect Vienna to Salonika (Thessaloniki) and on to Constantinople. Though north-south trade routes through Sofia existed, the routes via Skopje were more direct. Moreover, Macedonia was the only area in the southern Balkans where the mountains could be crossed both north to south and east to west.[21] The Ottomans encouraged this trade by cutting the overland tax rate out of Salonika to less than half that on shipping.[22]

The age of the railroad reenforced the trade routes through Macedonia. Following the Crimean War, Western European banks believed that trade through the region would increase.

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[20]Bulgaria had the largest army in Europe in proportion to its population, and Greece hosted a large naval fleet. Ibid., 72-3.

[21]Misha Glenny, "The Macedonian Question: Still No Answers," Social Research 62 (Spring 1995): 146.

[22]John R. Lampe and Marvin R. Jackson, Balkan Economic History, 1550-1950: From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982), 43.

They recognized Macedonia's commercial potential as a conduit for the goods. One banker convinced the Ottomans to build a railroad from Salonika through Skopje to Mitrovica in 1873. The Porte only supported the railroad for its military potential to move troops quickly into the region to suppress Macedonian revolts and protect the Serbian border.[23]

The Porte never allowed a railroad to connect Sofia and Skopje in spite of the obvious economic benefits. The military leaders did concede to an east-west rail link of Bitola, Salonika, and Istanbul in the 1890s, which builders eventually extended to Durazzo (Durres) on the Adriatic coast. Once again the primary motivation for the railroad was the transport of troops, though the rail followed an important commercial route.[24] (See attached maps.)

These connections made Macedonia a key strategic location for states wishing to control, expand, and profit from Balkan trade and move troops. Following the Bucharest Treaty, Greece controlled most of the east-west rail link through Salonika and captured the Salonika shipping market. Greece also controlled the southern end of the north-south trade route; Serbia gained the remainder of the route which extended through Skopje to Belgrade and beyond.[25] The mountain passes and caravan routes between Durazzo, Skopje, and Sofia also came under Serb control.

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[23]Mitrovica is currently called either Kosovska Mitrovica or Titova Mitrovica in Serbo-Croatian. Ibid., 299, 302.

[24]Ibid., 298-303; Paul Robert Magocsi, Historical Atlas of East Central Europe (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1993), 90-1.

[25]Magocsi, figures 26a and 26b (p.85), 27c (p.89).

One additional strategic interest motivated Bulgarian action: Geographic Macedonia bordered on the Aegean Sea.[26] Bulgaria was especially interested in gaining direct land access to the sea, and the Bucharest Treaty granted them that access in Central Thrace. Later, at the Paris Peace Conference ending World War II, Bulgaria would request portions of either Western Thrace or Aegean Macedonia to border the sea.[27]

While the primary goal of these territorial acquisitions was strategic, the countries involved had not given up their ethnic claims to Macedonia. Because Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria had had to rely on ideology and historical rights for earlier expansion, national unification remained an important goal. Conveniently, this coincided with commercial and military concerns.

The achievement of Greece's aspirations further connected its strategic and ethnic goals. Greece and Bulgaria engaged in massive population relocations as Slavs in Aegean Macedonia, the territory ceded to Greece, moved to Bulgaria. At the same time, Greeks from Bulgaria and Turkey moved into Aegean Macedonia. These movements fundamentally changed the ethnic balance of the Macedonian regions.

Greece bolstered this position by hellenizing all Slavic town names between 1913-1928 and hellenizing all Slavic personal names by 1936.[28] The Greeks could then deny Slav claims to

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[26]Macedonia, the administrative unit since World War II, has never bordered on the Aegean Sea.

[27]Bulgaria did not gain Western Thrace or parts of Macedonia, and in fact lost its access through Central Thrace to the Aegean Sea.

[28]Danforth, 69.

Aegean Macedonia based on ethnicity. In the future, strategic interests truly would overlap

ethnic concerns. This issue arose in the Greek Civil War when Tito gave material and troop

assistance to the Greek communists. Many Yugoslav Macedonians volunteered in the Greek

communist army, and many "slavophone Greeks" also used the opportunity to rebel against the

Greek government. After the communists lost, the Greek government exiled many slavophone

Greeks while others fled. The Greek government did not allow the refugees' return until the

1980s. The Greek Civil War bolstered Greek fears that its hold on the Slavic population in

Aegean Macedonia was tenuous and sparked further forcible assimilation efforts.[29] Greek fears

and Macedonian resentments stemming from the Greek Civil War continue to influence leaders

today.

**Macedonian Nationalism Reemergent**

At the conclusion of World War II, Yugoslavia (Serbia) controlled 39% of geographic

Macedonia in spite of having the most questionable claim to the area. Serbianization plans from

the past 50 years had failed, and Yugoslavia found itself needing to somehow justify its

territorial gains. Tito and his government began advocating a policy of "ethnogenesis," creating

and molding a Macedonian nation, within the Yugoslav federation.

The Macedonian communists, in conjunction with the central government, pursued

several policies to encourage the Macedonian identity. Language planners established an official

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[29]Ibid., 75-7.

Macedonian literary language distinct from both Bulgarian and Serbian. The government also established an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church centered around the ancient Ohrid archdiocese. Historians argued that they had traced the Macedonian nation back to the original Slavic tribes which had invaded the Balkans thirteen centuries earlier. Saints Cyril and Methodius were hailed as founders of Macedonian nationhood.[30] Finally, the Yugoslav constitution recognized the Macedonian nation as one of the constituent founders of the state.

Greek scholars argue that these policies clearly indicate that the Yugoslav government artificially created the Macedonian nation. While Yugoslavia pursued "ethnogenesis" policies thoroughly and forcefully, it is wrong to believe that these policies created a Macedonian identity. The Serb argument (voiced at the end of the 19th century) that Macedonia was a "transitional group" remained applicable following World War II. By that time, observers and historians recorded that Macedonians were not Bulgarian or Serbian, though they disagreed as to whether the Macedonians had coalesced into a nation.[31] Serbia had not been able to impose its ethnicity on the region since the Balkan Wars, and the prolonged separation from Bulgaria had weakened those cultural ties.

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the government's policies, especially in regards to a Macedonian language, paralleled plans voiced by early Macedonian nationalists. After Bulgaria exiled Misirkov to Russia, it destroyed most copies of his book, On Macedonia Matters. The

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[30]Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia: Civil Conflict, Politics of Mutation, National Identity (New Rochelle, NY: Aristide D. Caratzas, Publisher, 1964), 292-4; Danforth, 67; Poulton, 116-8.

[31]Danforth, 66.

language planners of Yugoslavia did not base their work on Misirkov's book. Nonetheless, they established the same northwestern dialect which Misirkov had advocated a half century earlier as the Macedonian language. The establishment of an official language "confirmed what was already *de facto* practice...it granted recognition to a literary language whose modern development began in the 19th century."[32]

While Yugoslavia encouraged a Macedonian identity, at most the government can be accused of speeding up the nation-building process. Tito desired to safeguard his new territory from Bulgarian irredentist designs as well as Serbian expansion and domination of the Yugoslav federation. To do so, he found it politically expedient to recognize the development of a Macedonian nation. Bulgaria also conceded the existence of a Macedonian nation, though it hoped it could be incorporated into Bulgaria in the same manner that Macedonia had joined Yugoslavia. Greece did not recognize a Macedonian nation, realizing fully that it would threaten its strategic holdings in Aegean Macedonia. As in the Balkan Wars, the states involved shrouded their continuing strategic interests in ethnic terms.

Yugoslav plans began to go awry in the 1960s. A central immigration agency in Skopje had propagated the "ethnogenesis" policies to immigrant communities in Canada, the United States, and Australia. Many communities had adopted the Macedonian identity, shedding earlier hyphenated names (Bulgarian-Macedonian or Greek-Macedonian). The Macedonians abroad found existence within a Yugoslav federation too limiting, however, and advocated an

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[32]Victor Friedman, "The Sociolinguists of Literary Macedonia," <u>International Journal of Language</u> 52 (1985): 35; quoted in Danforth, 67.

independent unified Macedonia. The government abandoned its overseas policies to focus on the closer and more controllable Republic of Macedonia population.[33]

## The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)

On September 8, 1991, Macedonia held a referendum to determine whether to declare its independence from Yugoslavia. The government allowed Macedonian citizens and any person who identified himself as an ethnic Macedonian to vote, including the large Macedonian populations in the US, Canada, and Australia. Votes from immigrant communities overseas were only unofficial; the government wanted to use the immigrant votes as psychological support for whatever decision the people of Macedonia made. However, the immigrant communities overseas had long supported an independent Macedonia, and the Macedonian government clearly believed that its population also wanted independence.[34] Not surprisingly, Macedonia voted to secede.

Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov achieved a major diplomatic success when the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) withdrew without violence: only Macedonia seceded peacefully from Yugoslavia. Serb leaders later admitted that they had withdrawn to avoid a non-contiguous front war in Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia. They believed that internal and external tensions

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[33]Kofos, 294-5.

[34]Danforth, 98-100, 143.

would cause the state to collapse and that Serbia would soon control the region again.[35]  The deal

with Yugoslavia left Macedonia without any weapons to defend itself.

Reportedly, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic offered in 1993 to partition Macedonia

among Serbia, Greece, and Albania.[36]  Athens declined the offer, and the possibility of a land

grab was averted—temporarily.  The threat continued to exist that if internal tensions grew too

great, other Balkan states would find it necessary or opportune to support their ethnic minorities

in Macedonia.  Internal tensions would also provide a convenient excuse through which states

could pursue their continuing strategic interests in Macedonia.

The 1994 Macedonian census, monitored by the European Union, reported 67% of the

population as Macedonian (or Slav-Macedonian), 23% Albanian, 4% Turkish, 2% Roma, 2%

Serb, and Vlachs, Muslims (or Torbeshi), Bulgarians, and Croatians composing the remaining

2% of the population.  The Albanians disputed the numbers, claiming that 33% of the population

was ethnic Albanian.  Albanian leaders claimed that the numbers purposely underrepresented

their population to deny them equal status as a constituent nation of Macedonia.[37]

Such tensions between the two largest ethnic groups have been one source of political

instability.  Initially, Albanians declared an independent state, the Ilirida Republic, in

southwestern Macedonia.  Albanians backed down on that issue, but the Party for Democratic

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[35]Anthony Robinson, "Survey of the Republic of Macedonia," Financial Times, 7 July 1995. Lexis/Nexis.

[36]Christopher Hitchens, "Letter from Macedonia," New Statesman & Society 7 (15 April 1994): 11.

[37]Duncan M. Perry, "Macedonia: Balkan Miracle or Balkan Disaster?," Current History 95 (March 1996): 115.

Prosperity (PDP), the main Albanian political party, has continued to press for greater ethnic equality. President Gligorov attempted to alleviate some of those concerns when he appointed five Albanian ministers to his cabinet. The PDP wants similar concessions made in the military, police force, and education.

The problems between the ethnic Albanians and Macedonians predate FYROM. Albanians long pressed for recognition as Yugoslavia's seventh constituent nation without success. In the 1980s, Macedonian communists persecuted Albanians more harshly than the Serbians did in Kosovo.[38] These problems stretched back even further to the Ottoman Empire when the Muslim Albanians, along with Turks, ruled over the Orthodox Slavs.

On the other hand, President Gligorov had reason to fear the Albanians. A genuine threat existed that Albanians would withdraw from the new Macedonian government and set up their own institutions in Tetovo.[39] Gligorov could not make too many concessions to the Albanians, though, because of popular pressure. Having finally won national independence, Macedonians did not want to lose their state to the Albanians. Many Macedonians feared that Albanians were attempting to breed Macedonians out of their country; political concessions would only speed up Albanian ascendancy.[40]

Extreme economic pressure has also destabilized the country. FYROM supported the United Nations blockade against Serbia at an estimated loss of $1.9 billion per year. Greece also

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[38]Glenny, 147.

[39]Ibid., 149.

[40]The Albanian birth rate is several times the Macedonian birth rate.

blockaded Macedonia in defiance of the European Union at a loss of $40 million per month to the Macedonian economy.[41] With these blockades, Macedonia lost its two primary trading partners (following trade patterns that had been established in the late 1800s). As the state could not fulfill consumer needs, mafias sprang up to provide necessary goods. Now that the blockades have been lifted, the government faces the dangerous and daunting task of rooting out the organizations.

## Conclusion

Macedonia sits in a key strategic location in the southern Balkans where the mountains can be traversed east to west and north to south. These routes have remained important since the 1800s, when Greece forged and expanded overland trade between the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. Numerous militaries have also taken advantage of the routes for quick troop deployment.

The Macedonian question has revolved around this fact for the past century though the development of Balkan nationalism hides that fact. Because Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece lacked traditional sources of state power after gaining their independence, they relied on ideology and claimed historic rights to expand their influence to neighboring regions. By the 20th century these countries had the means to attack the Ottoman Empire directly and did so in the Balkan Wars. However, they continued to advocate their goals in terms of ethnicity. They did so for

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[41]Perry, 116.

several reasons: 1) the concept of ethnic nationhood was already ingrained in the population and could be utilized to support state conquest; 2) Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece appealed on ethnic and humanitarian grounds to the Great Powers for support against the Ottoman Empire because they had done so in the 1800s; and 3) war could be justified better on moral grounds rather than through strategic interests.

Macedonia's recent problems continue to reflect its strategic location. Serbia and Bulgaria still harbor some designs on Macedonia. Albania has entered the fray since its establishment as an independent state; Albania also wants to unite its ethnic group and assert its claim to the region. Though Greece does not wish to expand its territory, Greek leaders realize that their occupation of Aegean Macedonia is challenged by the existence of a Macedonian nation-state. While a foreign land grab was not an immediate threat after Macedonian independence, there was a well-founded fear that internal political and economic instability could lead to another Balkan War. Unlike in Bosnia, the conflict could extend beyond the former states of Yugoslavia to Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. The NATO alliance and US interests were immediately and seriously threatened.

**Chapter Three: Theory versus Reality**

The Macedonian problem reemerged when Yugoslavia disintegrated, but a full year

passed before the United Nations became involved. After Macedonia declared its independence

in September 1991, President Kiro Gligorov requested the deployment of UN observers in

November 1992. Gligorov worried that hard-line nationalists would win during the Serbian

elections scheduled for December 20, 1992. With substantial army resources in southern Serbia

and Kosovo, only 90 kilometers away from Macedonia's capital, Skopje, a revanchist Serbian

government could have quickly overwhelmed Macedonia's ill-equipped 8,000 man army.[1]

**United Nations Authorization**

In response to Gligorov's request, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed

sending an exploratory mission to Macedonia to assess the need for peacekeeping troops. He

submitted his findings to the Security Council on December 9, 1992. After discussions with

Gligorov and other government and party leaders, the exploratory mission concluded that the

primary threat to Macedonia was external. Macedonian leaders feared a spillover of the conflict

in Bosnia could ignite the Kosovo tinderbox. Because the only major road from Albania to

Kosovo runs through Macedonia (where the mountains can be traversed), Albania had stated that

it would intervene through Macedonia to stop the oppression of Kosovar Albanians. If the

Albanians launched an attack through Macedonia, it was also likely that Serbia would strike back

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[1]Bob Furlong, "Powder Keg of the Balkans," <u>International Defense Review</u>, 1 May 1993.
Lexis/Nexis.

through Macedonia. The Macedonian government further believed that the ethnic Albanians living in northwestern Macedonia might use such an occasion as an excuse to try to secede from Macedonia and join Albania.

Apart from being the main fighting ground in a larger Balkan war, leaders expressed concerns that any crisis in Kosovo could cause a refugee exodus which would destabilize the small country. In addition to the threat from Kosovo, Macedonians believed that Serbia probably harbored territorial designs on Macedonia.[2] Not only did many nationalist groups continue to call Macedonia "south Serbia," but Serb leaders admitted that they had only withdrawn from Macedonia for tactical reasons.[3]

In response to questioning, Gligorov stated that he considered Macedonia internally stable. While ethnic problems did exist, he claimed his government was addressing the problems adequately. Further discussions with government officials, though, indicated Macedonia's willingness to consider a UNCIVPOL (UN civilian police) deployment to monitor Macedonian border police.[4]

The exploratory mission took particular interest in the border areas. The mission cited several border incidents in which Albanians were killed trying to enter the country illegally and found that such incidents could raise the level of ethnic tension. While leaders of the primary

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[2]United Nations, "Annex: Report of the UNPROFOR exploratory mission to Macedonia," Report of the Secretary-General on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 9 December 1992, 4. (S/24923)

[3]Robinson. Lexis/Nexis.

[4]United Nations document S/24923, 5.

ethnic Albanian party in Macedonia, Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), assured the UN

officials that trouble would come from the north, not the west, the UN mission concluded that

external and internal tensions could best be addressed in Macedonia's northern and western

border areas.[5]

Acting on the advice of the Secretary General, the Security Council authorized the

extension of UNPROFOR to Macedonia on December 11, 1992 (resolution 795). The mission

would include military, civil affairs, and administrative personnel, and the UN authorized the

deployment of police monitors if the Macedonian government consented to their presence.[6] The

Security Council ordered that the governments of Albania and Yugoslavia (Serbia and

Montenegro) be notified of its decision. One week later, Gligorov's fears appeared to be coming

true: Serbian nationalists significantly increased their strength in the Belgrade parliament, and a

hard-line Serbian commander was elected to represent Kosovo.[7]

A reconnaissance party arrived in late December, and Canada sent 500 troops in early

January 1993 to begin the mission. Five hundred Nordic troops joined and supplanted some of

the Canadian troops to compose a 700-member force. The UN charged the force with deterring

threats to Macedonia, monitoring Macedonia's borders with Serbia and Albania, and reporting on

[5]Ibid.

[6]United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 795 (1992), 11 December 1992. (S/RES/795 (1992))

[7]Furlong. Lexis/Nexis.

any activities which could destabilize the borders or threaten the territorial integrity of Macedonia.[8]

## US Deployment

Newspapers reported in May 1993 that the Clinton administration was considering sending troops to Macedonia. Gligorov first read about the possibility of US involvement in the Wall Street Journal. Only later was he contacted by Secretary of State Warren Christopher.[9] In May the administration still stressed that deployment was only one of several options under consideration.

On June 11, 1993, the American ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, offered the services of 300 American troops to UNPROFOR in Macedonia. The Security Council approved the expansion of the UNPROFOR mission in Macedonia to include the 300 new troops, which brought the total number of peacekeepers to 1000. Though the administration had announced its decision to deploy troops on June 10, President Clinton did not formally inform Congress of his actions until July 9, four days after Americans began arriving in Macedonia.

Congressional reaction swiftly followed Albright's announcement. On June 24, 1993, 86 members of the House of Representatives sent a letter to President Clinton expressing their concern about his decision to deploy troops to Macedonia without congressional consultation and

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[8]Lund, 64.

[9]Roy Gutman, "Macedonia as a Role Model: Deployment of 300 Troops by US is seen as a success," Newsday, 11 November 1993, 14. Lexis/Nexis.

without a clear mandate for the forces.[10] Two months later, Representative Toby Roth (R-Wisconsin) submitted a joint resolution which would require the president to seek congressional approval under the War Powers Resolution before deploying troops to any area of the former Yugoslavia.[11] During the months of June, July, and August 1993, the Congressional Record notes only one speech given in favor of the president's decision. In that case, Representative Doug Bereuter (R-Nebraska) criticized the president for not making a larger commitment to Macedonia, claiming that ten times as many troops should have been deployed.[12]

**International Reaction**

The US decision to deploy troops elicited an equally strong international reaction. President Gligorov had insisted in May when talking with Secretary of State Christopher that the US first ask Macedonian permission before deploying troops.[13] When finally asked, Gligorov consented. As Macedonian Deputy Foreign Minister Risto Nikovski stated, the mission was primarily symbolic and provided a psychological boost to the country. He added, though, that "having 300 Americans here is an obligation for the United States; in the case of difficulty, they

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[10]Congress, House, 103d Cong., 1st sess., H. Con. Res. 120 (13 July 1993). WAIS Document Retrieval, ocID=6927419316+2.

[11]Congress, House, 103d Cong., 1st sess., H. J. Res. 250 (5 August 1993). WAIS Document Retrieval, ocID=6957925657+1.

[12]Congress, House, Representative Bereuter, "Limited Firebreak Force in Macedonia Termed A Mistake," 103d Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record (13 July 1993), vol. 139, H4516.

[13]Gutman. Lexis/Nexis.

cannot just flee from Macedonia."[14] While US officials avoided making any promises beyond the UN mandate, at least some foreign observers viewed the deployment as a commitment to defend Macedonia's sovereignty.

Nonetheless, Gligorov consented to the US presence against some adamant international opposition. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic visited Gligorov and attempted to cajole and threaten Macedonia into refusing the US offer. The Russian ambassador to Yugoslavia, Gennady Shikin, also visited Macedonia and reportedly voiced his country's discomfort with an American presence in the Balkans. Despite criticism in the US that our troops were too lightly armed to defend themselves, the Russian media pointed out that ships from the Sixth Fleet were stationed in the Adriatic to provide sea and air cover as needed.[15] Apparently Russia, like Macedonia, interpreted the US policy as a serious commitment to the Balkans.

## On The Job

By July 12, 1993, approximately 350 American soldiers had arrived and set up their posts in Macedonia. They joined forces from Norway, Finland, and Sweden and served under the command of Danish General Finn Saermark-Thomsen. Originally Thomsen had reservations about the US forces because of their "shoot to kill" mentality; as one American soldier phrased

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[14]John Pomfret, "First US Troops Arrive in Balkans," The Washington Post, 6 July 1993, A11.

[15]Ibid. Sergei Gryzunov and Andrei Baturin, "'Yankization' of Macedonia," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 June 1993, 1; in "Yugoslavia," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 45, 21 July 1993, 21.

it, "It [peacekeeping in Macedonia] is a lot different than 'sneak and peek.'"[16]  Thomsen feared

that the US troops, because of their training, would not mesh with the Scandinavian troops

already on patrol.  In an interview published in Nova Makedonija, Macedonia's main newspaper,

Thomsen stated in June that his mission did not need additional forces and that the US policy

was politically motivated.[17]  However, Thomsen reversed himself by July, in part because of

Gligorov's claims that a US presence would provide a more credible trip-wire for Serbia.  The

US troops underwent nearly a month of in-country training before beginning their mission to

assure that they were prepared for peacekeeping, and Thomsen praised the US troops for their

professionalism and discipline.[18]

The American sector covers the northeastern border with Serbia, with one post close to

Bulgaria.  From the beginning of their deployment, though, American troops have observed

along the length of the border with Serbia.  Thomsen explained that he wanted to be "loyal" to

the Clinton administration's intent "to send a political message to the Serbs."[19]

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[16]Gutman.  Lexis/Nexis.

[17]"Mixed Reaction to Decision on Deployment of US Troops," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 June 1993.  Lexis/Nexis.

[18]U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Services, 1995), William J. Clinton, 1994, 17-8; Gutman.  Lexis/Nexis; Jonathan Landay, "US Troops Arrive in Macedonia to Keep Watch on Serbian Border," The Christian Science Monitor, 7 July 1993, 1.  Lexis/Nexis.

[19]Gutman.  Lexis/Nexis.

In March 1994, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman John Shalikashvili announced plans to enlarge the US contingent in Macedonia to approximately 550 soldiers.[20] The same month the Secretary-General reported that while the peacekeepers' mandate was still external, internal affairs were the more likely source of conflict for Macedonia. As such, the likely source of destabilization was beyond the scope of the UN forces.[21] In Resolution 908 (1994), the Security Council supported the Secretary-General's conclusion that economic contraction was causing social and political tension in Macedonia. The Macedonian government had abided by the UN embargo on Serbia at the same time that Greece imposed an unilateral embargo on Macedonia, thereby severing the main trade route through the country. Economic problems exacerbated existing ethnic tensions and created social instability. The Security Council broadened the mission's mandate by recommending the appointment of a Special Representative to Macedonia to encourage internal peace and stability.[22]

1995 brought both stabilizing and destabilizing developments to Macedonia. Border incursions by Serbian units in late 1994 continued into the new year; in November 1995, Yugoslavia was the only neighbor that still refused to recognize Macedonia. However, an agreement between the border police in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Macedonia, brokered by UNPREDEP, promised to ease tensions. Greece and Macedonia reached a preliminary

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[20]David Arminas, "US to Deploy More UN Peacekeepers in Macedonia," UPI, 31 March 1994. Lexis/Nexis.

[21]United Nations document S/1994/300, 13.

[22]United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 908 (1994), 17 September 1994. (S/1994/1067)

agreement concerning the Macedonian flag and other contested national symbols. Shortly

afterwards, an attempted car bomb assassination severely wounded Gligorov and threatened to

undo his diplomatic successes. Instead, the government observed the constitutional provisions

for the emergency transfer of power, all major political parties in Macedonia condemned the

attack, and the parliament overwhelmingly approved Gligorov's agreement with Greece.[23]

Lastly, the Dayton Peace Accord began lifting sanctions against Serbia in November at the same

time Greece lifted its embargo of Macedonia.

In 1995, the UN split the UNPROFOR mission in to three parts. The Macedonian

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stevo Crvenkovski, wrote to the Security Council:

> ...[J]ust a minor and perhaps symbolic modification of the name of these forces
> has a clear effect in defining their mandate and makes a distinction in regard to
> the foundations of the spirit of the United Nations actions....With this in view, we
> consider that the solution containing the distinction "UNPREDEP" entails the
> idea of emphasizing the key and most specific issue in the case of the Republic of
> Macedonia - preventive diplomacy and its first application in United Nations
> history and the practice of international relations. We believe that its uniqueness
> and maximum successfulness thus far deserve additional small efforts that would
> underline once again a key principle of individualizing global solutions.[24]

United Nations documents also stressed the Macedonian deployment's ground-breaking nature.

The Macedonian government requested another extension of the UNPREDEP mandate in

November 1996. As Macedonia had survived the tumultuous events of 1995, Russia argued that

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[23]Julie K.L. Dam, "Heading for Trouble?," Time, 16 October 1995. Lexis/Nexis; United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General to Security Council Resolutions 981(1995), 982 (1995), and 983 (1995), 23 November 1995. (S/1995/987)

[24]United Nations, Letter Dated 29 March 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General: Annex, 29 March 1995. (S/1995/236)

the UNPREDEP forces should be drawn down for several reasons. First, the mission was too large and too expensive; Boutros-Ghali reported the mission could save $400,000 per month by reducing the mission to its original size of 700 troops. Second, the Russian representative to the UN, Sergey Lavrov, argued that the continued deployment of troops in Macedonia threatened to wipe out the mission's achievements to date. Bulgarian news reported that Russia still eyed the US military presence with suspicion. If the US troops were primarily affected by the proposed drawdown, Russia would object less to continuing UNPREDEP's mandate.[25]

Though the Secretary-General hesitated to recommend a drawdown, cautioning that the troops' ability to fulfill their mandate would be hampered, Boutros-Ghali recognized the need to placate Russian objections. As a result, the Security Council approved resolution 1082 (1996) which called for a reduction of 300 personnel of all ranks in Macedonia. A US Defense Department briefing indicated that the US troop levels would decrease from about 500 soldiers to 350 soldiers by April 1997.[26] While US troops continue to fall under the UN mandate, a bilateral agreement between Macedonia and the US in June 1996 allows the US troops in Macedonia to

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[25]"Macedonian Official Praises UN Peace Mission," Xinhua News Agency, 17 September 1996. Lexis/Nexis; United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1058 (1996), 19 November 1996. (S/1996/961); "Security Council Extends by 6 Months Mandate of UN Preventive Force in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," M2 Presswire, 3 December 1996. Lexis/Nexis; Petur Pudev, "Russia is Worrying Only Over the Americans," Bulgarska Armiya, 25 November 1996, 7. WNC, article id: dreeu229_m_96002.

[26]On April 9, the Security Council suspended the troop drawdown and encouraged the redeployment of troops at least until May 31, 1997, when the current mandate would expire. These steps were taken in response to continuing instability in Albania. "Holds Background Briefing on Current Operations of the Defense Department," FDCH Political Transcripts, 21 February 1997. Lexis/Nexis.

revert to US command if so desired by both countries. The agreement, similar to agreements with Japan, South Korea, and Panama, provides a legal basis for the US deployment, which is only subject to regulation by the two countries.[27]

## Policy Evaluation

### 1. Why did we do it? Domestic and Foreign Policy Considerations

In Clinton's formal notification to Congress of his decision to deploy troops to Macedonia, he gave two reasons to justify his actions: "[T]o support multilateral efforts to prevent the Balkan conflict from spreading and to contribute to stability in the region."[28] Representative Bereuter provided little additional insight when he stated that our troops had been "deployed to Macedonia in our national interest to avert the further internationalization of the warfare, and to defend Macedonian sovereignty."[29]

The American media fleshed out the terse assertions of policy proponents. According to news reports and editorials, the administration envisioned a twofold benefit for its proposed policy. First, a deployment would counter our European allies' criticism that the US was not involved on the ground in the Balkans. The US had advocated the use of NATO air strikes

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[27] "Macedonia Takes 'huge step forward' in its Relations with USA," Nova Makedonija, 6 June 1996, 2; in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 June 1996. Lexis/Nexis.

[28] U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Services, 1994), William J. Clinton, 1993, 1045.

[29] Congress, House, Representative Bereuter, 13 July 1993.

against the Serbs and wanted to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnians. Several European

countries, led by the United Kingdom and France, objected that such policies would endanger

their peacekeeping troops in Bosnia. By committing troops to Macedonia, the US would have

forces in the region without placing troops within the immediate theater of conflict.[30]

Second, the US presence would decrease the likelihood of a larger Balkan war,

particularly between two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece. A Western diplomat in Skopje

explained:

> The old Balkan conspiracy theory was that the Serbs, Greeks, and Bulgarians
> would partition Macedonia. Would you like to know the new Balkan conspiracy
> theory? Milosevic pushes the Albanians in Kosovo south, and destabilizes
> Macedonia. Then he cedes western Kosovo to Albania, and also lets Albania pick
> up part of Macedonia while Serbia gets all the rest. Bulgaria might object, but
> Bulgaria lost the last two Balkan wars, and World War I and World War II.
> Nobody would care about Bulgaria.[31]

The diplomat's assessment is based on an unusually optimistic scenario for a larger Balkan war.

As Gligorov stated, "It is not by chance that Macedonia is the only part of the former Yugoslavia

where American troops are deployed."[32] Serbia and Greece have exhibited a close working

relationship over Macedonian issues, whereas Albania has developed relations with Turkey.

Bulgaria's place in Balkan politics is less clear. Though it aligns religiously with Serbia and

Greece, historically Bulgaria has competed against and lost out to Serbia and Greece in

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[30]See, for example, Bob Adams, "Macedonia May Be Where The Line is Drawn," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 16 May 1993. Lexis/Nexis.

[31]John Corry, "Why Are We in Macedonia?," The American Spectator, November 1995, 34.

[32]Ibid., 30.

Macedonia. Observers feared that the north-south Orthodox axis and east-west Muslim axis would clash in Macedonia which sits on the crossroads.[33] The war in Bosnia was a similar "clash of civilizations," but Macedonia, because of its proximity to Greece and Turkey and its historical and strategic importance, could actually spark a full regional conflict. With both Turkey and Greece involved in a Macedonian conflict, they might extend fighting to disputed islands in the Aegean. That conflict, in turn, would force world powers to choose sides.[34]

Our policy held an additional benefit for President Clinton. President Bush, though he advocated a tough policy towards Serbia, had been reluctant to get involved in the Balkan conflict. Clinton campaigned on the promise to follow through on administration threats and claimed that he would order NATO air strikes as president. While Clinton was not elected because of his foreign policy promises, a troop deployment to Macedonia served as a face-saving measure as long as he was unable to convince our European allies to act more assertively in Bosnia.[35] One Congressional source stated that the deployment was Clinton's way of "taking it off the top of the agenda."[36]

Interestingly, foreign media sources suggested an opposite interpretation. A Russian newspaper, Nezavisimaya gazeta, stated that the American actions indicated an increasing US strength in the Balkans. The director of the Belgrade Institute of International Politics and

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[33]Misha Glenny, "Heading off war in the southern Balkans," Foreign Affairs 74 (May-June 1995). Expanded Academic Index ASAP.

[34]Ibid.; Corry, 30.

[35]Bob Adams, "Macedonia May Be Where The Line is Drawn," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 16 May 1993. Lexis/Nexis.

[36]Ibid.

Economics, Dusan Simic, thought the US policy would "drive a wedge" into the new spheres of influence in the Balkans: Muslim, Russian, and German/European.[37]

Simic's interpretation draws together several ideas. First, the US had originally hesitated to become involved in Bosnia, instead deferring to Western European sentiments that it was a European problem. Initial negotiations by the European Union (EU) failed to halt the Bosnian conflict, however, and soon NATO asserted its supremacy in the matter. Although membership in the two organizations closely parallels each other, NATO involvement was a concession that Western Europe could not handle the problem by itself. Deploying troops to Macedonia, even under the guise of a UN peacekeeping mission, advanced US regional interests apart from its European allies. Nonetheless, Germany and the US appear to be pursuing mutually exclusive spheres of influence. Germany has courted influence in Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia while the US has exerted influence in the southern Balkans.[38] Bosnia, sitting between the two spheres before the Dayton Peace Accord, served as contested territory.

American policies in Albania also suggest that the US was attempting to control the growing Muslim influence in the Balkans. Although Turkey prevents the expansion of radical Islam into the Balkans, the (Turkish) Islamic Welfare Party's electoral victories during the 1990s raised the possibility of a less secular government in that country. Moreover, many Turks believed the wars in Bosnia and Chechnya indicated the willingness of Christians to attack

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[37]Gryzunov, 21.

[38]T.W. Carr, "Self-Determination or Inviolability of Borders? Inconsistent Application of Principles is Killing," Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy (February-March 1994). Lexis/Nexis.

unarmed Muslims and the West's unwillingness to stop the religious slaughter. Even without an

electoral win by a Muslim party, Turkey's political spectrum could shift towards more

religiously oriented policies. In case that should occur, the US wanted its own ties with various

Balkan states to counter a radical Muslim influence.[39]

The US exhibited marked leniency towards its new Muslim client state, Albania, and

even helped modernize the Albanian army. These actions suggest that the US was fostering

relations with Albania in such a manner so as to make Albanian-Turkish relations less vital. The

US would supply Albanian military needs as readily as Turkey, and the US was a richer patron

state.

By committing to Macedonia, the US could exert some influence over the Albanians in

the country, in the same manner as Turkey was trying to do. At the same time, the US could

demonstrate to Turkey our commitment to protecting a Muslim population in Kosovo and

Macedonia. We both limited the impact that an increasingly conservative Turkish government

would have on our interests in the Balkans while doing what we could to lessen the possibility

that Turkey would turn towards anti-western policies.[40]

Lastly, throughout the Bosnian conflict, the UN and NATO had been cautious to avoid

aggravating Russian sentiments because of ties between Serbia and Russia. Russia expressed its

concern about the one-sided view of the Bosnian conflict many in the West had, a view which

led to proposals to punish Serbia with an economic embargo and the Bosnian Serbs with

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[39]Glenny, "Heading off war..." Expanded Academic Index ASAP.

[40]Martin Sieff, "Active US Support of Macedonia Urged," The Washington Times, 2 December 1992. Lexis/Nexis.

airstrikes. Any semi-autonomous American move into Eastern Europe and the Balkan region signaled increasing American strength and, conversely, decreasing Russian strength.

In retrospect, it appears that the domestic and international factor explanations for the US deployment are too simplistic. Judging by the nearly complete absence of public statements about Macedonia, the administration probably was not overly concerned with Macedonia's fate. Nonetheless, deploying troops to a peripheral area did have several foreign policy benefits. It answered the charge that the US was supporting haphazard policies in the Balkans because we did not have any troops at risk. With troops on the ground, Clinton credibly could advocate lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia and using NATO airstrikes on Bosnian Serbs. By becoming involved in a (peripheral) potential conflict, the US increased its influence in the Balkan region as a whole. The specific deployment asserted US interests independent of our European allies, while still reassuring our allies of our commitment to the continent. On balance, it appears that we used Macedonia as a means to achieve several other policy objectives vis-à-vis our allies and the northern Balkans. We risked little, protected genuine interests, and focused our attention elsewhere.

## 2. What was achieved?

One could judge the American foray into preventive deployment by two standards. First, did the US achieve its larger foreign policy objectives? In this case, the US clearly did achieve many of its regional objectives, to which our deployment in Macedonia was subordinate. The US successfully pushed NATO towards using airstrikes in Bosnia; although the arms embargo

was not lifted, the US did not prevent embargo-busting by Iran; and eventually the US took the lead in Bosnia by brokering the Dayton Peace Accord. Not incidentally, we protected NATO and our southern Balkan allies from the risk of conflict.

If we seek to infer future policy recommendations from the preventive deployment, we should examine the deployment for its effect on Macedonia. US policy makers need to understand the results of preventive deployment specifically, not the general foreign policy of which it is only one aspect. However, that judgement may be more difficult to make, especially at this point in time. Stuart Kaufman defined peacekeeping success as "the complete absence of armed conflict. The more shooting incidents, and the more casualties there are from such incidents, the less successful peacekeeping is."[41] According to Kaufman's model, UNPREDEP has been successful. Border incursions did not lead to altercations, several stand-offs between border police have ended without incident, and, best of all, nobody has invaded Macedonia. In short, no armed conflict has broken out in Macedonia, so Macedonia must be a successful peacekeeping mission.

Unfortunately, Kaufman's model is inadequate for judging the success or failure of UNPREDEP. By the Secretary-General's admission, UNPREDEP's mandate before 1994 failed to address the actual threat to Macedonia's stability: internal tensions. After 1994, a Special Representative from the UN helped the Macedonian government to alleviate internal problems, though that work had little to no bearing on the preventive deployment of troops. Essentially, the troops' mandate continued to focus on external sources of instability while social workers picked

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[41]Kaufman, 231-2.

up the pieces in Macedonia. Judging the preventive deployment's mission as successful when it faced a secondary or false enemy fails to address whether the preventive deployment was, in fact, successful. Not only must we judge if a mission fulfilled its mandate, but whether the mandate was correct. If the Secretary-General correctly concluded that internal tensions were of primary concern for stability, the UNPREDEP mandate was indirect at best.

Nonetheless, any threat of an external intervention that did exist failed to materialize. But was this due to the presence of UN, and particularly US, peacekeepers? One should react skeptically to the assertion that the preventive deployment served as the only, and perhaps even decisive, factor. In spite of Clinton's threats and Macedonian leaders' opinions that the US was committed to Macedonia's sovereignty, CNN reported that the American troops had standing orders to evacuate within 30 minutes should Macedonia be invaded. Moreover, the West's lack of resolve in Bosnia probably created a reasonable doubt in Serbian minds as to whether the US was resolved to defend Macedonia. Thus it is difficult to say how much of a deterrent effect US peacekeepers had on Serbian aggression. After all, Serbian troops basically did push back American troops in 1994 when they asserted that the Americans were in Serbian territory. Serbian troops moved up to 3 kilometers into Macedonia along a 70 kilometer long stretch without any resistance.[42]

Additionally, direct support that Serbia lent to the Bosnian Serbs stemmed from the assertion that Bosnia had illegally and unrightfully seceded from Yugoslavia without the consent of its people. Serbia could not use a similar excuse in Macedonia. Macedonia seceded only after

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[42]CNN, "U.S. Soldiers Under U.N. Command: Peacekeeping in Macedonia," News, Transcript 632-4 (16 June 1994 (3:17 pm ET)). Lexis/Nexis.

a public referendum, and the Yugoslav army's (JNA) retreat from Macedonia resulted from

negotiations between Serbia and Macedonia. Moreover, the Serb population in Macedonia is

indisputably low, around 2%. Serbian encroachment into Macedonia would have been direct and

less defensible to the international community. Although Serbia has shown little respect for the

right of sovereignty, Warren Zimmerman, the US' last ambassador to Yugoslavia, pointed out

that Milosevic anxiously avoids taking direct responsibility for his (or his state's) actions.[43] In

Macedonia, responsibility would be inescapable. Unless Serbia could entice other Macedonian

neighbors into a partition plan, Milosevic would have assumed too large a risk for Serbia to

handle by itself. Reportedly, Milosevic approached the Greeks with a partition plan in 1993,

after UN troops had already arrived in the region, to no avail.[44] If the report is indeed correct,

Macedonia owes it existence as much to Greece's responsibility as the UN peacekeepers'

deterrent effect.

US and UN troops did provide one major benefit to the region. By guarding the

Macedonian/Serbian border, the US and UN troops provided a certain security guarantee to

Serbia. Stabilizing the southern periphery of Yugoslavia allowed Milosevic to focus his

attention elsewhere and avoided a security dilemma with Albania and Bulgaria.[45]

UNPREDEP did accomplish several tasks. It prepared Macedonia for a possible influx of

refugees from Kosovo; it brokered an agreement between Serbian, Macedonian, and Albanian

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[43]Warren Zimmerman, "The Last Ambassador," Foreign Affairs Agenda 1996: Critical Issues in Foreign Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), 121.

[44]Hitchens, 11.

[45]Kaufman, 243-4.

border police which eased border tensions; and it allowed the Macedonian and Serbian governments in particular to worry less about an unstable border and more about other problems facing their countries. As such, the UNPREDEP mission could be best described as a catalyst. While it accomplished little proactively, its presence allowed and encouraged the surrounding countries towards reconciliation.

The durability of those "reconciliations" remains to be seen, and ultimately, success should be judged by the longevity of the Macedonian peace. As Special Representative of the Secretary-General Henryk Sokalski stated, "The real litmus test of its accomplishment can only be seen if and when, following UNPREDEP's withdrawal, peaceful conditions prevail in the host country for decades to come."[46] If troops must remain in the region indefinitely to guarantee peace, as has occurred in Cyprus, the mission has failed both US and UN interests. The aim of a peacekeeping mission under UN auspices is not to replace a state's sovereignty with the security of troop deployments, but rather to support and strengthen the sovereignty of the host country. The US may not have similar compunctions about violating a state's sovereignty, but the criteria seems equally applicable to our actions if we wish to avoid a permanent deployment or quagmire. Until UN and US troops are withdrawn from Macedonia, policy makers must reserve final judgement as to UNPREDEP's success or failure.

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[46]Henryk J. Sokalski, "Preventive Diplomacy: The Need for a Multi-Dimensional Approach" (Skopje, Macedonia: An Agenda for Preventive Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, 1996), 14, photocopied.

## 3. How does the mission mesh with preventive deployment theory?

In October 1996, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, in conjunction with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Center for Democracy, and the Macedonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hosted a conference entitled "An Agenda for Preventive Diplomacy - Theory and Practice." The conference was held in Skopje and highlighted the recent preventive diplomacy efforts in the country. Boutros-Ghali told the participants that "UNPREDEP is an effective demonstration of what can be accomplished in the realm of conflict prevention when the international community demonstrates political will, and acts decisively and promptly." Gligorov emphasized that the presence of UN peacekeepers underscored the world's determination to preserve Macedonia's security.[47]

Over 60 participants with academic and governmental backgrounds attended the conference in Skopje. Their overwhelming conclusion was that the international community must use preventive diplomacy more frequently in inter- and intra-state conflicts, utilizing political, diplomatic, economic, and military tools.[48] One presentation at the conference concluded that "it can be deduced from the Macedonia mission that a preventive deployment can be about underwriting internal stability, as well as external threats."[49] The presenters ignored

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[47]"International Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy Ends in Skopje," M2 Presswire, 28 October 1996. Lexis/Nexis.

[48]Ibid.

[49]Jeremy Ginifer and Espen Barth Eide, "Ethnicity as a Source of Conflict" (Skopje, Macedonia: An Agenda for Preventive Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, 1996), 19, photocopied.

their earlier statement that the Macedonian government was extremely concerned that the UN should not become involved in internal ethnic issues.[50] Apart from the conference, though, academics seem more reserved in their judgment about Macedonia.

Two scholars who have examined preventive diplomacy in Macedonia argue that the mission was successful overall. Lund lists various non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the OSCE, and the UN efforts, through UNPREDEP and the Secretary-General's Special Representative, and the roles they played in reducing tensions. His explanation is long on negotiations and attempts to strengthen civil society while short on the role peacekeeping forces played in stabilizing the situation enough to allow significant reductions in ethnic tensions. Lund admits that it is unclear how much of a deterrent effect the peacekeepers had or continue to have in Macedonia. Moreover, he acknowledges that many of the underlying sources for tension, such as economic stagnation or contraction, still exist. Even though Lund calls the Macedonian case a successful preventive diplomacy case study, he concludes his evaluation by stating, "[I]t remains to be seen whether this prevention effort will continue to forestall an escalation of tensions."[51]

If both conclusions are correct, if the Macedonian case is successful thus far but its future success remains questionable, Lund suggests an unsettling lesson about preventive deployment: in cases which would provoke military intervention, those forces may need to remain indefinitely to guarantee peace. The obvious question that arises is how long is too long? At what point do

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[50]Although the Secretary General's Special Representative eventually was sent to Macedonia to help address internal tensions, his extensive mandate did not specifically address ethnic concerns, but rather democratization and political moderation. Ibid., 17-20.

[51]Lund, 66.

we consider preventive deployment a failure?  Once again, the Cyprus peacekeeping example comes to mind.  While the peacekeepers' continued presence controls hostilities, can we consider the deployment successful?  It began in March 1964, has cost over $800 million, and has no foreseeable end.[52]   While the deployment has stopped a major conflict between two NATO allies, if the aim of peacekeeping is to create a viable peace, the mission has failed.  Even if the peacekeeping failure in Cyprus is judged worthy of the expense because of other interests, limits exist as to how many military quagmires the US or UN would be able to support.

Kaufman is equally ambiguous in his conclusions about Macedonia.  He compares the Macedonian mission to a "semi-hypothetical" one in Croatia in 1991.  Kaufman argues that for a variety of reasons, including Milosevic's unwillingness to negotiate, peacekeepers could not be interposed between Croatia and Serbia.  In citing Milosevic's stubbornness as a reason why peacekeeping would not work, Kaufman ignores the argument made persuasively by others that Croatia probably would have welcomed a peacekeeping contingent because it would act like a shield and protect Croatia (at least partially) from its decision to secede from Yugoslavia.

The antithesis between the Macedonian and Croatian cases that Kaufman sets up in his paper is designed to illustrate why the Macedonian preventive peacekeeping mission has succeeded.  He lists four necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for successful peacekeeping: all parties must consent to the peacekeeping mission, all parties must cooperate with the peacekeepers, the peacekeepers must have an appropriate mandate, and a strong international motivation and resolve to action must exist.  For peacekeeping in ethnic conflicts, Kaufman lists

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[52]United Nations, Department of Public Information, United Nations Peace-Keeping (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section, August 1996), 16-7.

several additional criteria including the willingness of leaders to resolve the conflict, the willingness of the population to resolve the conflict, and the ability of elites to enforce peace within their followers' ranks.[53] He argues that each criterion was met in Macedonia while the conditions were not met in Croatia.

Nonetheless, Kaufman hesitates in declaring the UN mission in Macedonia a complete success. He returns to his theory that ethnic conflicts are "intractable" and that ethnic tensions are the source of Macedonia's instability. By declaring that Macedonian problems are ethnic problems, Kaufman seeks to pin any blame for the failure of peacekeeping on the nature of the conflict, not the tools used to dissipate the conflict. However, evidence suggests that ethnic tensions that do exist in Macedonia are the superficial by-products of deep-rooted geo-strategic interests. Unless geo-strategic interests are also intractable, we must examine whether the tools utilized to offset tensions have achieved their goals. Essentially, "intractable ethnic conflict" serves as a smoke-screen to necessary policy analysis.

Judging by Kaufman's definition of successful peacekeeping ("the complete absence of armed conflict"), the Macedonian case was a success. However, his definition for peacekeeping ignores his supposition that troops can "be used preventively to forestall ethnic violence."[54] According to his thesis, peacekeeping troops should be able to dissipate a crisis situation and eliminate the possibility of violence, especially in a situation where the unique problems of ethnic peacekeeping do not arise. If a successful mission only requires the absence of hostilities

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[53]Kaufman, 232-3.

[54]Ibid, 229.

while troops are present, though, preventive peacekeeping would serve only to postpone violence, not "forestall" it. As with Lund's analysis, a comparison of Kaufman's thesis and conclusion indicates some limitations on preventive deployment that proponents are hesitant to admit explicitly. These limitations stem from the policies themselves and not the situations in which the policies are utilized.

As one might expect, UN documents admit fewer discrepancies than Lund's or Kaufman's accounts. The UN has a vested interest in portraying the first ever preventive deployment, the type of deployment Boutros-Ghali urged in An Agenda For Peace, as a complete success. Only Resolution 908 (1994) and its supporting reports suggest that the mission's mandate did not fully address the Macedonian problem. However, the resolution expanded the mandate to include internal affairs, which Boutros-Ghali originally had envisioned in his Agenda. Macedonia served as the model for what the UN could achieve in the post-Cold War, and it was (and continues to be) politically infeasible to criticize the model.

**4. PDD-25 Criteria (How does this mission mesh with enunciated American policy?)**

The administration released PDD-25 in 1994 after deploying troops to Macedonia. As officials in the administration and in Congress had been reviewing drafts of the directive for the previous year, much of the criteria which later appeared in PDD-25 had already been formulated and outlined by June 1993. When Congressional criticism of the Macedonian deployment began, one complaint was the failure of the administration to abide by its own criteria.

PDD-25 describes six criteria which should be used to decide if US troops should participate in a peace operation. First, the mission should advance US interests and the risk to American lives must be considered acceptable. According to PDD-25's introduction, "US interests" do not really pose any sort of criterion for our actions: "While many of these conflicts may not directly threaten American interests, their cumulative effect is significant."[55] PDD-25 avoids clearly explaining what is in the national interest, especially our indirect interests. In Macedonia, the risk to American troops was viewed as minimal as troops were not being deployed to a theater of conflict.

Second, the needed resources for the mission must be available. Though scholars debate the cumulative effect of peace-keeping on our defense readiness, one small peace-keeping contingent would not bankrupt the Defense Department. Moreover, the use of American troops stationed in Europe bolsters the claim that NATO forces can be adapted to the post-Cold War era.

Third, US participation in the mission should be necessary for the mission's success. That criterion is difficult to assess accurately, though the hostage-crisis with peacekeepers (British, French, Canadian, Ukrainian, and Russian) in Bosnia in May 1995 suggested that the US presence probably lent more validity to a peacekeeping mission. Fourth, the peace operation should have clear objectives and an endpoint tied to those objectives which can be identified. Clinton had more difficulty satisfying this criterion. The peacekeepers in Macedonia were told to monitor the borders and report on developments which could threaten Macedonia. While the

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[55]"Key Elements...," The Clinton Administration's Policy..., 1.

mission seems reasonable enough, it does not really clearly delineate what the troops will and will not do. Compounding this problem was the admission by the UN exploratory mission that the internal situation in Macedonia is just as likely, if not more likely, to spark a conflict. However, the mandate, except for a proposed UNCIVPOL contingent, did not address internal problems. Moreover, the mandate's aim to preserve peace and stability in the southern Balkans describes a clear endpoint at an indefinite point in the future. The UN will leave when stability is achieved, but we have no idea when that will occur. Typically, UN missions are reevaluated every six months to one year to determine whether the mission is still appropriate and what progress has been made towards the objective. The US had two problems in this case justifying intervention: No clear endpoint existed and the objectives failed to address half of Macedonia's problem.

The last two criteria cover domestic and congressional support and command and control arrangements. Domestic sentiment probably veers more toward apathy than support (if only because our deployment was not well covered in the media and most citizens do not know we have troops there), and congressional opinion was decidedly mixed on the deployment. As for command and control arrangements, US forces were placed under UN control while the US retained ultimate command.

PDD-25 outlines three further criteria for the use of American troops when the likelihood of conflict is significant. Presidents Bush and Clinton sent clear ultimatums to Serbian President Milosevic that transgressions in Kosovo and Macedonia would not be tolerated, suggesting that their tough words would be followed with tough action. Nonetheless, there is little evidence that suggests the administration was prepared to back up the ultimatum through our forces in

Macedonia. After questioning from Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky), the administration asserted that the UN mission was classified under chapter VI of the UN Charter as a regular peacekeeping mission which affirms the conclusion that Clinton considered the risk of conflict minimal. However, Senator McConnell noted that several resolutions referred to UNPROFOR (the precursor to UNPREDEP which included the mission in Macedonia) specifically as a chapter VII, i.e. peace enforcement, mission.[56]

Whether because of a lack of specificity as to which UNPROFOR areas should be designated chapter VII missions or a desired empowerment of the forces in Macedonia, the Macedonian forces were authorized by the UN to act as a peace enforcing mission. Under the circumstances, it would seem appropriate to apply the more stringent peacekeeping restrictions enunciated in PDD-25. However, the administration dismissed the additional criteria as irrelevant. Regardless, the US mission would not meet the requirement of "a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives."[57] In spite of official statements which claimed US forces would support Macedonian sovereignty, our forces would have been little more than a speed bump for any invading army.

Considering that few of PDD-25's criteria were clearly met by this deployment, one should question whether the criteria are relevant to future peacekeeping missions and to the success of those future missions. PDD-25, like the Weinberger Doctrine, grew out of a military

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[56]Congress, Senate, Executive Session, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (28 June 1996), vol. 142, S7336-S7337. Congressional Record Online via GPO Access, DOCID: cr28jn96-75.

[57]"Key Elements...," The Clinton Administration's Policy..., 5.

debacle. American policy can be cyclical in such matters: increasing deployments, or increasingly diverse demands on our forces during deployments, lead to military disasters which spur policy reviews designed to prevent future disasters from occurring. If the US avoids a disaster long enough, policy makers may attempt to expand the role deployments play in our foreign policy. Eventually another incident will spark another policy review which again will attempt to place limitations on deployments.

Nonetheless, policy reviews and limitations are important, even when an administration does not completely abide by the guidelines established in those policy reviews. At the very least, guidelines give policy makers a model within which to envision future deployments. Incorporated into that model are lessons from past deployments, successful, unsuccessful, and disastrous.

The model should force policy makers to consider any changes to the military option which a new deployment would cause. The deployment to Macedonia could have reshaped the American peacekeeping model by the novelty of its preventive aims. One hopes that the administration considered what criteria would be appropriate for a preventive deployment when it became obvious that the PDD-25 model did not fit our new policy. However, as the final version of PDD-25 was released the year following our deployment, if the administration engaged in such reflection, it did not explain its reasoning in PDD-25.

Thus it appears that the US does not have a detailed policy model on which to judge future preventive deployments. Because preventive deployment does not fit the normal peacekeeping model, we can expect that future decisions will be made on an ad hoc basis until a model is developed. In spite of the academic euphoria surrounding our "successful" Macedonian

mission, the US is not in a position to draw general policy guidelines from one incomplete

preventive deployment.

## Conclusion

From the tentative conclusions about our mission in Macedonia, one can glean some general conclusions about the efficacy of preventive deployment as a policy tool. To do so, one should compare the theoretical models set forth by scholars like Michael Lund with events of the past decade. As with the specific comparison of theory and practice in Macedonia, preventive deployment comes up short.

The US has focused much of its foreign policy attention in recent years on Eastern Europe, in part because of the region's former ties to the Soviet Union and its proximity to our west European allies. When the Berlin Wall fell, many observers seemed to believe that peace and stability would flow naturally from democratization and free market economies. Instead, the world has witnessed the emergence of numerous destabilizing factors. Most scholars ascribe instability in Eastern Europe to one of two problems: either historical ethnic tensions resurfacing after the Cold War's end, or societal destabilization due to rapid political and economic changes. Both problems certainly exist, though not in all cases, with the same manifestations, or to the same degree. One should take into consideration the range and difficulty of problems confronting any policy the US formulates to counteract instability. Just as there exist multiple sources of instability, so must a policy be flexible enough to address the diversity of problems at hand.

By Lund's and Kaufman's own admissions, neither scenario of ethnic tensions or societal destabilization can be adequately confronted by a policy of preventive deployment. Kaufman argues that ethnic conflict presents unique challenges for peacekeepers and often creates intractable sources for tension. Instead of rising to those challenges and reevaluating policies

based on their past success, Kaufman is content to excuse peacekeeping failure while hoping for better luck the next time. Lund finds that established political processes and nonpartisan governments are necessary for successful peacekeeping. Allowing for the moment that a truly nonpartisan government can exist (which is doubtful), the lack of established political processes underlies much of the instability we see today.

Through these criteria Lund and Kaufman attempt to define when a preventive deployment could be useful and successful. Certainly their caution is laudable at a time when some of their colleagues advocate wide-spread interventions with little consideration for the costs or risks involved. However, by establishing such narrow criteria, Lund and Kaufman essentially eliminate preventive deployments' viability in the post-Cold War era.

Nonetheless, it is premature to abandon preventive deployment completely as a possible policy option simply because it remains to be tested. In spite of UN and academic proclamations, UNPREDEP was not the first case of preventive deployment. While UNPREDEP was a deployment before conflict broke out (and thus was a preventive deployment according to the words' definitions), UNPREDEP did not satisfy "preventive deployment" theoretical postulates. If we disregard the narrow framework Lund has argued is necessary for mission success, we still must rely on the definition of what preventive deployment is and what it seeks to accomplish. Fundamentally preventive deployment is designed to reduce the likelihood of conflict by interposing troops before conflict begins. Unlike peacekeeping, the troops would use a credible threat of force to impose peace on a region. If conflict breaks out, the troops must be willing to halt conflict and perhaps punish the aggressor. Preventive deployment bears similarities in its aims to collective security, just as the euphoric and exaggerated claims of

preventive deployment advocates mirror similar claims by collective security advocates nearly a century ago. However, despite the Clinton administration's preference for multilateral action, preventive deployment remains a tool of both the individual state and international organizations.

Clearly the definition of preventive deployment was not satisfied by our intervention in Macedonia. First, Serbia probably would not risk an invasion of Macedonia without assistance from other Balkan states; as support was not forthcoming, the likelihood of conflict was slim. Second, Clinton seems to have believed that the threat of violence in Macedonia was minimal so that troops were not being placed in a dangerous situation. Without a credible threat of aggression or a credible threat of deterrent force, the preventive deployment definition was not met, and the policy's efficacy was not tested in Macedonia.

Preventive deployment proponents call for intervention in both inter- and intra-state conflicts. Jeremy Ginifer and Espen Barth Eide concluded at the recent conference in Skopje on preventive diplomacy that the Macedonian case sets an example for what the UN can achieve in internal matters, though they also find that conducive conditions helped encourage the host country's consent in this case. They extrapolate from this conclusion that deployment theory and practice should forge new ground in Africa by setting up a peacekeeping contingent which would be less concerned with issues of consent while necessarily using greater force.[1] In advocating a new assertive role for preventive deployment, Ginifer and Eide ignore the admonition of the Secretary-General's Special Representative Henryk Sokalski: "Preventive peace-keepers ought to

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[1]Ginifer and Eide, 21.

be particularly cautious that a well-meant initiative be not taken as a slight to the sovereign rights of their host country."[2]

Ginifer and Eide seem to realize the unique combination of factors that make a Macedonian deployment likely to succeed, and perhaps the unlikelihood of those conditions being replicated elsewhere leads them to the conclusion that the UN should be more assertive in the future. Leading the list of unique and favorable factors, we find in Macedonia an example of a primarily intrastate conflict that was classified as an interstate conflict under the UN mandate so that a deployment actually would be received by the host country. According to the Secretary-General, internal tensions presented the most immediate threat to the state's stability, though UNPREDEP's mission involved only border patrol. Gligorov specifically told the UN exploratory mission that his government could address its internal concerns without UN assistance. When Lt.-Col.-General Mitre Arsovski, the Macedonian Army Chief of General Staff, stated that there was no threat from the north threatening his country and thereby implied that UN troops were stationed in Macedonia for internal rather than external reasons, Gligorov quickly removed Arsovski from his position.[3] Macedonian officials adamantly insisted, at least *de jure* if not *de facto*, that the UN peacekeepers were guarding against an external enemy.

As Kaufman stated, "...[I]f Macedonia—small, weak, beset by threats within and without--will not consent to preventive action, who will?"[4] A country that stands to gain by a UN

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[2]Sokalski, 6.

[3]Poulton, 179.

[4]Kaufman, 241.

preventive deployment may still be hesitant to admit the need for an intervention in its internal

affairs. By doing so, the state would acknowledge that one of its main reasons for existence, the

ability to impose control internally, has disappeared. The state essentially would admit that it

was something less than a state. Although a government would be more willing to admit

impaired sovereignty if the state faced imminent collapse, it is difficult to judge before a conflict

breaks out how seriously it may threaten the state's integrity. By the time the seriousness of the

conflict becomes apparent, the time frame for preventive deployment probably will have passed.

But until the state admits that it cannot exercise its sovereignty, the UN is bound by its charter

not to interfere within the internal affairs of the country, at least insofar as diplomats currently

are willing to interpret the charter.[5] Thus we find an interesting dilemma facing preventive

deployment. The majority of conflicts in this decade have been intra-state, yet those are the

conflicts in which the UN is least likely to participate. The way around this dilemma is to find a

conflict, like that in Macedonia, where a credible external military threat exists which can justify

an intervention. Once there, troops can hopefully exert a calming influence within the country

while the troop mandate focuses on external developments.

We find yet another telling coincidence in the Balkans for future US policy. Although

Zimmerman had urged the US to use preventive deployment in Bosnia before violence began

there, the US and UN rejected Bosnia's plea for preventive peacekeepers. By the time American

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[5]Several scholars, such as Gidon Gottlieb, have argued that sovereignty may belong with
the people of a state and not the state itself, thereby allowing the international community to act
in violation of a state's sovereignty to prevent internal repression and human rights abuses. It
seems unlikely that the UN will adopt this position soon. Gidon Gottlieb, Nation Against State:
A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 36-44; cited in Ginifer and Eide, 11-12.

policy makers were considering a deployment to Macedonia, the world had already witnessed the

horrifying images of war in Bosnia. American indignation at such brutalities was aroused

enough to justify an intervention, though conveniently an intervention in an area that had not yet

experienced atrocities. Had Macedonia already experienced the sort of atrocities seen in Bosnia,

the chances of halting conflict would have been minimal. Even more convenient was the

proximity of Macedonia to NATO's southern rim. The US could afford to become aroused over

a conflict which possibly could spillover and directly affect its interests. How often will two

conflicts be so intimately related, yet with a long enough time delay, that we can learn from our

mistakes in the first in time to avoid similar mistakes in the second? And how often will these

conflicts directly impact something as central to US national interests as our NATO alliance?

Arguably, the circumstances which preceded our Macedonian deployment are fairly rare and

probably cannot give us too much guidance for future deployments.

Lastly, we should consider what sort of commitment the US would be making with a

preventive deployment assuming that all of the above problems are answered and all of the

theoretical conditions are met. President Clinton stated that "we must use military force

selectively, recognizing that its use may do no more than provide a window of opportunity for a

society—and diplomacy—to work."[6] Special Representative Sokalski affirmed the UN's similar

appraisal when he stated that "the real litmus test of its accomplishment can only be seen if and

when, following UNPREDEP's withdrawal, peaceful conditions prevail in the host country for

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[6]A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, iii.

decades to come."[7]  However, Kaufman and Lund suggest that for preventive deployment's

success, international or US troops will have to prop open that window indefinitely.  Perhaps it is

placing an unfair expectation on preventive deployment that it should establish long-term

stability.  But, unless the US wants to station its troops abroad indefinitely in conflicts which

bear an indirect impact on our national interest, we must weigh the costs of a prolonged

deployment and the risk to American lives against the possibility that a stable, viable, and self-

supporting peace may never be attained.

Preventive diplomacy is a noble idea.  While the likelihood of success is limited, no

evidence suggests that the idea is a complete waste of time and money.  In fact, most preventive

diplomacy tools, such as UN special representatives, human rights advocacy, and "track-two"

diplomacy, are relatively cheap and can have a disproportionately large positive influence for the

investment.  However, no evidence exists that preventive deployment works as an extreme form

of preventive diplomacy.  Even if it can succeed in imposing peace on a region, the lack of a real

application of preventive deployment does not allow us to draw conclusions as to the policy's

value once costs and benefits are weighed.

Despite the grand hopes which several scholars attach to preventive deployment's future

role in American foreign policy, the US is not yet in a position to measure the role such a policy

can play in our foreign affairs arsenal.  Those scholars who claim otherwise are too busy looking

into crystal balls and reading tea leaves to notice the incongruence of their predictions with

reality.  Until preventive deployment is actually tested, the US will probably find its

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[7]Sokalski, 14.

humanitarian mission to Somalia or its peace-enforcement mission in Bosnia more instructive for the future of American deployments than anything we have learned in Macedonia.

Macedonia in South-eastern Europe

The Balkan peninsula, 1817-1877

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
Venice · Zagreb · Sibiu · MOLDAVIA · RUSSIA · CRIMEA
Rijeka (Fiume) · Kupa · Drava · Brașov · 1856 to Russia 1812-56 · Izmail
Bologna · CROATIA-SLAVONIA · Novi Sad · Tisza · Sava · ROMANIA · 1856 to Russia 1829-56
Po · BOSNA · Belgrade · Drăgășani · Brăila 1829
SAN MARINO · Zadar · Travnik · WALACHIA · 1829 · Bucharest
Florence · Sarajevo (Bosna-Saray) · 1833 · SERBIA · Vidin · Danube · 1829 · Giurgiu · Constanța (Küstenja)
DALMATIA · Mostar · 1833 · Niš (Niš) · Turnu Măgurele · Ruse (Rusçuk) · Silistra (Silistre)
Rome · HERSEK · Dubrovnik · 1860 · TUNA · BLACK SEA
Naples · MONTENEGRO · Shkodër (İşkodra) · KOSOVA · SOFYA · Sofia (Sofya) · Plovdiv (Filibe) · Varna
İSKODRA · Skopje (Üsküb) · Maritsa · Edirne · Burgas (Burgaz)
Taranto · MONASTIR · Bitola (Monastir) · SELÂNIK · EDIRNE · İstanbul · KASTAMONU · Kastamonu
TYRRHENIAN SEA · OTTOMAN · Salonika (Selânik) · İSTANBUL · HÜDAVENDIGAR · Ankara · ANCYRA
Palermo · YANYA · Larissa · AEGEAN SEA · EMPIRE · Bursa · Sakarya
CORFU · Ioannina (Yanya) · Trikkala (Tirhala) · LESBOS · CEZAYIR-I-BAHR-I-SEFID
IONIAN SEA · LIVADIA · CHIOS 1822 · İzmir · KONYA
IONIAN ISLANDS 1864 · Mesolóngion · EUBOEA · SİSAM · AYDIN · Konya
CEPHALONIA · Patras · Corinth · Athens · CYCLADES
ZANTE · Nauplia · Epidaurus · GREECE · ADANA
Navarino · Tripolis · PELOPONNESE (MOREA)
CERIGO · GIRIT · Candia (Girit) · RHODES · Rhodes
CRETE · CYPRUS

— · — · — International boundaries, 1877
— · — Boundaries of kingdoms and principalities
· · · · · Ottoman district boundaries
◉ Capitals of Ottoman districts
1833 Dates of territorial acquisition
⚔ Battles of the Greek revolution

150 miles
0
150 kilometers
0
Scale 1:9 780 000

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The Balkan peninsula, 1878-1912

GORIZIA-GRADISCA · CARNIOLA · Zagreb · Drava · AUSTRIA-HUNGARY · Sibiu · Brașov · 1878 · RUSSIA · CRIMEA
ISTRIA · Rijeka (Fiume) · Kupa · Novi Sad · Tisza · Sava · ROMANIA · Izmail
Venice · Bologna · Olt · Bucharest · DOBRUJA · 1878
Florence · SAN MARINO · 1908 BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA · Belgrade · Danube · BLACK SEA
DALMATIA · Sarajevo · SERBIA · Vidin · Nikopol · Ruse · Silistra
Zadar · SANJAK OF NOVI PAZAR · Aleksinac · Niš · Pleven · Veliko Tŭrnovo · Varna
ADRIATIC SEA · Dubrovnik · Novi Pazar (Yeni-Pazar) · 1878 · Sofia · BULGARIA · Shipka Pass · 1885 · Sheinovo · Burgas
MONTENEGRO · Cetinje · Prizren (Pirzerin) · EAST RUMELIA · Plovdiv
Rome · Shkodër (İşkodra) · Skopje (Üsküb) · Vardar · Edirne · İstanbul
ALBANIA · MACEDONIA · OTTOMAN · THRACE · Yeşilköy (San Stefano)
Naples · Salonika (Selânik) · EMPIRE · Bursa · Sakarya · Ankara
TYRRHENIAN SEA · EPIRUS · Ioannina (Yanya) · 1897 · Larissa · AEGEAN SEA
CORFU · THESSALY 1881 · LESBOS
IONIAN SEA · CHIOS · İzmir
Palermo · CEPHALONIA · LIVADIA · Patras · Corinth · Athens
ZANTE · PELOPONNESE (MOREA) · GREECE · CYCLADES
CERIGO · RHODES
Canea · Candia · CRETE · CYPRUS

——— Proposed boundaries of Treaty of San Stefano, 1878
— · — International boundaries, 1912
— — Boundary of Hungarian Kingdom
- - - Boundaries of Austrian provinces
1881 Dates of territorial acquisition
⇐ Main Russian campaigns during Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78
⚔ Major battle sites

150 miles
0
150 kilometers
0
Scale 1:9 780 000

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The Balkan peninsula, 1912-1913

**Legend:**

- —·—·— International boundaries, 1913
- — — — Boundary of Hungarian Kingdom
- – – – – Boundaries of Austrian provinces
- ——▲—— Demarcation line following the First Balkan War, April 1913
- — — — Bulgarian-Ottoman boundary determined by the Treaty of London, May 30 1913
- 1913 Date of territorial acquisition

Scale 1:9 780 000

0 ——— 150 miles
0 ——— 150 kilometers

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Canals

1 Kaiser Wilhelm, 1895
2 Elbe-Lübeck, 1900
3 Plauen, 1745
4 Finow, 1746
5 Oder-Spree, 1891
6 Ludwig, 1845
7 Bydgoszcz, 1774
8 Vistula, 1850
9 Oberland, 1860
10 Augustov, 1830
11 Dnieper-Bug, 1841
12 Wiener-Neustadt, 1804
13 Sarviz, 1840
14 Franz, 1803
15 Franz-Josef, 1875
16 Bega, ca. 1710
17 Corinth, 1893

**Railway construction**

Before 1850

1850–80

1881–1914

International boundaries, 1880

Boundaries of semi-independent
kingdoms and principalities

0 — 150 miles
0 — 150 kilometers

Scale 1:8 890 000

## Security Council

RESOLUTION 795 (1992)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3147th meeting,
on 11 December 1992

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992,

Recalling the letter of the President of the Security Council dated
25 November 1992 conveying its agreement to the Secretary-General's proposal
to send an exploratory mission to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(S/24852),

Noting the report of the Secretary-General dated 9 December 1992
(S/24923),

Concerned about possible developments which could undermine confidence
and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or threaten its
territory,

Welcoming the presence of a mission of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,

Considering the request by the Government in the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia for a United Nations presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia,

Recalling Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1.    Approves the report of the Secretary-General (S/24923);

2.    Authorizes the Secretary-General to establish a presence of the
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, as recommended by him in his report (S/24923), and so to inform the
authorities of Albania and those of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro);

3.    Requests the Secretary-General to deploy immediately the military, civil affairs, and administrative personnel recommended in his report, and that he deploy the police monitors immediately upon receiving the consent of the Government in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to do so;

4.    Urges the UNPROFOR presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to coordinate closely with the CSCE mission there;

5.    Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of the implementation of this resolution;

6.    Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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 **Security Council**

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT
TO RESOLUTION 871 (1993)*

## I.    INTRODUCTION

1.    In paragraph 11 of its resolution 871 (1993), the Security Council decided
to extend the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for an
additional period terminating on 31 March 1994.   In his letter to the President
of the Security Council of 28 January 1994 (S/1994/94), the Secretary-General
informed the Council of his intention to conduct a thorough review of the role
and functioning of the Force prior to the Council's consideration of the further
renewal of its mandate.   The present report represents the outcome of that
review, which was conducted by senior Headquarters personnel in cooperation with
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, the
Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the
Former Yugoslavia, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Sadako Ogata, and senior civilian and military
personnel of their offices in the mission area during the second half of
February.   In addition, the report takes into account the developments in recent
weeks, which have contributed to a new environment for UNPROFOR's functioning.

## II.    STRUCTURE OF UNPROFOR

2.    UNPROFOR is headed by my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and
includes military, civil affairs (including civilian police), public information
and administrative components, with overall headquarters in Zagreb, Croatia.   As
of 15 March 1994, the strength of the military personnel, led by the Force

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*    A brief note of explanation may be useful for readers regarding the
terminology employed in the present report to describe the three principal
groups with which UNPROFOR has had to deal in its area of operations.   "Serb"
and "Bosnian Serb" refer to members of that ethnic group in Croatia and in
Bosnia and Herzegovina respectively.   "Croatian" refers to citizens or
institutions of the Republic of Croatia; "Croat" or "Bosnian Croat" to members
of the ethnic group.   "Bosniac" is the term preferred by the Government of
Bosnia and Herzegovina to refer to citizens loyal to it, irrespective of their
ethnic origin.

C. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Establishment of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Command

37.  Following a request by the President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for the deployment of United Nations observers in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to counter the possible impact on it of fighting elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR was mandated by resolution 795 (1992) as of 11 December 1992 to establish a monitoring presence on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).  The mandate of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is a preventive one aimed at monitoring and reporting any developments in the border areas that could undermine the stability of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and threaten its territory.  This first "preventive deployment" of United Nations peace-keepers has proved successful so far and serves as a valuable early-warning resource for the Security Council.  It should, however, be stressed that UNPROFOR has no mandate in relation to the internal situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which could prove to be more detrimental to the stability of the country than external aggression.  Although UNPROFOR stands ready to lend its good offices in appropriate circumstances, it has no mandate to intervene in the event that internal instability results in some form of civil conflict.

IV.  FINANCIAL ASPECTS

38.  The cost of maintaining UNPROFOR for a period of six months, should the Security Council continue the mandate of the Force beyond 31 March 1994, based on the continuance of its existing strength and responsibilities, would be approximately $573 million.  This cost is based on the current recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in its report (A/48/878) and does not reflect the additional expenditures proposed in document S/1994/291/Add.1.  The resources needed for maintaining UNPROFOR beyond 31 March 1994 will be sought from the General Assembly at its current resumed forty-eighth session.  In the event that the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR are increased by the Security Council, the Secretary-General will report, in the usual manner, to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and to the General Assembly on the additional resources needed.

V.  OBSERVATIONS

39.  The role of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia has proved a complex one, involving the Force in a number of responsibilities and undertakings that were not foreseen when the Force was first established by the Council in resolution 743 (1992).  In responding to the rapid evolution of events, the Security Council has adopted 54 resolutions and issued 39 presidential statements relating to the former Yugoslavia, all of which have, to a greater or lesser degree, had an impact on the functioning of the Force.  While this proliferation of resolutions and mandates has complicated the role of the Force, UNPROFOR's record in these circumstances has been impressive, although much remains to be accomplished.

/...

# Chronology of Events

| | |
|---|---|
| September 8, 1991 | Macedonian referendum, vote for independence |
| November 11, 1992 | President Kiro Gligorov requests UN observer mission |
| December 11, 1992 | Security Council passes Resolution 795 extending United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and establishing peacekeeping force in Macedonia |
| December 20, 1992 | Serbian parliamentary elections with significant nationalist party gains |
| December 27-28, 1992 | UNCIVPOL monitors deployment |
| January 7, 1993 | Canadian deployment to Macedonia |
| February 18, 1993 | Nordic deployment to Macedonia |
| April 1993 | Macedonia admitted to UN under name "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" |
| May 1993 | Initial reports that President Clinton is considering a US deployment to Macedonia |
| June 11, 1993 | US offers troops for UN deployment |
| June 18, 1993 | Security Council Resolution 842 expands UN deployment to Macedonia to include US troops |
| July 3-12, 1993 | US troops arrive in Macedonia |
| July 9, 1993 | Congress officially notified of troop deployment |
| March 16, 1994 | Report of the Secretary-General finds that internal tensions pose a greater threat to Macedonian stability than external tensions |
| March 31, 1994 | Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General John Shalikashvili announces an increase in US deployment in Macedonia from 350 to 550 soldiers |
| May 1994 | Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) released |
| March 31, 1995 | Security Council Resolutions 981, 982, and 983 divide UNPROFOR mandate; Resolution 983 establishes United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia |
| October 3, 1995 | Car bomb assassination attempt on President Gligorov |
| November 1995 | Dayton Peace Accord begins lifting sanctions against Serbia |

October 16-19, 1996     International conference "An Agenda for Preventive Diplomacy - Theory and Practice" held in Skopje, Macedonia

December 3, 1996     Security Council Resolution 1082 extends UNPREDEP mandate for 6 months with a reduction of 300 troops by April 1997

April 9, 1997     Security Council Resolution 1105 suspends UNPREDEP drawdown and redeploys troops already withdrawn until at least May 31, 1997

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