Is Germany All It's Cracked Up To Be?
A Study Of Civil Society In Germany

Elizabeth Fritze

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Introduction

In this thesis, I examine the strength of civil society in Germany. Generally, "civil society" is informal community association, distinct from state and market interaction, through which citizens develop a sense of moral obligation. (For a much more involved explanation, see Chapter 1.) While many social critics agree that civil society in the United States is weak and declining, some suggest that Germany is a model of a stronger civil society. My purpose is to test the latter assertion.

I arrived at the objective of measuring Germany's civil society in a rather roundabout way. Over a year ago, I began an individual study as preparation for writing a thesis. Having worked two summers in my local social services office, I was interested in the welfare system and frustrated by the cycle of dependency which the system seemed to foster. As a result, the first step in my thesis process was to research criticisms of United States public assistance programs.

I found that critics of public assistance abounded, among both liberals and conservatives. Charles Murray found that the welfare system released individuals from accountability for their actions and wrote that "the principles of personal responsibility, penalties for bad behavior, and rewards for good behavior have to be reintroduced into social policy" (xvi). Daniel Patrick Moynihan asserted that weak families and communities perpetuated societal problems:

> A community that allows a large number of young men to grow up in broken families, dominated by women, never acquiring any stable relationship to male authority, never acquiring any set of rational expectations about the future--that community asks for and gets chaos. Crime, violence, unrest, disorder . . . [T]hat is not only to be expected; it is very near to inevitable. And it is richly deserved. (56)

Joel Schwartz argued that public assistance relieved the poor from obligations that others had to

meet. He said, "Many oppose judging the poor by the same moral standards thought valid for the nonpoor; they are reluctant to criticize the poor" (32). Responding to concerns that it was unfair to impose morals upon the poor, he found that "mundane moral virtues such as diligence, orderliness, and sobriety do make it easier to escape poverty. That is why a concern for the moral environment of the poor is appropriate, in fact imperative" (34).

After looking at problems in the United States public assistance programs and considering the movements in policy reform, I looked to the issues of federalism and social welfare policy. Considering the call by some critics for the federal government to move to a block grant system for public assistance (as it did with legislation passed during the summer of 1996), I examined how the federal countries of Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States divided social welfare responsibilities between federal and provincial governments. This comparative research did not provide much insight about how decentralization would impact the operation of welfare policy in the United States, however. I determined that, of the five countries studied, the United States already had the most decentralized welfare system. Swiss public assistance programs have successfully incorporated a high level of decentralization, with most decisions being made at the local level. However, the Swiss public assistance programs are only a small part of the overall welfare program in the country. Switzerland's extensive social insurance programs, designed by the federal government, assist many who would otherwise require public assistance. The United States is a pioneer among the five countries in shifting so much welfare responsibility to sub-national governments. I found no decentralized experience in other federal countries to help evaluate United States welfare reform.

Without another federal system's experiences to apply to our own welfare reform, I began searching for a theoretical construct other than decentralization under which I could study welfare policy. One of my advisors, Dean Ken Ruscio, suggested that I look at a few books, including Who's Keeper: Social Science and Moral Obligation by Alan Wolfe. This book caught my attention for several reasons. First, Wolfe's language corresponds to criticisms of United States public assistance programs. Murray emphasizes personal responsibility; Wolfe asserts that each individual must develop a sense of obligation. Moynihan believes that the quality of family and community life will be reflected in an individual's development; Wolfe believes that strong family and community networks are essential for a strong society. Schwartz writes that society should not avoid discussion of moral virtues; Wolfe finds that society will decline if it does not embrace moral discourse.

A second reason Wolfe's book interested me is that he uses a comparative approach. He contrasts the United States and Scandinavia in order to illustrate his points. He finds that both areas have weak civil societies, but these societies have declined for different reasons. Wolfe believes that the welfare system does too much in Scandinavia, while in the United States, it does not do enough. He does not give an example of a country that does have a strong civil society.

Whose Keeper? also frustrated me to some extent. Although Wolfe does suggest that discussion surrounding abortion decisions and the response to AIDS are instances of civil society at work, he fails to set forth an example of a strong civil society. Also lacking is an explanation of how to restore civil society in the United States. If the state and the economy cannot restore civil society, how can the society be prompted to restore itself?

Using Wolfe's book as a starting point, I began examining the body of civil society literature and criticisms of civil society theory (Chapter 1). From there, based on some comments by Wolfe and others, I used Wolfe's and Robert Putnam's statistical measures to find out whether Germany serves as an example of a strong civil society (Chapter 2). Thus, I ask the question "Is Germany all it's cracked up to be?" Exploring this question has involved not only a check of whether Germany has the strong civil society some critics suggest it does, but also whether it is possible and desirable to have the system envisioned by civil society proponents.

Chapter 1
Describing Civil Society

"A general lament that more and more Americans think of themselves first and of their obligations to society only later, if at all, has become the stuff of conventional wisdom," says Alan Wolfe in his book Whose Keeper: Social Science and Moral Obligation (95). Wolfe is one of many social critics who believe that America is losing its sense of what he describes as "civil society" to growing individualism. Although these critics recognize that the needs and wants of the individual are the driving force in our democratic system, they also believe that citizens must strengthen their sense of community responsibility--i.e., civil society-- by becoming active members of communities and developing a sense of obligation toward others.

The logical first step in a study of civil society would be to define the term. However, a clear working definition of civil society is difficult to find. Acknowledging this difficulty of definition, Mary Ann Glendon says that "individual freedom and the general welfare alike depend on the condition of the fine texture of civil society--on a fragile ecology for which we have no name" (1991, 109-110). The purpose of this chapter is to explain "civil society" by looking 1) at some symptoms of weak American civil society, 2) at the vision of civil society that critics believe America has lost, 3) at Wolfe's concept of a sociological moral code, and 4) at two central elements of civil society: participation in community and a sense of moral obligation. Then, I will examine the two groups of civil society proponents. Finally, I will consider some unclear or problematic areas for those promoting civil society: 1) tautology in the liberals' argument, 2) bad communities, 3) moral regulation, 4) the broad definition of community, and 5) citizenship.

Some Symptoms of Weak Civil Society

Contemporary social critics cite many problems as evidence of America's weak sense of civil society. One problem is the weakening of social relationships. This weakening is occurring in intimate and large communities, from the family to the country as a whole. For example, Wolfe and Amitai Etzioni write about weakening family relations, with more working parents leaving their children in child care and increasing rates of divorce (Wolfe, 52-60; Etzioni, 54-88). At the local level, Robert D. Putnam notes that Americans give less time to clubs and organizations and spend less time socializing, but they do spend more time watching television (1996, 1, 13). Nationally, Wolfe believes Americans lack "common stories" which instill a sense of virtue. Even the stories about "Washington's honesty" and "Lincoln's humility" are ignored by politicians who commit crimes, by religious leaders who participate in "dubious moral enterprises," and by passers-by who keep money which falls out of an armored truck in an accident (94-95). Wolfe also notes that charitable contributions from younger generations are decreasing, reflecting a diminishing sense of connection with and obligation to others in society (86-94). Civil society proponents thus perceive weakening communities at a variety of levels.

A second problematic area observed by civil society proponents is the assertion of rights without an accompanying sense of obligation. In Rights Talk, Mary Ann Glendon explores this issue of emphasis on individual rights. She supports the development of individual rights, but is concerned because the development has been accompanied by a "near-aphasia concerning responsibility" (1991, 14). She contrasts the individualistic, rights-oriented legal system in the United States with more community- and responsibility-oriented European legal systems. One example she gives of the individual nature of rights is the privacy right to abortion without

consultation for anyone over 17 in the United States. By contrast, Germany requires counseling, a three-day waiting period, and a doctor's consultation before a woman can have an abortion (59, 65). Glendon also identifies the United States' absence of a law requiring a person to help another who is in mortal danger as part of "the missing language of responsibility" (77).

In the United States, Glendon finds that the emphasis on rights talk creates difficulty in compromising, as individuals put their own rights above any responsibility requiring a sacrifice for the common good (15). When citizens consider their rights to be absolute, the exercise of those absolute rights is going to infringe on others' exercise of their liberty (45). For example, those who insist on the right to ride their motorcycle without wearing a helmet or to drive their car without wearing a seat belt do not consider the burden they would place on others in society were they to become seriously injured in an accident (46). Glendon notes that some citizens believe they have a property right to welfare benefits (31), but she also finds that many citizens are neither "prepared to accept some responsibility for the less fortunate" nor "willing, so far as is possible, to take responsibility for themselves and their dependents" (105).

Etzioni shares Glendon's sentiment and states that citizens in the United States must reconcile individual rights with responsibility to community. He says people need to step back from the "celebration of self" and emphasize "we-ness" (25-27). Civil society proponents argue that rights must be accompanied by responsibility, so that a citizen will balance his individual interests with those of the society. They find that this balance of rights and responsibility is lacking in the United States' weak civil society.

Civil Society Lost

The belief that civil society is declining implies that there was a time when the United States had a stronger civil society. Wolfe believes that social moral codes used to be incorporated into the American population to such an extent that the Founders did not consciously think about the importance of obligation to community (77). Glendon writes that although our founding documents lack language about social organization outside of the individual and the state, "there is much evidence that [the Founders] counted on families, custom, religion, and convention to preserve and promote the virtues required by our experiment in ordered liberty" (1991, 116). Putnam writes about declining social capital, or "features of social life--networks, norms, and trust--that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives" (1996, 1). He points to statistics showing declines in Americans' socializing, involvement in clubs and organizations, political participation, and social trust over the past twenty to thirty years as evidence that our social capital has diminished (1993b, 6; 1996, 1-2).

Most critics find that the decline of civil society began in the second half of the twentieth century. Putnam and Wolfe find that the decline is demonstrated by a distinct generation gap. On one side of the gap, people place high value on their social interaction with others; on the other side, people place more emphasis on their roles as individuals. Putnam believes that social capital has diminished in the generations following the generation that "came of age during the Depression and World War II" (1996, 1). In organizations such as the PTA, labor unions, the Elks Club, bowling leagues, churches, and political parties, Putnam finds that people have been spending less and less time in their social relationships since 1965 (1996, 1-2). Corresponding

with this diminished social interaction, there is less trust and cooperation among citizens, who leave problems such as crime in ghettos and insufficient educational opportunities in public schools unresolved (1993b, 1).

Wolfe divides twentieth-century Americans into the "older generation" and the "younger generation." The older generation, having experienced the Depression, found comfort in social networks such as family and community; the younger generation has accepted the market system as a model for its social relations (76). The younger generation has higher rates of women working outside the home and of divorce, accompanied by a decreasing number of children born in families (52-60). The younger generation has also seen a decline in home ownership with an increase in mobility between communities (62-70), as well as growing privatization of public services, especially in the case of education (70-75). Wolfe finds that these changes in family and community since the end of World War II reveal that market individualism is replacing America's social networks.

Critics such as Glendon and Michael J. Sandel believe that government emphasis on individual rights marked the beginning of civil society's decline. These critics do not oppose the development of individual rights, but they do feel that Americans, with their emphasis on individual liberty, have failed to recognize responsibility to community. Sandel finds that civil society began to decline during the New Deal when the federal government started to "vindicate individual rights that local communities had failed to protect" (69), promoting the individual's right to choose his values by fighting prejudice and intolerance, but at the same time setting aside attention to "our capacity as citizens to share in shaping the forces that govern our collective destiny" (66). The Roosevelt administration found Keynesian economics appealing because the

government could improve the economy "without having to choose among controversial views of the good society" (63). Subsequently, the emphasis in the welfare programs of the Johnson administration was to enable people to live the way they wanted, rather than imposing requirements to work or attend job training or family planning (67).

Glendon pinpoints the civil rights movements as the time when the courts began improving the protection of individual rights, while forgetting "the vision of a republic where citizens actively take responsibility for maintaining a vital political life" (1991, 17). She finds there was an attitude shift surrounding the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision in 1954. Glendon praises the decision as one which lit "the way toward an America whose ideals of equal justice and opportunity for all would at last be realized," but she thinks Americans began putting too much emphasis on the Supreme Court, at the cost of ignoring the legislative process. Glendon believes the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was an "equally monumentous social achievement" to the *Brown* decision, but that this legislative achievement was not appreciated by the American people. People altered their pattern of political activity. They turned away from participation in the legislative process, which requires compromise and collective decision-making which impacts all citizens, to focus their attention on the individual-oriented judicial process, where their demands for one person's particular rights "could yield total victory" (6).

Etzioni believes America's civil society has been declining throughout the twentieth century. He writes that Americans have shifted their priorities from social ties to the free market and self-interest. He describes the change in attitude by saying, "The sun, moon, and stars of the new universe would be individuals, not the community" (117). Etzioni thinks that as technology advanced, people came to view the city as the ideal, where each person could anonymously

pursue his own self-interest, while scorning villages and small towns, where citizens knew their neighbors and were expected to help each other (116). Farm hands living with families became factory workers living alone in urban apartments (118).

Proponents of civil society frequently refer to the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville as a description of the stronger civic virtue which once existed in America (Wolfe, 16; Glendon 1991, 118; Putnam 1993b, 2; Sandel, 69). In Democracy in America, Tocqueville explained that, for Americans of the 1830s, activity in social and political associations kept them from succumbing to the natural democratic tendency of individualism. He found that, where the French relied on the government and the English relied on a "territorial magnate" to facilitate community projects like hospitals or schools, the Americans would use an association (513). Tocqueville wrote, "Local liberties, then, which induce a great number of citizens to value the affection of their kindred and neighbors, bring men constantly into contact, despite the instincts which separate them, and force them to help one another" (511).

Tocqueville described American political culture as being characterized by "self-interest properly understood." He believed Americans realized that taking the responsibility to assist others would serve their own needs. Tocqueville did not expect all Americans to be saints, but he did believe the civil society in America helped create a well-ordered nation. There is a distinction between the "civic virtue" of civil society, through which people compromise, and moral virtue, under which people are expected to adhere to one set of principles (Sandel, 8-9). Tocqueville wrote, "The doctrine of self-interest properly understood . . . cannot make a man virtuous, but its discipline shapes a lot of orderly, temperate, moderate, careful, and self-controlled citizens" (527). Proponents of civil society want to restore this self-interest properly

understood. Whether America's civil society began weakening thirty, fifty, or one hundred years ago, civil society proponents call for a return to higher levels of social interaction and an increased sense of responsibility to others.

Wolfe's Sociological Moral Code

In his explanation of civil society, Wolfe discusses three moral codes or "set[s] of rules that define people's obligations to one another": the market, state, and sociological moral codes (2). Under the market moral code, a person will meet his obligation to society if he works rationally to meet his own economic self-interest. The market moral code arises from Adam Smith's economic theory, where free market trading will produce the common good. Under the state moral code, government must regulate its citizens so that they meet their obligations to others. The state moral code is at the heart of the welfare state, where the state redistributes wealth to serve the common good. Under the sociological moral code, people in society can develop their own systems of obligations to each other through social interaction. The sociological moral code relates to Tocqueville's concept of self-interest properly understood, where citizens work together in associations (or communities) and recognize their responsibility to others through compromise. Wolfe believes that the three moral codes work together and that there must be a balance among them in order to have a strong market, government, and civil society (258). Wolfe finds, however, that there has not been a balance among the three moral codes in countries such as the United States, where the market moral code dominates, and Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, where the state moral code dominates.

Wolfe developed his concept of the three moral codes through an examination of what he calls the "paradox of modernity": people rely on others more than ever in the modern world, but they also disagree more than ever about their moral obligations to one another. Wolfe writes, "The essence of the liberal condition is freedom, yet a people who are completely free are a people unencumbered by obligations, whereas economic growth, democratic government, and therefore freedom itself are produced through extensive, and quite encumbered, dependence on others" (2). The extensive dependence in modern liberal society creates extensive moral obligation. Wolfe finds that citizens' obligations extend beyond family and community to strangers and future generations (3).

Wolfe believes that people in modern society face not only a broader sphere of moral obligation, they face ambiguity in the source of their moral codes because "traditional morality" has declined. He says, "Religion . . . is certainly no longer the source of moral authority it once was" (3). He writes that even though there has been a recent increase in religious association, religion does not hold an authoritative voice in contemporary societies. Wolfe also finds that attempts to develop a moral philosophy, with a universal definition of justice, have failed. In addition, he states that literature has declined as a source of moral codes. He says that "introspective, if not narcissistic, explorations of inner worlds" have replaced "the novel of manners and morals," such as works by Jane Austen and E. M. Forster (4). Wolfe does not call for a return to traditional morality because he believes "moral codes of yesterday constrained the potential of an individual's self-development" (6). Instead, he argues, society must adjust to its new source of morality--the social sciences.

Wolfe refutes the claim that the social sciences are morally neutral. He writes, "Even those social sciences that pride themselves on rigorous value neutrality, insisting that they are only describing how people do act, not advocating how they should, contain implicit (and often explicit) statements of what people's obligations to one another should be" (6). It is within the social sciences that Wolfe finds the three sources of the moral codes he discusses: economics is the source of the market moral code; political science, the state moral code; and sociology, the sociological moral code.

Wolfe presents the United States as a country in which the market moral code plays the dominant role. A citizen's obligation under a market moral code is to do that which is best for himself as an individual (7). Wolfe believes the role of the market in America has extended beyond economics to play a strong role in the moral and social realms, and he writes that in the United States, "the market substitutes for a conception of civil society that no longer exists" (76).

Dominance of the market moral code in social life is undesirable because people strive to serve their own interests, without considering the impact of their actions on others. If a person makes decisions purely on the basis of his own gain, he ignores his capabilities to consider the other consequences of his actions. Wolfe writes, "By denying the moral complexity that flows from the need to take account of others, economic models make fewer demands on the moral capacity that people, as social creatures, are capable of possessing" (50). He contrasts the individualism of market-oriented decision making with the community-mindedness of volunteering: "When we agree to donate time or to give to charity of our own free will, it is because we recognize that others whom we do not know are dependent on the choices we make" (87). Wolfe does concede that economic considerations have always been influential in people's

decisions (52), but he points to diminished intergenerational and charitable giving by younger citizens; increasing mobility between communities; and changes in family structure, such as more working women, smaller family size, and higher divorce rates as evidence that the role of the market moral code is increasing in social life.

Wolfe believes that the adoption of the market moral code means that economic self-interest is more likely to influence family decisions than family interests are to influence economic decisions. He notes that many women work because they need the income to survive. However, others work not because of an economic necessity to meet the needs of their family, but instead "for self-esteem, for greater decision-making authority within their families, and for security in the event of divorce" (54). Women increasingly time the births of their children around their careers and often choose to have only one child so that they may maintain their career with their family. Additionally, in their interest to appear economically self-sufficient, middle-class families do not seek the help of friends or family for child care, but instead pay for child care services (56).

Wolfe suggests that this turn to an economic moral code is not something Americans find desirable. He believes civil society already existed in America at its founding, so the people never created a theory to explain how civil society influenced the country. They took civil society for granted. Wolfe writes, "The small town, the voluntary association, the spirit of the people--these aspects of how Americans viewed themselves contained such an emphasis on trust, friendship, and community that people simply assumed they would always be there" (77). He believes Americans recognized the threat of state intervention to civil society, but while they were developing a critical attitude toward the state, they did not perceive the threat of the market,

which had already destroyed part of the American civil society. Wolfe calls for a concerted effort to preserve the remaining civil society and guard it from economic forces: "If Americans now are to protect the remaining realms of intimacy and community against the market, they will have to create, through conscious deliberation, the kinds of ties of civil society that they once assumed God or nature would automatically provide" (77).

In contrast to the United States' strong market moral code, Wolfe finds that the state moral code has dominated Scandinavia. A citizen's obligation under the state moral code is to act in accordance with the law (9). Domination by a state moral code is problematic because people follow government mandates and utilize government services without evaluating their own moral obligations. Wolfe writes that "the new welfare state, in assuming greater responsibilities, has led to a decline in a sense of individual moral responsibility" (181). He finds it laudable that the Scandinavian governments recognize the needs of the people, but he also finds that the government does so much that the citizens are detached from a direct sense of obligation.

Wolfe discovers evidence of the dominant state moral code in the Scandinavian government's taking over roles traditionally belonging to the family, especially in the area of child care. He writes, "Far and away the biggest component of the increase in government's role in providing services once assigned to the family . . . is the decision to finance and build a nationwide system for the provision of public day care, especially in Denmark and Sweden" (137). With children in state-supported child care facilities, Wolfe believes the government is taking decision-making responsibility about "how children should be raised" out of the hands of parents (140). Wolfe also believes the growing welfare state is making families more unstable,

and that increasing family instability causes the welfare state to grow even more. He writes, "[I]t seems clear that the welfare state makes divorce somewhat easier to obtain and weather (by providing day care for the children, for example) and then seems the most appropriate mechanism for resolving the problems created by divorce (such as providing extra funds for newly divorced women)" (141). Wolfe supports transferring from the wealthy to the needy under the state moral code, but he questions a government which functions as care giver and subsidy provider to the middle class (129, 154).

With government provision of services, people lose their identity as community and family members, relying instead on their legal definitions of citizenship to obtain help (150). A growing state moral code represents a shift "from a recognition that we owe things to one another because we share certain understandings to a recognition that we can expect things from others because we vote and belong to an organized political community" (151). He presents data showing that between 1968 and 1981 Scandinavians increased their contact with friends and relatives, but the character of the contact changed. Most people are not willing to ask for "ongoing assistance, such as picking up or watching children, shopping, or cooking" (145-46).

Wolfe believes that the alternative to market and state moral codes is the sociological moral code. Unlike the citizens following the market moral code, who blindly pursue their own self-interest, and citizens following the state moral code, who blindly accept the government's decisions, Wolfe argues that citizens who follow the sociological moral codes develop a sense of moral obligation. He bases the idea of a sociological moral code on the belief that "[p]eople have a remarkable capacity, given them by the societies they create, to develop their own rules of cooperation and solidarity" (8). Under the sociological moral code, individual citizens are

accountable for others in their society. Wolfe writes that in civil society our relations with other people make us realize our dependence on and our obligation to them (18). The sociological moral code does not have written laws; the civil society develops its norms through social interaction.

In describing the sociological moral code of civil society, Wolfe explains the role of compartmentalization. Compartmentalization excludes certain elements of society from the influence of the market or state. For example, conducting a business transaction differently with a family member than with a stranger is compartmentalization of the family. The restriction against government regulation of religious practices is a compartmentalization of the freedom of religion. Compartmentalization is important, Wolfe explains, because "only by isolating the most sacred of our common possessions can we be sure that we can keep them" (41). The definition of compartments defines the society, as citizens decide what they commonly consider as something to be protected (46). When people work together to define their moral obligations, they gain understanding of others' moral beliefs (233). After playing an active role in a society defining its obligations, citizens will also be more inclined to meet their obligations (246).

In comparison with economic and political moral codes, the sociological moral code is more flexible. The sociological moral code does not have the unbending rules of a state moral code or require the pure pursuit of self-interest like the market moral code. Instead, the sociological moral code requires conscious consideration of responsibility to others (209). Because there are not fixed rules, the sociological moral code gives citizens the flexibility to look at the context of a situation and to adjust moral tenets to fit new situations (229). The sociological moral code allows a citizen to take into account the variety of influences behind

human action. Wolfe writes, "Society... is a process, not a thing, oscillating between rules that establish behavior and behavior that establishes rules" (214). This give-and-take process of the sociological moral code pushes each individual to use his own judgment.

Wolfe insists that the sociological moral code is an essential element in society. He believes there must be a balance of the market, state, and sociological moral codes, not only to create a strong civil society, but also so that the economy and the government can function effectively. Wolfe rejects the position that pursuit of self-interest alone will provide for common good, as well as the position that a strong central authority is required to restore the public's sense of obligation. He recognizes that some critics think he is naive to expect restoration of civil society, but Wolfe insists that he holds a realistic ideal, saying that

> all societies, no matter how tough-minded their institutions, operate successfully because some people trust others, because conformity tempers individualism, because some are willing to let others be free riders, and because not all people press their rights simultaneously. (188)

Wolfe's explanation of the sociological moral code resonates with the works of other civil society proponents. Tocqueville's argument that social interaction offsets the individualism in a democratic system corresponds with Wolfe's call for a stronger sociological moral code in America. Similar to Wolfe's emphasis on interdependence, Tocqueville writes, "As soon as common affairs are treated in common, each man notices that he is not as independent of his fellows as he used to suppose and that to get their help he must often offer his aid to them" (510). Although people begin considering others because it serves their own interest, they come to recognize a moral obligation to others. He states that Americans find "it is the duty as well as the interest of men to be useful to their fellows" (512). Tocqueville's writings could also be applied

to Wolfe's warnings against heavy reliance on a state moral code which causes dependence on government. Tocqueville explains, "The more government takes the place of associations, the more will individuals lose the idea of forming associations and need the government to come to their help. That is a vicious circle of cause and effect" (515).

Glendon also notes the danger of heavy reliance on the state to provide for citizens. She states that "a mere commitment to social assistance from cradle to grave can lead to relaxed vigilance concerning who is eligible for the cradle and who is ready for the grave" (100). Putnam shares Wolfe's vision of a balance of the state, economic, and moral codes. Putnam writes, "Social capital is not a substitute for effective public policy but rather a prerequisite for it and, in part, a consequence of it. Social capital . . . works through and with states and markets, not in place of them" (1993b, 7).

Community: The Source of Civil Society

If, as Wolfe suggests, civil society cannot be created by the state or by the individual, how does civil society arise? The consensus among civil society proponents is that civil society arises from interaction among people as members of communities. Civil society proponents use the word "community" in a broad sense. Etzioni uses the metaphor of Chinese nesting boxes to describe community--smaller communities, like families and neighborhoods, rest within larger communities, like towns, which rest within still larger communities of national and multi-national proportion (32). "Community" also includes the associations which Tocqueville praised. Putnam finds that associations from churches to service organizations to sports clubs to choral societies provide opportunities for social interaction and "instill in their members habits of

cooperation, solidarity, and public-spiritedness" (1993a, 89-90). He does not explain how to distinguish whether an organization promotes "public-spiritedness," but he does emphasize the influence of associations on an individual's development, saying, "Where you live and whom you know--the social capital you can draw on--helps to define who you are and thus to determine your fate" (1993b, 5).

One reason the fate of the individual lies in the community is that each person depends on others. Although, according to Glendon, Americans disdain being dependent on others, few can actually be totally self-sufficient and some, like young children and the very sick, must depend on others to a large extent (1991, 72-73). By coming into contact with others in communities, people not only see others' dependence on the community, they also become aware that they themselves may rely on the community one day. As people recognize interdependence within the community, they develop what Wolfe calls "the concept at the heart of a theory of civil society"--trust (204). Trust rests in the principle of reciprocity. A person recognizes and fulfills his obligations to the society, believing that if he has needs in the future, he will find the assistance of others who are fulfilling moral obligations (Putnam 1992, 2).

For trust to develop among citizens, citizens must play an active, participatory role in their communities. Etzioni finds that the need to take an active stance may be so great as to require a person to create a community himself when he sees a need (125). Wolfe explains that only when people interact with others can they create moral rules (213). Sandel notes that to find the common good, people must discuss the definition of that good. Once the good is defined, people must actively follow the principles they established within that definition (58). In the process of defining its moral obligations, the community will develop its identity. The identity

of the community will be distinct from the identity of individuals within the community. One individual's demand will be "softened" in the community if that demand is not held by others in the community (Wolfe, 113-14). Also, meeting the moral obligation to the community will sometimes require a sacrifice which goes against an individual's self-interest (94).

Just as an individual must make concessions as a member of a community, a community must make concessions as a member of society. Etzioni writes that "societies (which are nothing but communities of communities) must help those communities whose ability to help their members is severely limited" (146). Proponents of civil society criticize special interest groups which pursue their own interests without regard to the effects of their activities on others (Etzioni, 217; Wolfe, 157). Civil society entails not only meeting moral obligations to those with whom one directly interacts, it also entails fulfilling moral obligations to those one will never know (Wolfe, 257). Wolfe emphasizes, "We cannot have families to love and communities to appreciate unless we first have societies that require us to consider the needs of nonintimate others" (100). In civil society, recognizing one's moral obligation to the society at large is as important as recognizing one's moral obligation to one's immediate community.

Moral Obligation

The sense of moral obligation which arises in communities is essential to social critics' endorsement of civil society. Realizing the connotation of the term "moral obligation," they note that their idea of moral obligation is distinct from that of right-wing conservative Christian groups. Wolfe states that the religious right "calls for blind obedience to a handed-down moral code" (5), and Etzioni asserts the Moral Majority "raised the right questions" but "provided the

wrong, largely authoritarian and dogmatic, answers" (13). In civil society, moral obligations are to be developed by communities and changed when necessary. Evaluating a moral obligation requires one to consider the context in which a decision is made, and a moral obligation does not always provide a black-and-white distinction between right and wrong.

Although they agree that moral obligations should not require "blind obedience" to a "dogmatic" set of rules, proponents of civil society disagree to some extent about the means by which moral obligations should be conveyed. Wolfe's sociological moral code draws a clear distinction between civil society and the state, and he criticizes those who suggest the state should be responsible for the restoration of civil society. He separates the laws of a state moral code from the moral obligations of a sociological moral code--laws should be as precise as possible, but moral obligations need to be ambiguous (232). With this delineation between the state and civil society, it seems that Wolfe wishes to keep moral obligation of civil society separate from the law.

Etzioni and Glendon, on the other hand, find that some moral obligations should be conveyed within the law. Neither Glendon nor Etzioni believe the law is the most desirable mechanism to promote moral obligation, but both believe the use of law is necessary. Glendon cites the law as the most developed and most widespread body for social regulation within a large, heterogenous society (1991, 87). Etzioni finds that the coercive power of the law is necessary to enforce the moral order in instances such as child abuse and toxic pollution (48). While Etzioni and Glendon believe law is an essential part of developing moral obligation, Sandel believes that moral discourse is an essential part of developing law. He contends that if politics does not incorporate morality, citizens become "disenchanted" with government (70).

In contrast to Wolfe's statement that lawmakers strive for precision, Glendon does seem to believe there is a place for ambiguity in the law. She says that there is no "monopoly on truth and justice" in legal debates (1991, 176). One example of appropriate legal ambiguity Glendon finds is the 1976 West German abortion statute. The 1974 statute, which did not restrict early-term abortions, was struck down by the West German Constitutional Court for not recognizing a fetus's constitutional right to life, so the legislature amended the law to require that a woman be "in a situation of serious hardship" to have an abortion (1987, 31). This law did allow women to have abortions, while also conveying the principle that a fetus's life should be protected (26). Although the change in German abortion policy may not have prevented women from seeking abortions, Glendon still finds it important that the country's law made fetal life an element to be considered, rather than offering no restriction to early-term abortions. She writes, "In the long run, the way in which we name things and imagine them may be decisive for the way we feel and act with respect to them, and for the kind of people we ourselves become" (62). Glendon believes it is appropriate for moral obligation to be expressed in the laws, and she finds that the laws can convey social norms without precise regulation of behavior.

As proponents of civil society differ in their opinions about expressing moral obligation of civil society in laws, they also differ toward the actual content of moral obligation. Wolfe, emphasizing the role of the individual within a community in developing moral obligation, avoids the explicit statement of any moral obligations. He declares that "the search for universal moral principles associated with much of analytic moral philosophy comes at the cost of assumptions about human behavior that strip individual agents of the capacity to respond to specific circumstances" (224). In contrast, Etzioni does find that Americans must adhere to a set

of "core values," which include "democracy, the Bill of Rights, and mutual respect" (157). He argues that values, "such as the inappropriateness of racial and gender discrimination, the rejection of violence, and the desirability of treating others with love, respect, and dignity," should be taught in schools (97). Etzioni's book The Spirit of Community also argues for moral obligations including the responsibility of parents to raise their small children, of married couples to stay together, of citizens to engage in substantial volunteer activity, and of the government to reform campaign financing.

It is difficult to distinguish where proponents of civil society are speaking about basic requirements for civil society and where they are presenting their own ideas about moral obligation as members of communities. Although Wolfe opposes the establishment of "universal moral principles," he himself makes statements such as "divorce does weaken relations in civil society" (140) and "individual parents are usually in the best position to know what the specific needs of their children are" (163). Wolfe's statistical measures of civil society, such as alcohol consumption, cohabitation, and foster care placement, also seem to indicate some beliefs about the moral obligations which characterize civil society. Conversely, Etzioni, who details many moral obligations in The Spirit of Community, writes in the "Responsive Communitarian Platform", "A Communitarian perspective does not dictate particular policies" (254).

The Two Sides of Civil Society

Each proponent of civil society seems to have a different perspective on which moral obligations are necessary for civil society, but from the various perspectives of civil society proponents, one major classification has arisen, dividing the civil society proponents into two

groups based on their views toward the appropriate role of the state. The distinction between the two groups is made on the basis of whether they believe civil society should exist alongside or in lieu of liberalism. Gertrude Himmelfarb refers to the "C team" and the "L team"--the communitarians and the liberals. The communitarians agree that "a 'value-free' liberalism is inimical to the good life and the good society," but the liberals argue that civil society operates within the realm of individual choice that liberalism provides (12).

Stephen Holmes draws a similar distinction between the two groups of civil society proponents, using the terms "hard" and "soft" antiliberalism: "Hard antiliberals damn liberalism from a wholly nonliberal point of view and dare to draw the shocking political consequences. Soft antiliberals malign liberalism verbally, but when faced with practical choices, reveal surprising fondness for liberal protections and freedoms" (88). The hard antiliberals believe that liberals begin "lowering the goals of mankind, promoting selfishness, and encouraging the pursuit of material satisfactions" because they lack moral guidance (81). The soft antiliberals believe that people should have the individual freedom of a liberal system. The liberal system has been misused, however, and people do not recognize the potential for a "better world" because "[t]hey see the social world as a platform where naked egoisms haggle and brawl" (91).

Himmelfarb writes that critics have emphasized the distinction between communitarian and liberal proponents of civil society since the publication of Sandel's article "America's Search for a New Public Philosophy" (12). In this article, Sandel clearly states that the government must play a role in instilling a sense of moral obligation. He writes, "To share in self-rule therefore requires that citizens possess, or come to acquire, certain civic virtues. But this means that republican politics cannot be neutral toward the values and ends its citizens espouse" (58).

Sandel does not understand the liberal proponents of civil society, who believe government should remain separate from community development of moral obligation. He finds that the civic virtue a person develops in the social realm is connected with his civic virtue as a citizen in the state. Sandel asks, "Why insist on separating our identity as citizens from our identity as persons more broadly conceived?" (70). He finds that obligations such as loyalty and solidarity are necessary to the state, but that people will not develop these qualities if they are acting only as self-interested individuals.

Sandel believes that a society without moral guidance from its government will find undesirable alternatives for its moral leadership. He writes that the Christian Coalition and other fundamentalists "rush in where liberals fear to tread" and provide dogmatic morals to the public. Also, because politicians do not discuss public morality, the media focuses on the private lives of the country's leaders, highlighting "the scandalous, the sensational, and the confessional" (72). Sandel believes that moral discourse must become accepted in the political arena.

Glendon, like Sandel, is a communitarian, believing that the government should play a role in the development of morals. She writes that the United States has no alternative institutions, such as strong religious or community institutions, from which moral development can be based:

> In places and times where law is only one of many coexisting systems of social norms--and not the most important one among them--the silence of the law on many subjects is of no particular importance. . . . In heterogenous modern states, however, common values are harder to identify, while law and its official enforcement apparatus are more universal and highly developed than other forms of social regulation. (87)

Glendon believes Justice Brandeis was correct when he said that government is the most pervasive teacher, and she believes law should be written to utilize this teaching power.

Etzioni is also a communitarian. In fact, he wrote the "Responsive Communitarian Platform," which was edited by Glendon, among others. Etzioni shares Glendon's belief that laws are a necessary forum for moral discourse. He believes that citizens derive their morals from and express their morals in the law to a greater degree than the public acknowledges. For example, he writes that the establishment of a "no fault" divorce law indicated a decline in public feelings of marital obligation, while the reinstatement of stricter divorce regulations "would signal that we were restoring our respect for the family" (48). Etzioni states that the morality in American law is distinct from morality imposed upon citizens in totalitarian regimes because American morality is created within a democratic system checked by the public and the constitutional system (47).

Liberal proponents of civil society, on the other hand, believe that moral development should occur outside the realm of the state. They believe that individuals must make their own moral judgments, free of state pressure. Liberals share Tocqueville's sentiment that "a government can only dictate precise rules. It imposes the sentiments and ideas which it favors, and it is never easy to tell the difference between its advice and its commands" (516).

Wolfe and Putnam are both liberal civil society proponents. Wolfe finds that, considering the "decline of a moral notion of social control[,] . . . the best solution to the decline of social control would be to encourage people to redevelop those codes" (198). He opposes the position that the state should define moral obligation for its citizens. Wolfe draws a distinction between civil society and government, finding that civil society should be the primary source for developing moral obligation because it provides a flexibility not found in government authority. He writes that "if morality is to come from the social activity of individuals, it can work only (at

least in modern societies emphasizing self-development) if people are given a certain freedom to explore alternative avenues of moral growth" (200). Wolfe also believes that direct moral discourse must occur among all individuals, not just government officials. For many issues, Wolfe finds there is no "right" answer, and each person should make decisions for himself, after consulting with those around him, instead of relying on a government mandate. One example of civil society Wolfe provides is the decision-making process in abortion. A woman making the decision of whether to have an abortion consults with others including her sexual partner, her family, counselors, and doctors before she herself must decide what to do (239-40). (Glendon would disagree with Wolfe's belief that abortion decisions in the United States are representative of civil society and say that the government should promote consultation between a woman seeking an abortion and counselors or doctors (1991,65).)

Putnam believes it is social interaction, not government activity, that builds social capital. Government does not improve civil society; civil society improves government. He writes, "In all societies . . . dilemmas of collective action hamper attempts to cooperate for mutual benefit, whether in politics or in economics" (1993a, 177). Putnam bases his findings on his studies of Italy. In 1970, regional governments were established across the country, but these governments have had varying degrees of success in terms of standards like economic development, environmental standards, and job-training programs. He finds that in northern Italy, where the governments were more successful, participation in horizontal associations was much higher.

Putnam concludes that people develop trust in the give-and-take of horizontal associations, like guilds, mutual aid societies, and soccer clubs, where people cooperate with each other on an equal level. In vertical associations, with superior-subordinate relationships,

people become more suspicious of each other. He says, "Cooperation or shirking and exploitation become ingrained" (180) among the people, depending on their social relationships, and these methods of interaction carry over into the government. Thus, Putnam determines that it is civic activity that "makes democracy work." He wants to increase social capital and strengthen civil society, but he is not interested in government determination of morals or moving away from a liberal system.

Tautology of the Liberal Argument

Although civil society proponents are divided into two groups, based on their attitudes toward liberalism, there is one aspect (in addition to an emphasis on community) which unites civil society proponents: they are all subject to criticism. One criticism directed toward the liberal proponents of civil society is that their argument for civil society is tautological. Jean L. Cohen directs this argument toward Putnam, saying "[t]hat voluntary association is <u>evidence</u> of social cooperation and trust is both undeniable and almost tautological" (17). She finds it obvious that social cooperation and trust are present in voluntary associations; cooperation and trust are necessary to develop the associations which then further cooperation and trust. A tautology can also be found in Wolfe's statement that "[p]eople have a remarkable capacity, given them by the societies they create to develop their own rules of cooperation and solidarity" (8). People create societies through which they develop rules of cooperation, but their societies must also arise from cooperation in the first place.

Holmes finds little value in the mere presence of social interaction. He writes that social interaction is not inherently good:

> [T]he social nature of man is too trite to count as an insight. The social constitution of the individual is worthless as an argument either for or against existing institutional arrangements. If all individuals are socially constituted, then the social self cannot serve as a critical standard to praise some societies and revile others. (179)

Holmes believes that proponents of civil society attach false value to everyday contact between human beings, giving interactive behaviors labels such as "social bonds." He finds that it is what the behavior actually accomplishes which is important; civil society proponents need to look at groups' outcomes, not just the fact that people associate with one another.

The Bad Community

The reason Holmes places such an emphasis on community behavior, as opposed to simply looking at community interaction, is that communities are not inherently good. He writes, "Unfortunately, as history reveals, collective action can be monstrous and 'group aims' may include genocide" (179). Critics of civil society theory provide many examples of bad communities: the Ku-Klux-Klan, political supporters of Hitler and Stalin, the religious communities of Northern Ireland, armies in Yugoslavia, the Crips and the Bloods, the Mafia (Holmes, 179; Fowler, 57; "Politics," 34). Robert Booth Fowler notes that although many civil society proponents look to the Founding Era as a time when the United States had a strong civil society, it may be most historically accurate to look at the Puritans for an example of a community which developed moral obligation (30). Gertrude Himmelfarb writes, "One philosopher protests that 'the communitarian critics want us to live in Salem, but not believe in

witches.'" (13). Himmelfarb finds that the civil society proponents' use of the words "virtue" and "community" are ominous to many critics because of the variety of doctrines which could be imposed under those general terms.

Civil society proponents themselves acknowledge that communities can be dangerous. Cohen finds that Putnam does say that associations should be egalitarian and democratic, but he makes this statement only in a footnote in Making Democracy Work (Cohen, 20). Putnam is more explicit about bad communities in "Social Capital and Public Life." In this article, he remarks, "We also need to ask about the negative effects of social capital, for like human and physical capital, social capital can be put to bad purposes" (7). Putnam does not have a solution for controlling against bad communities: "Before toting up the balance sheet for social capital in its various forms, we need to weigh costs as well as benefits. This challenge still awaits" (7).

Sandel also finds that the development of civic virtue risks the development of bad communities. He believes that this risk cannot be avoided:

> [T]he liberal worry does contain an insight that cannot be dismissed: republican politics is risky politics, a politics without guarantees, and the risks it entails inhere in the formative project. To accord the political community a stake in the character of its citizens is to concede the possibility that bad communities may form bad characters. Dispersed power and multiple sites of civic formation may reduce these dangers but cannot remove them. (70)

Sandel believes the risk of bad communities is something society must accept because society must involve itself in public moral discourse.

When considering the potential of prejudicial communities, Etzioni writes, "I suggest that no community has a right to violate higher-order values, values that prescribe rule of behavior such as 'Do unto others only as you wish others would do unto you'" (37). He agrees that

"puritanism is a potential danger for the Communitarian movement" (41), but argues that as long as communities do not discriminate, they avoid being puritanical. He finds that people in communities can exert pressure by regulating their contact with others:

> In some communities members put strong pressure on those who live and work within their confines to be religiously committed. . . . Or local moral pressures may lock in some other value--for example making all those who are not married after a certain age feel inferior. But as long as these preferred moral expressions do not lead to discrimination against those who do not abide by them, not to mention coercion, they do not amount to puritanism. Those who wish to follow other courses may join other communities, form their own communities--or put up with the fact that many people in a given community will avoid social contact with them. (43)

However, Etzioni does not explain who should prevent communities from discriminating or how they can prevent this discrimination.

Moral Regulation

Critics of civil society find problems not only with the imposition of bad morals in bad communities, but also with the general imposition of morals on a group of people, especially by the state. In "The Politics of Restoration," The Economist states that when there is government involvement in moral discourse, "[i]t is no longer permissible to assume that consensus exists among the members of any putative community, as it would be if everybody was a volunteer. It becomes a matter of first importance, once the coercive power of the state is involved, to ask how dissent will be dealt with" (34). Holmes believes it is troubling to have the majority decide and enforce the morality for a population in general. He believes, "All political arrangements involve the use of physical force. Thus, at a minimum, communitarians should be specific about the conditions under which, in their ideal order, sanctions would be applied" (178). For example,

Holmes asks, if the majority determines it serves national solidarity to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, would Jehovah's Witnesses be required to participate? He finds that the communitarians lack a clear definition as to which individual rights can be limited in pursuit of the good of the community. Himmelfarb questions the impact of restricting individual rights. She finds that citizens' individual rights in a liberal system have encouraged their development and asks, "If [civil society] succeeds in promoting the civic or social virtues, does it not also undermine the 'vigorous virtues' associated with the free market--self-reliance, self-sufficiency, entrepreneurship, ambition?" (13).

Critics also question Etzioni's belief that there is a broad base of common values in American society, upon which everyone agrees. Etzioni writes that there are "myriad values we all share," the values of the "overriding community" (99, 248). In connection with these phrases, Etzioni identifies the values which oppose child abuse, theft, rape, murder, and book burning. However, critics find some of Etzioni's other values to be more controversial, such as Etzioni's support of the Mapplethorpe art exhibit in the name of free speech ("Politics", 34), or his family ideal. Cohen writes, "To be sure, the figures on marriage, divorce, single parenthood and sexual standards do indicate change, but this change cannot be understood as the demise of 'the family'. It is only a particular family form that is losing ground: the 1950s model of the nuclear family" (50). Critics maintain that if, as Etzioni suggests, basic rights were apparent to everyone, the United States would not have needed constitutional guarantees of rights and governmental limits ("Politics," 34). Fowler questions not only whether common values exist, but whether they are desirable. He writes, "There is plenty of unease that conformism in small communities can starve the human spirit and mind" (53).

The Expansive Community

Even if it were desirable for communities at the familial, local, and national levels to develop concepts of moral obligation, critics question whether it would be possible to do so. Etzioni believes citizens need to be aware of moral obligation not only within their local communities but within the national society:

> We should also note that minority and individual rights within a given community are protected by the values of the society at large. . . . [S]ocietywide values come into play to alert the communities' members that their inclinations violate fundamental values we share as a community of communities, as a society. (52)

Fowler believes Etzioni has set forth an impossible task; citizens cannot follow local, national, and international issues closely enough to make accurate moral decisions for all levels of community. Fowler finds, "The paradox is that too much internationalism in the local participatory democracy will lead us either to burned-out and disinterested participants or to a crisis of legitimacy" (145). Also, it may not be practical for a citizen to consider the interests of community at multiple levels without being biased toward one community. The Economist notes, "Often, reinforcing one sort of community means weakening another. For instance, stronger regional identities militate against a strong national identity" (33-34).

Who Belongs?

Putnam and Wolfe both recognize that the problem of exclusion is inherent in communities. Putnam writes, "Recognizing the importance of social capital in sustaining community life does not exempt us from the need to worry about how that community is

defined--who is inside and thus benefits from social capital, and who is outside and does not" (1993b, 7). Wolfe writes that for communities and their moral obligations to have any significance, the communities must have boundaries. Creating "entrance rules" for a society is not an easy task, however. Wolfe recognizes the difficulty in creating the proper rules:

> If such rules are drawn too tightly, obligations to people already in the group are more likely to be satisfied, but at the risk of ignoring any obligation to people outside. If, however, they are drawn too loosely, a commitment to the people outside the group can cause a lessening sense of obligation to those inside. (248)

He finds that the problem of entrance rules appears in both the United States and Scandinavia.

In the United States, Wolfe finds that entrance rules are comparatively loose, but the consequence is that membership has less meaning. He cites his own experience at the City University of New York, where opening admission standards was accompanied by a "decline not only in academic standards but also in the meaning of the experience of education" (250). Wolfe describes the membership dilemma in Scandinavia as an issue for both national associations and international citizenship. Societal memberships within Scandinavia can be exclusionary: "when day care for small children is as well organized as it is in Scandinavia, the streets are extremely lonely for children not in day care; when unemployment compensation is administered by unions, life can be rough for women and young people who are unemployed and have never been in the labor market" (248). In the case of refugees, a Danish mayor appeared racist when he protested that his city was becoming Turkish. On the other hand, Wolfe notes, "the notion that everyone ought to be allowed in . . . is hardly a satisfactory entrance rule" (247).

The situation of guestworkers in Europe presents a special dilemma in the area of entrance rules. Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal writes that European countries recruited guestworkers

after World War II to meet their labor needs, with the intention that the workers would be sent back to their countries when the country no longer needed them. The guestworkers have not left the European countries, however, and Soysal notes, "Guestworkers are now permanent, and form large, 'foreign' communities within the host societies" (2). She suggests that guestworkers' citizenship in countries where they do not have historical cultural ties represents a global shift to "postnationalism." For example, she writes, "A Turkish guestworker need not have a 'primordial' attachment to Berlin (or to Germany, for that matter) to participate in Berlin's public institutions and make claims on its authority structures" (3). As citizens of Germany, Turkish residents pay taxes, own property, receive welfare benefits, and attend public schools (166).

Kay Hailbronner notes, however, that many Turkish guestworkers in Germany have not become citizens. She writes that many Turks feel bound to Turkey and do not want to complete the "cultural integration" required to become German citizens, which includes knowledge of the language and political structures of Germany, as well as "voluntary and permanent attachment to Germany" (68-69). In addition, German law requires demonstration that a person's naturalization is in the public interest, no matter how strong the applicant's private interest may be.

Hailbronner believes that the German requirement of cultural integration before the granting of citizenship is justified: "A nation-state may legitimately make full citizenship conditional on some degree of cultural assimilation" (72). She finds that the citizenship requirements help maintain a sense of political community among the German citizens (76), noting that "[p]olitical communities . . . will entrust power only to those persons from whom they can expect a feeling of solidarity and loyalty, only to those who can be expected to share common interests." For those residents who are not German citizens, Hailbronner asserts, the Basic Law does guarantee legal rights very similar to those of citizens (73).

In addition to discussing entrance rules for those entering new communities, Wolfe explains "waiting rules." He writes that waiting rules give community membership more meaning, since one must wait his turn before receiving benefits. In America, "waiting rules" are market-based. Market-based waiting rules shorten the wait to receive goods and services for most, but they also allow some people to cut in front of others in line. In Scandinavia, universal benefits such as health and child care allow greater access to everyone, but create longer lines. He notes that Danish waiting lists for operations may last up to four years and that Scandinavian children may be in school by the time a space opens for them in state child care (251-52).

Wolfe also suggests that societies should have "exit rules" requiring an individual to make a contribution to the community, whether marital, local, or national, in return for the benefits he received as a member. He recognizes exit rules may conjure images of oppressive governments like that of the former Soviet Union, but he insists that exit rules in civil society would not involve a state police force. He argues, "Leaving should not be prohibited, but exit rules should be established to remind both those taking their leave and those left behind that, because they once had obligations in the old group, they will likely have obligations to others in the new social arrangements that are formed when the old ones change" (256).

The Search For Civil Society

Social critics have provided both substantial support and criticism for civil society, the idea that people develop a necessary sense of moral obligation through interaction in communities. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the evaluation of civil society theory is the absence of a modern model of a nation with a strong sociological moral code. (If critics are

correct, there may not even be an historical model.) Wolfe does suggest there are some nations where there is a stronger sense of community than one finds in the United States and Scandinavia. He makes this suggestion in one sentence of his book: "In recent years, it has been recognized that the countries with relatively low inflation and high productivity, such as Japan, Austria, and West Germany receive economic benefits from the existence of strong social and cultural ties: loyalty to the firm, fewer accidents, and greater wage restraint, to name but a few" (189).

Glendon's identification of Germany as a country whose laws are written in a manner which recognizes civil obligations along with civil rights also implies that Germany may be a country with a stronger civil society. She notes that German law incorporates tensions which prevent rights from being construed as absolute and require citizens to recognize their responsibilities toward others. As mentioned above, Glendon finds that Germany's legal requirement that a woman "be in a serious hardship" to have an abortion recognizes both a woman's "right to the free development of her personality" and the fetus's right to life (1987, 26; 1991, 63). In the case of property rights, she finds a tension among liberal, biblical, and socialist principles. Article 14 of the Basic Law sets the provision that "[p]roperty and the right of inheritance are guaranteed" alongside the statement that "property imposes duties. Its use should serve the public weal." The next article grants government authority to nationalize property (1991, 39).

Glendon also notes that the importance of familial relationships is recognized in Article 6 of the Basic Law. Section 2 of this article states, "The care and upbringing of children are a natural right of, and a duty primarily incumbent upon, the parents. The national community shall

watch over their endeavors in this respect" (1991, 73). This article is indicative of a strong civil society because it recognizes parents' responsibilities alongside their rights, as well as identifying a community responsibility in children's development.

A third source suggesting that Germany may have a strong civil society is David P. Conradt's piece "Changing German Political Culture", which appeared in The Civic Culture Revisited in 1980. The Civic Culture Revisited was a follow-up volume to the 1963 The Civic Culture. In the first book, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba find "low levels of social trust, consideration for others and generosity ('the public virtues'), and 'faith in people'" among German citizens. This absence of social trust corresponded with "low levels of active membership in voluntary associations with some political concerns" (Conradt, 218). Less than twenty years later, however, Conradt reports that Germans increased their membership in voluntary associations and became increasingly active as participants in these associations (255). Citing the increasing active participation in voluntary associations along with increased political participation and more participatory family and school structures, he finds that Germany "has built up a reserve of cultural support which should enable it to deal with . . . future issues of the quality and extent of democracy" (265). The finding that Germany has strengthened its culture, in part through participation in voluntary association, suggests the presence of a strong civil society.

In the next chapter, I use measures developed by Wolfe and Putnam to see if there is statistical evidence for Wolfe's, Glendon's, and Conradt's suggestions that Germany has a strong civil society.

Chapter 2
Measuring Germany's Civil Society

The purpose of this chapter is to test whether statistical measures of civil society support the impression that Germany is a country with a strong sense of civic identity. For this test, I use nine measures, seven developed by Wolfe and two developed by Putnam, to assess the strength of Germany's civil society relative to the United States and the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. I use these countries for comparison because they are the countries Wolfe identifies as having weak civil societies. The nine measures are welfare expenditure as a percentage of GDP, marriage rate, divorce rate, rate of children born to unwed mothers, suicide rate, alcohol consumption, crime, voter turnout, and newspaper readership.

After examining Wolfe's and Putnam's use of empirical data to measure civil society, I collected statistics for the nine measures in West Germany, the United States, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Whenever possible, I used statistics beginning from 1965, so that I would have 25 years of data between 1965 and 1990. Using data from several years gives a broader, more representative sample from each country and helps to identify any trends in the data. One would expect worsening trends in the statistics, such as increasing crime rates and decreasing voter turnout, to accompany the decline in civil society which critics identify. If Germany does have a strong civil society, then instead of following trends of social deterioration, its statistics should remain constant or improve.

I collected the most recent statistics I could find, but I analyzed statistics only until German reunification. (German statistics since reunification and data about the extent to

which they are similar to or different from pre-unification statistics in West Germany are included in footnotes.) This omission of unified Germany's statistics was made to avoid the impact of the East German population on the data. Civil society, as viewed by the liberals Wolfe and Putnam, rests on individual decision making in democratic societies. People living under a communist regime's strict state authority for forty-five years would not be expected to have developed civic ties. Wolfe's statement about a strong German sense of civic identity was made specifically in reference to West Germany, before the reunification, and the addition of the East German population would skew a measure of the strength of civil society developed in West Germany.

In this chapter, I will explain the nine civil society measures from Wolfe and Putnam which I used in this study and some problems with using these measures. (I have a total of eleven statistics because I use a net marriage statistic to combine marriage and divorce figures and I use two crime statistics, murder and car theft.) Then, for each measure, I will examine where Germany lies relative to the United States and Scandinavia, comparing the mean values and the trends of change. From these comparisons, I will explain why Germany's civil society does appear somewhat stronger than the United States' and Scandinavia's, while still lacking conclusive evidence of having a desirably strong civil society.

Wolfe's and Putnam's Statistical Measures

Wolfe believes a strong civil society has strong intimate and distant relationships. He finds that strong familial, community, and national relationships would manifest themselves in a high marriage rate; low rates of divorce, illegitimate births, alcohol consumption, suicide,

and crime; and a moderate level of welfare spending. Putnam emphasizes the importance of civic participation to developing a strong civil society. He expects a strong civil society to have high rates of voter turnout and newspaper readership.

Family Statistics

The family represents the most intimate level of relationship. Wolfe sees formal familial relationships as a foundation from which people develop further social ties. He suggests that "if commitments in the home weaken, so will commitments to the people" (142). Wolfe uses marriage, divorce, and illegitimate birth rates to measure commitments in the home. He finds, "Statistically speaking, the Scandinavian countries have among the world's lowest rates of family stability, with Sweden as the extreme case" (140). He also finds that economic-based decision making in the United States has weakened familial relationships.

Wolfe argues that marriage enhances civil society because it provides a level of commitment not present in simple cohabitation. He discovers that the Scandinavian countries, especially Sweden, have low marriage rates in comparison to other countries and that the rate has been declining. As the marriage rate has dropped, the cohabitation rate has increased (140). In the United States, Wolfe finds that the rate of marriages as a percentage of the population has been increasing, but he believes this increase reflects growing instability in the institution of marriage (60). He writes that marriage has "become oriented increasingly along marketlike principles of exchange" (56), and he finds that the strength of marriages peaked in the 1920s, when couples stayed married for the longest time (57).

The length of marriages in the United States has decreased, despite increasing marriage rates, because divorce rates have increased. With the development of no-fault divorce, Wolfe believes that citizens increasingly see marriage as a reversible choice made for individual benefit, rather than a binding relationship and obligation (57). In Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, Wolfe notes that the divorce rate doubled between the 1960s and the 1980s (140). Although Wolfe concedes that Scandinavian women are often "better off" in new relationships after they divorce, he states,

> Still, divorce does weaken relations in civil society: people who were once intimate, of course, have less contact with each other, and when they do, they experience difficult emotional problems; serious consequences for health and longevity are associated with divorce; and the children of divorced parents find themselves in awkward, and often lonely situations. (140-41)

Many problems faced by a single parent following a divorce may also be faced by mothers who never married in the first place. Wolfe expresses concern about the percentage of births outside of wedlock in Scandinavia. He notes that Sweden has a high rate of children born out of wedlock compared to other countries, and he cites a study which found that the percentage of children born out of wedlock increased in Denmark between 1975 and 1985 (140). Births outside of wedlock are undesirable in civil society because they lack the formal relationship of births within marriage. Children born to unwed mothers, like children living with a single parent, may face family instability because the unwed mother will either be alone or in cohabitative relationships (140). Also, as with divorces, a separation of unwed parents means that one or both parents will have less contact with their children than they would if the entire family were living together.

Wolfe believes that formalized commitment is the best measure of family stability. If Germany does have a stronger civil society than Scandinavia and the United States, it would need to have a comparatively high marriage rate combined with a low divorce rate, as well as a low rate of births out of wedlock, in order to meet Wolfe's qualifications. Also, there should be stable or upward trends in marriage rates and stable or downward trends in divorce and births to single mothers. Such statistics would be evidence of strong familial relationships, which should in turn foster strong communities.

Community Statistics

Wolfe believes that, as people isolate themselves in states where market morality dominates, or as they defer to the government when a state morality dominates, they turn to antisocial behavior. He writes, "That moral ties in civil society may have weakened in Scandinavia, even while social ties have been strengthened, is indicated by rates of crime, alcohol consumption, and, to a lesser degree suicide" (147). Wolfe does recognize that these measures can be problematic, however. He notes that Sweden is often mistakenly identified as the country with the highest suicide rate in the world and that alcohol consumption has increased throughout Western countries since World War II. "Yet," Wolfe insists, "one cannot ignore such trends, for ever since [Emile] Durkheim, the notion that the strength of civil society can be measured indirectly through behavior patterns indicating weak social networks has become something of a commonplace" (147).

Wolfe attributes suicide to fear of the future and lack of trust in social relationships (82). He again points to Durkheim, who believed "that suicide is symptomatic of declining

social solidarity" (147). Wolfe acknowledges that a country's suicide rate may be influenced by its environmental factors, like the weather, so he does not directly compare suicide rates among countries. His concern with suicide rates arises from their changes within the same country over an extended period of time. The suicide rate among youth in the United States doubled between 1960 and 1980 (82). Wolfe believes this increase in suicide among the younger generation reflects fear of the future which developed because of "the present generation's weakening sense of obligation to them." In Norway, Wolfe finds the suicide rate increased "substantially" after 1970, and in Denmark, the number of suicides increased from 931 to 1,484 between 1960 and 1983. However, he also notes that Sweden's suicide rate declined from 22.3 to 18.2 per 100,000 people between 1970 and 1985 (147).

Wolfe identifies alcohol consumption, along with narcotic and tobacco use, as "the rate of consumption of dangerous substances" (147). As with suicide, he considers alcohol consumption figures within a single country over time rather than drawing direct comparisons between countries. He notes that although hard liquor consumption has decreased in Scandinavian countries between the 1950s and 1980s, beer and wine consumption increased six hundred percent. Wolfe recognizes that alcohol consumption as a measure of civil society is open to dispute, noting that the current level of alcohol consumption in Scandinavia, after its recent increases, is at about the level it was at in the 1800s. Still, he maintains that increasing alcohol consumption is indicative of weakening social ties and contends, "the visible rise in the number of derelicts on the streets of Stockholm, Oslo, and Copenhagen says something about the weakness of ties in civil society, even if exactly what it says is open to dispute" (148).

Wolfe identifies crime as an antisocial behavior like suicide and consumption of dangerous substances. He notes that in addition to representing antisocial behavior and a weak sense of social norms on the part of the perpetrator, crime creates suspicion and decreases trust within societies as a whole (66, 148). Wolfe notes that an increase in petty crimes, such as breaking and entering, has accompanied the increase of violent crime in Scandinavia. In showing the trends of increasing violence, Wolfe points to the increase in murders between 1970 and 1980. The number of murders per annum rose from 47 to 236 in Denmark, from 6 to 31 in Norway, and from 218 to 394 in Sweden. He also shows that breaking and entering rates almost quadrupled in Denmark and Sweden between the 1950s and 1970s (148-49).

Wolfe finds that the problems of suicide, alcohol consumption, and crime tend to be connected, noting correlations between alcoholism and both suicide and the use of violence. He writes,

> What is perhaps most important to emphasize about all these figures is not that each, by itself, represents a weakening of the social fabric . . . Rather, each category is related to the others, suggesting that all together they measure the extent to which a group exists, whose size is difficult to determine, that is not part of the welfare state's success story. (148)

If Germany has maintained a strong civil society alongside development of the welfare state, strongly developed social networks will have kept the population from slipping into increasing patterns of antisocial behavior which Wolfe found in Scandinavia. Wolfe would expect Germany's rates of suicide, alcohol consumption, and crime to have remained constant or to have declined.

State Statistics

Wolfe associates antisocial behavior with the growth of the welfare state in Scandinavia because he believes that citizens in a highly developed welfare state rely on the government to take care of others, while the government is unable to take care of everyone. He finds that the welfare state cannot replace civil society because "for all those who are brought in to the functions of the welfare state, there will always be some who are left out" (150). Wolfe uses public expenditure as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product to measure the level of state participation in society. He believes that government spending has grown too much in Scandinavia, arguing that a shift in public attitude has accompanied the increase in government spending: "Instead of being based on the principle that the obligation of government was to transfer money from those who needed it less to those who needed it more, these programs emphasized the principle that government could build the institutions and carry out the services that the family itself had once provided" (135). Wolfe especially disagrees with the growth of state child care. He believes the state, as it provides everyday care to children, is becoming a "surrogate parent," making decisions which mothers and fathers should make (140).

Looking at specific figures, Wolfe notes that Sweden's and Denmark's public expenditures both grew 36% between 1960 and 1982. Norway's relative spending increased less but "was still quite high comparatively speaking" (132). The United States' grew only 10% during the same period. In addition, Wolfe notes that in Scandinavia, "unlike the United States, the great bulk of this money was used not for defense or interest on the public debt, but for welfare state activities that, in one way or another, express a sense of obligation to others" (133). Wolfe finds that real social security expenditures grew 88 percent in Denmark, 111 percent in Sweden, and 124 percent in Norway between 1970 and 1980.

Although Wolfe believes that welfare spending in Scandinavia is too high and represents a turning away from individual moral responsibility to reliance on the state, he does not believe that all welfare spending is bad. He finds that the United States' welfare spending is too low and that market interests, rather than a sense of moral obligation to others, determine citizens' actions. Wolfe argues the government must play a role in civil society because the state represents the responsibilities, such as educating youth, fire protection, or redistributive welfare programs, which citizens have decided to meet for themselves as a whole. He writes, "Privatization is an important trend because it raises the implicit question of whether people have any common stake in the provision of services that define their society" (75).

Wolfe believes civil society must strike a balance between privatization and socialization, so that the state does provide services which should be guaranteed to the public through regulation, without taking away moral responsibility of the individual. Thus, it seems that the desirable level of welfare spending, according to Wolfe, would fall between spending levels in the United States, where people are reluctant to grant the government moral responsibility, and Scandinavia, where the people have given the state too much authority, thereby avoiding personal obligation. This middle-of-the-road qualification is somewhat problematic because Wolfe gives no clear indication on what an appropriate level of spending would be.

Civic Participation

Like Wolfe, Putnam uses a comparative statistical approach to study the strength of civil society in Making Democracy Work. Rather than comparing data among countries, however, Putnam compares statistics for different regions within Italy. Putnam evaluates the performance of the various regional governments, using criteria such as cabinet stability, breadth of statistical and information facilities, legislative innovation, and bureaucratic responsiveness. Looking to explain the variations in government performance, he finds that strength in civil society is the best predictor for high performance in democratic government.

Putnam uses four empirical measures to develop a "Civic Community Index"--club association, newspaper readership, electoral turnout, and preference voting for specific candidates. He finds a high degree of correlation among the four measures. A region with a high level of association in clubs also tends to have a high newspaper readership and electoral turnout, as well as low preference voting (1993a, 96).

Club association may be the best measure of civil society. Civil society is based on interaction among people in non-state institutions, and Putnam has census data about membership levels in all of Italy's local and national associations, from soccer clubs to literary groups to Lions Clubs. Putnam compares the "density" of clubs among regions. In areas where clubs are more dense, more people are probably interacting with others in their communities through these organizations (91-92). Unfortunately, I have not found a compilation of internationally comparable statistics about the presence of clubs in the countries in this study, so I was unable to use this measure.

Putnam's second measure for the Civic Community Index is newspaper readership. He believes that the level of newspaper readership reflects the level of "civic vitality" (92). By reading a newspaper, Putnam finds, citizens become more aware of issues and debates in their communities. Putnam does recognize that people now get news from many sources other than newspapers, but he still believes newspaper readership best reflects the level of civic information citizens receive about their local communities. He writes, "In the contemporary world, other mass media also serve the function of town crier, but particularly in today's Italy, newspapers remain the medium with the broadest coverage of community affairs" (92). I adopt this measure of civil society by using the available statistics about newspaper circulation in the population.

Putnam's study does not refer to German, United States, or Scandinavian statistics. However, if Wolfe's assertions about the relative strengths of civil societies are correct, one would expect the United States and Scandinavia to have lower newspaper circulation levels because the people would be less interested in the happenings in their communities. In the United States, the individualistic moral code would cause people to spend their time pursuing individual interests. In Scandinavian societies, government assistance would give citizens assurance that their communities were receiving necessary care and mute interest in the news. If Germany is a country with a strong civil society, one would expect a high level of newspaper circulation. People who care about their communities must keep abreast of what is happening there.

The second measure I use from Putnam's Civic Community Index is electoral turnout. Putnam writes that electoral turnout is a "standard measure of political participation" (93). He

uses data on referendum voting because he believes these elections reflect the sense of civic duty in Italy better than general elections. Putnam believes the Italian general election turnout is largely determined by a national law requiring citizens to vote, by the strength of party organizations independent of the voters' involvement, and by patronage. However, international comparative data on referendum votes is not available, so I compare voter turnouts for elections to national legislative bodies--the Bundestag in West Germany, the House of Representatives in the United States, the Folketing in Denmark, the Storting in Norway, and the Riksdag in Sweden. Like Wolfe, Putnam looks at not just at the statistic of voter turnout itself, but the trend in the turnout. If Germany does have a stronger civil society, Putnam would expect its voter turnout rates to be higher than those in Scandinavia and the United States. He would also expect that Germany's voter turnout rate would not decline.

Putnam's final measure in the Civic Community Index is voluntary preference voting for specific candidates made separately from the mandatory selection of a party list. Because the problem of patronage is more specific to Italy and because most countries do not have a comparable system of preference voting, I omitted this measure from my study.

Findings

With each of the eleven statistics, I compared West Germany, the United States, and Scandinavia by looking at the differences in means and trends over the time period. I used a 95 percent confidence level to determine statistically significant differences among means, and I noted the linear relationships in data with an adjusted r^2 of 0.25 or above. When comparing trends in the statistics, there is some evidence that Germany's civil society is stronger than the United States' and Scandinavia's, but there is little evidence to support the claim that Germany has a strong civil society in absolute terms. Germany's data follows desirable trends for a strong civil society in six areas: suicide, alcohol consumption, crime (both murder and auto theft), welfare expenditure, and newspaper circulation. In three other areas--births out of wedlock, marriage, and divorce--Germany's trends have undesirable civil society implications, but the trends are not as severe as in the other countries. In the two remaining statistics, net marriage and voter turnout, Germany's trends are less desirable than the United States' or Scandinavia's. When comparing the mean statistics, the case for a strong civil society in Germany, absolutely and relatively, becomes even more unclear.

Suicide

Wolfe sees high suicide rates in the United States and Scandinavia as indicators of weak civil societies. He finds that people who commit suicide are those who are detached from others in their society and who feel pessimistic about the future. As people lose a sense of obligation to others, because of either a growing market or state presence, they lose awareness of those around them who may need help or companionship. Also, if a citizen does not feel obligation to others, he may feel insignificant himself.

With an adjusted r^2 of 0.207, West Germany does not show a linear trend in suicide rate between 1965 and 1989. The suicide rate did increase during this period in the United States, but only by 0.07 per 100,000 annually, with an adjusted r^2 of 0.539. Annual increases in Denmark and Norway were 0.45 and 0.40 per 100,000 respectively, with adjusted r^2s of 0.7000 and 0.961. In Sweden, the suicide rate declined by 0.12 per 100,000 annually during those years, with an adjusted r^2 of 0.467. Thus, using Wolfe's criteria, the lack of change in Germany's suicide rate would suggest a stable civil society, where the strength of social relations remained constant, rather than declining, as in the United States (to a small extent), Denmark, and Norway, or improving, as in Sweden.

Wolfe warns against direct comparison of suicide rates because environmental factors outside of civil society could influence the rate. Still, I did compare the figures to see where Germany stood in relation to the other countries. Between 1965 and 1989, Germany's mean suicide rate of 20.6 suicides per 100,000 population was significantly higher than every other

country in this study except Denmark.[1] Germany's suicide rate was, on average, 7.9 to 10.7 percent higher than Norway's, 8.0 to 9.4 percent higher than the United States', and 0.1 to 1.7 percent higher than Sweden's. West Germany's suicide rate was less than Denmark's by 2.5 to 5.8 percent.

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[1] This data set does not include the 1990 suicide rate in the unified Germany of 17.5 per 100,000 population. This rate is significantly lower than the mean suicide rate for West Germany between 1965 and 1989 (20.6), but it is higher than the 1989 suicide rate in West Germany (16.5).

Graph 1



Source:
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office. Demographic Yearbook: Annuaire demographique. New York: United Nations, 1967-94.

Table 1

Suicide as Cause of Death per 100,000 population					
	W. Germany	U.S.	Denmark	Norway	Sweden
1965	19.9	11.1	19.3	7.7	18.9
1966	*	10.8	17.8	7.1	20.1
1967	21.3	10.7	20.5	7.0	21.6
1968	*	10.7	20.5	8.1	21.5
1969	21.6	*	20.8	8.2	22.0
1970	21.2	11.0	21.5	8.4	22.3
1971	20.9	11.1	24.7	8.1	20.3
1972	19.9	12.0	23.8	9.0	20.3
1973	20.8	12.0	23.8	8.7	20.8
1974	21.0	12.1	26.0	10.4	20.1
1975	20.9	12.7	24.1	9.9	19.4
1976	21.7	12.3	23.9	10.8	18.9
1977	22.7	13.0	24.3	11.4	19.7
1978	22.2	12.3	23.3	11.7	19.0
1979	21.5	12.1	25.8	12.1	20.5
1980	20.9	11.8	31.6	12.4	19.4
1981	21.7	12.0	30.0	12.8	17.5
1982	21.3	12.2	29.0	14.0	19.4
1983	21.3	12.1	28.6	14.6	19.0
1984	20.5	*	28.7	14.5	19.5
1985	20.7	12.3	27.8	14.1	18.2
1986	19.0	12.8	27.7	13.9	18.5
1987	19.0	12.6	*	15.5	18.3
1988	17.6	12.4	26.0	16.8	18.8
1989	16.5	12.2	*	15.6	18.6
n	23	23	23	25	25
mean	20.6	11.9	24.8	11.3	19.7

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office. Demographic Yearbook: Annuaire demographique. New York: United Nations, 1967-94.

Alcohol Consumption

Wolfe finds alcohol consumption to be a measure similar to suicide. He believes that rising alcohol consumption ("consumption of a dangerous substance") reflects a rising feeling of isolation among citizens. Wolfe finds that, unlike poverty which can be ameliorated with government spending, alcohol consumption reflects a problem of individual isolation which society must solve through informal social networks. Wolfe does not make an reference to alcohol consumption in the United States, but he would probably anticipate increasing levels of consumption as individuals become alienated from each other under a market moral code.

In order to compare aggregate alcohol consumption, rather than looking at beer, wine, and spirits separately, I used the German conversion standard to calculate alcohol consumed. This standard weights beer at 4.4 percent alcohol, wine at 12 percent, and spirits at 38 percent (Heath 89). As with suicide rates, Wolfe cautions against a direct comparison of alcohol consumption levels. He believes cultural influences may determine drinking levels and suggests that increasing alcohol consumption, rather than the level of consumption, would be a better indicator of a weakening civil society. Looking at the trends of alcohol consumption, there is little indication that any of the countries face a declining civil society. Four of the five countries--Germany, the United States, Denmark, and Sweden--with r^2s ranging from 0.000 to 0.141--do not appear to have had a linear increase in alcohol consumption between 1975 and 1991. Norway's data, with an r^2 of 0.432, does indicate a linear increase in alcohol consumption, but the increase was only 0.06 liters per capita annually. If a steady, rather than increasing, rate of alcohol consumption indicates a strong civil society, then the alcohol consumption data suggests that not only Germany, but all five countries meet this qualification of a strong civil society.

Direct comparisons of alcohol consumption between 1975 and 1991 show that West Germany had the highest mean alcohol consumption, at 11.4 liters per capita[2]. This level of consumption was significantly higher than the United States, which had the second highest level of consumption at 10.5 liters per capita, and the three Scandinavian countries. Thus, if a high level of alcohol consumption indicates isolation in society, Germany's statistics in this area suggest a weak civil society, not only in absolute terms, but also in comparison to the United States and Scandinavia.

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[2] Alcohol consumption for unified Germany in 1992 was 12.2 liters. This amount is not significantly different from Germany's mean alcohol consumption of 11.6 liters, and it is a lower quantity than the 1991 consumption of 12.4 liters.

Graph 2



Sources:
Euromonitor. European Marketing Data and Statistics. London: European Research Consultants, Ltd., 1975-96.
United States Bureau of Statistics. Statistical Abstract of the United States. Washington DC: GPO, 1990-95.

Table 2

Per Capita Alcohol Consumption (liters/year)					
	W. Germany	U. S.	Denmark	Norway	Sweden
1973	16.1	*	7.2	2.8	8.5
1974	9.9	*	7.7	3.0	4.6
1975	10.4	11.4	8.2	3.1	4.8
1976	10.5	*	7.1	3.0	4.9
1977	12.5	*	7.2	3.9	6.8
1978	10.5	*	8.0	3.0	4.4
1979	10.9	*	*	3.0	4.8
1980	10.1	11.9	8.6	3.4	4.5
1981	*	8.2	8.6	*	*
1982	10.7	11.6	8.9	3.0	4.2
1983	10.7	11.4	8.8	3.0	4.2
1984	10.6	11.2	15.5	3.0	4.1
1985	11.9	10.9	*	3.0	5.4
1986	11.7	10.4	9.5	4.2	5.4
1987	*	10.3	9.8	*	*
1988	11.7	10.3	9.6	4.1	5.8
1989	11.9	10.3	9.0	4.0	5.8
1990	11.7	9.7	8.9	4.0	5.8
1991	12.4	9.6	9.0	3.9	5.6
n	19	15	18	19	19
mean	11.6	10.4	8.9	3.4	5.3

Sources:

Euromonitor. European Marketing Data and Statistics. London: European Research Consultants, Ltd., 1975-96.

United States Bureau of Statistics. Statistical Abstract of the United States. Washington DC: GPO, 1990-95.

Crime

Wolfe associates crime with suicide and alcohol consumption as a measure of personal connections within societies. Criminals violate moral obligations which are generally deemed appropriate by society and codified into law. Also, crime can weaken the trust in communities and hinder the level of interaction among citizens. Wolfe finds that Scandinavian crimes, both violent and petty, have increased since the 1950s. He does not evaluate United States crime statistics, but I believe Wolfe would find that the upward trend in incidence of murder and car theft reflects a weakening civil society. I used both murder and car theft statistics during the eight-year period from 1983 through 1990. Unfortunately, I did not find any comparable statistics from years prior to 1983.

West Germany was the only one among the five countries whose murder rate showed a linear decline between 1983 and 1990. In Germany, the murder rate dropped an average of 0.19 murders per 100,000 people annually, with an adjusted r^2 of 0.722. In Denmark, which had an adjusted r^2 of 0.056, there was no linear trend during the period. The United States, Norway, and Sweden all had upward trends, with increases by 0.13, 0.28, and 0.22 murders per 100,000 annually and adjusted r^2s of 0.281, 0.649, and 0.480.

Similarly, West Germany was the only country which had a decline in the rate of car theft between 1983 and 1990. This decline was small, a decrease of theft by only 1.9 incidents per 100,000 people annually with an adjusted r^2 of 0.361, but the other four countries had an increase of car theft during the same period. The incidence of car theft per 100,000 people increased annually by 35 in the United States, by 66 in Sweden, by 64 in Norway, and by 31 in Denmark. Adjusted r^2 values were 0.970, 0.975, 0.496, and 0.435, respectively.

The Eurostat Yearbook cautions against direct comparisons of crime statistics because each nation defines crimes differently. Keeping this caution in mind, an examination of the number of murders per 100,000 shows that West Germany's mean murder rate (4.5) was significantly lower than that in the United States (8.375), Sweden (6.375), and Denmark (5.5) for the years from 1983 to 1990.[3] West Germany's murder rate was significantly higher than Norway's (1.571). The rate of car theft in West Germany was significantly lower than all four other countries. With a mean of 117 motor car thefts per 100,000 people, West Germany's rate of theft was, on average, 347 to 479 below the United States', 389 to 549 below Denmark's, 212 to 521 below Norway's and 406 to 654 below Norway's between 1983 and 1990. Although there may be a difference in the definition of "theft" in the five countries, it still appears that Germany's level of car theft is substantially lower than other countries'.

Germany's relatively low crime rates and its decline in crime in recent years are consistent with the claim that Germany is maintaining, or perhaps even improving, a strong civil society. In the area of crime, Germany clearly stands apart from the nations which Wolfe identifies as weak civil societies. This is, however, the only measure which provides such clear results. No other statistical measure shows Germany both to be following a desirable trend which is distinctly better than trends of the United States and Scandinavia and to have a mean level better than the other countries' means.

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[3] I did not find crime statistics for unified Germany.

Graph 3



Graph 4



Source: Eurostat. Eurostat Yearbook. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1995.

Table 3

Murders per 100,000 people					
	W. Germany	U.S.	Denmark	Norway	Sweden
1983	5	8	5	1	5
1984	5	8	6	*	6
1985	5	8	6	1	7
1986	5	9	6	1	6
1987	4	8	6	1	6
1988	4	8	5	2	7
1989	4	9	5	2	7
1990	4	9	5	3	7
n	8	8	8	7	8
mean	4.5	8.4	5.5	1.6	6.4

Table 4

Motor Car Thefts per 100,000 people					
	W. Germany	U. S.	Denmark	Norway	Sweden
1983	131	431	427	273	419
1984	118	437	470	*	460
1985	114	462	514	426	538
1986	115	508	648	160	661
1987	121	529	692	566	695
1988	114	583	700	665	714
1989	108	630	659	683	810
1990	115	658	576	609	879
n	8	8	8	7	8
mean	117.0	529.8	585.8	483.1	647.0

Source: Eurostat. Eurostat Yearbook. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1995.

Welfare Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP

The first statistical evidence of Scandinavia's declining civil society Wolfe provides is the growth in public expenditures as a percentage of the GDP. He believes the Scandinavian government does too much, going beyond provision of material necessities to the needy. Wolfe thinks the Scandinavian government has taken responsibilities which should remain in the hands of the citizens, such as providing child care. Also, he believes the overly developed welfare state creates a false sense of security in communities, where people assume their government is taking care of their neighbors' problems. On the other hand, Wolfe believes the United States government does too little for its citizens. When laissez faire government leaves citizens solely under the market's forces, "it raises the implicit question of whether people have any common stake in the provisions of the services that define their society" (75). Wolfe believes that civil society would be best fostered in a state whose welfare programs are more developed than the United States', but not as omnipresent as those in Scandinavia.

Germany's welfare spending has increased annually by 0.14 percent of the GDP, on average, with an adjusted r^2 of 0.283, between 1972 and 1990. This growth rate falls above the United States', where there was no discernable linear trend in welfare spending during the period, and below Norway's and Sweden's, where the annual increases were 0.29 percent and 0.45 percent respectively, with adjusted r^2 values of 0.827 and 0.744. Denmark's welfare spending, with an adjusted r^2 of 0.118, shows no linear trend on average. Wolfe would probably find the growth rate of Germany's welfare spending to be desirable because it falls between the growth rate of the United States and Norway and Sweden.

The overall level of welfare spending as a percentage of GDP in West Germany does not fit Wolfe's ideal, however. The country's welfare spending between 1972 and 1990 is significantly higher than the United States', but there is no statistically significant difference between Germany's welfare spending and that of Denmark and Norway.[4] On average, Germany's welfare spending fell 6.6 to 8.0 percent above the United States' and 1.8 to 4.8 percent below Sweden's.

From 1972 to 1990, West Germany does not show a pattern of welfare spending that is noticeably distinct from that in the Scandinavian countries, especially Denmark. The Germans may show a greater sense of obligation to others by their willingness to support government welfare programs than Americans, but there is no clear evidence of a welfare spending pattern that is strikingly lower than that in the Scandinavian countries of Denmark and Norway. If Scandinavian welfare spending indicates that the governments are releasing their citizens from moral obligation, the statistics suggest that Germany is subject to the same problem.

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[4] Data for unified Germany were not available.

Graph 5



Sources:

International Monetary Fund. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 1980-94.

_____. International Financial Statistics Yearbook. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 1995.

Table 5

Welfare and Social Security Expenditures as a % of GDP					
	W. Germany	U.S.	Denmark	Norway	Sweden
1972	11.3%	6.3%	13.1%	11.3%	12.0%
1973	11.0%	6.1%	12.6%	11.4%	12.0%
1974	12.2%	6.5%	14.4%	11.3%	13.4%
1975	14.6%	7.7%	15.6%	11.5%	13.4%
1976	14.5%	7.7%	14.0%	11.7%	14.8%
1977	14.4%	7.2%	10.7%	11.7%	17.0%
1978	14.6%	6.7%	15.2%	*	18.7%
1979	14.3%	7.0%	15.6%	*	19.1%
1980	15.0%	7.5%	16.9%	12.4%	19.2%
1981	15.5%	7.8%	17.3%	12.6%	19.7%
1982	15.8%	8.1%	17.4%	13.2%	19.3%
1983	15.6%	8.4%	17.1%	13.5%	18.8%
1984	15.4%	7.5%	16.4%	13.1%	18.4%
1985	15.2%	7.0%	16.1%	12.9%	18.7%
1986	14.9%	6.8%	15.2%	14.0%	19.2%
1987	15.0%	6.6%	13.9%	14.3%	19.2%
1988	14.6%	6.3%	14.7%	15.9%	20.0%
1989	14.3%	6.1%	15.4%	16.7%	20.5%
1990	13.8%	6.0%	15.5%	17.2%	21.0%
n	19	19	19	17	19
mean	14.3%	7.0%	15.1%	13.2%	17.6%

Sources:

International Monetary Fund. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 1980-94.

_____. International Financial Statistics Yearbook. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 1995.

Newspaper Circulation

Newspaper readership is a measure of civil society used by Putnam, not Wolfe, so there are no references to these statistics in Scandinavia or the United States. I believe Wolfe would accept Putnam's measure because both theorists believe that civil society requires people to look beyond their own immediate personal interests to consider the common good. Putnam argues that those who are concerned about others in their community will try to remain informed about that community. By reading the newspaper a citizen can learn about the problems in his community and make knowledgeable decisions about how to respond to those problems. Putnam notes that there are other sources of news besides the newspaper, but he believes the newspaper is the best source of information about a citizen's local community.

Applying the measure of newspaper circulation to Wolfe's assessment of weak civil societies, one would expect that there would be declining levels of newspaper circulation in the United States because citizens were more interested in pursuing their individual interests than reading about what was happening to others and in Scandinavia because citizens felt that the state was taking care of others' problems. If Germany does have a stronger civil society, one would expect the country to have a high level of newspaper circulation which has remained at a stable level.

The United States is the only country which shows a declining trend in newspaper circulation between 1965 and 1988, with the newspaper circulation falling by 0.38 per 1,000 inhabitants each year at an adjusted r^2 of 0.957. In Norway, the circulation increased an average of 0.12 per 1,000, with an adjusted r^2 of 0.902. For West Germany, as for Denmark and Sweden, there was no discernable linear trend in the rate of newspaper circulation. This could indicate

that Germany's level of civic awareness has not changed between 1965 and 1988. Assuming there was no serious decline in newspaper circulation prior to 1965, the consistency of newspaper circulation indicates that Germany's level of community awareness has remained constant. Germany is not alone in this attribute, however, because the Scandinavian countries have all either maintained or increased their newspaper circulation levels.

Comparing the level of daily newspaper circulation per 1,000 inhabitants between 1965 and 1988, West Germany ranks above the United States but below the Scandinavian countries[5]. With a mean circulation of 336, West Germany's circulation is, on the average, 24 to 63 newspapers per 1,000 people higher than the United States'. West Germany's circulation is 170 to 208 below Sweden's circulation, 58 to 124 below Norway's, and 5 to 41 below Denmark's. Germany's lower circulation rate could indicate its citizens are less informed about community affairs than Scandinavians.

Newspaper circulation statistics suggest that Germany's citizens keep themselves better informed about their communities than citizens of the United States, but they also suggest Germans could be less informed than Scandinavians. Newspaper circulation could support a claim that Germany has a strong civil society but does not indicate that Germany has social ties stronger than those in Scandinavia.

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[5] I did not find any data more recent than 1988, so I have no newspaper circulation statistics for unified Germany.

Graph 6



Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Statistical Yearbook: Annuaire statistique. Paris: UNESCO, 1975-90.

Table 6

Daily Newspaper Circulation, per 1,000 inhabitants					
	W. Germany	U. S.	Denmark	Norway	Sweden
1965	326	311	347	384	505
1966	332	312	354	381	501
1967	328	308	*	382	514
1968	328	309	356	383	518
1969	331	305	363	388	528
1970	325	303	360	384	538
1971	*	301	368	396	*
1972	294	297	361	390	534
1973	301	300	364	391	*
1974	289	293	355	391	536
1975	327	281	341	414	539
1976	*	*	*	*	*
1977	423	287	362	430	528
1978	*	284	359	441	522
1979	335	276	367	457	529
1980	*	*	*	*	*
1981	*	*	*	*	*
1982	408	269	356	483	524
1983	*	*	*	*	*
1984	350	*	359	501	521
1985	*	268	*	*	*
1986	344	259	367	530	534
1987	*	*	*	*	*
1988	331	*	359	551	526
n	16	17	17	18	16
mean	335.8	291.9	359.7	426.5	524.8

Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Statistical Yearbook: Annuaire statistique. Paris: UNESCO, 1975-90.

Children Born to Unwed Mothers

Wolfe uses the percentage of children born to unwed mothers, in addition to marriage and divorce rates, as a measure of family stability. He believes parents should be formally committed by marriage before having children. In Scandinavia, Wolfe finds that the social benefits make it easier for a woman to leave a marriage, as well as making it easier for her to bear and raise a child as a single woman. Wolfe does not refer to the percentage of children born to single mothers in the United States. However, considering that 30 percent of the children born in 1990 were born to single mothers and that this percentage has been growing by almost one percent each year, I believe Wolfe would find this measure indicative of the United States' declining civil society. He would not attribute these births to the welfare state. Instead, he would probably find that the same individualistic thinking which causes the high level of divorce in the United States also leads citizens to decide to have a child without entering into a marital obligation.

The percentage of births out of wedlock has been growing in all five countries between 1965 and 1990, but the slowest rate of annual growth has been in West Germany, where the percentage increase is 0.3 percent per year, with an adjusted r^2 of 0.967. In the United States, the increase has been 0.9 percent annually, with and adjusted r^2 of 0.974. In Norway, the increase is also 0.9 percent per year; in Sweden, 1.6 percent; and in Denmark, 1.8 percent with adjusted r^2 values of 0.907, 0.963, and 0.963.

Looking at the percentage of births to single mothers supports Wolfe's claim that Germany has a stronger civil society than the United States or Scandinavia. Between 1965 and 1990, West Germany's average percentage of births out of wedlock, at 7.2 percent, is

significantly lower than the rates in the other countries.[6] West Germany's percentage of births to unmarried mothers is, on average, between 6.1 and 12.0 percent below the percentage in the United States, between 20.1 and 30.6 percent below Sweden, between 13.9 and 25.2 percent below Denmark, and between 1.7 and 6.9 percent below Norway.

Because Germany has a low rate of births to single mothers which is increasing relatively slowly, it appears that in Germany, there is more value placed on being married before having children than in the United States and Scandinavia. Wolfe would find that this is indicative of a stronger civil society because parents are legally bound to their families by marriage. Still, the fact that the incidence of births out of wedlock is steadily increasing in Germany would be troublesome to civil society theorists.

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[6] Germany's percentage of births outside wedlock did increase after the reunification to 15.0 percent in 1991 and 1992. This is a statistically significant increase, but it did not change the fact that Germany's percentage of births to unwed mothers and the rate of increase in this percentage are the lowest of the five countries in this study.

Graph 7



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office. Demographic Yearbook: Annuaire demographique. New York: United Nations: 1967-94.

Table 7

Births to Single or Unwed Mothers as % of all live births					
	W. Germany	U.S.	Denmark	Norway	Sweden
1965	4.6	5.4	9.5	4.6	13.8
1966	4.6	8.4	10.2	4.9	14.6
1967	4.6	9.0	*	5.1	15.1
1968	4.8	9.7	11.1	5.6	15.8
1969	*	10.0	11.3	6.1	16.3
1970	5.5	10.7	11.0	6.9	18.4
1971	5.8	11.3	12.3	7.9	21.6
1972	6.0	12.4	14.4	8.7	25.1
1973	6.3	13.0	17.1	9.1	28.4
1974	6.3	13.2	18.8	9.3	31.4
1975	6.1	14.2	21.7	10.3	32.4
1976	6.3	14.8	24.0	10.9	33.2
1977	6.5	*	25.9	11.6	34.7
1978	7.0	16.3	27.9	11.9	35.9
1979	7.7	17.1	30.7	13.0	37.5
1980	7.6	18.4	33.2	14.5	39.7
1981	7.9	18.9	35.7	16.1	41.2
1982	8.5	19.4	38.3	17.6	42.0
1983	8.8	20.3	40.6	19.3	43.6
1984	9.1	21.0	41.9	21.3	44.6
1985	9.4	*	43.0	25.8	46.4
1986	*	*	*	*	*
1987	*	25.7	*	*	*
1988	10.0	27.0	44.7	*	50.9
1989	11.0	28.0	46.0	*	52.0
1990	11.0	30.0	46.0	*	47.0
n	23	23	23	21	24
mean	7.2	16.3	26.8	11.5	32.6

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office. Demographic Yearbook: Annuaire demographique. New York: United Nations: 1967-94.

Marriage

Wolfe finds that the declining civil societies of Scandinavia and the United States are reflected in differing patterns of marital statistics. He believes that the Scandinavian societies' marriage rates are too low, showing that the people are reluctant to make committed intimate relationships. On the other hand, he believes the United States' marriage rates are too high, betraying a lack of serious commitment toward marriage.

In West Germany between 1965 and 1990[7], the mean marriage rate (6.5 per 1,000 people) did meet the ideal of falling below the United States (10.8) and above Denmark (6.4), Norway (6.2), and Sweden (5.6). However, the differences in marriage rates between Germany and Denmark and between Germany and Norway were not statistically significant. The comparability between German and Scandinavian marriage rates suggest that Germany's rate is lower than that of a strong civil society.

Germany's marriage rate has been dropping at the mean rate of 0.069 marriages per 1,000 people annually (with an adjusted r^2 of 0.431). This decline is less rapid than that in Denmark (0.11 per 1,000 with an adjusted r^2 of 0.542) and Norway (0.13 per 1,000 with an adjusted r^2 of 0.831), but greater than the United States and Sweden, which show no linear trend in marriage rate through those twenty-five years. Germany's declining marriage rate could be a sign of a declining civil society, where couples are becoming reluctant to make a binding commitment. One could argue that the Germany's marriage rate is declining slowly in relation to Denmark and

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[7] The marriage rates for the unified Germany in 1991 and 1992 (5.7 and 5.6 marriages per 1,000 people) did not have a statistically significant difference from the mean rate for West Germany between 1965 and 1990.

Norway, but it is still declining. Wolfe would find this trend of declining marriages troublesome, considering that Germany's mean marriage rate is comparable to the low rates of the Scandinavian countries.

Graph 8



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office. Demographic Yearbook: Annuaire demographique. New York: United Nations, 1970-94.

Table 8

Marriage Rates, per 1,000					
	W. Germany	U.S.	Denmark	Norway	Sweden
1965	8.3	9.3	8.8	6.5	7.8
1966	8.0	9.5	8.6	7.4	7.8
1967	8.0	9.8	8.5	7.7	7.2
1968	7.3	10.4	8.1	7.7	6.6
1969	7.3	10.7	8.0	7.7	6.1
1970	7.3	10.6	7.4	7.6	5.4
1971	7.1	10.6	6.6	7.6	4.9
1972	6.7	*	6.2	7.3	4.9
1973	6.4	17.1	6.1	7.1	4.7
1974	6.1	18.5	6.6	6.9	5.5
1975	6.3	11.1	6.3	6.5	5.4
1976	5.9	*	6.1	6.3	5.5
1977	5.8	9.0	6.3	5.9	4.9
1978	5.4	10.8	5.6	5.8	4.6
1979	5.6	10.4	5.4	5.7	4.5
1980	5.9	10.5	5.2	5.4	4.5
1981	5.8	10.5	5.0	5.4	4.5
1982	5.9	10.7	4.8	5.3	4.4
1983	6.0	10.4	5.3	5.0	4.3
1984	6.0	10.5	5.6	5.0	4.4
1985	6.0	10.1	5.7	4.9	4.6
1986	6.1	9.9	6.0	4.9	4.6
1987	6.3	9.9	6.1	5.0	4.9
1988	6.5	9.8	6.3	5.2	5.2
1989	6.4	9.7	6.0	4.9	12.8
1990	6.6	9.8	6.1	5.2	4.7
n	26	24	26	26	26
mean	6.5	10.8	6.4	6.2	5.6

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office. Demographic Yearbook: Annuaire demographique. New York: United Nations, 1970-74.

Divorce

Wolfe believes that the divorce rate in both the United States and Scandinavia has risen too much. In the United States, the dominance of individualistic decisions is causing more people to leave their marriages. In Scandinavia, state support mechanisms make it easier for a woman survive on her own after leaving a marriage. Using Wolfe's reasoning, one would expect a strong civil society to have a lower absolute divorce rate than the United States and Scandinavia, as well as expecting a divorce rate which is not increasing.

West Germany's divorce rate increased an average of 0.047 per 1,000 annually (with an adjusted r^2 of 0.620) between 1965 and 1990. This rate of increase was lower than the United States' (0.095 with an adjusted r^2 of 0.690), Denmark's (0.056 with an adjusted r^2 of 0.683), and Norway's (0.066 with an adjusted r^2 of 0.980). Sweden's divorce rate has shown less of a linear trend (with an adjusted r^2 of 0.283), but its rate of increase has been lower, at 0.039 per 1,000.

In 1990, West Germany did have a lower divorce rate (1.9 per 1,000 population) than the United States (4.7), Denmark (2.7), Norway (2.3), or Sweden (2.3). Comparing the mean divorce rates between 1965 and 1990, West Germany's divorce rate is lower than that of the United States, Denmark, and Sweden. There is no statistically significant difference between the mean rates of West Germany and Norway over the twenty-five years.[8]

In sum, Germany's divorce rate has tended to be lower than the countries in Wolfe's study and the increase in divorce rate is happening at a generally slower pace. However, there is still

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[8] The divorce rate in unified Germany during 1991 and 1992 was 1.7 per 1,000 people. This rate was lower than the 1.9 rate in 1990 and is not significantly different from the mean rate of 1.5.

not an absolute distinction between Germany and the Scandinavian countries, as Germany's divorce rate does not have a statistically significant difference from Norway's, and as Germany's divorce rate climbs faster than Sweden's. Also, Wolfe would be troubled by the rise in Germany's divorce rate, even though the rise is more gradual than in most of the other countries.

Graph 9



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office. Demographic Yearbook: Annuaire demographique. New York: United Nations, 1970-94.

Table 9

Divorce Rates, per 1,000					
	W. Germany	U.S.	Denmark	Norway	Sweden
1965	0.9	2.5	1.4	0.7	1.2
1966	0.9	2.6	1.4	0.7	1.3
1967	1.0	2.7	1.4	0.8	1.4
1968	1.1	2.9	1.6	0.8	1.4
1969	1.2	3.2	1.8	0.8	1.5
1970	1.2	3.5	1.9	0.9	1.6
1971	1.3	3.7	2.7	1.0	1.7
1972	1.4	4.0	2.6	1.0	1.9
1973	1.5	4.4	2.5	1.2	2.0
1974	1.6	4.6	2.6	1.3	3.3
1975	1.7	3.9	2.6	1.4	3.1
1976	1.8	*	2.6	1.5	2.6
1977	1.2	4.3	2.6	1.5	2.5
1978	0.5	4.5	2.6	1.5	2.5
1979	1.3	5.3	2.6	1.6	2.5
1980	1.6	5.2	2.7	1.6	2.4
1981	1.8	5.3	2.8	1.7	2.4
1982	1.9	5.0	2.9	1.7	2.5
1983	2.0	5.0	2.9	1.9	2.5
1984	2.1	4.9	2.8	1.9	2.4
1985	2.1	5.0	2.8	2.0	2.4
1986	2.0	4.8	2.8	1.9	2.3
1987	2.1	4.8	2.8	2.0	2.2
1988	2.1	4.7	2.9	2.1	2.1
1989	2.0	4.7	3.0	2.2	2.2
1990	1.9	4.7	2.7	2.4	2.3
n	26	25	26	26	26
mean	1.5	4.2	2.5	1.5	2.2

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office. Demographic Yearbook: Annuaire demographique. New York: United Nations, 1970-94.

Net Marriage

Perhaps the most constructive way to compare levels of commitment to marital relationships among the countries is to look at the net increase in marriages each year. I draw this comparison by subtracting the divorce rate from the marriage rate. In a strong civil society, where emphasis is placed on developing committed familial relationships, one would expect this net marriage rate to be high. Because divorce is already included in the figure, the net marriage rate cannot be "too high," as Wolfe believes is the case with the regular marriage rate in the United States.

Germany's mean net marriage rate between 1965 and 1990 is 4.954 marriages per 1,000 population. This is higher than the all three Scandinavian countries in absolute terms, but not significantly higher than Norway's rate of 4.685. The German rate is significantly lower than the United States's rate of 6.558. Thus, even though the United States may be plagued by a high divorce rate, more people wed and remain married in the United States than in Germany or Scandinavia.

Not only is the net marriage rate the highest in the United States, it also shows no clear trend of linear decline, with an r^2 of 0.212. Sweden's net marriage rate, with an adjusted r^2 of 0.04, also does not show a trend of linear decline. Germany's net marriage rate is dropping at an average of 0.116 marriages per 1,000 each year, with an adjusted r^2 of 0.676. Denmark and Norway also show net marriage rate declines. (Denmark is at 0.167 with an adjusted r^2 of 0.606, and Norway's rate of decline is 0.194 with an adjusted r^2 of 0.910.) Looking at the net marriage rate shows that people are getting and staying married in Germany less than in the United States, and that the low rate is becoming lower as the net marriage rate declines. In terms of marriage

and divorce, there is no empirical evidence that Germany has a strong civil society. Its net statistics are even worse than the United States', where Wolfe already believes the incidence of divorce and family instability is too high. In comparison to Scandinavia, where Wolfe believes there is also a high degree of family instability, Germany does not distinguish itself as a nation which fosters more stable marriages.

Graph 10



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office. Demographic Yearbook: Annuaire demographique. New York: United Nations, 1970-94.

Table 10

Net Marriage Rate (Marriages per 1,000 - Divorces per 1,000)					
	W. Germany	U.S.	Denmark	Norway	Sweden
1965	7.4	6.8	7.4	5.8	6.6
1966	7.1	6.9	7.2	6.7	6.5
1967	7.0	7.1	7.1	6.9	5.8
1968	6.2	7.5	6.5	6.9	5.2
1969	6.1	7.5	6.2	6.9	4.6
1970	6.1	7.1	5.5	6.7	3.8
1971	5.8	6.9	3.9	6.6	3.2
1972	5.3	*	3.6	6.3	3.0
1973	4.9	12.7	3.6	5.9	2.7
1974	4.5	13.9	4.0	5.6	2.2
1975	4.6	7.2	3.7	5.1	2.3
1976	4.1	*	3.5	4.8	2.9
1977	4.6	4.7	3.7	4.4	2.4
1978	4.9	6.3	3.0	4.3	2.1
1979	4.3	5.1	2.8	4.1	2.0
1980	4.3	5.3	2.5	3.8	2.1
1981	4.0	5.2	2.2	3.7	2.1
1982	4.0	5.7	1.9	3.6	1.9
1983	4.0	5.4	2.4	3.1	1.8
1984	3.9	5.6	2.8	3.1	2.0
1985	3.9	5.1	2.9	2.9	2.2
1986	4.1	5.1	3.2	3.0	2.3
1987	4.2	5.1	3.3	3.0	2.7
1988	4.4	5.1	3.4	3.1	3.1
1989	4.4	5.0	3.0	2.7	10.6
1990	4.7	5.1	3.4	2.8	2.4
n	26	24	26	26	26
mean	5.0	6.6	4.0	4.7	3.4

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office. Demographic Yearbook: Annuaire demographique. New York: United Nations, 1970-94.

Voter Turnout

Voter turnout is another of Putnam's measures of civil society. This measure reflects the level of citizen participation in community decisions. Although Wolfe draws a distinction between the state and civil society in their creation of moral codes, I believe he would accept voter turnout as a measure of civil society because voting citizens have a voice in creating the government which will impose state obligations on the whole population. Wolfe finds that it is the state that determines the formalized moral obligations which will apply throughout a country, and it is by voting that citizens determine who will make these state decisions. As Putnam notes, referendum voting allows citizens a more direct influence in deciding specific issues, but there are no uniform international records of referendum elections. Looking at the voter turnout levels, I would expect low or declining voter turnouts to correspond to weaker civil societies. Statistically speaking, voter turnout is the weakest measure in this study because the sample size is small, especially for West Germany, where there is data for only five national elections between 1965 and 1988.

In the period from 1965 to 1988, West Germany had the steadiest decline in voter turnout among the five countries. Voter turnout dropped from 90.4 percent in 1972 to 83.5 percent in 1987. On average, this equates to a decrease in voter turnout by 0.42 percent each year, with an adjusted r^2 of 0.745. In the United States, Norway, and Sweden, there is no evidence of a linear change in voter turnout during the period. In Denmark, voter turnout declined 0.15 percent annually, with an adjusted r^2 of 0.281. Among the five countries, Germany seems to be losing its "civic-ness," in terms of political participation, most rapidly.

There was a strong distinction between voter turnout for national legislative elections in West Germany and the United States between 1965 and 1988, but there was not a distinctive difference between West Germany and Scandinavia[9]. The mean voter turnout for West Germany was, on average, between 34.9 and 48.6 percentage points higher than voter turnout in the United States. West Germany's voter turnout was between 2.0 and 8.1 percentage points higher than Norway's, but there was no statistically significant difference between turnouts in West Germany and Denmark or Sweden. If the strength of civil society is to be measured by a direct comparison of voter turnout, there appears to be no difference between the strength of Scandinavian and German civil society.

Voter turnout provides no evidence that Germany has a uniquely strong civil society. Germany's voter turnout is higher than that in the United States, but it is not remarkably higher than voter turnout in Scandinavia. Also, Germany's voter turnout has been declining at a more rapid rate than any of the other four countries, perhaps indicating a declining interest in the state's formal definition of social obligations.

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[9] The collection of voter turnout data for the five countries which I found contained data only through 1988, so I have no statistics for reunified Germany in this area.

Graph 11



Source: Mackie, Thomas T. and Richard Rose. The International Almanac of Electoral History, 3d ed. Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1991.

Table 11

Voter Turnout, National Legislative Elections					
	W. Germany	U. S.	Denmark	Norway	Sweden
1965				85.1	
1966		46.6	88.4		
1967					
1968		56.9	89	83.7	88.7
1969					
1970		46.1			88.1
1971			86.6		
1972	90.4	53.2			
1973			88.2	80.1	90.7
1974		37.8			
1975			87.7		
1976	89.9	51.6			91.4
1977			87.4	82.8	
1978		37			
1979			85		90.2
1980	87.8	50			
1981			82.7	81.9	
1982		40.3			90.6
1983	88.3				
1984		51.2	87.8		
1985				83.9	89.1
1986		36.2			
1987	83.5		86.1		
1988		48.2	85.1		84.9
n	5	12	11	6	8
mean	88	46.2	86.7	82.9	89.2

Source: Mackie, Thomas T. and Richard Rose. The International Almanac of Electoral History, 3d ed. Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1991.

Conclusion from Statistical Tests

As Wolfe examines the impact of the growing welfare state on civil society in Scandinavia, he recognizes that data can be applied to contradictory conclusions. He writes, "When we try to answer the question of whether community and social ties have weakened as the welfare state has grown, we find evidence that can support almost any response" (150). Similarly, looking at the eleven indicators in my study, the data could be used to support or deny the claim that Germany's civil society is stronger than the United States' and Scandinavia's. In terms of civil society, Germany's statistics are sometimes better, sometimes worse, and sometimes similar to the statistics of the other countries. It would be unrealistic to expect any country to meet the ideals of a civil society theorist, but there is still no clear evidence to support Wolfe's statement that Germany is a country with "strong social and cultural ties."

One of the problems in comparing statistics among Germany, the United States, and Scandinavia was the lack of unity in Scandinavian statistics. When comparing the means of statistics, West Germany's statistics often fall in the middle of Scandinavian measures. For example, the marriage rate in Germany is not significantly different than the marriage rates in Denmark and Norway, but it is higher than the marriage rate in Sweden. Differences in trends among the Scandinavian countries are also problematic because these differences make it difficult to evaluate what Scandinavia's overall trends have been. For example, suicide rates have been increasing in Denmark and Norway, but they have been declining in Sweden. In making my final evaluation, I ranked Scandinavia by using two Scandinavian countries as representative of the region. I have noted which countries represent Scandinavia for each measure.

Germany shows a mix in the desirability of its social trends. The stability of suicide, alcohol consumption, and newspaper circulation rates; the decline in crime rates, as measured in murder and auto theft rates; and the moderate level of increase in welfare spending meet Wolfe's and Putnam's qualifications of a strong civil society. However, the increasing rates of divorce and births out of wedlock combined with decreasing marriage (both gross and net) and voter turnout rates indicate a weak civil society. Looking at Germany's mean statistics further blurs the image of how strong Germany's civil society is. Although Germany's suicide and alcohol consumption levels have remained constant, these constant levels are higher than the levels in the weak civil societies of the United States and Scandinavia. Wolfe does caution against drawing direct statistical comparisons because of environmental and cultural influences. However, environmental considerations do not explain why Germany's suicide rate is higher than Norway's and Sweden's, and it is difficult to understand why Wolfe distinguishes cultural influences to drink alcohol from social networks which keep people from drinking.

Despite the ambiguity of my findings, I believe a case could be made that Germany does have a stronger civil society than Scandinavia and the United States, if one focuses on the trends in the statistics only (and sets aside the mixed picture painted by the comparison of means). Germany clearly has desirable trends (or lack of trends) in the areas of suicide, alcohol consumption, crime rates, and newspaper circulation. Also, the growth in welfare spending strikes a balance between growth in the United States and the Scandinavian countries of Norway and Sweden. In the areas of births outside wedlock and divorce, Germany's trends have been undesirable, but they have been less severe than in the United States and Scandinavia. In addition, Germany's marriage rate has been declining at a slower pace than in the Scandinavian

countries of Denmark and Norway. (Wolfe believes that the United States' marriage rate is currently too high, so he would not find the constant marriage rate here to be ideal.)

The two trends which go against the claim that Germany's civil society is stronger than that of the United States or Scandinavia are voter turnout and net marriage. Among the five countries, West Germany has had the sharpest decline in voter turnout. This is arguably the worst indicator, however, because there are data for only five German legislative elections between 1965 and 1988. Germany's declining trend in net marriage is clearly an area where Germany's civil society is weaker than the United States'. Although Wolfe believes that the United States has too many marriages which end up in divorce, there are more couples staying married in the United States than in Germany. Further evidence against the claim that Germany's civil society is stronger than the United States' or Scandinavia's could be drawn from the frequent overlap between Germany and at least one Scandinavian country and by looking at the comparison of means.

Thus, my general finding from this study is that the statistics I used are inconclusive in measuring the absolute and relative strength of German civil society. There are two possible conclusions that could be drawn from the inconclusiveness of this statistical study. The first would be to conclude that Germany's civil society, although it does have some unique strong points, is comparable to the Scandinavian countries'. This would suggest that Germany faces the same problem Wolfe identifies in Scandinavia, namely, turning to the government to provide assistance rather than using informal social interaction to develop a sense of moral obligation. This first conclusion would also discredit Wolfe's statement that Germany has a strong sense of society. The second possible conclusion is that the statistics used in my study are either not

accurate or not sufficient as measures of the strength of a civil society. This conclusion would be problematic for Wolfe's work because he uses primarily the same indicators as evidence of Scandinavia's weak civil society.

Table 12

Measure	Undesirable Trend	W. Germany's Trend	Relative Position (1 = most desirable)		
			W. Germany	U. S.	Scandinavia
marriage	-	-	2	1	3 (D, N)
divorce	+	+	1	3	2 (D, N)
net marriage	-	-	2	1	3 (D, N)
births to single mothers	+	+	1	2	3 (D, N, S)
suicide	+	0	1	2	3 (D, N)
alcohol consumption	+	0	1	1	1 (D, S)
crime-murder	+	-	1	2	3 (N, S)
crime-auto theft	+	-	1	2	3 (N, S)
welfare expenditure	extreme +	moderate +	moderate	low	high (N, S)
newspaper circulation	-	0	1	3	1 (D, S)
voter turnout	-	-	3	1	2 (N, S)

Table 13

Measure	Desirable Level	Relative Position (1 = most desirable)		
		W. Germany	U.S.	Scandinavia
marriage	high	2	1	2 (D, N)
divorce	low	1	3	2 (D, S)
net marriage	high	2	1	3 (D, N)
births to single mothers	low	1	2	3 (D, S)
suicide	low	3	1	2 (N, S)
alcohol consumption	low	3	2	1 (D, N, S)
crime-murder	low	1	3	2 (D, S)
crime-auto theft	low	1	2	3 (D, S)
welfare expenditure	moderate	high	low	high
newspaper circulation	high	2	3	1 (D, N, S)
voter turnout	high	1	3	1 (N, S)

Conclusion

Is Germany All It's Cracked Up To Be?

The main purpose of this thesis was to use statistical measures employed by civil society theorists to test the strength of Germany's civil society. My findings are, as described in Chapter 2, mixed. Under some measures--suicide, alcohol consumption, crime, welfare expenditure, and newspaper readership--Germany's statistical trends indicate a strong civil society. Under others--marriage, divorce, births outside wedlock, and voter turnout--Germany's statistics follow a trend which civil society theorists would identify as social deterioration. Often, Germany's statistics and trends fall near or among statistics of the Scandinavian countries.

Comparing Germany with Scandinavia would suggest, in Wolfe's terms, that Germany is a country dominated by a state moral code. Under such a code, the citizens would have come to rely too much on the government to take care of people's needs. Corroboration for concluding that Germans rely on a state moral code can be found in "Freedom, solidarity, individual responsibility: Reflections on the relationship between politics, money and morality." This paper was written by Rudolf Scharping, the Deputy Chairman of Germany's Social Democratic Party, for the 1996 Communitarian Summit held in Geneva.

Like civil society proponents, Scharping emphasizes recognizing the role of family and community. He finds that "the family or the community provides a context in which the patterns of behavior which make the individual a moral subject are learnt and absorbed" (4). Unlike Wolfe, who sees civil society as an entity which develops separately from the state, Scharping takes the hard communitarian position of considering what the state can do to restore community: "The question facing us is what can be done at the systemic level to promote

communal action. What role can, and should, the state assume in bringing up and educating mankind, to use Lessing's old phrase?" (9). Scharping does believe, however, that the state should defer to the community whenever possible. He states, "Wherever the community is in a position to solve a given problem, it must take the lead. . . . The state should watch over processes rather than encumbering them with red tape" (14). In conclusion, Scharping determines that the communitarians and the Social Democrats both want to promote the same three ideals: "freedom, solidarity and individual responsibility" (17).

Scharping finds that society cannot be governed by purely capitalist principles, but he also writes that the Social Democrats must realize that "[t]he old left-wing vision--that a just order would automatically create a just citizen--has proved to be wrong" (2). Not only is the state limited in what it can do for society, according to Scharping, but the state can have an adverse impact on its citizens. Like United States welfare critics, he finds that policy makers have failed to consider the impact of social welfare policy on citizens' values. He writes, "It is not only capitalism but also the way we organize the system of social security, and the way the state organizes itself, which occasionally erode the values which our society urgently needs" (13-14). Scharping shares Wolfe's belief that if the state becomes too active in determining societal values, the individual will not develop his own sense of moral obligation and argues, "If morality is no longer required, it is in danger of atrophying" (15).

Scharping insists that the state needs to consider the societal impact of welfare policy decisions in addition to the economic impact: "The current [social security] debate tends to focus almost exclusively on the financial impact, which, although necessary, offers a very narrow perspective of the future" (5). Scharping believes that it is as important for Germans to change

the way they think about social welfare policy as it is for them to change the policy itself. He declares, "There is not a crisis of social security in Germany but a crisis of political thought" (17). Scharping's call for increased attention to community and citizen's development of individual responsibility suggests a lack of civil society discourse in Germany, similar to that which Wolfe finds in Scandinavia.

Equating Germany with Scandinavia does not tell the whole story, however. My mixed statistical findings imply more of a problem than a false classification of Germany on Wolfe's part. Germany does not fit neatly into the category of a strong civil society, but it also does not fit neatly into the category of a weak civil society. Germany becomes an anomaly for Wolfe's statistical measures. In the area of family statistics, Germany looks like a strong civil society because its rates of divorce and births out of wedlock are low and falling comparatively slowly while its marriage rate strikes the happy medium Wolfe desires between the United States and Scandinavia. On the other hand, Germany's net marriage rate falls well below the United States'. It seems civil society theorists should be ambivalent toward Germany's familial relationships: citizens do honor their commitments to family, but they are reluctant to make these commitments in the first place.

Germany's community statistics also do not fit the civil society model as either a positive or negative model. The country's trends in suicide, alcohol consumption, and crime would meet with Wolfe's approval because they have held steady or declined. However, the fact that Germany's suicide and alcohol consumption rates are, on average, higher than the United States' or Scandinavia's would probably alarm some civil society theorists, even if Wolfe would contribute the relatively high rates to environmental or cultural factors. He never clarifies why

the level of alcohol consumption and suicide can be attributed to environment or culture as categories distinct from civil society, while levels of other statistics, such as mariage rates, can be included in evaluating civil society. It does not seem that high rates of suicide or alcohol consumption would be conducive to social interaction and trust, even if these rates did not increase. Also, Germany does not fit Wolfe's belief that suicide, alcohol consumption, and crime rates correspond to each other because the country's low crime rates stand in opposition to the high suicide and alcohol consumption.

Putnam's two indicators also create ambiguity in evaluating Germany's civil society. The newspaper circulation rate has remained constant, but the voter turnout has been declining. Looking only at Putnam's measures, the strongest civil society appears to be in the Scandinavian countries, which have maintained high levels of voter turnout and newspaper circulation. Although Putnam measures civil society with different statistics than Wolfe, he shares the same vision of a strong civil society being composed of citizens in a liberal system who feel a sense of obligation toward others. Because the two theorists share similar views toward the ideal civil society, it is problematic that Wolfe identifies Scandinavia as a weak civil society while Putnam's measures portray Scandinavia as a strong one.

Wolfe's and Putnam's statistical measures do not conclusively present Germany as a strong civil society, so Germany is not all it is cracked up to be. However, Germany cannot simply be declared a nation dominated by a state moral code, as Scharping suggests, because some of its statistics, especially low crime rates, do indicate the presence of strong community ties. There are also instances where desirable trends conflict with undesirably high or low comparative statistics, as with suicide and alcohol consumption. These contradictions call into

question what type of civil society Germany has, as well as how to use statistical measures of civil society. Civil society theorists need to develop their measures more fully to explain how to interpret mixed results.

Is Civil Society All It's Cracked Up To Be?

Scharping wrote his speech for a communitarian conference, so it is not surprising that he calls for an increased emphasis on civil society in Germany. However, although Scharping does not explicitly criticize communitarianism, some of his statements reflect the difficulties of strengthening a civil society. He notes that change is inevitable, stating, "Society is being changed by the increasing momentum of scientific and technological progress and the globalization of economic activity it causes" (12). Scharping recognizes that as society changes, its values will change, but he writes that this change in values does not necessarily mean values are declining: "The issue of declining moral standards is as old as human civilisation. Very often, what is later recognised as a shift in values is perceived at the time to be a loss of values" (2). To some extent, it appears that civil society theorists are resisting inevitable changes in the modern world. For example, both Etzioni and Wolfe assert that they recognize the traditional nuclear family cannot be expected to be the norm in modern society, yet they both call for people to get married, to avoid divorce, and to have one parent stay at home with the children.

A modern example of a strong civil society would be extremely valuable because of the problem in distinguishing between a shift in and loss of values. Unfortunately, Germany does not provide such an example. With its contradicting elements of strong and weak civil society, Germany heightens the question of how a modern civil society would operate. Civil society

theorists have not addressed issues such as whether a country where couples have lasting marriages still represent strong civil societies if the marriage rate is low.

Another problem for promoting civil society appears in Scharping's comment, "We need a renewal of our society, but we need consensus in order to achieve it. . . . I would add self-critically that we Social Democrats have contributed to these misconceptions by occasionally creating the impression that consensus meant helping everybody and hurting nobody" (10). This comment reflects some of the problems for civil society theory which I explained in Chapter 1. It seems unrealistic to expect society to reach consensus, especially when some citizens will be required to make sacrifices. Civil society theorists themselves create different images of a desirable civil society. The largest split is between the hard and soft communitarians and their debate over the role government should play in fostering its citizens' sense of responsibility. Even among soft communitarians, however, there is disagreement. Wolfe and Putnam endorse similar community behaviors, but their statistics give rise to different conclusions about Scandinavia's civil society. Until there is a more defined statistical test of civil society or a clear definition of the obligations to be promoted in society and the means by which they should be promoted, the ambiguity of what civil society is, outside the general definition of "people developing obligations through social interaction," will remain.

I complete this thesis with many of the same questions I had when I first encountered Wolfe's book Whose Keeper?. It remains unclear to me how civil society can be fostered without government mandate. If the German government reduces social welfare programs in order to promote individual responsibility, what will prevent economic forces rather than community values from guiding behavior? On the other hand, government-mandated morality

reduces a citizen's freedom and subjects him to the morality of the majority. Perhaps, as Glendon suggests, the answer is to create laws which present the tension between societal values involved in an issue while still leaving decision-making authority to the individual citizen. In the case of Germany, however, the incorporation of moral discourse in the law has not prevented social trends civil society theorists find undesirable, and according to Scharping, German political debate still fails to recognize the impact of policy on society.

Although I find civil society to be a problematic ideal, I do believe civil society proponents make valuable contributions to political theory. By examining the role of community, including families and associations, civil society theory builds on Tocqueville's explanation of why people act in community-minded rather than individualistic ways. This body of theory also urges policy makers to consider the impact of legislation on the public's sense of obligation. Laws do represent the rights and obligations that the nation has decided are important enough to bestow or impose on its citizens. The extent to which the government should determine society's values and the actual determination of these values will remain contested political issues for the government, and the people as democratic citizens, to resolve.

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