

Roosevelt and Yalta: the Myth and the Reality
(A President Gambles for Peace)

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Chapter 1.

Genesis of the Yalta Myth

In February 1945 three national leaders--Joseph V. Stalin, Winston S. Churchill, and Franklin D. Roosevelt--met at a resort in the Russian Crimea. Here at Yalta far-reaching decisions were made which would affect the shape of the new international order. Yalta would soon become a household word. Initially American public opinion applauded the agreements for they seemed to forecast the endurance of Big Three unity. To many Americans the success at Yalta meant that the United States would finally achieve the peace and security that it had sought at the Versailles Conference in 1919. It was hoped that the suspicions and frustrations which had been compounded by the events of the 1920's would be vanquished in 1945. In the postwar world nations would no longer struggle for "spheres of influence, for alliances, and for balance of power."¹

This illusion was quickly shattered. The hopes were replaced by rumors of perfidy and treachery. Yalta produced a myth and remained a symbol. This happened as Poland, China, and Czechoslovakia were seduced by the Communists. Allied unity crumbled in Germany; the Berlin blockade became a landmark in the "cold war" between the United States and Russia. Congressional "muckrakers" alleged that State Department officials had spied for the Communists. New aggression in Korea demonstrated that the United Nations lacked the power

to preserve the peace by successfully implementing "collective security." In this period Roosevelt's "secret diplomacy" was branded a "great betrayal." Yalta became infamous as the "American Munich" and as the "Pearl Harbor of American diplomacy." Lethargic Americans rose to condemn the "Red Rape of Poland" and the "Chinese sellout." Many Americans believed that at Yalta the dying President Roosevelt unnecessarily appeased the Soviets by permitting them hegemony in Europe and Asia. For example, the decisions on the German and Austrian occupation zones allowed the Soviet colossus to enter Central Europe and to seize strategic positions which could be used to threaten and to infiltrate European civilization.² In the Far East the idealistic Roosevelt betrayed our ally Chiang Kai-shek to assure the needless entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan. The vague political agreements approved at Yalta did all this despite the fact that the Atlantic Charter had bound the large powers to respect "the right of people to choose their own forms of government...."

The revisionists bitterly attacked Roosevelt's "secret diplomacy" in historical journals and in the political arena. The myth of Yalta helped fan the flames of criticism against President Truman when he campaigned for re-election in 1948. It was an important plank in the 1952 Republican platform which helped General Eisenhower to win the Presidency.

Because the Crimean happenings have had far-reaching consequences, it is my purpose to place Yalta in a more accurate and meaningful perspective. Because the United States

seems to be moving toward a new rapprochement with the Soviets, it may be helpful to assess the implications of our past mistakes in foreign policy. Have our failures been the fault of our elected national leaders, our foreign policies, or our society? This approach will be incomplete if it fails to investigate the charges of the revisionists and their impact on domestic and foreign events. Studies of past historical dealings with the Soviets may provide valuable tools for shaping our present policies. At least, they will be caution signals which warn of our past mistakes.

A historical interpretation always faces the dual test of being both reasonable and responsible. With more information, less confusion and pressure, and greater time for thought, it will be easy to be hypercritical of policies that have failed. At some time in the past, these same actions may have been the most fruitful alternatives. Still judgements remind national leaders that their actions must pass the test of time. With this in mind, I shall attempt to discuss Yalta critically, but objectively, as a myth and as a reality.

Chapter 2.

Evolution of a Distinctive Foreign Policy

Public opinion shapes the foreign policy of the United States. Consequently it is impossible to abstract U.S. foreign policy from the traditional experiences of the American people. These have indirectly molded the American attitudes which have guided our policy. The most important factor was geographical detachment. Separated from European rivalries by the Atlantic Ocean, blessed by weak nations to the North and to the South, aided by land for expansion to the West, and protected by the British navy, Americans developed a way of life suited to the peculiar demands of their domestic environment.

Seemingly unlimited natural resources had a remarkable influence on developing attitudes. One historian has written:

The unexampled abundance of land and resources was the cardinal factor in the development of American civilization. It molded the character of the American people, and was the chief reason for the unique qualities of their way of life. It facilitated the growth of individual freedom and social equality, and it promoted attitudes of optimism and self-assurance.³

In ordered European societies, people were unable to fulfill their highest aspirations. There were always evil elements that could not be regulated. However, on the open frontier man struggled against his environment. He was not restricted by social customs. The frontiersman became optimistic when he found that he could conquer evil by hard work. This characteristic American optimism pervaded the diplomacy of the young republic. The nation was also influenced by Calvinism and by the social contract theories of government. Calvinism gradually

became secularized. The pious were influenced by the liberal frontier conditions. Each man found that he had the innate ability to create a better way of life for himself and his family. Popular democracy arrived when the Jacksonians removed many barriers to the individual. Every individual could participate in government, and many held government jobs. This movement toward individual freedom and equality of opportunity formed a basis of the new body politic. The unique impact of the American experience is cleverly disclosed in Herman Melville's novel Moby Dick. The effort of Captain Ahab to kill the great white whale represents the determined American belief that good will conquer evil. Yet in the end Ahab is frustrated and destroyed.⁴

After the Civil War the traditional American way was challenged by the growth of the industrial system. Though the egalitarian propensities of American civilization were threatened, the Populists, Progressives, and New Dealers showed Americans how they could continue to mold their own environment. Despite modifications, Lincoln's observation was still accurate. He described the United States as "the last best hope of earth." It was true that industrialization had a great social impact, but Americans still affirmed traditional principles. They were the ones stated in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and by Thomas Jefferson. In the 1930's it was clear that President Roosevelt was committed to the same principles. In 1936, he told a midwestern audience:

In all our plans we are guided, and will continue to be guided, by the fundamental belief that the American farmer, living on his own land, remains our ideal of self-reliance and of spiritual balance--the source from which the reservoirs of the nation's strength are constantly renewed.⁵

On the eve of World War II, agrarian principles still shaped public opinion--and influenced foreign policy through the democratic process.

Yalta is only a brick in the masonry of our international relations. Therefore the events at Yalta cannot be understood apart from the constantly evolving themes of American foreign policy. After winning a revolution for freedom and independence, Americans were almost enticed to intervene in the French Revolution and in the struggle for Greek independence. This hasty involvement might have threatened American security. The cornerstone of our policy was freedom of action. In his Farewell Address, President Washington argued that the United States' commitment to revolutionary ideals could best be preserved by maintaining freedom of action in diplomacy. W.W. Rostow notes that Washington's idea was a pragmatic prescription for the following reason:

The nation's ideological commitment was likely to be fruitful only to the extent that the nation exploited the military possibility of a security achieved and maintained without taking up fixed positions in the European power struggle, working out its ideological destiny within its own expanding borders.⁶

While the United States followed this path guided by Washington and John Q. Adams, sentiment developed in favor of isolation. Isolation, it was believed, would protect the virtuous American experience from the contamination of European balance of power politics.

Developments in the late nineteenth century altered the total commitment to isolation. Industrialization increased the power of Japan, Germany, and Russia. Recognizing the change

in the balance of power, Alfred T. Mahan argued that sea power must be increased for no nation could successfully isolate itself from other nations. The Spanish-American war was a milestone in the emergence from isolation. The moral injustices of Spanish rule were graphically described by the Hearst newspapers. Indignant public opinion prompted intervention. When the Messianic crusade was completed, the United States discovered that it was an imperial power. It had captured the Philippines. As a world power the United States tried to protect its commercial integrity and assure commercial equality to all trading countries. This policy expressed American interest in terms of moral principles, but it did not provide a means of enforcement. The United States still wished to keep its traditional freedom of action--although the realities of world power had changed.

Under President Woodrow Wilson, the United States almost accepted the role of a world power. In 1913 the Progressive Wilson entered the White House. Soon he insisted that U.S. diplomatic recognition be contingent upon the morality of the foreign government in question. When German power threatened during World War I, Wilson decided to use American resources "to make the world safe for democracy." He failed. The world did not become safe, although Germany was defeated. After the war Wilson failed to get the United States to accept an international role equivalent to its real power. "What Wilson did not understand was that the American people had not undergone the great conversion to the cause of collective security

that he himself had experienced."⁷ Wilson's idealism was sacrificed at the altar. Isolationists like Senator Borah were able to mobilize Congress to defeat the plan for a League of Nations. They feared that American democracy would be contaminated by a commitment to an alliance with the imperialistic powers of Europe. In a sense Borah reflected the traditional American idealism because he believed that American democracy was "moral entity, a spiritual force as well. And these are things which live only and alone in the atmosphere of liberty."⁸

During the 1920's America remained uncommitted to international alliances; yet, the U.S. wished to provide the moral leadership for world peace. The best example of this is the Kellogg-Briand Treaty which asserted that signatory nations would never resort to war as an instrument of national policy. This treaty revealed the inherent contradiction of the American foreign policy. It was the conflict between the desire to help preserve peace and the traditional reluctance to commit force to this goal. The Kellogg-Briand Treaty was naive for it assumed that a moral pledge would be sufficient to keep the peace. The Nazi challenge demonstrated that moral pacts for preserving peace by outlawing war were inadequate when they confronted the "twin spirits of autocracy and aggression."⁹

The stock market crash of 1929 sidetracked foreign affairs. The people defeated Hoover, and they elected Franklin D. Roosevelt. The severity of the depression forced Roosevelt to concentrate his efforts on the American economy. While the Japanese advanced relentlessly into Manchuria; a new isolationist sentiment gripped the American will. The Nye Committee disclosed

that the "merchants of death" had led the United States into World War I. Neutrality acts were promulgated by the isolationist Congress to prevent America from becoming involved in a war--like World War I. It is likely that considerations of domestic public opinion and of Congressional membership required Roosevelt to adopt a chauvinistic foreign policy. It is important to realize that the foremost isolationists were progressive Republicans who consistently backed the New Deal programs and helped to provide the administration with a voting majority.¹⁰ Therefore Roosevelt would have risked his programs for domestic recovery if he had supported international involvement. Popular support for the policy of the isolationists--to protect American security by avoiding foreign commitments--should not be underestimated. The sentiment was clearly revealed in the voting on the Neutrality Act of 1937. It passed the House 376 to 13, and the Senate 63 to 6. There can be little doubt that public opinion--influenced by the traditional American ideals--fashioned foreign policy during the 1930's to an unparalleled degree.

The Neutrality legislation was important for it also illustrated the American belief that the mechanics of foreign relations was the interest of imperialistic powers and of aggressors. The best way for the United States to protect its unique way of life would be for it to be isolated from Europe where law and morality were dying.

The United States regarded itself as an innocent violated by the First World War and now belatedly protecting itself from its own ardors and a wicked world by a chastity belt of Neutrality Acts.¹¹

As the dark storm clouds gathered over Europe, the United States enacted more neutrality laws.

By 1937 Roosevelt had concluded that the peace and security of the world depended on the United States taking collective action against the aggressors with other "peace-loving" nations. He decided to test the climate of public opinion when he spoke in Chicago in October. He told the people that the spread of lawlessness and anarchy and the rise of dictatorships in Europe and the Orient had created a dangerous situation. "There is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality."¹² Thousands of hostile replies told Roosevelt that the public was not ready for a "quarantine."

During the period beginning with the German invasion of Poland in 1939 and ending with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the United States moved closer to war. By means of lend-lease the United States gave Britain and the Allies all aid "short of war." America decided to try to protect herself by extending material assistance and moral support--but not by joining the belligerents openly.

The Atlantic Charter of August 1941 was a milestone in American policy. Meeting in the Atlantic off the coast of Newfoundland, Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt discussed matters of defense, lend-lease, and a coordinated policy against the Japanese. Their most important agreement was the Atlantic Charter which was a mixture of Roosevelt's New Deal and Wilson's Fourteen Points. The charter indicated that Britain and the United States would permit "no territorial changes contrary to the wishes of the people concerned" and they would support "the right of people to choose their own

forms of government." After the war the powers would form a "permanent system of general security." Now the United States had accepted the principle of collective security. It had also accepted its true role as the leader of the Allies by gaining Britain's adherence to traditional American values. Even Churchill admitted that America was the Allied leader. He told Roosevelt: "Mr. President...we know that you constitute our only hope. And...you know that we know it. You know that we know that without America, the Empire won't stand."¹³

That Roosevelt would attempt to impose American morals in making the peace was also made clear when he said: "The peace cannot include any continued despotism. The structure of the peace demands and will get equality of peoples."¹⁴ The United States was ready to abandon isolation for collective security. But postwar collective security would depend on the general acceptance of Western values. The Soviet Union would find that American ideals were incompatible with Communism.

On December 7, 1941, Japan launched a surprise sea and air attack on U.S. bases at Pearl Harbor. Public opinion immediately mobilized behind President Roosevelt's decision to declare war. Subsequently Germany and Italy entered the war against the United States. No longer was the United States a nonbelligerent, it was a full partner. Although the United States did not officially enter the war until December 1941, a momentous decision was made by President Roosevelt in June which indicated what course American foreign policy would take. When Hitler broke his nonaggression pact with Stalin by

invading Russia in June 1941, the democracies--Britain and the United States--married totalitarian Russia. The democracies knew that they were not powerful enough to subdue the Nazis without invoking the aid of totalitarian Russia. Alliance with the Russians meant that Hitler would ultimately be defeated. The cost of removing the Nazi threat from Europe would be that of permitting the Soviet Union to have a dominant position in Eastern Europe.

The decision to extend lend-lease to Russia in 1941 was a significant one. It was the first effort by the United States to establish a friendly relationship with the Soviet Union. This decision has been sharply criticized. When the "twin prices of darkness"--Russia and Germany--began to destroy each other, the United States was the dominant political power. If we had agreed to extend aid to Stalin in return for specific political agreements, the Soviet Union might have been frustrated in its move to dominate Eastern Europe in 1945. Ambassador Bullitt advances this argument:

President Roosevelt was warned that if he should help Stalin to victory without previously obtaining from the Soviet dictator definite, written, public pledges with regard to the future of Europe and Asia, he would find himself in a far worse situation at the end of the Second World War than that in which Woodrow Wilson had found himself at the close of the first--the weight of power in both Europe and Asia would have passed from the United States to the Soviet Union.¹⁶

But, if Roosevelt had demanded written pledges, Stalin might have reached a separate peace with Hitler. This would have given Russia the dominant position and forced Britain and the United States to defeat Germany alone--if they could.

President Roosevelt decided that Russian cooperation was absolutely necessary to defeat Germany and to secure peace. He would collaborate with the Soviets and try to postpone boundary settlements until after the war. Perhaps Soviet imperialism would be no threat if an understanding could be reached among the three leaders. This was Roosevelt's greatest gamble. Ambassador Bullitt claims that this was "sheer ostrich infantilism" for it was the "first step down the road to our present danger."¹⁷ This policy toward the Soviet Union was implemented in four ways. First, the United States provided equipment for the Russians to wage the war without asking for concessions in return. Second, Roosevelt sought to secure Stalin's adherence to statements of general aims like the Atlantic Charter. This was accomplished when twenty-six nations signed the Declaration of the United Nations in January 1942 pledging themselves to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and a coordinated military effort against their common enemies. Third, Roosevelt manipulated American public opinion to encourage the Soviet Union. For example, Ambassador Davies wrote a best seller entitled Mission to Moscow which extolled America's Russian ally. Fourth, Roosevelt met Stalin face to face in an attempt to persuade him to continue the Grand Alliance. There were two such meetings-- at Teheran in 1943 and Yalta in 1945.¹⁸ The clearest statement of Roosevelt's Russian policy is found in the explanation which he gave to Ambassador Bullitt:

I think that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace.¹⁹

Roosevelt was not the only American who recognized the fact that Russia would become a dominant force when the Allies crushed the Nazis. At the Quebec Conference in August 1943 a military paper was circulated among the Anglo-American delegates. Although its author remained anonymous, General Marshall was rumored to have written it. The document reached this conclusion:

Since Russia is the decisive factor in the war, she must be given every assistance and every effort must be made to obtain her friendship. Likewise, since without question she will dominate Europe on the defeat of the Axis, it is even more essential to develop and maintain the most friendly relations with Russia.²⁰

To maintain the United Nations alliance against the Axis, numerous summit conferences were held. In addition, the leaders of Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States corresponded many times. At Cairo, in November 1943, the United States, Britain, and China pledged to continue the fight against Japan until she surrendered unconditionally. The great powers promised to restore to China all the territory that Japan had stolen--including Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores. Then, Roosevelt and Churchill flew to Teheran for a historic meeting with Stalin. There plans were completed for an invasion of France in early 1944. They also discussed the future of Poland and agreed upon the principle of dismembering Germany. Teheran was a success. Tensions were reduced and the leaders established the personal relationship which would be necessary if unity were to be preserved. The Big Three--Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt--would not meet again until February 1945.

Chapter 3

Portrait of Three Statesmen
(An Imperialist, a Communist, and a Democrat)

Three national leaders led three strange allies (Britain, Russia, and the United States) to victory over three Axis aggressors (Italy, Germany, and Japan). Three individuals would determine the nature of the postwar peace. Since these three met for the last time at Yalta, the record of the Yalta Conference is the story of three men--Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. Differences in personalities, in approaches to diplomacy, and in diplomatic aims distinguished each of the three from the others.

Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain and now the only surviving member of the triumvirate, was "the rare statesman--perhaps the only great one of his time--who has kept his feet in the mud of today but his eyes on the stars of tomorrow."²¹ He was an old Tory, like his father Randolph Churchill, who wished to restore Britain to her former imperial greatness. But, at Yalta, Churchill was a "junior partner" in the company of Stalin and Roosevelt because Britain had become a second-class power. Despite his weaker national power, Churchill was an excellent bargainer who relied on his trusted experts for policy advice.²² The pragmatic British would contest the Russian demands.

Churchill's realistic approach to foreign policy was demonstrated in his previous dealings with the Russians. As a young politician with great aspirations, Churchill had

campaigned against Bolshevik candidates. He recognized and feared the Soviets because he had actively debated their revolutionary ideas in democratic elections. Still Churchill was realistic enough to understand that Hitler was the immediate threat to England's security. After the German invasion of Russia, he told parliament: "Any man or state who fights on against Nazidom will have our aid. Any man or state who marches with Hitler is our foe. That is our policy and that is our declaration. It follows therefore that we shall give whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people."²³

During the war his statements were cordial to the Russians, but his actions showed that he understood the Soviet ambitions. For example, at the beginning of the war the Prime Minister tried to convince President Roosevelt that they should recognize Russia's 1940 frontiers. He argued that they would be merely recognizing the status quo, but this recognition might keep Stalin from signing a separate peace with Hitler. Roosevelt vetoed the proposal because it contradicted the Atlantic Charter.

In another incident Churchill opposed the plans for a "second front" in France; he wished to attack through the Balkans in order to capture some of Eastern Europe. The advantage of this campaign was that it would halt the Russian advance in Eastern Europe.²⁴ Finally Churchill concluded an agreement with Stalin by which the Soviet Union assumed a 90 per cent predominance in Rumania and 75 per cent in Bulgaria, while Britain secured a 90 per cent control of the affairs in Greece.²⁵ This contradicted Roosevelt's policy of postponing territorial

settlements, but in retrospect Churchill acted wisely to check the Soviets in the Middle East. Churchill was a calculating statesman. Churchill and Stalin were formidable opponents.

The Prime Minister's vision of a new world order did not include a United Nations. He felt that an Anglo-American alliance should be the keystone for the postwar security arrangements. In a letter to Field Marshal Smuts in September 1943 he stated his views clearly:

I think it inevitable that Russia will be the greatest land power in the world after this war, which will have rid her of the two military powers, Japan and Germany, who in our lifetime have inflicted upon her such heavy defeats. I hope however that the 'fraternal association' of the British Commonwealth and the United States, together with sea and air power, may put us on good terms and in a friendly balance with Russia at least for the period of rebuilding.²⁶

By binding the British nation to the United States, Churchill hoped to counter-balance Russian power on the continent, to restore the British Empire, and to reassert British influence in international politics.

McGeorge Bundy, special adviser to President Johnson for National Security Affairs, has written: "The President who seeks peace must have a clear view of the Soviet Union. The one great weakness of Franklin Roosevelt was that he did not...."²⁷ If Bundy was correct, it was also true that very few Americans understood the Soviet Union in 1945. The Soviet government was an enigma. Still certain facts were known which helped to explain some of the mystery. Stalin was more independent than either Roosevelt or Churchill to pursue ruthlessly a foreign policy for immediate national gain. This

was true because Soviet leaders molded public opinion, while in the democracies unfettered criticism influenced the government to a greater degree. This severely limited the freedom of Roosevelt and Churchill to act unilaterally and arbitrarily.

Russian plans for reorganizing the world after defeating the Axis were related to the Russian experience. Insecurity had troubled the Russians for centuries. It began when the Russians were an agricultural people living on a vast plain exposed to attacking nomads.²⁸ The Russians always sensed that their society was archaic--and they feared the upheavals that would disrupt their society as Western contacts increased. Since Russia had been the whipping boy in international politics, insecurity continued. This was the ideal place for Marxism to grow for it preached a doctrine of "insoluble class conflict." When Roosevelt made friendly overtures with lend-lease, the Soviet experience instinctively made them question his motives. Perhaps there was substance ~~of~~ these suspicions for the West had intervened in the Bolshevik revolution. The United States refused to recognize the Soviet government until the 1930's. Russia was expelled from the League of Nations. When war came, hostile groups urged that Stalin and Hitler be permitted to kill each other off. When Russia seized the former states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, the United States declined to recognize them. Traditional Soviet hostility to the West found ideological support in the writings of Marx and Lenin. As decadent capitalist nations attempted to expand their markets, it was inevitable that they would conflict. The conflict

would end when the workers had united and defeated the bourgeoisie. Since the class struggle was inevitable, it would be impossible for the Soviet Union (a Socialist republic for the proletariat) to live peaceably with the capitalists of the United States and Britain. Stalin, a skeptic, would naturally become suspicious when the "Americans showered lend-lease supplies upon Russia."³⁰

Stalin's goal must be to protect the Russian nation. This would make Russia secure for Communism. The goal of Soviet security depended upon creating a "buffer zone" in Eastern Europe and in the Far East. These were Stalin's aims. They were first clearly stated late in 1941 when British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden discussed military plans and postwar goals with the Russians in Moscow. Stalin had insisted that he must be allowed to incorporate parts of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, Poland, and Rumania into the USSR. In addition, other settlements would gain friends for Russia among her immediate neighbors. They included restoring Austria to independence; giving Poland East Prussia; returning the Sudetenland to the Czechs; and giving new territory to Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia.³¹ This plan would make Russia secure.

Did Stalin only want Russian security, or was he also planning to spread Communism? A few Russian experts believed that the Soviet Union's foreign policy was still dedicated to this goal of creating revolutions. In the 1930's Ambassador Bullitt wrote:

... the sum of Stalin's policy... is to maintain peace for the present, to keep the nations of Europe divided, to foster enmity between Japan and the United States, and to gain the blind devotion and obedience of the communists of all countries so that they will act against their own governments at the behest of the Communist Pope in the Kremlin....³²

It seems probable that Communist ideology was placed in "cold storage" for the duration of the war. The Russians devoted their full efforts to suppressing the Nazi threat. It may be argued that wartime cooperation with the West did temper Soviet anxieties. Stalin stated at Yalta: "They all knew... that as long as the three of them (Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill) lived none of them would involve their countries in aggressive actions...."³³ Stalin was wise enough to observe that within ten years a new generation might be ruling who would not know the horrors of war. To Stalin, peace was equated with Russian security. Without territorial guarantees and friendly governments along Russia's borders, there could be no security. A collective security pact--like the United Nations--might help preserve the peace, but the Russians remembered that a similar pact--the League of Nations--had frustrated their ambitions and then expelled them. As long as capitalism survived, Russia would be insecure.

Churchill and Stalin were realistic statesmen. Their interests would conflict as each one sought security for his country by manipulating the balance of power. Peace, if it could be obtained, would be Franklin Roosevelt's achievement. This was especially true since in 1945 the United States was the most powerful nation in the world. The U.S. had proven itself to be the "arsenal of democracy"--financing and supplying

both the British and the Russians during the war. American industry had not been bombed; productive facilities had only to convert to consumer goods. In 1945 the United States was building an atomic bomb which would soon give it an nuclear monopoly. These weapons would make it possible for the U.S. to dictate the peace, if it were willing to use the new destructive weapons.

The United States President was a great man. He was the hero of millions, the Prince Charming who ruled the nation with a wand--that was actually an ivory cigarette holder.³⁶ His New Deal led America from the depths of depression to new heights of economic prosperity. This President was both an idealist and a consummate politician. Although he favored joining the League of Nations in the 1920's, by the 1930's his actions were wedding America to political and economic nationalism. The public heartily endorsed this policy. Roosevelt pushed America toward war and then led her to victory. But in 1945 he was a sick man. One of his supporters confessed that during the 1944 election campaign "I was terrified when I saw his face. I felt certain that he was going to die."³⁶ Critics have charged that at Yalta the President was a dying man who was incapable of intellectual concentration and who was vulnerable to Stalin's demands.³⁷ A veteran diplomat has recently written that in late March 1945 "Roosevelt was in no condition to offer balanced judgments upon the great questions which had concerned him so long...." Robert Murphy, the diplomat, had been summoned to Washington for consultations

on terms of the German surrender. He reported after seeing the President that he "scarcely mentioned the Russians; the Germans were on his mind. He said the important thing was to keep the Germans out of uniform, because 'the uniform does something bad to them, especially to the young men.'"³⁸ The condition of the President's mind is a moot question. The only measure for historians--except for medical evidence--is the consistency of the policy decisions Roosevelt made at different times during his administration. If his decisions vacillated at Yalta, then perhaps the dying Roosevelt did betray his country.

As a philosopher the President was American. His ideas and actions reflect the American heritage and can be interpreted only in terms of it. As a thinker Roosevelt was intuitive, not logical, in grappling with problems.³⁹ This can be seen by examining his attachment to idealism and his view of man. Roosevelt's commitment to the policy of "unconditional surrender" indicated his idealism. Although the policy might be defended reassured the Russians, it contained the elements of traditional American belief that "good must conquer evil." W.W. Rostow, a keen student of American diplomacy, has observed this about Americans:

We have the tendency to view any war in which we might be involved not as a means of achieving limited objectives in the way of changes in a given status quo but as a struggle to the death between total virtue and total evil, with the result that the war had absolutely to be fought to the complete destruction of the enemy's power, no matter what disadvantages or complications this might involve for the most distant future.⁴⁰

The President's view of man was also idealistic and optimistic. He believed in the inherent goodness and decency of each individual. Even if all men did not act in a just manner all the time, at least "ninety percent" wanted to do the right thing.⁴¹ Because each man was basically decent, Roosevelt postulated "the only way to have a friend is to be one."⁴² The President attempted to apply this principle to his dealings with the Russians--but they were the products of an entirely different philosophical heritage. Roosevelt felt that the ten percent who acted in an evil way were not innately bad; they were the victims of an evil environment. Like the Reform Darwinists, the President tried to reshape the social environment which produced this type. On the domestic scene, the New Deal legislation helped to create better social conditions. Applying the same guide line to international politics, he felt that acceptance of the principles in the Atlantic Charter and of the Four Freedoms would be a giant step forward.

The President was also a skillful politician--so he was a pragmatist. He realized that the fundamental problem of politics was balancing principle against principle. When two parties adhered to different principles, the skillful statesman must adjust the differences. At Rollins College in 1936, Roosevelt explained the role of statesmanship. He told the students:

It is the problem of Government to harmonize the interests of these groups which are often divergent and opposing, to harmonize them in order to guarantee security and good for as many of their individual members as may be possible. The science of politics, indeed, may properly be said to be in large part the science of adjustment of conflicting group interests.

Although the President felt that the need to compromise would often compel the statesman to deviate from principle, he believed that the fundamental test was whether compromise brought a result which was an improvement over what had been.⁴⁴ This view of statesmanship helps to explain the President's decisions at Yalta.

American foreign policy during the war had a dual purpose: (1) to win the war and (2) to secure the peace. The second was naturally subordinated to the first objective as the Allies waged a concentrated effort to defeat the Axis with a minimum loss of life. So that nothing might jeopardize the war effort, Roosevelt wanted to defer discussions of political settlements to postwar conferences. Consequently Roosevelt, as military commander-in-chief, relied heavily on the advice of his military advisers. He circumvented his State Department. A good example of Roosevelt's almost single-minded devotion to defeating the Nazis is his dispute with Churchill over a Balkan invasion. Churchill argued that the allies should attack in the Mediterranean. His purpose was primarily political. On the advice of his military advisers the President sided with the Russians who felt that Operation Overlord--the planned invasion of France--was the best way to smash the Germans, win the European war, and to save countless American lives.⁴⁵ Moreover, the President felt that this would help reduce Soviet suspicions and make feasible a new international organization that was being planned.⁴⁶ General Deane, who had been the U.S. military adviser in Moscow declared:

"Roosevelt...was thinking of winning the war; the others were thinking of their relative positions when the war was won."⁴⁷

Not only did Roosevelt ignore the State Department on military decisions, he consistently relied on selected advisers--such as Harry Hopkins, Sumner Welles, and Raymond Moley--for foreign policy decisions. Secretary of State Hull was the forgotten man in the administration. During the war Hull did not attend the Atlantic Conference, the Cairo Conference with Chiang Kai-shek, or the Teheran meeting with Stalin. At Cairo and Yalta where important decisions were made concerning the Far East, Roosevelt had no Asian expert. Even Sumner Welles observes that if the President had taken an authoritative expert on Far Eastern affairs, a number of defects in the agreements might have been avoided.⁴⁸ The reason why Roosevelt distrusted the State Department is a topic that concerned Elliott Roosevelt. He quoted his father as saying:

You know any number of times the men in the State Department have tried to conceal messages to me, delay them, hold them up somehow, just because some of those career diplomats aren't in accord with what they know I think.⁴⁹

Like Andrew Jackson, Roosevelt distrusted experts. The fact was that he was his own Secretary of State indicates that he believed that any intelligent man could be a diplomat.

Churchill distrusted the Russians, but he was willing to cooperate with them to defeat the Germans. Roosevelt lacked this profound understanding of Communism. His policy toward Stalin had several important political and intellectual

implications. First, the President naturally attributed decent motives to other men.⁵⁰ This was an outgrowth of his optimism and success in domestic matters. Even if the Russians were among the evil ten percent, they were not innately evil. Friendly diplomatic relations might continue if Stalin and he became personal friends. He assumed that the science of human relationships, of which he was an expert, was more viable than revolutionary ideology. He did not believe that differences in ideologies or economic systems prevented nations from working together. "The war of ideologies...was largely a book argument."⁵¹ Second, Roosevelt felt that Nazism was the primary threat to the West; Communism was not dangerous. In writing to Pope Pius on September 3, 1941, he expressed his view on the Russians:

The only weapon which the Russian dictatorship uses outside of its own border is communistic propaganda which I, of course, recognize has in the past been utilized for the purpose of breaking down the form of government in other countries.... Germany, however, not only has utilized, but is utilizing this kind of propaganda as well, and has also undertaken the employment of every form of military aggression outside of its borders for purpose of world conquest by force of arms and by force of propaganda. I believe that the survival of Russia is less dangerous to religion, to the church as such, and to humanity in general than would be the survival of the German form of dictatorship.⁵²

Successful cooperation with the Russians would defeat the primary threat to democracy and might help to develop a working relationship with strange Communist ideology. A third reason why the President chose to cooperate with the Russians was a result of domestic factors. He had frequently seen reform leaders falsely labeled Reds.⁵³ These reactionary

right-wing attacks tended to blind the President to Soviet goals. Finally, Roosevelt felt that cooperation could be sustained with the Soviets because when the war was over the Russians would need time to recover from Hitler's attacks. They would be too weak to threaten the United States.

In February 1945 the President of the United States believed that he could promote peace by preserving Big Three cooperation. Cooperation must be continued with the Russians-- and it must be continued with the British. The British and the Russians were natural opponents. Churchill wished to reconstruct the British Empire. The Communists held that imperialism created war. Roosevelt himself accepted this view. He told his son Elliott:

The colonial system means war.... Exploit the resources of an India, a Burma, Java; take all the wealth out of those countries, but never put anything back into them, things like education, decent standards of living, minimum health requirements--all you're doing is storing up the kind of trouble that leads to war. ⁵⁴

If the British managed to revive their empire, Roosevelt felt the United States would still face the threat of more war in the future. To prevent this situation from developing and to limit the threat of Communism, Roosevelt decided that he must be the "honest broker." Peace would benefit America; Roosevelt thought it would benefit the world. He planned to tell the American people what formula would assure peace in an address planned for Jefferson Day 1945.

Today we are faced with the pre-eminent fact that, if civilization is to survive, we must cultivate the science of human relationships--the ability of all peoples, of all kinds, to live together and work together, in the same world, at peace. ⁵⁵

The science of human relationships was the device the President selected to gain acceptance of his peace formula. When the Big Three met for the last time at Yalta, Roosevelt was prepared to make his great gamble for peace.

Chapter 4.

Preparations for the Big Three Reunion at Yalta

By July 1944 President Roosevelt realized that it was again necessary to meet with Stalin and Churchill. A number of problems had to be resolved by the Big Three. Although strategy had been mapped for the final assault on Germany, no agreement had been reached on postwar Germany. Questions of reparations, dismemberment, zones of influence, and war criminals were still undecided. France wanted to be represented on the commission that would control Germany. No decision had been reached on the thorny Polish problems of boundaries and government. Possible Soviet participation in the war against Japan had to be clarified. The United States wanted Britain and Russia to support the Nationalist government in China. Finally the United Nations voting procedure had to be approved.⁵⁶

For several months no agreement could be reached over the location of the meeting. Roosevelt first proposed Northern Scotland. Stalin rejected this claiming that operational war decisions made it impossible for him to leave the Soviet Union. Then Roosevelt could not leave the United States until after the election in November 1944. He suggested other possible meeting places: Athens, Cyprus, Malta, Salonica, and Constantinople. Stalin was still adamant about leaving the Soviet Union. Harry Hopkins told Roosevelt that he thought Stalin would not leave Russia--and this proved to be true.⁵⁷ Finally, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to meet

Stalin in the Crimea sometime in early February. Churchill and Roosevelt planned to confer first at Malta over military plans for the spring offensive against the Germans. The Malta session was the result of British prodding. Churchill hoped that the President and he might coordinate strategy for their discussions with Stalin.⁵⁸ President Roosevelt opposed any Anglo-American understanding because he feared that it might torpedo the Big Three talks.

When the three statesmen met, important territorial decisions had to be made regarding the future of Europe and the Far East. The military situation in February had a major impact on the territorial agreements. The nature of the European agreements were related to the progress of the war against Germany. From June 1941 until November 1942, when the Allies opened the North African campaign, the Soviet Union fought the German armies alone. In late 1943 the Russians defeated the Nazi forces at Stalingrad and began to push them back. Not until June 1944 was the long-promised second front opened against Hitler in the West. Then Anglo-American forces landed on the beaches of Normandy. After D-Day, the Red Army pushed through Rumania, Hungary, the Baltic States, and Poland. The Russian offensive played a decisive role in Germany's defeat. For example, while General Eisenhower was fighting 700,000 Germans in the West in the three months from June to September 1944, the Russians inflicted 900,000 casualties on Hitler's armies.⁵⁹ Even Churchill admitted to the House of Commons in August 1944

that the Russians were doing "the main work of tearing the guts out of the German army."⁶⁰ If the Russian offensive continued with the lend-lease aid given by the United States, the Russians might soon control all of Eastern Europe.

While the Russians were sweeping eastward, the Allies found strong German resistance. On December 16, 1944, Eisenhower was struck by a fierce German counter-offensive which forced him back and created the "Bulge." Consequently the government in Washington ordered a "comb out" of all men qualified for combat duty. The Joint Chiefs of Staff notified the Commander in Chief that there were no more combat divisions available in the United States.⁶¹ This meant that the United States could not defeat the Germans alone. The pressure on Eisenhower was relieved in January when Marshal Stalin ordered 150 to 160 Soviet divisions to attack the Germans and to secure the Oder River. In early February, Eisenhower and Marshall agreed that continued Soviet assistance was necessary for bringing the war in Europe to a speedy close.⁶² In the East the Russian offensive continued to push the Germans back. When the Yalta Conference began on February 4, 1945, the Russians had liberated Poland and had recognized the Lublin government. Other Red armies had separated East Prussia from the Reich. Marshal Zhukov's armored forces had advanced to within one hundred miles of Berlin. The Soviet military position was strong in Eastern Europe when the meeting began. "These were facts above which personal diplomacy could not rise."⁶³

In the Far East the American position was improving, but fierce fighting was yet to come. The Japanese had at least 4,000,000 men in Japan, China, Manchuria, and Korea; the United States had nearly 1,600,000. The forward line in February included Attu, the Marianas, and Luzon, although the Americans controlled the sea and air up to China, Formosa, the Ryukyus, and almost to the coast of Japan. In late February and early March the Marines would capture Iwo Jimo at the cost of 7,000 lives. After this fierce battle the Americans would lose 7,300 men to capture Okinawa in what has been called the "greatest sea-air battle in history."⁶⁴ The violence of the struggle yet to come has been described by the military writer for the N.Y. Times as follows:

Never before, in so short a space, had the Navy lost so many; never before, in land fighting had so much American blood been shed in so short a time in so small an area; probably never before in any three months of the war had the enemy suffered so hugely.⁶⁵

It was expected that a land invasion of Japan in late 1945 would be extremely costly. For the invasion to succeed, the army told President Roosevelt that the Russians would be needed to engage Japanese forces in Manchuria. The military position of the Allies was generally better than that of the Axis on all fronts in 1945. Still ultimate defeat required that cooperation continue among the Big Three. This was the military situation on the eve of the Yalta Conference.

To the Crimean Conference each nation sent its most prominent and skilled leaders. Headed by President Roosevelt the American delegation was especially imposing. It included

Edward R. Stettinius, Secretary of State since Cordell Hull's resignation in December, 1944; Harry Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt; James Byrnes, former Supreme Court Justice and head of the Office of War Mobilization and Conversion; W. Averell Harriman, ambassador to the Soviet Union; and H. Freeman Matthews, Alger Hiss, and Charles E. Bohlen from the State Department. Bohlen served as Roosevelt's interpreter. The President was also accompanied by military leaders. They included: Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy; General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army; and Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.

The British delegation was led by Prime Minister Winston Churchill and included Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff. Marshal of the Soviet Union, Joseph V. Stalin was accompanied by Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov and Andrei Y. Vishinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

The plenary conference sessions were held in Livadia Palace, built by the Romanovs, but now the temporary home of the American contingent. The British were billeted twelve miles away in Vorontsov Villa, while the Russians stayed at Koreis Palace midway between the others.

Despite the importance of the occasion, each delegation preferred to keep its own records--and they were often incomplete.

Bohlen, who was present at all the meetings between Roosevelt and Stalin, kept the best notes for the Americans. Most of the other delegates kept their own records.⁶⁶ From February 4th to 11th the three world leaders discussed their problems. Then the conference ended with a formal banquet in Livadia Palace on February 10. Winston Churchill expressed the delegates optimism when he declared hopefully in a toast to Stalin that "the fire of war had burnt up the misunderstandings of the past." The President and Marshal Stalin were equally sanguine that the future was bright.

On the next day the protocol of the Crimean Conference was signed by the three Foreign Secretaries for their respective governments. Its provisions mentioned Germany, Eastern Europe and the proposed United Nations. No mention was made of the "secret agreement" on the Far East which Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin had signed.

In examining the agreements and analyzing their importance, it is convenient to consider four problems: (1) Poland and Eastern Europe, (2) Germany, (3) the Far East, and (4) the United Nations. These are the decisions which have received the most criticism. They are the areas where revisionists have alleged there was appeasement, treachery, and betrayal.

Chapter 5.

The Compromise on Poland and Eastern Europe
(Microcosm of Imminent Conflict)

By the end of 1945, Americans had become disillusioned by the increase of Soviet authority in Poland. To some Americans, the Polish settlement was the first sign of the Yalta betrayal. Resentment grew. Republican Senator Vandenburg stated in 1945 that "it is clear that the settlement of the Polish question thus far made is inadequate and unconvincing to millions of our citizens, among whom I may say that I am numbered."⁶⁸ Charles Rozmarek, president of the Polish-American Congress, charged:

Yalta was that single moment at the tragic moment at the tragic crossroads of history that decided the life and death of millions of people, the fate of many nations and the outcome of the Second World War. There it was where we lost the peace while winning the war.⁶⁹

The fate of Poland became a leading political issue in the postwar period. Each February on the anniversary of Yalta politicians denounced Roosevelt and his "sell-out of the liberty-loving Polish people."⁷⁰ Many congressmen seized this issue to win the support of voters of Polish descent. Worst suspicions seemed to be confirmed when in 1955 Time editorialized: "How the fate of Poland was settled at Yalta is a story that contains, in a small scale model, the elements of the larger story of how the West lost the peace."⁷¹ Even one of the participants at the fate Crimean conclave, Winston Churchill, wrote in his memoirs that the Polish question was the "first of the great causes which led to the breakdown of the Grand Alliance."⁷²

What were the objections to the Polish agreement? A clear statement was issued by the Polish-American Congress in March 1945. The Congress charged that the decisions were contrary to the aims of the Atlantic Charter. Moreover they gave away half of Poland to Russia without agreement or consultation, without knowledge and without consent of the legal Polish government and the Polish people.⁷³ These Americans of Polish descent claimed that the President had sacrificed American principles by acquiescing to the "Red rape of Poland." This led to the destruction of the constitutional and territorial sovereignty of the Polish government.

Administration supporters had good answers. They explained that the question was not what the Americans and British would permit the Russians to take, but what they could get the Russians to accept.⁷⁴ That Polish sovereignty was lost was not a consequence of Roosevelt's diplomacy, but a result of the Russian's failure to live up to the intent of the agreements. James F. Byrnes added another point. He said that Soviet pledges on paper served as formal evidence to the rest of the world that Russian actions in Eastern Europe had violated the written commitments.⁷⁵ Still discord continued.

To evaluate the opposing views on Poland, one must examine the final agreements and the fundamental issues which were debated by the Big Three. The Declaration on Poland which was approved by Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt at Yalta stated that a "new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army." Therefore

the paper continued: "The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should be...reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad." This Polish Government should be "pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot." The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed to extend diplomatic recognition to the new provisional government. Finally they decided that "the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favor of Poland." The Western boundary would be determined at a postwar peace conference.

This draft was the product of conflicting interests. Different historical, ideological, and practical considerations shaped these interests. Averell Harriman, American ambassador to the Soviet Union, accurately assessed the Soviet policy when he cabled the State Department on January 10, 1945, that

the overriding consideration in Soviet foreign policy is the preoccupation with 'security,' as Moscow sees it.... The Soviet conception of 'security' does not appear cognizant of the similar needs or rights of other countries and of Russia's obligation to accept the restraints as well as the benefits of an international security system.

This policy had its roots in a long history of Polish-Soviet conflict. Throughout modern history Russo-Polish relations have been strained. Differences in religious and cultural orientation, conflicting ambitions for territory, and the

absence of a natural frontier have intensified this bitterness.⁷⁷ Poland dictated the peace until the seventeenth century. Then Russia participated in three partitions of Poland in the late nineteenth century. Neither the Poles nor the Soviets were satisfied when Allied diplomats established the Curzon Line as the Soviet-Polish border at the end of World War I. During the 1920's the new Poland served as a cordon sanitaire against the spread of Communist ideology and as the eastern terminus of the French defenses against Germany. In 1939 while the British negotiated an alliance with Poland, the Germans signed a nonaggression pact with Russia which also provided for another partition of Poland. The Soviets apparently had begun to realize that Russian security depended on Soviet control of Poland.

During the 1940's after Germany's surprise attack on Poland, Stalin refused to guarantee explicitly to Poland that Russia would return to her former boundaries. An ambiguous Russo-Polish Pact encouraged this hope. Poland was heartened further by the Atlantic Charter which seemed to guarantee the restoration of a sovereign Poland.⁷⁹ Still no territorial arrangement was made with Russia before Stalin's armies defeated the Germans at Stalingrad. A primary reason for this inaction was that the United States had ruled that territorial settlements would be left until hostilities ended. By April 1943 it was clear that Stalin had postwar political interests in Poland. This was evident when he severed diplomatic relations with the Polish government-in-exile. At the Teheran Conference

Roosevelt wavered in his decision to postpone territorial arrangements. He accepted Churchill's proposal to get the Russians to accept the Curzon Line. However, the Poles refused to accept this compromise. Military advances would soon demonstrate the folly of the Polish decision. By January 17, 1945, Stalin's forces had liberated Poland and had installed a new Polish government at Lublin. British efforts to force Mikolajczyk, leader of the London exiles, to form a coalition government in Poland with the Lublin government failed. It was now apparent to all but the wishful Poles that Russian military control of Poland might leave a permanent imprint. Since Soviet security had always been threatened by the existence of a sovereign Poland, Stalin could take advantage of his superior military position to make Poland responsive to Moscow. A puppet government was created with the end of the string in the Kremlin. At Yalta it became clear that Soviet Russia was in control of most of Eastern Europe and that she had little to gain by discussing the region with the Big Three.⁷⁹

If Poland was vital to Russian security, it was very important to the British. Britain had tried to preserve the balance of power in Europe since the time of Henry VIII. If Russia were able to dominate the continent, then Britain would be threatened. Churchill had always recognized the Communist ideological threat. In 1944 he acted alone to frustrate Soviet ambitions by making an agreement with Stalin. The pact established spheres of influence for the Russians in Rumania and Yugoslavia and for the British in Greece.⁸⁰ Churchill

realized that the future of Poland was a question of honor-- as well as security. The British had gone to war in 1939 to protect the independence of Poland; it would indeed be ironic if in peace Poland became a captive of some other power. At Yalta Churchill was aware that the British and Soviet interests were conflicting. He told Stalin:

Great Britain has no material interest in Poland. Her interest is only one of honor.... Never could I be content with any solution that would not leave Poland as a free and independent state.⁸¹

The future of Poland did not vitally concern U.S. policy planners, but it was important to them. Poland was not particularly important to American national security. It was significant because it was an opportunity for the United States to apply the democratic principles that had been proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter. The State Department prepared several briefs for Roosevelt to read on his way to Yalta.⁸² One report urged that the United States pursue a "middle course" between British and Russians in an attempt to consider the general mood of the people. The United States should dedicate itself to the preservation of civil liberties and to the advocacy of social and economic reforms. This would be best for "the general mood of the people of Europe is to the left and strongly in favor of far-reaching economic and social reform."⁸³ There was further evidence of America's commitment to establishing democratic governments in Eastern Europe. In late 1943 the President appealed to Marshal Stalin to hold a "second plebiscite" in the disputed territories along

the Russo-Polish border. The people could determine their own political status.⁸⁴ This moral appeal had domestic political implications. Roosevelt recognized that six million Polish-Americans expected the "full restoration of an independent Poland."⁸⁵ They might vote Republican in the next election if the President repudiated the Polish nation.

In January 1945 the State Department devised a second policy. The Russian position in Poland was fait accompli. Therefore the United States might trade its consent for what has already been done in Poland for Soviet acceptance of America's plans for world security. The position paper concluded:

... the point is that it has been done and nothing which it is within the power of the United States Government to do can undo it. We know that the Russians will insist on the annexation of a substantial portion of East Prussia and a boundary with Poland roughly in accordance with the Curzon Line.... I would favor using any bargaining power that exists in connection with the foregoing matters to induce the Russians to go along with a satisfactory United Nations organization and the proposed Provisional Security Council for Europe to deal with Poland, Greece, and other trouble spots.⁸⁶

Roosevelt recognized the inherent dangers in this action.

If he agreed to recognize the Soviet government of Poland, he would risk adverse public opinion in the United States. His plan for a United Nations might meet the same horrible death as Wilson's plan for a League of Nations. Somehow the debates must resolve the dilemma.

The Polish thorn was the greatest threat to Allied unity. The debates lasted six days. Two primary problems were involved: (1) Polish boundaries and (2) the type of Polish government. On the boundary problem the United States and

Britain proposed that the Curzon Line, essentially the 1941 border, mark the division between Poland and Russia. Since Russian armies controlled Poland, Stalin was at first irrevocably opposed. He said that the White Russians and Ukrainians would think that he and Molotov were less reliable defenders of Russia than Curzon and Clemenceau had been in 1919.⁸⁷ After much discussion Stalin accepted the Curzon Line. The western boundary of Poland was more difficult to resolve. Stalin wanted to move the Polish boundary deep into Germany to compensate Poland for German injustices. He also desired to evict six to nine million Germans living in the area east of the Oder-Neisse River. At Teheran, Churchill had supported this. At Yalta he refused. It was obvious that if the Russians controlled Poland this would only increase the Soviet sphere of influence in Western Europe. Because no agreement could be reached, this issue was left for the peace conference. This was consistent with the American belief that territorial questions should be decided after the war. Ironically this principle had already been violated by each ally.⁸⁸ Still the decision to delay action postponed a Big Three break.

The second trouble spot was more vital to Western interests. Although the Russians had de facto possession of Poland, the London Polish government had refused to compromise with the "puppet" Lublin government. Still the West believed at Yalta that Eastern Europe could be held in the orbit of democratic nations.⁸⁹ At first the Big Three could not settle the matter. They referred it to the Foreign Ministers, but they could not

agree either. Finally the Big Three reconsidered and reached an agreement. The provisional government of Poland was to be reorganized from Poles inside and outside the country. How would a permanent government be chosen? Roosevelt was vitally concerned with the type of election. He told Stalin: "I want this election in Poland to be the first one beyond question. It should be like Caesar's wife. I did not know her but they said she was pure." Stalin retored with a prophetic statement. "They said that about her...but in fact she had her sins."⁹⁰ The final draft was vague and was presented on the last day of the conference. Admiral Leahy says that when he saw the phrases "a strong, free, independent, and democratic Poland, with Russia 'guaranteeing' the liberated country 'unfettered elections, 'universal suffrage,' and the secret ballot" he told the President: "Mr. President, this is so elastic that the Russians can stretch it all the way from Yalta to Washington without ever technically breaking it." The President replied to him: "I know, Bill--I know it. But it's the best I can do for Poland at this time."⁹¹ This suggests that the President may have realized that the Russians would never permit a democratic government to be established in Poland. The Soviets did not want Poland to serve as a corridor for another invasion. Nevertheless, Roosevelt decided to try. If he had genuinely pushed the demand for representative elections in Poland, he might have needed to use American military strength. This was not possible, first, because Americans were not willing to keep troops in Europe

any longer than necessary to defeat Hitler. Second, belligerent actions or threats would have damaged the Big Three cooperation which was a prerequisite to the creation of the United Nations. Recently a historian wrote that since Roosevelt and Churchill had blocked Soviet pretension in Germany, it was difficult for them to resist Stalin's Polish demands. Neither was ready to let the Polish dispute rupture Western relations with the Soviet Union.⁹² As a shrewd, practical politician Roosevelt saw that adjustment was necessary. The techniques of compromise that had proven so successful for him in U.S. politics would be tested on the international problem.

In a sense Poland was a microcosm for the greater conflict involving the future of all Eastern Europe. Stalin knew that this area could not be permitted to turn against the Soviet Union. Opposing him were Churchill and Roosevelt, the authors of the Atlantic Charter. They were committed to the establishment of free and democratic governments in all the lands of Eastern Europe where true democracy had never existed. This division was papered over in the Declaration on Liberated Europe. This committed the Great Powers to assist the liberated governments to "creat democratic institutions of their own choice." However, where "in their judgment conditions require....," they would "form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people." It is difficult to determine whether or not the

three statesmen recognized the implications of this policy. Professor McNeil recognized that in free democratic elections the people would probably choose governments opposed to the Soviet Union. He also believed that Stalin did not realize that his forceful efforts to exclude hostile voters would be resented by the West.⁹³ Still the Declaration on Liberated Europe was a moral victory for Britain and America for it affirmed the principles of the Atlantic Charter and encouraged the captive peoples. It was hollow in practice because the high-sounding words were not buttressed by military force. Not only were the American people unwilling to fight to liberate these nations, their leaders believed that Soviet friendship must be sustained at all costs.⁹⁴

Chapter 6.

The German Bargain

German aggression had fused the Grand Alliance of Britain, Russia, and America, but at Yalta Germany was not a major problem. As the debates on the future of Poland revealed fundamental conflicts of interest, the discussions on Germany evoked more bitterness. The fundamental question on the future status of Germany that Roosevelt and Churchill had to answer was difficult. How could they eliminate the threat of German power without leaving the Soviet Union in the dominant position on the continent?⁹⁵

After several sessions the powers agreed to dismember Germany, to collect reparations, and to give France a control zone in Germany. Actual dismemberment was to be **decided** by a three-power commission. A reparation commission would meet in Moscow. It was to take as a basis for debate the Soviet proposal that reparations be 20 billion dollars with 50 percent of this for the Soviet Union. The question of war criminals was postponed.

In the discussions all three powers were strongly influenced by their intense hatred for Germany. The British and Soviet people had directly experienced the scourge of war. Americans were no less vitriolic. Even the usually liberal Walter Lippmann wrote in 1944: "Our primary war aim must be unalterable: it must be to make it impossible for Germany to hold the balance of power."⁹⁶ The intensity of Stalin's feeling are seen in his proposal that Germany be reduced in size, be

divided into four parts, and be forced to pay reparations.⁹⁷ The Western policy during the war was to postpone territorial decisions, and it was cloaked by the moral principles of the Atlantic Charter. By late 1944 the Anglo-American position was being influenced by Morgenthau's plan to "pastoralize" Germany. The Morgenthau proposal was formulated by Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau and his Communist-inspired assistant Harry Dexter White. If it had been adopted, Germany would never have been able to threaten the peace. She would have no industry. A more serious disadvantage was that it would have given the Soviet Union effective control over the destiny of all continental Europe.⁹⁸ At the first Quebec Conference President Roosevelt initialed his approval to the Morgenthau plan. Churchill concurred.

The discussions over dismemberment, reparations, territorial reduction, and war criminals were on matters that could--and were postponed. The bitterness and disunity which their discussion fostered explains why they were postponed. For example, on the subject of reparations Stalin argued that the U.S.S.R. had suffered direct losses as high as \$128,000,000,000.⁹⁹ Roosevelt argued for Churchill and himself that it would be impossible to discuss reparations until the "Allies discovered what was left of Germany after the war." His argument was based on the belief that unreasonable reparations might incite the Germans to break the peace--as they had done after the heavy reparations were imposed on them at Versailles in 1919.¹⁰⁰ Stalin replied that the essence of his proposal

had already been accepted by Roosevelt and Churchill. They were included in the Morgenthau plan. Churchill retorted that he was "haunted by the specter of a starving Germany, which would present a serious problem for the Allies."¹⁰¹ Lengthy, heated debates continued for several days. Finally at the President's insistence the matter was given to the Reparations Committee. The President managed to forestall a crisis by getting the Russians to postpone the reparations decision. The Russians were partially placated by the agreement to initiate discussions on the twenty billion figure. Although the British registered a protest, the gulf was smoothed over. Roosevelt had won a temporary battle for unity on this issue.

Some critics believe Roosevelt's policy of postponement was myopic because it left a power vacuum in Eastern Germany. The vacuum was rapidly filled by the advancing Russian soldiers. W.W. Rostow criticizes the President's policy for he thinks that the United States and Britain should have established strong de facto military positions. This would have forced the Soviets to negotiate from weakness--not strength--in Eastern Germany.¹⁰² At this juncture it is crucial to reiterate that Roosevelt was confronted by the dilemma of how to subdue Germany and check the Soviets. The German threat worried him the most. Consequently U.S. military leaders opened the Second Front in France against the Nazis. Politically this move assured the Russians that they would have a strong position

in postwar Europe. This would be dangerous to the United States, the President thought, only if Big Three cooperation failed. The policy of postponement avoided immediate conflicts and made it possible for the Big Three to remain united to win the war and perhaps the peace.

Chapter 7.

Far Eastern Concessions
(The Secret Accord)

Nothing in the Yalta protocol has contributed more to "unbridled revisionism" than the secret agreement President Roosevelt negotiated on the Far East. This decision delivered China to the Communists. At least this is the view of former Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley. He claimed:

Our diplomats surrendered the territorial integrity and political independence of China in a secret agreement at Yalta. The Yalta secret agreement is the blueprint for the Communist conquest of China. Every step in the Communist conquest of China has been engineered by our own diplomats, in cooperation with the Chinese Communists and Russia.¹⁰¹

Roosevelt was also accused of violating the sacred principles of the Atlantic Charter and of repudiating the traditional American policy on China. "Secret diplomacy" and "intrigue" were the emotional words that explained the loss of China and the war in Korea. Those who detested Roosevelt proclaimed in red letters that this was personal diplomacy at its lowest ebb.

What were these concessions that sold China down the river and lost the Far East to democracy? On Sunday, February 11, 1945, Stalin and Roosevelt signed a secret agreement. It stated that in two or three months after the war in Europe had ended the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan on the side of the Allies. Stalin received a guarantee that the status quo would be maintained in Outer Mongolia and that the port of Dairen would be internationalized. He received

title to Southern Sakhalin and adjacent islands, the lease of Port Arthur, possession of the Kurile Islands, and joint operation of railroads with China. In return, Roosevelt received, along with the promise to fight Japan, the guarantee that Stalin would support the Chinese Nationalist government. Also both parties agreed that the condition of Outer Mongolia and the railroads would be subject to Chiang Kai-shek's concurrence.

Measured on the scale of legitimacy, the Soviet claims were not unfounded. Outer Mongolia's separation from Chinese sovereignty had been a fact for twenty years. The southern half of the island of Sakhalin had been lost to the Japanese in 1905. The Kurile Islands had great strategic value to Russia since they stretched from the tip of the great Russian peninsula down to the northern end of Japan. One authority argued that if Russia was to play the expected role in the war against Japan, she was entitled to these concessions. Moreover, Roosevelt had discussed the internationalization of Dairen with Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo and with Stalin and Churchill at Teheran. It can be seen that internationalization of the Port of Dairen, with adequate facilities for Russia, was a fair arrangement. It was difficult to contest this settlement when Russia's landlocked, ice-bound status was remembered.¹⁰⁴

Legitimacy in international politics should not be a function of legal or moral standards. Power is a primary determinant of national interest. This being the case, it

is incumbent on the analyst to examine Soviet and American interests in the Far East. Both nations recognized that Germany's defeat would be desirable. Each nation had certain goals for creating a favorable peace. In 1945 Russia still wanted access to the sea and use of the Pacific Ocean. To the Russians the possession or domination of Manchuria, Korea, Sakhalin, Tsushima Island, and the Kurile Islands was desirable to protect Soviet naval interests. Stalin felt that the conquest of these bordering areas by another power would constitute an immediate and serious threat to Russia.¹⁰⁵ The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 had been fought over these disputed territories. Since 1905, the Russians had been checked by the expanding Japanese.

The American interest in the Far East was primarily economic during the nineteenth century. To preserve its commercial interests in China, the United States favored the Open Door policy. This supported the territorial integrity of China and the creation of a strong Chinese government. In 1945 these traditional interests were intensified by the fact that the inevitable defeat of Japan would create a power vacuum in the Far East. Neither the United States nor Russia could afford to let the other dominate this area.¹⁰⁶ Accordingly the American policy was presented in a State Department briefing paper which said:

The American Government's long-range policy with respect to China is based on the belief that the need for China to be a principal factor in the Far East is a fundamental requirement for peace and security in that area.¹⁰⁷

So at the Crimean Conference the President wished to reconstitute China as a great power. Getting British and Soviet acceptance of the principles of the Atlantic Charter would realize this goal. Getting their acceptance of the United Nations collective security clause would protect the new China. The British were not particularly concerned with the conflict of interest in the Far East. For that reason they did not participate actively in the discussions over the disposition of Asia. In terms of American interests Roosevelt's concessions to Russia can be defended for two possible reasons: (1) they would hasten the Japanese defeat and (2) they would increase U.S. security by strengthening China and promoting the United Nations.

Was it necessary to secure Soviet military cooperation to defeat Japan? In February 1945 the answer was not obvious. Yet several international and domestic considerations indicated that Russia should enter the Pacific war. United States forces had not yet recovered Iwo Jima or Okinawa, and the heavy air raids against Japan were not initiated until March 1945. General Kuter, who represented the Air Force at Yalta, stated that it was sixty-five days from the time of the meeting until the first five-hundred-airplane strike could be delivered.¹⁰⁸ However, the Navy did control the seas almost to the coast of Japan. But, in February the United States found that time and manpower were scarce, but crucial, factors.¹⁰⁹ When General Eisenhower had called for reserves in December 1944 the United States had exhausted its supply of trained manpower. Moreover, Secretary Stettinius reported that there was a

groundswell of public opinion in the United States that the boys be returned home as soon as the war was over in Europe.¹¹⁰ Consequently the thoughts of thirty experienced Russian divisions being transferred to the Japanese front looked very good to President Roosevelt.¹¹¹ Moreover it was expected that the defeat of Japan would take eighteen months after the defeat of Germany, and Secretary of War Stimson estimated there would be from 500,000 to possibly one million casualties in the planned invasion of the Japanese homeland.¹¹² Even General MacArthur urged that the Russians be brought into the war. Later he wrote:

On December 13, 1941, I urged that Russia attack immediately from the North. This would have saved countless lives, billions of dollars, and spared the Philippines, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, and many Pacific Islands.¹¹³

Although the General had not expressed a written opinion since 1941, no evidence indicates that he changed his mind. There is, instead, very good reason to believe that MacArthur still favored Russian aid.¹¹⁴ Having considered these factors, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff gave President Roosevelt a memorandum to guide him in his negotiations with the Kremlin. It was signed by General Marshall. It read as follows:

Russia's entry at as early a date as possible consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations is necessary to provide maximum assistance to our Pacific operations. The U.S. will provide maximum support possible without interfering with our main effort against Japan.

The objective of Russia's military effort against Japan in the Far East should be the defeat of the Japanese forces in Manchuria, air operations against Japan proper in collaboration with U.S. air forces based in Eastern Siberia, and maximum interference with Japanese sea traffic between Japan and the mainland of Asia.¹¹⁵

No doubt this recommendation was important, but there is some doubt that it alone convinced the President of the need to confirm the promise of Russian assistance. There is much evidence to indicate that Roosevelt may have acted for other reasons. First, there was no unanimous agreement on the need to invade Japan. The Navy and the Air Force believed that the United States could defeat Japan without a land invasion. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King and Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz wrote that the defeat of Japan could have been accomplished by sea and air power alone.¹¹⁶ Admiral Leahy, the ranking American naval officer, said in his memoirs that "I personally...did not feel that Russian participation in the Japanese war was necessary."¹¹⁷ General Arnold, of the Air Force, sent a note to Yalta which indicated that the Japanese capacity to resist had been completely undermined.¹¹⁸

Second, it seems likely that President Roosevelt was aware of the unofficial Japanese peace overtures. Two days before he left for Yalta he received a forty-page paper from General MacArthur outlining five unofficial Japanese peace overtures which amounted to an acceptance of unconditional surrender, with the sole reservation that the Japanese Emperor should be retained.¹¹⁹ Admiral Zacharias reported that intelligence reports were available to corroborate the fact that Japan was about to surrender.¹²⁰

Finally there was the atomic bomb. On December 20, 1944, Major General Leslie R. Groves, chief of the Manhattan District Project, sent a top-secret message to the President that it

was now "reasonably certain" that a bomb could be built which would produce the equivalent of a ten-thousand-ton TNT explosion.¹²¹ Roosevelt obviously knew of the project. Then Colonel William Considine was sent to Yalta to inform Secretary Stettinius that a successful bomb would be constructed and would be ready by the first of August. This bomb would be able to wreck a large-sized city.¹²² Although the President knew he would have a new weapon, his Army advisers did not include the atomic bomb in their strategic thinking. Recent examination of Pentagon records indicates that there is not a scrap of evidence to show that the Joint Chiefs even once speculated about the possibility that the A-bomb might change the course of the Pacific war or prevent a frontal invasion of the Japanese homeland.¹²³ Since the President had access to all classified data, there is reason to doubt that any single source had a controlling influence on his decision. If Roosevelt sought a Far Eastern agreement because the Army advised it, he made a grave mistake. In this case he may have been too sick to act rationally. Another possibility exists, however. This is that Roosevelt found other more compelling reasons for negotiating with the Russians.

If America did need Soviet assistance to defeat Japan, was it necessary to make concessions to Stalin to bring Russia into the war? This is a significant question. At first Stalin had asked nothing. Russia would enter the war when Germany was defeated. The Marshal pledged this to Cordell Hull at the Moscow Conference on October 30, 1943. Now at

Yalta Stalin argued that the Soviet peoples would be reluctant to pursue another war without the promise of a tangible reward. This may have been true. Although one can doubt that a dictator needs help in creating public opinion, America could not deny that they were reluctant to ask their own troops to begin a second invasion on the other side of the world. This made it difficult to deny Stalin's request for a bribe.¹²⁴

As a neutral in the Japanese war Stalin had several alternative courses of action. First, the Japanese government was frightened out of its wits at the thought of another war with Russia and was willing to pay a heavy price to avoid it. Japanese Foreign Minister Togo even suggested that Japan might return to her pre-1904 boundaries if the Russians would remain neutral.¹²⁵ A better case can be made for Russian intervention without concessions. British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden told this to Secretary of State Stettinius:

If the Russians decided to enter the war against Japan they would take the decision because they considered it in their interests that the Japanese war should not be successfully finished by the U.S. and Great Britain alone.¹²⁶

This was sound reasoning. If Stalin remained neutral, he would have no voice in the peace settlement. The Americans could dictate the peace in an area which had strategic value to the Soviet Union. Stalin could never permit this. Ambassador Bullitt was probably correct when he stated: "It was not only unnecessary to pay Stalin a price for making war on Japan but it would have been greatly to our political advantage to have prevented him from doing so."¹²⁷

If Japan could be defeated without Russian assistance, why did the President "give away" Chinese territory to the Soviet dictator? Perhaps this really was the "American Munich"! Careful analysis suggests that the "personal agreement" was no betrayal of U.S. interests. Rather it may have been a carefully contemplated gamble for peace. Since Roosevelt's foreign policy depended on a strong China, one motive for his accord with Stalin was to guarantee Chinese independence. Both China and the United States were quick to realize that this would fail without Soviet support. So when President Roosevelt went to Cairo, he found that the Nationalist Chinese foreign policy was directed toward reaching a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.¹²⁸ Indeed, in June 1944, Chiang Kai-shek suggested to Vice President Henry Wallace that he ask Roosevelt to act as a "middleman" between China and the USSR. Chiang was willing to go a long way to obtain a friendly understanding with the Soviet Union. He hoped that this would induce the Russians to continue recognizing his government as the government of China. This might reduce Russian incentive to support the Communists in China. Also he felt that obligating Russia to something by a treaty was better than leaving her uncommitted.¹²⁹ In adopting this course of action, Roosevelt did not rewrite the text books on American foreign policy. Indeed he was only following the instructions that the State Department had given him. A Briefing Book stated:

We regard Sino-Soviet cooperation as a sine qua non of peace and security in the Far East and seek to aid in removing the existing mistrust between China and the Soviet Union and in bringing about close and friendly relations between them.¹³⁰

Roosevelt has been accused of giving Stalin too much in the "secret agreement." In truth the President did not give away anything that the Russians could not have taken for themselves. Secretary Stimson said the concessions in the Far East were:

generally matters which are within the military power of Russia to obtain regardless of U.S. military action short of war. The War Department believe that Russia is militarily capable of defeating the Japanese and occupying Sakhalin, Manchuria, Korea, and Northern China before it would be possible for the U.S. military forces to occupy these areas.¹³¹

Because Stalin could seize these points whenever he wished, it was desirable for China to have Russia's gains limited and recorded on paper. This would prevent the Soviets from grabbing a larger piece of territory. In this perspective the Chinese government was lucky to have the United States negotiate for it.¹³² Nevertheless, these arguments did not dispel the myth that the dying Roosevelt was tricked into secretly handing over great sections of China to the Soviets--behind the back of Chiang Kai-shek.¹³³ The fact is that the secret deal was not a corrupt bargain. Revisionists tended to confuse this point. Military exigency required that the document be kept secret. At Yalta Roosevelt told Stalin his reasoning. It was simply that one of the difficulties in speaking to the Chinese was that anything said to them was know to the world in 24 hours.¹³³ Another reason for discretion was the fact that the Soviets were still neutral. If the agreement had been revealed, the Japanese might have attacked Russia. This would have forced Stalin to withdraw troops from Europe before Hitler had been

defeated. Considered along with these factors, the Yalta agreement did not portend the Nationalist Chinese collapse in 1949. Corruption and Stalin's failure to keep his promises were the real reasons.¹³⁴

A second equally important reason for the secret agreement was the necessity to sustain the spirit of wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union. Roosevelt realized that the creation of a United Nations was dependent upon Big Three harmony. Roosevelt was dedicated to his vision of a world where collective security kept peace. His feelings were shared by many people at the end of World War II. People were weary of war with its suffering and sorrow; they wanted to establish an organization for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. None of the world leaders was more devoted to his ideal than President Roosevelt. "He was more interested in the establishment of the United Nations than in any other item on the agenda."¹³⁵ If Roosevelt had succeeded in his great gamble, everyone would have benefited. Nevertheless his pursuit of the greater good violated the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo agreement with Chiang Kai-shek. There can be no moral defense for the Far Eastern concessions. "...morality and reality were in conflict; reality won."¹³⁶ As he had done to settle the Polish question, Roosevelt accommodated his principles on the Far East to prevent a schism. He hoped the Great Powers could continue their cooperation until world peace was guaranteed.

Chapter 8.

The Gamble for the United Nations

On his return to the United States, President Roosevelt addressed a joint session of Congress to describe his trip to the Crimea. He said:

The Conference in the Crimea was a turning point, I hope, in our history and, therefore, in the history of the world. I think the Crimean Conference was a successful effort by the three leading nations to find a common ground for peace. It spells--and it ought to spell--the end of the system of unilateral action, exclusive alliances, and spheres of influence, and balances of power, and all the other expedients which have been tried for centuries and have always failed. We propose to substitute for all these, a universal organization in which all peace-loving nations will finally have a chance to join.¹³⁷

This message more than any other explains why President Roosevelt compromised the liberties and sovereignty of Poland and the territorial integrity of China. Roosevelt wished to preserve the Big Three and make it the instrument for creating an effective security system. Implicit in this speech is the President's candid realization that the peace and security of the United States could no longer be protected by isolation. The evolution of this idea in the President's mind is clearly related to the achievements of the Big Three in the Crimea.

In 1920 Franklin Roosevelt first became associated a plan for collective security when he campaigned for Vice President advocating that the United States join the League of Nations.¹³⁸ During the 1920's Roosevelt was disillusioned by the failure of America to join the League and by the British and French domination of the League of Nations. In 1923 he developed a plan for a world organization. This was similar to the United

Nations draft presented at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944.¹³⁹ Although the President torpedoed the World Economic Conference in the early 1930's to protect his inflationary domestic programs, he did not completely discard his faith that man could fashion a better world and could create a world organization. In December 1933 he stated: "I say that the old policies, the old alliances, the old combinations and balances of power have proved themselves inadequate for the preservation of world peace."¹⁴⁰

Until the fateful morning in December 1941, the American people were unwilling to break with isolation and to assert American leadership internationally. Roosevelt himself was more sagacious than the people. He discussed a system of collective security with Churchill at the Atlantic Conference in August 1941. He soon coined the name "United Nations." Despite the fact that the term referred only to the nations who united to fight the Axis, "Roosevelt looked forward to linking it with a lasting association for peace."¹⁴¹ In private the President spoke of a postwar organization; in public he avoided the issue. Secretary of State Hull had warned him that the early announcement of such a plan would be equivalent to political suicide.¹⁴²

The plan which germinated in the President's mind was not a world government, nor was it a replica of the League of Nations. He hoped, however, that a world government might evolve from the democratic proceedings of the United Nations. To enforce the peace, Roosevelt knew the postwar organization

must have a military peace force. It must also be acceptable to the United States Senate. These were two lessons that Roosevelt learned from Wilson's mistakes.

Compromise was the tool that Roosevelt employed to gain acceptance of his United Nations plan. If peripheral features of the U.N. must be modified to please the Russians, Roosevelt would support the changes. In this way he hoped to win the hesitant Russians to his cause. By means of compromise, the optimistic Roosevelt felt that men could agree to establish the basis for what would be a better society. He expressed his ideas to the people in his 1945 Annual Message. He **said**: "Perfectionism, no less than isolationism or imperialism or power politics, may obstruct the paths to international peace."¹⁴³ Realizing that neither party to a compromise is ever completely satisfied, he cautioned the American people that "the world would be mighty lucky if it gets fifty percent of what it seeks out of the war as a permanent success."¹⁴⁴ Even if a perfect United Nations could not be established, the President felt that American interests would best be protected by an imperfect world organization. Isolation was impossible in 1945. Consequently cooperation must be perpetuated at all costs. From the beginning this conviction was implicit in his dealings with the Russians. No U.N. could be founded or could work effectively without their support. To get Russian support, compromise was essential. "Therein lay the essential meaning of Yalta in the history of man's search for world order."¹⁴⁵

The Crimean discussions on the United Nations centered on the differences that developed in August and September 1944. Then at Dumbarton Oaks the Russians had refused to accept the British-American proposal not to count the votes of parties to a dispute before the Security Council. Also Ambassador Gromyko had demanded that sixteen Soviet Republics be granted membership in the United Nations. No agreement had been reached. Subsequently many Americans began to fear that Stalin might refuse to join a peace organization. Marshal Jan Smuts of the Union of South Africa voiced his uneasiness to Winston Churchill in a letter.

Should a World Organization be formed which does not include Russia she will become the power centre of another group. We shall then be heading towards a third World War.¹⁴⁶

Finally the participants at Dumbarton Oaks agreed to postpone the question of voting until the Big Three could consider it.

These unresolved problems were important at Yalta. On the evening of February 4, the question of Security Council voting was first considered by the leaders. Roosevelt had been advised by the State Department that he must secure Soviet agreement to the American voting formula. If he failed, the U.N. would alienate the small nations for it would "bear every earmark of a great-power alliance."¹⁴⁷ Stalin, however, demanded an absolute veto power. Roosevelt disagreed. He thought that the veto should not cover the discussion of charges of aggression. Stalin tried to postpone the decision. He feared that Russian security might be endangered, if the Great Powers united against the Soviet Union. He spoke of

recent historic precedents when Russia had been an outcast. Stalin was thinking of 1939 when Britain and France expelled the Soviet Union from the League of Nations and mobilized world opinion against her. Finally on February 7, Stalin capitulated. The Russians accepted the American proposal for Security Council voting.

Now the debate over representation in the General Assembly became deadlocked. Stalin reminded the Americans that he had accepted the American voting suggestion for the Security Council; he also reminded the Allies that the Kremlin had asked for sixteen votes in the General Assembly at Dumbarton Oaks. Now he said he would be satisfied if two or three Soviet republics became original members. This move had two objectives: (1) to secure representation in the General Assembly proportional to Soviet size, and (2) to gain additional voices for debate not only in the U.N. but in other postwar conferences.¹⁴⁸ The President fought the formula because it would violate the principle that each sovereign nation should have one vote. Realizing that the British Empire would have six votes in the General Assembly, Churchill agreed with Stalin. Finally to keep harmony Roosevelt assented, but the agreement was not published in the Yalta protocol that was released to the press.

This secret deal attracted criticism when it was leaked to the New York Herald Tribune just before the United Nations organizational meeting in San Francisco.¹⁴⁹ Roosevelt's agreement to permit the Soviets three votes could not be

defended in terms of its legitimacy. The Russians disagreed and argued that three votes would better protect Soviet interests. Time proved that three seats were little better than one. Still Roosevelt had realized that the Russians were adamant. He had compromised his principles to preserve Big Three sodality. Immediately after the San Francisco Conference the Republican foreign policy spokesman, Senator Vandenburg, still shared Roosevelt's optimism that the disagreeable features of the U.N. could be improved. He said:

Within the framework of the Charter, through its refinement in the light of experience, the future can overtake our errors. But there will be no future for it unless we can make this start....¹⁵⁰

In conclusion, the story of Yalta was President Roosevelt's valiant effort to preserve the Big Three--Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. He believed peace could be assured by personal diplomacy. Only time could judge the merits of his actions. Yet, there can be little doubt that both Churchill and he believed that Yalta had been a success. The Prime Minister expressed his confidence to Parliament when he returned to Britain:

The impression I brought back from the Crimea and from all my other contacts is that Marshal Stalin and the Soviet leaders wish to live in honorable friendship and equity with the Western democracies. I feel their word is their bond.¹⁵¹

Chapter 9.

Frustration and Revision
(Denouement of Big Three Unity)

The Yalta Conference ended on a note of optimism. At the final banquet Churchill had declared hopefully that the "fire of war had burnt up the misunderstandings of the past."¹⁵² Also believing that Russian cooperation had been won, Roosevelt said the banquet atmosphere was like that of a "family." He liked to use the analogy to characterize the relations that existed between the three countries.¹⁵³ Even the sickly Harry Hopkins, who had been confined to his bed for long periods during the meeting, felt that the air had been cleared for cooperation. Hopkins said:

We really believed in our hearts that this was the dawn of the new day we had all been praying for and talking about for so many years. We were absolutely certain that we had won the first great victory for peace--and by we I mean all of us, the whole civilized human race. The Russians had proved that they could be reasonable and farseeing and there wasn't any doubt in the minds of the President or any of us that we could live with them peacefully for as far into the future as any of us could imagine.¹⁵⁴

Unlike 1919 when Woodrow Wilson returned from Versailles, the Americans were willing to dedicate themselves to the proposals for an international organization that would guarantee the peace. In the United States public opinion and Congressional leadership supported the President. Senator Vandenburg, who had once been an isolationist, declared that Yalta had reaffirmed the basic "principles of justice to which we are deeply attached." He added that it undertook for the first time to implement these principles by direct

action.¹⁵⁵ Former President Hoover, who had been defeated by Roosevelt in 1932, praised the diplomatic victory. Indeed, in 1945 Americans were anxious to throw off the chains of isolation for a new system of collective security.

Soon enthusiasm was replaced by disillusionment. In the months after Yalta, Russian actions in Eastern Europe revived the suspicions of Anglo-American diplomats and soldiers. In Rumania and Poland the Soviets consolidated their power. After the Berne meeting where Nazi agents discussed the possible surrender of Nazi troops in Italy, Stalin accused Roosevelt of making a separate peace with Germany. A few experts recalled that General Deane, the U.S. military adviser in Russia, had warned the administration that agreements meant nothing to the Soviets.¹⁵⁶ Robert Murphy was alarmed by the Soviet actions in Eastern Europe and in Italy.¹⁵⁷ Soon Averell Harriman, Roosevelt's ambassador to the Soviet Union, realized the Russians were violating the Yalta agreements. He cabled the following message to the President on April 4, 1945:

We now have ample proof that the Soviet government views all matters from the standpoint of their own selfish interests. They have publicized to their own political advantage the difficult food situation in areas liberated by our troops, such as in France, Belgium, and Italy, comparing it with the allegedly satisfactory conditions in areas which the Red Army has liberated. Unless we and the British now adopt an independent line the people under the areas of our responsibility will suffer and the chances of Soviet domination in Europe will be enhanced. ... we should be guided...by the policy of taking care of our Western Allies and other areas under our responsibility first, allocating to Russia what may be left.¹⁵⁸

The President, however, was confident of his ability to get along with the Russians; he mollified the importance of the disagreements in the spring of 1945. Roosevelt felt that misunderstandings had developed, but he was sure that personal diplomacy would still succeed. Resolutely he asserted this until his death on April 12, 1945. His final telegram to Churchill conveyed this conviction:

I would minimize the general Soviet problem as much as possible because these problems, in one form or another, seem to arise every day and most of them straighten out as in the case of the Bern meeting. We must be firm, however, and our course thus far is correct.¹⁵⁹

After the President's death, the world would never know if his faith in his ability to work with the Russians had been justified.

In the period following Yalta, Roosevelt's death, and the defeat of Germany, there was a breakdown in East-West relations. President Truman lacked the diplomatic experience, and some of his actions seemed hostile to the Russians. At the same time Americans began to discuss the inexorable Communist threat. The Soviets advanced the iron curtain to take in Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. In the Far East tensions mounted. The Soviet Union repudiated its agreement with Chiang Kai-shek and aided the Communist Chinese to "liberate" the mainland. North Korea, Manchuria, and Outer Mongolia entered the Soviet orbit. Responding to Soviet actions, President Truman approved the containment policy, encouraged the Marshall Plan to strengthen Europe, and engineered the Truman Doctrine to save the Middle East.

Rivalry had replaced wartime cooperation by 1946 when Winston Churchill rattled his sword in a memorable address in Fulton, Missouri. The former Prime Minister warned of the threat of the iron curtain to world peace.

When the already disillusioned American public read Roosevelt's "secret agreements," the "witch hunt" began. Isolationist Republicans quickly seized onto the Yalta "betrayal" and promoted it as a symbol of Democratic failure. Criticism was harsh and violent. Americans demanded to know why their dreams for peace and security had been shattered by the "cold war." Why had American diplomacy failed? While searching for answers, many citizens looked for evidence of treachery.¹⁶⁰

The "myth of Yalta" became inflated as historians rummaged for the inside story. Some tried to clear Roosevelt's name; others lashed out at his apparent appeasement of the Russians. These conflicting interpretations were important because they illustrated the American disenchantment with power politics and involvement in "secret negotiations." Whether the view was critical or defensive, Americans agreed that the Yalta meeting had results which did not conform to the officially proclaimed interests of the United States. Elliott Roosevelt, who was not present at Yalta, wrote the most emotional defense of his father's actions. He argued that when Franklin Roosevelt died, the forces for progress in the world were replaced by "the proponents of the world that was, the advocates of reaction." It was not the President who was to blame for the Yalta failures, but his successor, who chose sides with the British and

negated the principles of Big Three unity.¹⁶¹

Another defense was written by Edward Stettinius, Roosevelt's Secretary of State in 1945. He claimed that the President did not betray his country; rather he exacted far greater concessions from the Soviets than he granted them. In fact, Kremlin leaders may have felt that Stalin sold out the Soviet Union at Yalta. For this reason they ordered Stalin to break the agreements.¹⁶² In any case, Stettinius blamed the Russians, not Roosevelt.

Cordell Hull and Anthony Eden provided a realistic interpretation. They believed that with the exception of the Kurile Islands, the United States handed nothing over to the Russians which would not have been acquired anyway.¹⁶³ Poland was a good example. The Red Army had de facto control of that nation, but Roosevelt hoped that he might obtain the guarantee of free elections. This would permit the people to vote themselves independence. Although the Russians renounced their paper promises, the President made the best possible agreement for the Polish people. A third opinion was written by James Byrnes, who attended the Crimean meeting as an adviser to the Chief Executive. He argued that although the Soviets broke their agreements, the United States had their pledges on paper. They were evidence to the rest of the world that Russian actions had been in violation of written commitments.¹⁶⁴

Roosevelt's foes attacked him on all levels: (1) on his decision-making procedures, (2) on the substantive merits

of his decisions, and (3) on his idealistic approach to foreign policy. One critic charged that Roosevelt was "inexcusably naive" if he believed that the triumphant Soviet Union was making real concessions to its rivals. Moreover, he claimed that the President recognized the realities of the Soviet victory, but with political duplicity he concealed the threat from the public and "voiced hopes which he knew were false."¹⁶⁵

The pot began to boil in 1948 when articles appeared intimating that the Communists exploited the dying President at Yalta. In August and September, Life published two censorious articles which denounced Roosevelt's appeasement policy. The author was former Ambassador William Bullitt, an adviser of Roosevelt's. He charged that Franklin Roosevelt's whole program of dealing with the Soviets had been in error. He wrote:

There was never the slightest possibility of converting Stalin from the creed which calls for the installation of Communist dictatorships in all countries of the world.¹⁶⁶

Being more specific, he claimed that the President's Far Eastern policy at Yalta "most gravely endangered the vital interests of the United States." This to Bullitt and his followers was how the United States had won the war and lost the peace.

Bullitt's fears were compounded by publicists in more vitriolic attacks on Roosevelt and the Democrats. By 1954 Senator McCarthy had achieved fame as the symbolic leader of the hysteria. That year he wrote a scathing attack on

General Marshall who had "stood at Roosevelt's elbow at Yalta." McCarthy claimed that Marshall had urged Roosevelt to bribe Stalin to enter the war against Japan. Marshall allegedly intervened many times during the course of the war for the "well-being of the Kremlin."¹⁶⁷ By 1959 mass hysteria had subsided, but revisionists were still denouncing Roosevelt's treachery. One author asserted that the late President had been a Communist tool and that his "mission which he performed implacably was to put weapons in Stalin's hands and, with American military might, to demolish all of the dikes that held back the pressing tides of Communist expansion in Europe and Asia."¹⁶⁸

While the circumstances surrounding the "lost peace" were being critically examined in print, Yalta achieved notoriety in politics. The desire for personal political gain propelled the "Yalta myth." However, before 1948 the Yalta blunders were dwarfed by the adherence of Democrats and Republicans to a bipartisan foreign policy. There were a few scattered attacks by political mavericks as some Congressmen sought the support of minority groups who believed the Democrats had betrayed their homeland. In March 1945 Congressman Wasielewski of Wisconsin charged that the United States agreed to dismember Poland "without giving it a chance to present its side of the case." He demanded that the President reconsider this portion of the Yalta agreement at San Francisco when the United Nations conference convened.¹⁶⁹ Just before the 1946 elections Congressman Flood of Pennsylvania sought

Polish support when he said:

A great injustice has been done to Poland. A great injustice has been done to these Americans of Polish ancestry. I know how they think and I know how they feel.¹⁷⁰

Despite the few political snipers, the Congressional elections of 1946 were fought on domestic matters--demobilization, high prices, and political incompetence.

When the Republicans gained control of Congress, they naturally began to think of winning the White House in 1948. They searched for issues. In 1948 China was faltering and the Russians were stopping all traffic bound for Berlin. They decided not to inject these issues into the campaign. Continuing the bipartisan unity on foreign policy that the Republican spokesman (Senator Vandenburg) favored, the campaign between Governor Dewey and President Truman was fought on domestic issues. Dewey did, however, accuse the Democrats of "wobbling and fumbling" the execution of their international objectives.¹⁷¹ Late in the campaign, before Truman's desperation whistle-stop tour to find votes, Governor Dewey unleashed a violent attack on the "bankruptcy of Democratic statesmanship." Speaking in Salt Lake City, he said:

It wouldn't serve any useful purpose to recall tonight how the Soviets conquered millions of people as a result of the failures of statesmanship. It does not advance our purpose to discuss the manner in which the Soviet has been able to pick the fruits of diplomatic victories that were yielded up at that long series of secret conferences culminating in Potsdam.¹⁷²

Although Republicans and Democrats were committed to foreign policy bipartisanship throughout the campaign, a few conservative Republicans spoke out. In a debate over expanding military

aid to the Chinese Nationalist government, Representative Walter Judd denounced Roosevelt's betrayal of the Chinese.

Included in his inflammatory oration was this moving passage:

... your President and my President, went to Yalta and, without the knowledge of a single Chinese, to say nothing of their consent, gave Russia control of the ports and railroads of Manchuria, which means control of Manchuria. Does the gentleman call that a betrayal?¹⁷³

Senator Styles Bridges, influential Republican from New Hampshire, also attacked the bipartisan foreign policy for concealing "mistakes and soft-peddling criticism." He believed that an indecisive and vacillating foreign policy had jeopardized the national security.¹⁷⁴

In his articles in 1948, Ambassador Bullitt had charged that Soviet sympathizers had established themselves in government positions and that apologists for Soviet policy had been sent to China and Latin America as American advisers.¹⁷⁵

Except for these comments and the isolated remarks of a few Republicans, Yalta was still not a front-page scandal. But in the months after the Republican defeat in 1948, events seemed to corroborate the claims of Bullitt and the extremists. In early 1949 Chiang Kai-shek withdrew his tattered armies from China to the island of Formosa. The Russians exploded the atomic bomb; and Communists were discovered in the State Department. In this atmosphere of unbridled suspicion it was easy for irreconcilables to wrench Yalta out of historical perspective and to blame it for American distresses. Public concern grew when General Patrick Hurley, Roosevelt's emissary to China, delivered a speech at Georgetown University. He

attracted attention with these words:

At Yalta the United States surrendered not only the principles of the Atlantic Charter, but also every element of the traditional American policy in China.¹⁷⁶

In August the State Department issued a White Paper which placed the blame for the Nationalist Chinese collapse on Chiang's government. It defended the Yalta agreements and indicated that military exigency required that the secret agreements be withheld from Chiang. Republicans immediately impugned this in the House and in the Senate. Senator Malone of Nevada asked if there was any doubt that the Communists would control all of China after they were given title to Manchuria at Yalta.¹⁷⁷ The press publicized and promoted this "red hunt." Journalist George Sokolsky, for example, asserted that Mr. Roosevelt employed Communists, fellow-travelers, and pro-Russians to please Stalin in Far Eastern discussions.¹⁷⁸

In February 1950 the search for traitors in the government had political implications. Republicans wanted to embarrass President Truman. Alger Hiss had been indicted for perjury. Now Senator McCarthy alleged that there were 205 "card-carrying Communists" in the State Department.¹⁷⁹ Other legislators joined McCarthy. Senator Karl Mundt of South Dakota declared that Communist agents in the State Department planned the sell-out at Yalta.¹⁸⁰ As the Congressional elections of November 1950 approached, even former President Hoover attacked Roosevelt's appeasement of Soviet Russia.¹⁸¹ In 1945 he had applauded the diplomatic victory. Evidence that the Yalta

"myth" had become an emotional partisan issue could be found in commentator George Sokolsky's appeal to voters on the eve of the elections. He told them:

On Tuesday we shall go to the polls to vote.... I shall, first of all, vote against the men of Yalta, against the politicians and statesmen and bureaucrats who have lied to us with consistency, who have tricked and fooled us, and upon whose souls must be the blood of Americans, spilled in this avertible war.¹⁸²

The results of the Congressional elections shaped Republican strategy for the 1952 Presidential election. Republicans felt they could only win the White House by capitalizing on every doubt and suspicion that they could find in the legacy of Democratic foreign policy. The stage was rapidly prepared for a Republican victory in 1952. The American people were disillusioned and frustrated, despite their prosperity, by high prices, the "mess in Washington," and the knowledge that Russia had the bomb. Moreover, many believed the State Department had lost China. They could not understand the Korean War stalemate. Nothing in the American experience had prepared Americans for a war which they could not hope to win.¹⁸³ Americans were ready for a change. Yalta was the symbol that Senator Robert Taft and conservative Republicans selected to win the White House. While campaigning for the Republican nomination, the Ohio Senator made speeches which reflected the isolationist, or "dinosaur," wing of the Republican party. In one radio address Taft declared:

... in the Republican campaign of 1952 there must be no hesitation about attacking the foreign policy of Mr. Truman and Mr. Acheson. Our Left-Wing leaders were bamboozled into believing that Communism was just

another form of democracy and would co-operate to achieve liberty and peace throughout the world. Their policies at Yalta and Potsdam established Stalin in full control of Central Europe, dominating Europe, and in full control of China, dominating Asia.¹⁸⁴

Taft lost the nomination to General Eisenhower, but he won the nominee. Eisenhower campaigned against Democratic foreign policy for the Republican Platform was explicit in its condemnation of Yalta and "secret diplomacy." The platform included the following promises:

The Government of the United States, under Republican leadership, will repudiate all commitments contained in secret understandings, such as those of Yalta, which aid Communist enslavements. It will be clear, on the highest authority of the President and the Congress, that United States policy, as one of its peaceful purposes, looks happily forward to the genuine independence of those captive peoples.¹⁸⁵

Although Eisenhower was an internationalist, his platform was obviously a concession to the isolationists who wanted to repudiate past diplomatic mistakes.

After Eisenhower defeated Adlai Stevenson, the new President decided to keep his campaign promise. On February 2, 1953, he said in his State of the Union message:

We shall never acquiesce in the enslavement of any people in order to purchase fancied gain for ourselves. I shall ask the Congress at a later date to join in an appropriate resolution making clear that the Government recognizes no kind of commitment contained in secret understandings of the past with foreign governments which permit this kind of enslavement.¹⁸⁶

There were three reasons why some Republicans wanted to repudiate the "secret understandings." First, it would give hope to the satellite peoples because the United States would

recognize their desire to achieve independence. Second, it would reemphasize the American moral commitment to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of Independence.¹⁸⁷ And third, it would officially denounce the Democrats for having appeased the Reds. But, when the President did send a proposed resolution to Congress on February 20, the isolationists were disillusioned. The draft denounced the Russians for having "perverted" the Yalta agreements--not the Democrats for having made them. Eisenhower had rephrased his condemnation when he learned that he would lose Democratic support for his domestic and foreign programs. Ike realized that many conservative Republicans would vote against his programs. Consequently his legislative success depended on his having Democratic support. Senator Taft refused to compromise; he wanted to denounce the Democrats. Both sides were relieved when Stalin died, and Yalta was forgotten in the excitement.

Unfortunately, the ghost of Yalta did not die with Stalin. In March 1953 President Eisenhower asked the Senate to confirm his nomination of Charles Bohlen as ambassador to Russia. Although Bohlen had been Roosevelt's interpreter at the Crimean Conference, he had a distinguished record as a Russian expert. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Bohlen stated he was not in on the Far Eastern discussions.¹⁸⁸ The Yalta decisions were, he felt, the best arrangements that could be made. Conservative Republicans led by Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire opposed Bohlen's nomination. They felt the Crimean Conference

was a matter of principle. They had promised the American people that the Republicans would repudiate the conference; now they were nominating a man who had been closely associated with the New Deal as Ambassador to Russia. To them Bohlen symbolized the Yalta failures. Speaking against the nomination, Senator Bridges said:

I find that in most every diplomatic horse trade at which Mr. Bohlen was present, the Russians got the fat mare and the United States ended up with the spavined nag.¹⁸⁹

His opinion was typical of isolationists who felt that American failure must be the result of treachery. Still Eisenhower as President had the prerogative to select the man he felt was most qualified, and he had selected Bohlen. Taft, who had repeatedly led the Republican right-wing, decided to support the President. On March 27, 1953, after Eisenhower personally asked the Senate to confirm his nomination, Bohlen was approved. The vote indicated a schism in the Republican ranks. Of the 13 negative votes, 11 were cast by Republicans. Among those casting negative votes were Senators Bricker, Bridges, Dirksen, Goldwater, Hickenlooper, and McCarthy. This vote indicated that Yalta was more than a political issue; it had philosophical and moral connotations.¹⁹⁰ The Republican split on Bohlen's nomination proved this.

Yalta next appeared on the front pages of newspapers in 1955. The occasion was the publication of the Yalta papers. The State Department had an established policy of publishing historical documents about fifteen years after they occurred.

Because the Republicans had profited from the Yalta issue, they were naturally anxious to release the papers. They expected to uncover new items that would substantiate their charges of treachery and betrayal. With the encouragement of Senators Knowland of California and Bridges of New Hampshire, special funds were appropriated to publish and declassify the documents.¹⁹¹ On March 16, 1953, the inflammatory oratory of Senator McCarthy first brought the impending release to public attention. Speaking in the Senate he pointed out that the Republicans had promised to repudiate the Yalta agreements; they had not done this. McCarthy demanded that the Republicans fulfill their commitments to the people. If Republicans forgot their campaign promises, the Wisconsin Senator was not optimistic of Republican victory in 1956. McCarthy did not know why the administration delayed the release, but he made an educated guess that "certain entrenched bureaucrats" in the State Department had delayed them. McCarthy boldly proclaimed:

These holdovers from the Roosevelt-Truman-Acheson regime exert a powerful influence on the shaping of American foreign policy even today. Some of them, unfortunately, are as inclined today to appease international communism as they were in 1945.¹⁹²

The unorthodox manner in which the Yalta papers were released raised a storm of criticism. When the State Department completed publication, the British objected to releasing the papers because they might embarrass Winston Churchill. As a result of this objection and the public clamor for the papers, the State Department decided to issue 24 copies

to congressional leaders on a confidential basis. Some Democrats (including Walter George, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) declined to accept copies. The State Department then "leaked" a copy to James Reston of the New York Times. The Times hurriedly copied the records and published them. Caught in the subsequent furor, Secretary Dulles agreed to release all copies.¹⁹³

Whether the papers should have been released was debatable. Many Democrats argued that the release was unwise because many of the conference participants were still alive. Senator Knowland defended the decision to release the papers. He said that a useful purpose would be served if every diplomat realized that he had an ultimate accounting to the people and that his decisions would have to stand the light of history.¹⁹⁴ Whether the papers should have been released after they had been was immaterial.

The repercussions were sudden and serious. Winston Churchill and the British were disturbed by inaccuracies in the documents. On the national scene the Yalta papers revived the Yalta "myth". Partisanship returned; Yalta continued to be a political football. Senator Lehman, a Democrat from New York, charged that the Republicans had released the papers to divert the attention of the public from the crisis in the Formosa Straits and in the Far East.¹⁹⁵ Lyndon Johnson, the Democratic Majority Leader, hurried to President Roosevelt's defense. He alleged that the secret concessions were advised

by military leaders. Johnson's strategy was to implicate leading Republicans with Yalta to quieten extremists like McCarthy. He said:

I am very proud...of the fact that no one on my side of the aisle has arisen to question the motives of those military men, whether they be General Eisenhower or General MacArthur, who made miscalculations, if any were made.¹⁹⁶

Democrats were not the only persons disappointed and offended by the Yalta papers. Right-wing Republicans found little in the papers to substantiate their charges of Democratic treachery. Now they claimed the State Department had suppressed the most incriminating evidence. Senator McCarthy charged that 150 persons were employed to censor the papers.¹⁹⁷

McCarthy's accusations were affirmed by the original compiler of the documents who claimed that they were incomplete and were censored. Moreover, Bryton Barron, the former chief of the State Department's publishing section, was forced to retire and Donald Dozer, a staff historian, was dismissed after both protested against the delays and distortions in the compilation.¹⁹⁸ Dr. Dozer wrote that Mr. Barron, the compiler of the records, was subjected to "brain-washing sessions" when he tried to secure consent to publish all the documents.¹⁹⁹ The State Department answered the criticisms saying that "no significant papers were omitted." Barron retorted that one hundred pages of material had been removed and this included some secret documents. What were these documents? Barron implied that they concerned the establishment of a land corridor to Berlin from the West, the disastrous

concessions to Soviet Russia in the Far East, and Roosevelt's attitude on the Jewish-Arab question. Finally he alleged that the role of Alger Hiss in the conference had been deliberately subdued in the final documents. In retrospect Barron may have distorted the importance of the omissions. Best evidence indicates that he tried to make political judgements without sufficient knowledge. For example, Barron wrote the following about the Far Eastern agreement:

It was truly a disgraceful document. It made vast concessions to the Soviet Union which were neither necessary nor justified. It was a treacherous attack on a loyal ally, the Nationalist Government of China, and it paved the way for a collapse of American policy and prestige in the Far East.²⁰⁰

He should have confined his criticisms to technical matters.

The Yalta papers provided few surprises for the people who most anxiously awaited them. They already knew that at Yalta Stalin knew what he wanted and got it. They knew that Churchill was suspicious and that Roosevelt tended to side with Stalin. The most important revelation, said one critic was Roosevelt's "stubborn refusal to face political reality."²⁰¹ The President insisted that Big Three unity could survive the war and guide the peace.

By 1956 Yalta had been fully exploited by politicians. To Republicans the mention of Yalta recalled memories of Democratic failure and treachery. When the Republicans had attempted to capitalize from Democratic distresses, they factionalized the G.O.P. and endangered future bipartisan cooperation with the Democrats. Still Yalta was the greatest symbol of partisan failure. It would always remain in the

Republican closet as a weapon of last resort to fire at the vulnerable Democrats. For example, when Democrats criticized Eisenhower, Republicans reminded them of Yalta. In 1958 Dean Acheson attacked Republican "feble-mindedness, incompetence, lassitude, and failure in dealing with foreign governments."²⁰² In the House of Representatives a Republican congressman rose to refute Acheson.

It is inconceivable to me...that the American people will heed the shoutings of anyone so intimately associated with Yalta and the Chinese giveaway to the Communists as Dean Acheson.²⁰³

When the Democrats elected John F. Kennedy to the White House in 1960, Republicans compared his actions to Franklin Roosevelt's. In 1961, when the Congo was blazing with insurrection and intrigue, a Republican charged the State Department with incompetence similar to 1945 when Poland was sold out to the Soviets at Yalta.²⁰⁴

The "myth" of Yalta is still not dead.

Chapter 10.

Exigesis of the Crimean Reality

The Crimean Conference is the most misunderstood and misrepresented meeting in recent diplomatic annals. The actual happenings have been perverted by the inflating myth. "The notion that Yalta was a victory for Stalin, that Yalta was an American Munich, that Yalta was a great betrayal, is a notion without foundation in history or in logic."²⁰⁵ These allegations are the products of shallow reasoning and wishful thinking. Many of the assertions are excellent examples of post hoc reasoning. For example, because China was lost in 1949 to the Communists, Roosevelt must have betrayed the Nationalists at Yalta in 1945. This paper is an attempt to analyze fundamental issues, not to corroborate specious villifications.

It is my conclusion that Yalta cannot be isolated from the American diplomatic experience. After Pearl Harbor was attacked, the United States was forced to recognize that a policy of isolation was an outmoded way of defending a distinctive society. Intervention was imperative. It was believed that collective action would defeat the Axis and then make the world safe for American democracy. After the war the United States would continue to assert her leadership in the family of nations. President Roosevelt committed America to collective action when he decided to extend Lend Lease to Russia. From that day forward American policy-- whether right or wrong--was dedicated to the task of sustaining

cooperation among the great powers--Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Specifically Roosevelt decided to make every effort to maintain friendship with the Soviet Union. The President assumed that the warmth of friendship would melt the coldest Russian suspicions. At Yalta he worked to mitigate Soviet fears. On the Polish question, for example, he recognized that the Red armies had de facto possession of the country. He knew that any attempt to dislodge them would arouse unnecessary antagonisms and create more hostility. It seems reasonable to conclude that Roosevelt's acquiescence was related to his strong conviction that cooperation must be preserved at any cost. Hoping to appease Polish-American voters in the United States, he did demand free elections. The intensity of Roosevelt's commitment to cooperation was revealed in the secret agreement on the Far East. In this area of the world the President sought to check Russia by making China a great power. Diametrically opposed to this was the Russian desire to recover territory lost in 1904-1905. Since Russian assistance was not needed to defeat Japan, the President's concessions may be interpreted as a gesture of friendship. Moreover, they would forestall a Russo-American conflict over China, and they would demonstrate to Stalin the honesty of American intentions. The fact that the President went more than halfway suggests that he was eager, perhaps too eager, to overcome traditional Russian suspicions.

The President's attempt to develop friendly relations with the Soviet Union was his "great gamble for peace."

This policy failed for several reasons. The President made serious tactical mistakes in handling foreign policy. For example, he told Stalin that America would not keep an occupation army in Europe. With a power vacuum opening in Eastern Europe and the Far East, Stalin took advantage of his opportunity. In addition, Roosevelt erred by not fully utilizing the diplomatic experience of State Department officers. White House assistants--like Harry Hopkins--often made policy decisions. Like Andrew Jackson, Franklin Roosevelt feared specialists. His management of foreign policy indicated that he thought any intelligent man could be a diplomat.

There is a more fundamental explanation for the President's failure at Yalta and for the subsequent execrations of revisionists. The Crimean agreements were the products of an optimistic political philosophy. In 1945 Americans talked of "total victory" and "unconditional surrender." Most Europeans seldom thought and spoke of total victory over evil forces in his environment. This and other influences created a philosophy that assumed the essential goodness and infinite malleability of human nature. It blamed the failure of the social order to measure up to rational standards on the lack of knowledge and understanding, on obsolescent social institutions, and on the depravity of certain individuals or groups. If a man was evil, he was the product of a bad environment. To improve him, his environment should be altered.²⁰⁶ In his negotiations with Stalin, President Roosevelt revealed that he was an optimist. He had faith in his own ability to

win Stalin's approval. If he established a lasting friendship with Stalin, he felt there was no reason why the barriers to world peace could not be removed. Unfortunately the Soviets had a different, more cynical heritage. Because Russia had been invaded so many times and its cities destroyed, Russians were suspicious and hostile. They tended to distrust Roosevelt because he was too friendly. Moreover, Communism told them that conflict was inevitable between capitalists and the proletariat. Since "F.D.R." was the epitome of the capitalist, his good intentions were regarded with suspicion.

Because Americans were optimistic they believed that all rational peoples wanted peace. Roosevelt, like most Americans, did not understand the Marxian dialectic. He believed that the Russians were acting only from national interest. If he persuaded them that Soviet interests and American interests were the same, he thought there would be peace. Even General Deane, the cynical U.S. military adviser in Moscow, believed that few conflicting interests separated the United States and the Soviet Union. "There is little reason why we should not be friendly now and in the foreseeable future."²⁰⁷

Americans found concrete evidence to support their confidence. Russia was devastated by war; she needed time to rebuild her economy. So the American desire for peace nurtured the idea that realists in the Kremlin would see that America was strong and prosperous. Contrasting this with relative Soviet weakness, they would find a cogent

reason for peaceful action and cooperation. This belief was encouraged and echoed by the Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems which reported in 1945:

The Soviet Union will prefer to follow a policy of international cooperation. Such a policy would bring her a maximum of assistance in her gigantic reconstruction problem and would reduce to a minimum the energies she would have to devote to the defence against danger of further aggression.²⁰⁸

Most Americans believed that Soviet Russia would endorse the United Nations and fulfill the obligations of membership.

The American plan for a United Nations was based on optimism and idealism. It assumed that the Soviets would be willing to cooperate. By 1948 even the public could see that this hope had been stillborn. Perhaps, American foreign policy would have been more effective if it had been tied to the principles of political realism. The political realist recognizes that the world is one of opposing interests and of unceasing conflicts among them. He knows that "moral principles can never be fully realized, but must at best be approximated through the ever temporary balancing of interest and the ever precarious settlement of conflicts."²⁰⁹ Consequently the realist seeks the lesser evil rather than the absolute good. If Roosevelt had been a political realist, he would have been a better negotiator. He might have accepted an Anglo-American alliance rather than insisting on a United Nations. He certainly would not have made concessions to Stalin in Eastern Europe or in Asia.

In theory the political realist would have acted differently at Yalta. Yet, in practice, it may not always be possible

for a democratic nation to seek the lesser evil rather than the absolute good. In the United States the government is responsible to the people. For this reason traditional attitudes and experiences of the electorate fashion foreign policy. In 1945 Roosevelt knew that if the soldiers didn't come home soon, the Republicans might win at the polls. Stalin was under less popular pressure to demobilize Soviet troops. Inherently the leader of a democracy is more responsive to the public, and he cannot act without favorable opinion. Walter Lippmann notes the problem this creates for a democratic government. There is a time lag between public opinion and government action. This insures that the government will be "too late with too little, or too long with too much, too pacifist in peace and too bellicose in war, too neutralist or appeasing in negotiation or too intransigent."²¹⁰ Because this is the case, it is almost impossible for a democracy to bargain successfully with an autocracy. When the agreement has been secured, it seldom satisfies the people. This happened at Yalta. When the Communists extended their influence in Europe and China, the American people felt they had been betrayed. They initiated a search to discover the causes of their diplomatic failures. Senator McCarthy led the hunt. McCarthyism was the manifestation of the inability of the people to understand themselves.

Today a large tombstone in our diplomatic graveyard serves as a reminder of Yalta. The Crimean Conference was a failure, but it was not a sellout. The failure at Yalta

was more fundamental. American diplomats--led by President Roosevelt--tried to apply an optimistic, but inadequate, political philosophy to the problems of the world. Our diplomats gambled that the Russian-American friendship would succeed. They gambled that the United Nations would replace traditional alliances and balances of power. They gambled against the odds--and against the precedents of history. They lost.

Chapter 11.

Appendix

Agreement Regarding Japan, February 11, 1945

The leaders of the three Great Powers--the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain--have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:
 - (a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,
 - (b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored,
 - (c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company, it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union. It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the Nationalist Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

Joseph V. Stalin
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Winston S. Churchill

February 11, 1945

The Crimea (Yalta) Conference

Protocol of Proceedings, February 11, 1945

The Crimea Conference of the Heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which took place from February 4th to 11th came to the following conclusions:

I. World Organization

It was decided:

- (1) that a United Nations Conference on the proposed world organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25th April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America.
- (2) the Nations to be invited to this Conference should be:
 - (a) the United Nations as they existed on the 8th February, 1945; and
 - (b) such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1st March, 1945. (For this purpose by the term "Associated Nations" was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey) When the Conference on World Organization is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i.e. the Ukraine and White Russia.
- (3) that the United States Government on behalf of the Three Powers should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to decisions taken at the present Conference concerning the proposed World Organization.
- (4) that the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations Conference should be as follows:

Invitation

The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invite the Government of _____ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on 25th April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of _____ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments.

Territorial Trusteeship

It was agreed that the five Nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the questions of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations Conference or in the preliminary consultations, and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be placed under trusteeship.

II. Declaration on Liberated Europe

The following declaration has been approved:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples of the former Axis satellites of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the re-building of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter--the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live--the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people, and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledges in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

III. Dismemberment of Germany

It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender Terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows: The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarization and dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security.

The study of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a Committee, consisting of Mr. Eden (Chairman), Mr. Winant and Mr. Gousev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

IV. Zone of Occupation for the French and Control Council for Germany

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French Forces, should be allocated to France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government. It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.

V. Reparations

The Heads of the three governments agreed as follows:

(1) Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

(2) Reparations in kind to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

(a) Removals within 2 years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling transport and other enterprises in Germany etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

(b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.

(c) Use of German labour.

(3) For the working out of the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparations from Germany an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives--one from the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

(4) With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the paragraph 2 should be 20 billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned. The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission.

VI. Major War Criminals

The Conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of enquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the Conference.

VII. Poland

The following Declaration on Poland was agreed to by the Conference:

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western part of Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of

universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accession of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.

VIII. Yugoslavia

It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic:

- (a) that the Tito-Subasic Agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement;
- (b) that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:
 - (i) that the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (Aunoj) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and
 - (ii) that legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (Aunoj) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly; and that this statement should be published in the Communiqués of the Conference.

IX. Italo-Yugoslav Frontier Italo-Austria Frontier

Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.

X. Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations

There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarians and Yugoslav Governments should be informed that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with M. Molotov in Moscow. M. Molotov agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.

XI. Southeastern Europe

The British Delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:

- (a) the Control Commission in Bulgaria
- (b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations
- (c) Oil equipment in Rumania

XII. Iran

Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius, and M. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in Iran. It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic channel.

XIII. Meetings of the Three Foreign Secretaries

The Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.

XIV. The Montreux Convention and the Straits

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in relation to the Montreux Convention and report to their Governments. The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment.

The foregoing Protocol was approved and signed by the three Foreign Secretaries at the Crimean Conference, February 11, 1945.

E.R. Stettinius, Jr.
M. Molotov
Anthony Eden

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22. John Gunther, Roosevelt in Retrospect, p. 14.
23. Virginia Cowles, Winston Churchill, p. 329.

24. Charles F. Delzell, The Meaning of Yalta, ed. John L. Snell, pp. 85-86.
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30. Ibid., p. 749.
31. Forrest C. Pogue, The Meaning of Yalta, ed. John L. Snell, p. 12.
32. Foreign Relations of the United States: Soviet Union 1933-1939, ed. E.R. Perkins, p. 227. (Contain a letter from U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union to Secretary of State written on July 19, 1935)
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42. Fleming, op. cit., p. 191. (from Franklin D. Roosevelt's Inaugural Address of 1945.)
43. Greer, op. cit., p. 129.

44. Ibid., p. 129.
45. Gunther, op. cit., pp. 336-37.
46. Ibid., pp. 336-37.
47. John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance, p. 43.
48. Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions that Shaped History, p. 216.
49. Elliott Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 205.
50. Greer, op. cit., p. 41.
51. Ibid., p. 203. (Sumner Welles reached this conclusion after an interview with President Roosevelt.)
52. Ibid., p. 193.
53. Ibid., p. 41.
54. Elliott Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 74.
Cf., Cowles, op. cit., pp. 338-39.
55. Greer, p. ii.
56. The Yalta Conference, ed. Richard F. Fenno, pp. 1-2.
(citing Harry Hopkins, adviser to Roosevelt.)
57. Forrest C. Pogue, The Meaning of Yalta, ed. John L. Snell, p. 35.
58. "Official Record of the Yalta Conference," N.Y. Times,
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59. Pogue, op. cit., p. 25.
60. Ibid., p. 26. Cf., Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command,
pp. 247-48.
61. Ibid., p. 27. Cf., , The Supreme Command, pp. 391-93.
62. Ibid., p. 28.
63. Ibid., p. 31.
64. Ibid., p. 32.
65. Hanson Baldwin, "Greatest Sea-Air Battle in History,"
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66. "Official Record of the Yalta Conference," op. cit.,
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67. Forrest C. Pogue, The Meaning of Yalta, ed. John L. Snell, p. 188
68. Arthur H. Vandenburg, Congressional Record, 79th Congress--1st Session (July 9, 1945), p. 7743.
69. Charles Rozmarek, Congressional Record, 81st Congress--2nd Session (February 7, 1950), p. A-886.
70. Lawrence H. Smith, Congressional Record, 82nd Congress--1st Session (February 7, 1951), p. 1082.
71. "Yalta Story," Time, LXV (March 28, 1955), p. 31.
72. Winston Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 366.
73. Lawrence H. Smith, Congressional Record, 79th Congress--1st Session (March 9, 1945), p. 1702.
74. William L. Neumann, "The Yalta Conference," Readings in Soviet Foreign Policy, ed. Arthur E. Adams, pp. 214-15.
75. Ibid., p. 215.
76. Yalta Papers, pp. 450-55. Cf., Charles F. Delzell, Meaning of Yalta, ed. John L. Snell, p. 94.
77. Delzell, op. cit., p. 75.
78. Ibid., p. 81.
79. Ibid., p. 97.
80. Hanson W. Baldwin, "Churchill was Right," Atlantic Monthly CXCIV (1954), pp. 32-34.
81. Yalta Papers, pp. 678-679. Cf., Delzell, op. cit., p. 105.
82. James Byrnes believes that Roosevelt did not read all of the State Department briefs. In Speaking Frankly (1947), he wrote: "So far as I could see, the President made little preparation for the Yalta Conference." Although he did not read all the papers, it seems that President Roosevelt was familiar with the general recommendations. Cf., Raymond Sontag, "Reflections on Yalta Papers," Foreign Affairs, XXXIII (1955), p. 622.
83. Yalta Papers, p. 103
84. Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, II, p. 1266.
85. Delzell, op. cit., p. 104. (from the conference minutes of H. Freeman Matthews.) Cf., Yalta Papers, p. 677.
86. Yalta Papers, pp. 94-95.

87. Yalta Papers, pp. 679-81.
88. Britain and Russia had agreed to establish "spheres of influence" in the Balkans at the Moscow Conference in October 1944. At Teheran, in November 1943, Roosevelt retreated from his position that territorial settlements must be postponed. To keep Soviet friendship, he tacitly approved Churchill's suggestion that the Curzon Line should serve as the western boundary of Russia.
89. Fleming, op. cit., p. 203.
90. Yalta Papers, pp. 842-55.
91. William D. Leahy, I Was There, pp. 315-316.
92. Delzell, op. cit., p. 126.
93. William Hardy McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia 1941-1946, pp. 532-36.
94. Roosevelt had promised the American people that troops would come home when the Germans were defeated. Consequently public opinion would not allow Roosevelt to keep troops mobilized in Europe to check the Soviets. Thomas A. Bailey, op. cit., p. 778.
95. Snell, op. cit., p. 72.
96. Ibid., p. 38.
97. Ibid., p. 40.
98. Ibid., p. 44.
99. Ibid., p. 57.
100. Ibid., p. 57. Cf., James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 26. Also, cf., Edward Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, pp. 230-31.
101. Ibid., p. 59.
102. W.W. Rostow, op. cit., p. 144.
103. Patrick J. Hurley, Congressional Record, 81st Congress--1st Session, (March 3, 1949), p. A 1344.
(This is the speech Hurley delivered on March 3, 1949, at the Georgetown University Foreign Service School.)
104. Fleming, op. cit., p. 193.
105. George A. Lensen, The Meaning of Yalta, pp. 127-130.

106. Ibid., p. 132.
107. Yalta Papers, pp. 352-356.
108. Laurence S. Kuter, Airman at Yalta, pp. 4-9.
109. Fleming, op. cit., p. 197
110. Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, p. 127.
111. Fleming, op. cit., p. 197.
112. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, pp. 617-19.
113. "MacArthur and Yalta," Time, LXVI (October 31, 1955), p.16.
114. Forrestal Diaries, op. cit., p. 31.
115. "Things Yalta Papers Reveal," U.S. News and World Report, XXXVIII (March 25, 1955), p. 43.
116. Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, a Naval Record, pp. 591, 598.
117. Leahy, op. cit., pp. 317-18.
118. George N. Crocker, Road to Russia, p. 269.
Cf., Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission, p. 537.
119. William H. Chamberlin, America's Second Crusade, pp. 218-219.
120. Ellis M. Zacharias, Behind Closed Doors, pp. 56-57.
121. "Things Yalta Papers Revealed," U.S. News and World Report (March 25, 1955), p. 44.
122. Pogue, op. cit., p. 199.
123. Neal Stanford, "Yalta Lesson for Pentagon," Foreign Policy Bulletin, XXXV (December 1, 1955), p. 43.
124. Fleming, op. cit., pp. 194-195.
125. Lensen, op. cit., p. 156.
126. "Things Yalta Papers Reveal" U.S. News and World Report, XXXV (March 25, 1955), p. 43-44.
127. William C. Bullitt, op. cit., p. 38.
128. Lensen, op. cit., p. 160.

129. Werner Levi, Modern China's Foreign Policy, pp. 243-44.
130. Yalta Papers, pp. 356-57.
131. Lensen, op. cit., p. 164.
132. Fleming, op. cit., p. 195.
133. "Things Yalta Papers Reveal," U.S. News and World Report XXXVIII (March 25, 1955), p. 46.
134. Forrest C. Pogue, The Meaning of Yalta, ed. John L. Snell, p. 197.
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136. Pogue, op. cit., p. 198.
137. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Congressional Record, 79th Congress--1st Session, (March 1, 1945), p. 1622.
(Address by the President before a joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the subject of Yalta.)
138. Welles, op. cit., p. 176.
139. Greer, op. cit., p. 196.
140. Ibid., p. 196. (Address to Wilson Foundation on December 28, 1933)
141. Ibid., p. 197.
142. Ibid., p. 197.
143. Ibid., p. 199.
144. Ibid., p. 198 (November 8, 1943)
145. Pogue, op. cit., p. 186.
146. Winston Churchill, op. cit., pp. 210-16.
147. Yalta Papers, pp. 85-87.
148. Fleming, op. cit., p. 199.
149. Ibid., p. 200.
150. Arthur H. Vandenburg, Congressional Record, 79th Congress--1st Session, pp. 6981-82.
151. Fleming, op. cit., p. 207.

152. Winston Churchill, op. cit., pp. 392-94.
153. R. J. Sontag, "Reflections on the Yalta Papers," Foreign Affairs, XXXIII (1955), p. 622.
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182. George Sokolsky, Congressional Record, 81st Congress--2nd Session (July 24, 1950), p. 10842.
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