

AUG 31 1977

LIBRARY OF
WASHINGTON & LEE UNIVERSITY
LEXINGTON, VA. 24450

Arch.
378.2
Falk

THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

IN LEBANON:

A QUEST FOR DIGNITY

by

James N. Falk

Approved 5/19/77

W. Buchman

Milton Colvin

John H. ...
Edward ...

POLITICS HONORS THESIS

WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY

1977

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	i
Chapter	
I. LEBANON	3
History	
Confessional System	
Ethnic Groups (discussion of major actors)	
Relations with Arab Nations (Western-Christian traditions)	
II. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION	19
Recent History	
Organization	
Factionalism	
III. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION IN LEBANON	28
1970 Black September in Jordan	
Why Lebanon	
Cairo Agreements 1969	
Conditions in Refugee Camps	
IV. THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE CIVIL WAR	38
Sinai Peace Agreement	
Leftist and Progressive Movements in Lebanon	
Confessional Caveats (philosophy and ethnocentrism)	
V. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION'S ROLE IN THE WAR	51
Quest for Self-determination, Autonomy	
Discussion of the Syrian Intervention	
EPILOGUE	63
APPENDICIES	70
Lebanese Population by Sect, 1956	
Distribution of Religious Communities in Lebanon, 1950	
Distribution of Parliamentary Seats by Sect, 1947-1964	
Balance of Sects in Administration	
Structure of the Palestinian Liberation Organization	
Principal Members of Palestine Liberation Organization	

Major Palestinian Commando Groups
Support of Commandos and Preferred Solution of Palestine
Problems
Distribution of Total Registered Refugee Population and
of Camp Population (1952)
Distribution of Total Registered Refugee Population and
of Camp Population (1972)
The Cairo Agreements
Lebanese Factions
Map of Lebanon Including Major Refugee Camps

BIBLIOGRAPHY 90

Contrary to what one might expect from the title of this thesis, I do not intend to write solely about the Palestine Liberation Organization. Instead I hope to fill a gap in what has already been written about the critical situation in Lebanon. All of us followed the daily death tolls, the kidnapping, and the seemingly senseless destruction of valuable property, but perhaps, not enough attention has been paid to the State that could easily be the "causus belli" of the next Arab-Israeli War. The war is over, but the recent assassination of the Druze leader, Kamal Jumblatt show that the unrest is there to stay. Will Lebanon emerge as a radical state, run by Syria? Will Israel occupy South Lebanon? What will happen to the Christians, too few to attempt to fight alone? These are some of the questions that this paper will address.

A work of this nature, however, is not without several inherent problems. First, due to the battle conditions inside Lebanon, most of the Lebanese press was forced to close shop. In light of this, most of the factual, chronological data, included in the text, comes from the *New York Times* and the *Middle East Journal*. Secondly, following a tradition I hope to see continue, I have transliterated personal and place nouns from the Arabic rather than give the English or French spellings. Frequently this may lead to some confusion; for example, the *New York Time's* spelling for Pierre Geyamel differs from my own which is Pierre Jumayyil. In any case, I shall try to alleviate the confusion by providing both spellings when considered appropriate.

The purpose of this paper is the examination of the various factors that contributed to the Palestine Liberation Organization's presence in Lebanon, and its role throughout the recent civil war. In order to do this, I have found that it is essential to study the dynamics of the organization as well as its leadership. In addition, in order to understand the P.L.O.'s actions, we must also have some knowledge of Lebanon's background. It is hoped that the appendices will add quantitative support to the text.

CHAPTER I

They use more food and clothes, and take pride in them. They build large houses and lay out towns and cities for protection. This is followed by an increase in comfort and ease, which leads to formation of the most developed luxury customs. They take the greatest pride in the preparation of food and a fine cuisine, in the use of varied splendid clothes of silk and brocade and other fine materials, in the construction of ever higher buildings and towers...

The Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldun

I, 221

CHAPTER I

LEBANON

Beirut had for years been the economic and cultural center for the Middle East, being the one place where wealthy oil Sheiks could come and spend their money as well as invest it in the Lebanese capital's numerous banks. Up until April 1975, Lebanon's economy seemed to be progressing well, even if the eleven percent inflation was crippling the poorer Shi'ites in South Lebanon. In 1973, according to the United States Department of State, Lebanon's per capita income was \$730.00 and the annual growth rate of the gross national product ranged from seven to ten percent.¹

Ever since the Phoenicians settled in Lebanon, its economy has been predominantly agriculturally based. About one-quarter of the land has been cultivated, while over one-half remains desert. Lebanon's population is as dense in some areas as it is diverse. The 1973 unofficial population estimate had over 3,149,000² people living in this nation slightly smaller than the state of Connecticut.³

Lebanon for years served as a place of refuge for the Christians who during the Crusades created many strongholds in what is now Lebanese territory. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, five of the former

¹U. S., Department of State, *Background Notes*. Lebanon, (January 1975), p. 4.

²Ibid., p. 1.

³See Table 1, *Lebanese Population by Sect*, 1956, p. 22.

provinces came under a French mandate. It was not until 1943 that Lebanon finally gained her independence. Unfortunately history has not treated Lebanon easily. Besides having a population made up of seventeen major ethnic groups; the country borders Syria in the north and east, and Israel to the south. The process of unification in Lebanon was never really a national effort. During the years, a number of groups have been involved, going back to the Ma'ni dynasty (1516-1697) and the Chehabi dynasty which followed (1697-1841).⁴ As an analyst for the United States Department of Commerce wrote, "The roots of the Lebanese tragedy lie deep in the country's history as a refuge for a multiplicity of sects and political tensions inherent in a multireligious society..."⁵ Modern Lebanon was respected for many of the same reasons that made the Phoenicians a wealthy, successful group. Both Phoenicians and Lebanese earned the reputation of being fair trade partners and cultural intermediaries for the region.⁶ This concept of "cultural intermediary" is still quite in evidence. In a speech at Washington and Lee University, President Ford's Special Envoy to Lebanon, Ambassador Talcott Seelye called Lebanon "the only open society in the Middle East." "The various Newspapers in Beirut," he continued, "were mouthpieces for the many factions" present in the Fertile Crescent.⁷

⁴Enver Koury, *The Crisis in the Lebanese System: Confessionalism and Chaos*. (Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976), p. 2.

⁵Norman Howard, "Upheaval in Lebanon," *Current History* (January 1946): 5.

⁶Kamal Salibi, "The Lebanese Identity," *Middle East Review* (Fall 1976): 18.

⁷Speech given at Washington and Lee University by Ambassador Talcott W. Seelye, 31 January 1977.

The organization of Lebanon's government is structured around the unrecorded "National Covenant of 1944" (al-Mithaq al-Watani). This supplement to the written constitution established a confessional system for Lebanon's political existence. It provided for the distribution of political and administrative posts to be allocated on the basis of a census taken in 1932, which showed the Maronite Christian population to be the largest in number. Under this convention or "Lebanese Formula" as Kamal Jumblatt calls it, the President and the Army Commander would always be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunnite Muslim and the President of the unicameral parliament a shi'ite Muslim; in addition, the ninety nine parliamentary seats were to be distributed according to a proportion favoring the Christians over the Muslims six to five.

This "delicate balance" is, a major cause of the current Lebanese problem. Professor Koury points out in *The Crisis in the Lebanese System: Confessionalism and Chaos*, the Maronite president has an almost impossible role to play for "not only must he choose a Sunnite prime minister who can influence the Muslim community, but at the same time he must make sure that the position of prime minister is rotated among the various prominent political Sunnite leaders so as to avoid the formation of an opposition Sunnite bloc." Needless to say, the prime minister must be someone who is acceptable to the Christian community.

History has proven that the president of Lebanon is generally thought not to be supportive enough of the Christian element to whom he owes his position. Referring back to the 1958 crisis that brought the

⁸Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (London), p. 27765.

⁹Koury, *The Crisis in the Lebanese System*, p. 24.

American Marines to Lebanon, President Shihab's attempt to involve Muslims into more positions of leadership appeared to many Christians as being needless concessions.¹⁰ The cosmopolitan city of Beirut is the first thing that comes to mind when one thinks of Lebanon. Yet, if one ignores the major coastal cities, then one can appreciate the fact that Lebanon is a nation prone to the growing pains of any other developing nation. "The clear implication, wrote Michael Suleiman in 1972, "is that the present Lebanese political system will not be able to harness and/or accommodate the social forces of change in the country."¹¹ The only way that the Lebanese confessionalist system could function would be if all the parties would be able to give-and-take, or as Charles Helou wrote, ..."the only possible peace is one arrived at by consent, based on understanding and cooperation, on a state of equilibrium."^{12 13} Yet, in 1970, when President Franjiyya expressed a belief in "strong government", the system rapidly began to come asunder.¹⁴ The Maronite president did not realize that while the Lebanese state was faced with so many sectarian interests that it was virtually impossible to pretend to have any control. A newly elected Lebanese president should make as his first executive action a move of real conciliation towards the Muslim

¹⁰Kamal Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War*, p. 3.

¹¹Michael Suleiman, "Crisis and Revolution in Lebanon." *The Middle East Journal* (Winter 1972): 11.

¹²Michael Hudson, *The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon*, (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 19.

¹³See Table 2, *Distribution of Religious Communities in Lebanon*, 1950, p. 27.

¹⁴Patrick Seale, "Lebanon at the end of its Tether," *Middle East International* (November 1975): p. 9.

populations. President Franjiyya felt that he could rule without going to any extremes wooing what he considered minority interests.¹⁵ The lack of cooperation between the president and the prime minister was in 1958 as in 1975 one of the major factors contributing to the respective crises. James Markham, the *New York Times* correspondent in Beirut, made an interesting observation about Lebanese politics writing "covering it (war) as a journalist, one often feels one is writing about the Middle Ages in the lexicon of 20-century politics."¹⁶

Books have been written about the dynamics of the Lebanese confessional system, but for our purposes it is sufficient to realize that the "National Covenant" was put into effect in 1943, a time when the Lebanese and Middle Eastern situations were radically different from what they are today. There was NO Israel, NO Palestinian issue, NO successful Soviet backed Communist or leftist movement.

Before moving to the discussion of the recent conflict and the role played by the Palestine Liberation Organization, let us examine the major ethnic groups making up Lebanon's diverse demography. The principal Christian group is the Phalange (Munazzamat al-Kata'ib Al-lubnaniyya). Pierre Jumayyil has been the only strong leader of the movement since its inception in 1936. Originally the group was a small youth organization which wanted Lebanon to be a "sovereign and independent state with alliance and friendship towards France."¹⁷ The Kata'ib Party,

¹⁵See Table 3, Distribution of Parliamentary Seats by Sect, 1947-1964, p. 215; Table 4, Balance of Sects in Administration, p. 320.

¹⁶James Markham, "Lebanon: The Insane War," *New York Times Magazine* (15 August 1976): 60.

¹⁷Michael Suleiman, *Political Parties in Lebanon*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 233.

perhaps more than any other, has been successful in seeing that its philosophy was carried to the thousands of Lebanese living abroad. The party's forty overseas branches were frequently able to convince former citizens to return to their country. If this proved impossible, then at least they were encouraged to remain in touch. Most of this wealthy party's finances come from the Lebanese emigrants who wish to contribute their part.

Of the Maronites living currently in Lebanon, over fifty per cent can be found near Mount Lebanon, while only twelve per cent reside in what is generally referred to as South Lebanon.¹⁸ The Kata'ib Party is predominantly made up of middle class merchants and small businessmen who are extremely jealous of losing their status in society to the Muslim population; a group perceived by them as being a major threat to their security. Devotees of Jumayyil make up what is undoubtedly the "best organized and most disciplined political grouping" in Lebanon. Michael Suleiman, author of *Political Parties in Lebanon*, goes so far as to say that they are even better organized than the Communist Party.¹⁹

The ideology of the group is helpful in allowing us to understand why they have taken such a hostile attitude towards the Muslim element. Followers of Pierre Jumayyil believe that they are descendents of the Phoenicians, therefore definitely not Arab. As Catholics, they recognize the authority of the Pope and are furthermore acknowledged by the Roman Catholic Church. Though the Maronites see their mission as being the protection of their faith from the "tide of Islam," they still carry out the liturgy in the Syrian language. Ever since the seventeenth century

¹⁸Ibid., p. 241.

¹⁹Ibid.

the Christian Maronite population has been protective of their footing in an Arab world that threatened to run them over. This is, of course, the reason why the group had, throughout history, gone to such lengths establishing strong links with France. When the Arab world was striving for pan-Arabism (Quamiyya), the Christian element thought of themselves solely in the context of Lebanon. This patriotism (wataniyya) contributed largely to the friction that incited the recent conflict. Ever since the Christians became focused around the Kata'ib Party, their "raison d'etre" according to Mr. Suleiman was "to fight against non-Lebanese or trans-Lebanese nationalism and to build up a Lebanese national feeling."²⁰ The leadership under Mr. Jumayyil has always been well aware of the serious difficulties facing the Maronite population. As I mentioned, a large number of Lebanese Christians emigrated to Europe and the United States. The Phalanges argue that these emigrants should be given all the rights and privileges of resident Lebanese. These rights would, according to Jumayyil, naturally include the right to vote as well as proportional representation. Yet, many countries act as the U. S. does and strip one's citizenship if they voluntarily vote abroad. The last census taken in Lebanon was carried out by the French in 1932. There is hardly any question that even without taking into consideration the Palestian refugees, the Muslim population is equal to or more than that of the Christian's.

Before the immigration of thousands of refugees radically changed Lebanon's foreign policy, what a spokesman for the Kata'ib Party said was what kept Lebanon separated from her neighbors. "To the Phalanges,

²⁰Ibid., p. 243.

Lebanon has an 'Arab face' in the sense that it belongs to the Arab world in the same way Italy belongs to the Latin worlds or Denmark to the Scandinavian world--no more and no less."²¹ Pierre Jumayyil echoed this ideology saying, "It is spiritually impossible to unite it (Lebanon) to a world which does not share its state of soul, its spiritual principles. Lebanon is a mission. It intends to continue to serve as a link between the two worlds without being absorbed by either, for then it would fail its mission."²² We shall soon see that this "mission" could never be successful while the Lebanese leadership ignored the peasant tiller of the soil who continuously search and expected wealth and security from his government.

Discounting the Palestinian refugees, the most recent group to come into Lebanon is the Armenian Christians. They represent an ethnic and a religious minority. Yet, they have been able to integrate themselves into Lebanon's sociological structure. Their political influence is affiliated with the Phalange, who has a strong interest in building what Michael Hudson calls the "myth that Lebanon is predominantly Christian."²³ Nevertheless during the recent war, this group tried extremely hard to remain neutral.²⁴

The Greek Orthodox Christians, comprising over ten per cent of the population, are widely scattered through the Arab world. Their beginnings can be traced back to the schism between Byzantine and Roman

²¹Ibid., p. 247.

²²Ibid., p. 248.

²³Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, p. 30.

²⁴LINK (New York: Americans for Middle East Understanding, Winter 1976): 3.

Christianity in 1054. Up until the civil war, these Christians divided their support between the Maronite and Muslim segments of society. In 1709, the Greek Catholics became a splinter group of the Orthodox. This discord was brought about when they were convinced that the church should return to Rome. Failing to win majority support they broke away from the Orthodox group. Even though these two Christian groups are numerically at a disadvantage with regard to political power, they are still considered a major force. As one observer commented, "...the making and unmaking of Lebanese statesmen was, certainly before 1958, almost a prerogative of the Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic upper class."

Of all Lebanese ethnic bodies, the Druze clan is undoubtedly the most interesting and difficult to understand. Throughout the civil war, this group's alliances have been almost impossible to follow. Time after time, the Druzes have almost been abolished, but even in face of adverse circumstances they have been able to remain effective and autonomous. Robert Gordon in his article "The Druzes: A Community Apart," claims that the Druzes served "as the first basis of the Lebanese polity."²⁵ Given that this is so, then they have also done more to disrupt the unity of Lebanon. Of all the Arabs they are probably the most vicious. A Turkish militiaman describing the Druzes remarked in the 1890's, "Then there are the Druzes of the mountains. Ha! They are the real fighters-like lions they fear neither Sultan nor soldiers."²⁶ This secret heretical sect places a great deal of emphasis on the notion of loyalty to their own folk and to the mountain. Their recognition of Fatimid caliph

²⁵Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, p. 28.

²⁶Gordon Roberts, "The Druzes: A Community Apart," *The Middle East International* (August 1973): 23.

al Hakim (d. 1021 A.D.) as the physical emanation of the divinity, forced the Druzes to break away from the Sunni community.²⁷ This withdrawal from a faction of Islam dissuaded any sentiment of Arab nationalism. The Druzes' contact with Christianity goes back to the 1820's when the leading Druze Amir, Bashir converted to Christianity. He did this for two reasons: first, it was recognition that the Maronites had risen to power; secondly, it was an intelligent tactic designed to crush Bashir's Druze opposition.²⁸ A few years later when he was deposed, both the Druze and Maronite elements realized that they were fighting for control of the same mountain, Mount Lebanon. As mentioned before, the Maronites were ideal trade partners for Europe. It was this alliance which brought about much of the tension with the Maronites. Their strained relations finally came to a head in 1860, when widespread slaughter occurred among the contingents forcing troops from France to carry out an amphibious mission to protect their silk industry and mediate the uproar. Many scholars have argued that France's act of benevolence was actually based on purely selfish motives. For years France's silk industry had depended on Lebanon's free port. Any threat to the status quo in Beirut was perceived as a real danger to France's economic stability. The Druze allegiance with the Palestinians in the war is quite enigmatic. This is especially true, considering that many of the Druzes have joined the Israeli Army and marched against the Palestinians during past operations. Their tie with the Palestine Liberation Organi-

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid.

zation is a result of Kamal Jumblatt, a scion of the old feudal family of Druze sheiks, which led the Jumblatti faction among the Druzes since the seventeenth century.³⁰ In 1949, Jumblatt led the development of the Progressive Socialist Party (al-Hizb al-Taqaddumm al-Ishtiraki). This party at its founding included some Christians, Sunnite and Shi'ite Muslims, along with the followers of Jumblatt. The Progressive Socialist Party has continued to argue for the transformation of Lebanon into a secular state where every vote would count. This coupled with appeals to Arab and international leftist organizations created the situation where the Palestinians perceived the Druzes as possible allies. One of the most puzzling duos in international relations took place between Jumblatt and Kamil Sham'un (Camille Chamoun). Coming from the same electoral district of Shuf, Jumblatt was instrumental in forcing the resignation of Bishara al-Khuri, Lebanon's first president, and in clearing the path for Sham'un's successor. However, Sham'un, once securely in power lost interest with Jumblatt's socialist ideology. Once the rivalry started, President Sham'un was not one to allow an opponent to have any advantage. In fact, he so carefully led the opposition against Jumblatt that it became impossible for him to win election in the religiously mixed constituency of Shuf.³¹ Yet, even without a seat in Parliament, Jumblatt had his family's tradition to propell him into Lebanese politics. In 1958, Jumblatt received a great deal of Arab support by committing himself to Nasserist pan-Arabism and by joining the Muslim rebellion against the Sham'un regime. Finally this support enabled him

³⁰Ibid., p. 24.

³¹Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War*, p. 12.

to obtain recognition as the leader of Lebanon's Muslim populations over Saib Salam who withheld support of Nasir.³² With regard to Jumblatt's philosophy, it can be said that it has, after numerous battles against the French, acquired what Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) spokesman Yusif al-Haythan calls "the historic role of progressivism."³³

Of the two Muslim elements, the Sunnites are the largest. Michael Hudson estimates that they represent about twenty per cent of Lebanon's aggregate population.³⁴ To the Sunnites, the Caliph and the Sultan were harmonious. The great majority of Lebanese Sunnites is made up of large landowners and commercial bourgeoisie living mostly in the coastal towns of Tyre, Saida, as well as South Lebanon. Their alienation by the Christians is not a new phenomenon, since traditionally the mountain was closed to them. The Sunnites only tolerated the other "people of the book," so that when in 1920, the roles were reversed and they found themselves under French colonialism and Maronite client control the friction exacerbated. Mr. Hudson writes, "Just as the other minorities cherish their autonomous pasts, so many Sunnites feel traditional attachment to a political-religious entity beyond the borders of the little state."³⁵

The second Muslim group is the Shi'ite. The philosophy of this division is based on the dynastic claims of the descendents of the

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid., p. 13.

³⁴Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, p. 31.

³⁵Ibid.

Prophet's cousin and son-in-law Ali. They believe that Muhammad's succession passes through Ali to the other "imams" or leaders. By all accounts, the Shi'ites are the largest Muslim group in Lebanon.³⁶ Concentrated mainly in the southern part of the country this feudal group has been the least exposed to modernity. Since 1968, when South Lebanon became a war zone, an estimated 100,000 Shi'ites left the region to live in the ghettos of Beirut.³⁷ This migration of thousands, of course, placed enormous stress on the Maronite mountain.

The external linkages of Lebanon with the Arab and Western worlds have depended on a number of factors. The oil crisis, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian question have brought with them the intervention of foreign powers.³⁸ This involvement of outside nations underscores the necessity that Lebanon follow a foreign policy that emphasizes equilibrium. Hardly a move can be made without word being conveyed to fleets of the Soviet Union and the United States cruising off Lebanon's western border, the Mediterranean Sea. Lebanon's estrangement from Syria will be mentioned in greater detail later, however, we should realize that the Syrian Arabs still realize that the Syrian Arabs still harbor resentment from the French decision of 1920 to give Greater Lebanon some Syrian territory. The perplexity of Lebanon-Syrian relations can be vividly seen in the 1958 crisis. The Sunnites in Tripoli were furnished with supplies by their Syrian brothers who crossed freely over the border. The Syrian Druzes provided their Lebanese cousins with all of the arms needed for a small war.³⁹ Yet, even

³⁶Howard, "Upheaval in Lebanon," *Current History* (January 1976):5.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Koury, *The Crisis in the Lebanese System*, p. 28.

³⁹Ibid., p. 100.

with all of the commerce exchanged between the two countries, they do not have formal diplomatic relations. The Ba'ath Party's growth in Syria has severely widened the divisions that seem to threaten peace in the region.

The fact that Lebanon and Israel have been in a technical state of war since 1948 has been a principal problem. Many Israeli citizens like to imagine that Lebanon is secretly benevolent towards them, while the Muslim-Arabs want Lebanon to act against Israel. Lebanon's insecurity in face of Arab nations can be seen in the case when Lebanon was unable to permit Syrian troops in its territory to help counter the Israelis while they diverted the Jordan River's water. In 1967, General Emile Bastani, the army's commander, ignoring all pleas from Arab leaders, refused to commit his troops to the Six-Day War. This action placed him in direct opposition with Prime Minister Karami who, of course, advocated complete solidarity with the Arab cause.⁴⁰ This decision brought with it a great deal of political unrest. Any support given to the Arabs by Lebanese authorities could have discouraged American cooperation, and a stance of neutrality would anger the Muslim populations, thus leaving them receptive to overtures made by leftist organizations.

Ironically and paradoxically, the Lebanese leadership has important business interests in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf. Economically Lebanon has always been required to remain in the Arab context. Politically, though, the leadership wants to keep Lebanon out of the Arab framework. As Professor Salibi mentions in his recent book, *Lebanon: Crossroads to Civil War*, the Christians in Lebanon are the

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 99.

only ones "in the Islamic world who have been politically successful." ⁴¹ These recent figures found in *Al Nahar* (7 May 1975) show just how closely Lebanon is linked with the Arab world: "remittances from Lebanese citizens working in Arab oil producing countries are almost five hundred million Lebanese pounds a year; Arab financial remittances in exchange for services is about one billion pounds; and, finally, remittances for investments and bank deposits in Lebanon are equal to about four hundred million dollars a year."⁴²

Lebanon's neutrality towards Israel was never officially proclaimed. However, until 1964, Lebanon was successfully alienated from the issues confronting the Fertile Crescent. The creation of the United Arab Command and the Arab League's decision to sponsor the Palestine Liberation Organization made Lebanon's tight rope particularly slippery. Nasir of Egypt did more than anyone else to force Lebanon out of its desired position of neutrality. To accomplish this, he used every possible trick designed to embarrass the Lebanese government. Nasir's ambassador to Beirut, Abd al-Hamid Ghabib, intervened in all aspects of Lebanon's affairs. Needless to say, this greatly disturbed the leadership and the Christian population.

Along with the already mentioned reasons, Lebanon was finally convinced to pull for the Arab side when the Zionists claimed parts of southern Lebanon and its water resources. Nevertheless since 1948,

⁴¹Salibi, "The Lebanese Identity," *Middle East Review* (Fall 1976): 10.

⁴²*Middle East Research and Information Project* (Washington, D. C., February 1976): 20.

⁴³Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War*, p. 18.

Lebanon has made token gestures to appease the Arab contingent. In 1948, a small volunteer force was sent into Palestine.⁴⁴

In conclusion, during the sixties, there was a tendency on the part of a growing number of Lebanese to uphold the Arab position. Faced with pressure with radical groups and the persistent maneuvers of Muslim Lebanese, Lebanon had little choice but to commit herself to a complete pan-Arab line. For as long as Lebanon is economically dependent on her neighbors, she will be unable to disattach itself from the major issue facing the Arab world.⁴⁵

⁴⁴Abbas Abusalik, "A Delicate Balance," *Middle East International* (May 1975): 18.

⁴⁵Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War*, p. 26.

CHAPTER II

The first generation retains the desert qualities, desert toughness, and desert savagery. (Its members are used to) privation and to sharing their glory (with each other); they are brave and rapacious. Therefore, the strength of group feeling continues to be preserved among them. They are sharp and greatly feared. People submit to them.

The Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldun

I, 307

CHAPTER II

THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

The Palestine Liberation Organization has been perhaps the hardest hit victim of its own exaggerated policy. To most of the world the letters "P.L.O." represent the fruitless massacre of the athletes at the Munich Olympic games, or the assassinations of two of America's outstanding Arabists in Khartoum.

In reality the P.L.O. is a loosely-knit umbrella organization for numerous splinter factions.¹ The Palestine Liberation Organization has come a long way since February 1959 when Fateh was able to win a significant victory winning a majority in the Palestine National Council to gain control of the P.L.O. This political achievement enabled Fateh to control the military and participate in all top-level Arab deliberations.² As evidenced in Table Five, the P.L.O. is literally a state within a state, possessing its own hospitals, schools, and tax collectors. The P.L.O., describes Nabil Sha'ath, director of the P.L.O. Planning Center, is "concerned with the present and the future, we are in effect concerned with the situation of the Palestinians as they are now, fifty per cent of whom are under occupation and almost exactly fifty per cent are

¹See Table 6, Principal Members of Palestine Liberation Organization.

²Hisham Sharabi, *Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness*, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1970), p. 28

in exile."³ To carry out their goal, Sha'ath adds, "Inside the Palestinian territory, we are concerned with the problem of maintaining the resistance to the Israeli occupation, resisting deportation, 'de-Arabi-zation,' destruction of homes, denial of civil rights, and the ability of the Palestinian people to resist their occupation."⁴ The power of the P.L.O. to maintain credibility is especially important if they are to remain a viable actor in the MidEast. To remain extant, the organization must convince themselves, their friends and the court of world opinion that they merit attention and consideration. Since 1967, the P.L.O., believes Hisham Sharabi, has made an intensive effort to be credible. Unfortunately the American perspective has been greatly shaped by the Israeli viewpoint that Palestinians lacked the proficiency for sustained action.⁵ The civil war has, without doubt, proved that as long as the Palestinians remain unaccommodated for, there will always be a P.L.O. or some similar organization to fight for their dignity. Ambassador Dean Brown, President of the Middle East Institute, perhaps best expresses the refugees plight, when on his return from the war torn nation, he said, there will always be refugees in Lebanon "hundreds of thousands of them and their voices will count."⁶

The Israeli Foreign Ministry thought for years that the various refugee factions would devour themselves before harming the Jewish nation.

³Nabil Sha'ath, "PLO Planning Report," (Speech given in Beirut June 29, 1975), p. 1.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Sharabi, *Palistine Guerrillas*, p. 6.

⁶Dean Brown, "Lebanon - A Mission of Conciliation," (Speech given at the Brookings Institute - June 22, 1976), p. 11.

And, still after so much destruction, the Ministry calls the commandos a "terrorist organization, which presents themselves as a Palestine Liberation Movement."⁷ Nabil Sha'ath declares, "We (Palestinians) are the exiled party. We are the oppressed party. We are the aggrieved party. Nobody expects us to fight for other people's rights before we really achieve some of those rights ourselves."⁸ This feeling of desperation can be blamed in part on Jewish intransigence. Golda Meir never did recognize the existence of the Palestinians. "There was no such thing as Palestinians. It was not as though there was a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist."⁹ Nevertheless, however hard, the Israelis try to ignore the P.L.O.'s efforts, there are, reports the *Christian Science Monitor*, "Every month dozens of incidents that the Israelis never report--highly competent jobs of cutting telephone wires, railway tracks, mining roads, harrassing military camps."¹⁰ General Moariv of the Israeli Army describes in the following statement the never ending determination of the Palestinians, "The fighting with Fateh goes on virtually every day. This is never mentioned in the news.... Despite severe casualties they keep mounting operations as though nothing happened."¹¹ Elie Landay, a leading Israeli military analyst believes that the P.L.O.'s efforts have forced the Jewish nation to be on the defensive for the first time.¹²

⁷Sharabi, *Palestine Guerrillas*, p. 6.

⁸Sha'ath, PLO Planning Report, p. 5.

⁹Sharabi, *Palestine Guerrillas*, p. 7.

¹⁰*Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), 21 June 1969.

¹¹Ibid., June 1969.

¹²Ibid.

The P.L.O., up until very recently, was extremely fortunate in having the support of China and the Soviet Union, not to mention the more radical Arab regimes.¹³ Many have incorrectly taken for granted that the Palestinian movement consisted of a mass of illiterate Bedouins blindly running about. Realistically, the P.L.O.'s members range from illiterate people in the camps to what Sha'ath calls, "a bunch of intellectuals numbering about 100,000 university graduates including 5,000 Ph.D's."¹⁴ Probably the rank and file can be described as generally being of peasant and lower middle class background. A survey carried out by Sharabi among a thousand guerrillas showed that six per cent were illiterate; fifty four per cent has a primary education; another thirty two per cent had gone through some secondary education; and, finally, eight per cent had a college education or more.¹⁵

The development of the current Palestine Liberation Organization came about in a number of separate stages. For our purposes, the P.L.O. was created in 1957 when Abu Lotuf, Abu Said, and Abu Yussef joined in Kuwait and published the newspaper *Our Palestine*.¹⁶ The next major date of interest is May 1964, when Ahmed Shukari was charged with the selection of the Executive Committee. He choose fifteen middle-aged men, all well educated. Finances for the operation were to be supplied by member countries of the Arab League.¹⁷ Before being relieved in 1967, in wake

¹³See Table 7, Major Palestinian Commando Groups.

¹⁴Sha'ath, "PLO Planning Report," p. 52.

¹⁵Sharabi, *Palestine Guerrillas*, p. 13.

¹⁶William Wuandt, *Palestinian Nationalism: Its Politics and Military Dimensions*, (Santa Monica: Rand, 1971), p. 44.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 27.

of the Six-Day War, Shukari had built the foundation for the Palestine Liberation Organization we know today.

After the 1967 War, the P.L.O. bureaucratic leadership was purged. This action took place primarily out of the Palestinian realization that a radical change was necessary since it was obvious that the Israelis could not be beaten by conventional means.¹⁸ The war had left nearly one-half of all Palestinian territory under occupation. The next phase of the Palestinian struggle emphasized violent commando raids in Israel and Europe. This tendency towards armed struggle came about from contact with the mercurial Syrian regime who believed that guerrilla type warfare would be the best way to mobilize the Palestinian refugees; and, secondly, it would force the other Arab nations to act.

By the fall of 1970, Fateh was estimated to have 10,000 armed men carrying a Russian weapon, the Kabashnikov rifle.¹⁹ For study of the Lebanese civil war, it is essential to understand the different ideologies of major P.L.O. factions. Fateh is the largest of the groups forming the P.L.O. Its leader Yasir Arafat is also Chairman of the entire structure. "Fateh" is an acronym formed by the first letters of the arabic name for Palestine Liberation Organization - Harakat al-Tahrir al-Filastini. Its leadership is predominantly of Sunni birth. Of all the groups, Gateh has the broadest nationalist appeal, having the support of most Arab nations. Fateh was able to have this support since its official policy was the avoidance of all inter-Arab quarrels.²⁰ In the

¹⁸John Moore, ed, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 6.

¹⁹Sharabi, *Palestine Guerrillas*, p. 23.

²⁰Quandt, *Palestinian Nationalism*, p. 12.

simplicity of Fateh's ideology lies a lot of its success. Arafat has never swayed from Fateh's main point, which is that the liberation should be a strictly Palestinian affair. Mr. Arafat was very much impressed by the guerrilla struggle carried out by Algerian nationalists against the French; he envisioned that his army (PLA) would also be able to follow their example.²¹ The platform of the Palestine Liberation Organization, unveiled at the all-Palestine Congress in January 1968, clearly stated in Article I that, "Palestine is the homeland of the Palestinian Arabs...." And, in Article III, "The Arab people of Palestine alone have the right to determine the destiny of Palestine...." Finally, the will of the Palestinian people was expressed in Article IV, "The Palestinian personality is an intrinsic and inseparable attribute passed on from generation to generation and cannot be annulled by the Zionist Occupation or by the dispersal of the Palestinian Arabs...."²² The history of the P.L.O.'s spokesman is hard to determine. Even the place of his birth is in doubt, though most believe that he was born in Cairo in 1929.²³ Nevertheless during periods of extreme duress, his ability as a leader has never been questioned since he has somehow managed to guard his coveted position under very trying circumstances.

The other major faction is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.), led by Dr. George Habash. Its ideology is far to the left of Fateh and most of the conservative Arab regimes. According to Habash, the struggle should be total, not confined to Palestine

²¹Eric Rouleau, "The Palestinian Quest," *Foreign Affairs* (January 1975): 271.

²²Sharabi, *Palestine and Isreal*, (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 281.

²³Thomas Kiernan, *Arafat: The Man and the Myth*, (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1968), p. 22.

but instead carried throughout the Middle East against 'World Zionism and imperialism.'²⁴ Habash recently discussed with a reporter representing United Press International his motivation. "I have no personal motive except that which every Palestinian has. I was a student in Lydda, the town where I was born, and I have seen with my own eyes the Israeli Army entering the town and killing its inhabitants. On the way from Lydda to Ramalla I have seen children, young men and old people dying. What can you do after you have seen all this? You cannot but become a revolutionary and fight for the cause. Your own cause as well as that of your people."²⁵ This Marxist-Leninist organization, limited by lack of funds, has emphasized "cells" in order to unify the diverse elements of the party. Also, Habash has concentrated on urban sabotage and special terrorist operations outside of Israel. In this organization lies the link between the Palestinian refugees and leftist doctrine. The success of guerrilla activity which was usually greatly exaggerated made the P.F.L.P. the first Marxist-Leninist group in the MidEast to obtain any significant popular support. The weekly, *Al-Hadaf*, has been particularly successful in gaining youth sympathizers.²⁶

Besides these two major groups, there does also exist a multiplicity of other splinter factions; for this study of the P.L.O. in Lebanon, we need only be aware of the opposing philosophies of the before-mentioned organizations. Before continuing, we might ask ourselves why the multiplicity of guerrilla organizations? First of all, the struggle is relatively recent. This is so; if we consider 1967 as the date of transition

²⁴Sharabi, *Palestine Guerrillas*, p. 26.

²⁵Suleiman, *Political Parties in Lebanon*, p. 18.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 27.

into a modern political group. During the first stage of revolutionary activity, there were many groups competing, using different names to achieve the same ultimate end. The fragmentation of the P.L.O. was caused by the fact that ideology mattered much more to the P.F.L.P. than to Fateh. "Indeed," writes Muhammed Musleh in *The Middle East Journal*, "small commando organizations such as the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine of Nayif Hawatimah and the popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-G.C. of Ahmed Jibril have constantly emphasized the importance of ideology for the promotion of the goals of the Palestinian resistance movement. In this respect these organizations have been a modernizing factor in Palestinian politics as they introduced into Palestinian political thought the ideas of Marx, Lenin, Mao, Trotsky.... Fateh's traditional content of Palestinian political thought has, however, introduced such important changes as political flexibility and a realistic appraisal of available options thus helping the P.L.O. to gain international recognition for the national rights of the Palestinian people."²⁷ According to Stanley Hoffmann, writing for *Foreign Affairs*, sympathy for the Palestinian struggle is relatively new. "There is no doubt that there is sympathy for the P.L.O., and one must remember....," he adds, "that the P.L.O.'s international emergence followed its defeat by Jordan in 1970."²⁸ Finally, as we turn to examine the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon, we should keep in mind the words of Fuad Jabber, "The Palestinian national movement is likely to remain at the mercy of the dynamics of

²⁷Muhamad Musleh, "Moderates and Rejectionists Within the Palestine Liberation Organization," *The Middle East Journal* (Spring 1976): 146.

²⁸Stanley Hoffmann, "A New Policy for Israel," *Foreign Affairs* (April 1975): 413.

inter-Arab politics...as it has been since its inception...for as long as it lacks a substantial degree of structural unity and ideological cohesion."²⁹

²⁹Fuad Jabber, "The Palestinian Resistance and Inter-Arab Politics," (Paper given at the University of California at Los Angeles, May 1971), p. 23.

CHAPTER III

The fifth stage is one of waste and squandering. In this stage, the ruler wastes on pleasures and amusements accumulated by his ancestors, through generosity to his inner circle and at their parties. Also, he acquires bad, low-class followers to whom he entrusts the most important matters, which they are not qualified to handle by themselves...the ruler seeks to destroy the great clients of his people and followers of his predecessors. Thus, they come to hate him and conspire to refuse support to him.

The Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldun

I, 317

CHAPTER III

"P.L.O. IN LEBANON"

The Palestinians, some argue, are fighting for "a cause long forgotten by the Western world (self-righteous in its overly easy conscience) and long mutilated by the Arab world (self-satisfied in its mercenary games)."¹ The preceding statement written by Fawaz Turki portrays how the refugee perceives his condition. "If I was not a Palestinian when I left Haifa as a child, I am one now," he adds, "Living in Beirut as a stateless person for most of my growing among my Arab brothers. I did not feel I was an Arab, a Lebanese, or, as some wretchedly pious writers claimed, a 'southern Syrian.' I was a Palestinian. And that meant I was an outsider, an alien, a refugee and a burden."² Mr. Turki was certainly on target, since for many years the Palestinian refugees have been tossed from one government to another until ultimately the P.L.O. took command and unified to some degree their efforts for liberation. Fuad Jabber explains how quickly the Palestine Liberation Organization changed, "From an obscure, politically dependent and military insignificant coterie of commando bands, the Resistance movement turned within months into a formidable political contestant and pivotal element on the Arab scene, and a grass-roots movement with few parallels in the contemporary his-

¹Fawaz Turki, *The Disinherited: Journal of a Palestinian Exile*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), p. 7.

²Ibid., p. 8.

tory of the Middle East."³

By 1969, the P.L.O. had become much more than a representative of a disinherited people. But instead of remaining a tool of the concerned nations; it made two big errors. First, it imagined that it was the leader, or what Mohammed Heykal calls, "the vanguard of the Arab revolution."⁴ The second mistake was its exaggeration of its importance. Mr. Heykal, a former Cairo newspaper editor, said in a recent interview, "I believe that if it (P.L.O.) had played its role within its true limitations, its impact would have been much greater. The resistance made swollen claims, and swelling is not a sign of health."⁵

The lack of support given to the Resistance movement can be fully appreciated when we realize that during the first half of 1965, more Palestinian commandos were killed by Jordanians and Lebanese than by Israelis.⁶ Concerning Lebanon, the Palestinians are the key to the civil war. Recognized as troublemakers, their presence in the Arab world has always been carefully scrutinized. In Syria, the army runs the commando organization, al-Saiqa. In Egypt, even the Voice of Palestine which is broadcast from outside of Cairo is heavily censored; and in Jordan, a bloody civil war purged the Palestinian Liberation Organization. How King Hussein managed to rid his country of the commandos is a fascinating story, but here we should just remember that by 1969, the

³Jabber, "The Palestinian Resistance and Inter-Arab Politics," p. 14.

⁴Mohamed Heykal, "Interview," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, (Autumn 1971): 17.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Jabber, "The Palestinian Resistance and Inter-Arab Politics," p. 11.

number of baseless commandos groups was quite high. As we have seen, the proliferation of ideologies and the increased popular support made their extinction almost impossible. So, why Lebanon?

Referring back to chapter I, Lebanon has, wrote Norman Cousins for *The Saturday Review*, "been walking a tightrope," ever since she was granted independence by the French.⁷ Arafat, in looking for a home for his nomadic organization considered the following countries as friends: Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Sudan, Somaliland, Syria, Kuwait, North and South Yemen, and Mauritania; as enemies: Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates; as neutral: Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.⁸

The development of the Palestinian population is difficult to ascertain. Yet Professor Nabil A. Badran of the AUB has found that the demography is increasing steadily. His study shows that from 1951 to 1955, "the rate of increase was 30 per 1000; 33/1000 from 1956 to 1960; and 36/1000 from 1961 to 1969. This means that in 1953, there were 152,000 refugees; in 1960, 190,600; and in 1969, 248,500." Badran goes on to say that 25,000 should be subtracted from the 1969 figure because of casualties and emigration. Badran adds 16,500 persons who entered Lebanon after the unofficial census taken in 1951 give us an estimate of 240,000 Palestinians currently living in Lebanon. Needless to say, these figures should not be considered without some questioning, but it is enough to remember that the Palestinian population had by 1970 reached over 200,000 persons - a considerable strain on the fragile republic.

In 1970, after being routed out of Jordan, the P.L.O. fell back

⁷Norman Cousins, "Last Chance for Peace in the Middle East," *The Saturday Review*, 22 March 1975, p. 12.

⁸Ibid., p. 13

⁹A. B. Zahlan, "Palestines Arab Population: The Demography of the Palestinians," *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Summer 1974): 60.

on Lebanon, and the "delicate balance" was tipped in favor of the Muslim populations. Their presence, of course, disturbed the Maronite Christian groups who feared that they would be overrun.¹⁰ The varying degrees of support for the Palestinian commandos can be seen in Table 8, in the study researched by Professor Barakat of the American University of Beirut. The Lebanese leadership, remembers Turki, were always conscious of their image as a "Western city." To guard this false image, they once even went so far as to move a refugee camp away from the main road going from the capital to the airport.¹¹

The 1967 War brought to the attention of the refugees the desperate state of the Arab nation's inability to seek Palestine's liberation. To counter this; it was hoped that the guerrillas would be able to lower Israel's morale while increasing Arab self esteem. Lebanon, on the other hand, was entirely unable to control a powerful outside group that threatened to propell her into an unwanted war. William Quandt admits that, "a weak and disorganized movement might be tolerable and even aided by Arab regimes, but a unified and growing organization could present a severe challenge, particularly to the seemingly vulnerable, political systems of Jordan and Lebanon."¹² In the absence of clear authority, the various Palestinian Liberation groups began, in 1969, to encroach on the sovereign rights of Lebanese citizens. If the Palestinians had heeded their "Black September" experience, and had kept a low

¹⁰See Tables 9 and 10, Distribution of Total Registered Refugee Population and of Camp Population (1952); Distribution of Total Registered Refugee Population and of Camp Population (1972).

¹¹Turki, *The Disinherited: Journal of a Palestinian Exile*, p. 10.

¹²Quandt, "Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions, p. 10.

profile in Lebanon, than perhaps there might have been some form of co-existence.

"Too many cooks spoil the broth," an old Arab proverb describes the divisions within the P.L.O., especially between the "moderates" and "rejectionists." They clearly caused many of the clashes against the Maronite Christians. "The disintegration of the Arab front; lack of coordination; the struggle to establish hostile blows; the habit of speaking in the name of Palestine instead of acting in a contested way. All this," Cooley says, "has increased the sufferings of the Palestinian people."¹³

More importantly the lack of unity has granted the P.L.O. the power to have its own internal laws and courts. They were for a time subject to Lebanese law for crimes involving Lebanese citizens, but even this ended when the Lebanese Shi'ites expressed their support of the Resistance. The refugees in southern Lebanon provided the villagers with a new source of income which had a means to survive the War of Attrition against South Lebanon severely hurt the nation. Over a seven year period, Israel has committed 6,200 separate acts of aggression: 4,000 aerial and artillery bombardments of villages, towns and refugee camps; forty per cent of these acts have taken place since the October 1973 War. As I mentioned in chapter I, the Shi'ites' economy depends largely on agriculture. The Israelis have killed over 2,000 head of livestock, and destroyed or damaged more than 2,000 homes.¹⁴ Lacking any strong political institutions, the Shi'ites were quick to rely on the Palestine

¹³John Cooley, *Green March: Black September*, (London: Frank Cars, 1973), p. 3.

¹⁴Tabitha Petian, "The Trials of South Lebanon," *Middle East International* (September 1975): 11.

Liberation Organization for economic and political assistance. In May 1974, the Nabatiya camp was destroyed; forcing some villagers to live in mosques or churches because of their thicker walls.¹⁵ Two years ago, Tabitha Petian interviewed certain inhabitants of South Lebanon. Their impressions of the commandos deserve some attention: "They take our wounded to the hospital, our dead to the church." "They do everything good for us and ask for nothing." Gradually, the Shi'ite's struggle for political representation became integrated with the commando's fight for recognition. Under the glare of Israeli searchlights and the blare of loudspeakers many Shi'ites felt the same as this villager, "The Zionists hate us as much as they hate the Palestinians. It is better to fight Zionists with Palestinians than alone."¹⁶

The Six-Day War took away Lebanon's luxury of remaining somewhat moderate. The swinging to the Arab's side was at first rationalized by citing economic factors, and a case can be made that the Arab boycott of Israel strengthened Lebanon's faltering economy.¹⁷ One of the reasons Lebanon had been the nucleus of the War of Attrition was that South Lebanon is topographically well suited for the launching of guerrilla raids, being protected by mountains and brush. Through 1969, there were minor disagreements between the Lebanese authorities and the Palestinian refugees, but it was not until the spring of 1969 that the first tremors of serious unrest could be felt. The Lebanese Army's attempt in April and October of 1969 to limit the activities of the commandos caused a

¹⁵Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Abusalik, "A Delicate Balance," p. 19.

cabinet crisis and many skirmishes between the Lebanese and Palestinian populations very nearly escalated into a civil war.¹⁸ It was at the conclusion of these battles that the Lebanese government and the command of the P.L.O. negotiated the CAIRO Agreements.¹⁹ The acceptance of this compromise was seen by many as evidence that the "fedayeen had succeeded in extracting from the Lebanese government a formal recognition of their autonomous presence in the country, and their right to continue to maintain operations from Lebanese territory."²⁰ The 1969 Cairo Accords did not go unnoticed by the man in the desert. Bassem Sirhan discovered, after spending weeks in the camps, that the inhabitant's "whole attitude is conditioned by them (politics)."²¹ Sirhan mentions in *The Journal of Palestine Studies*, that "talking about and listening to politics are much more common than reading, because of the educational level and concentration required by the latter."²² Furthermore in the MidEast, one of the preferred pastimes is listening to the radio. In Lebanon, one can find all of the major stations: B.B.C., V.O.A., Monte Carlo, and the Voice of Palestine (VOP).

As a result of Israeli reprisal raids on South Lebanon, over 100,000 of the Palestinian refugees emigrated to shanty towns around the cities of Beirut, Sidon and Tripoli; it is in these tin villages that

¹⁸Elie Salem, *Modernization Without Revolution: Lebanon's experience*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 27.

¹⁹See Table 11 for text of Cairo Agreements.

²⁰Jabber, "The Arab Regimes and the Palestinian Revolution," p. 79.

²¹Bassem Sirhan, "The Palestinian Camp Life in Lebanon," *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Winter 1975): 104.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 105.

most of the fighting took place during the last civil war.²³ The life in these camps is, to say the least, ghastly. For instance, the al-Karameh camp near Beirut was set up by the U.N.R.W.A. to accommodate 5,000 persons; in 1975, it was inhabited by 17,000.²⁴

The following figures, cited in Sirhan's article, "Palestinian Refugee Camp Life in Lebanon," show to just what extent the populations have mushroomed.

<u>Camp</u>	<u>Leb. survey</u>	<u>Estimated pop.</u>
Bourj al-Baranjneh	7,485	18,000
Nahr al-Bared	9,660	15,000
Ain al-Hilweh	16,755	25,000
Rashidiya	9,375	14,000
Bourj al-Shomali	6,765	10,000

The estimated figures are supplied from camp leaders.²⁵

Outside of Beirut the refugee camps formed a string from the Shi'ite town of Burj al-Bara Jina in the south, to al-Dubayya in the north. Historically, the political leadership within the camps had been based on the "wujaha" or notable. The "wujaha's" support was awarded according to the notable's former status in Palestine. During the sixties, the camp leaders were generally village heads or men who had come up through the ranks. The real leaders now, however, are the fedayeen. To the Palestinians, these P.L.O. freedom fighters have liberated them from years of frustration. Professor Bassem concludes that the "political leadership among those who live in the camps rests today firmly in

²³Petiam, "The Trials of South Lebanon," p. 13.

²⁴Sirhan, "The Palestinian Camp Life in Lebanon," p. 92.

²⁵Ibid.

the hands of the vanguard of the resistance movement."²⁶

In almost all of the camps, one can immediately see that the standard of living is almost subhuman. If French density standards are used for comparison, then 88.5% of the population are living in over-crowded conditions.²⁷ The age distribution of the camp's inhabitants resembles that of most any other developing nation. 64% are from the ages one to nineteen; 27.6% are between the ages twenty to forty nine; and 8% are over the age of forty nine.²⁸ This demographic distribution contributes greatly to the volatile atmosphere particular to Lebanon. Unlike most Western slums, the Palestinians have been very quick to organize themselves into cohesive, loyal groups. This unity made according to political beliefs is unheard of in other parts of the world.²⁹ One's social status carries little weight when one is without a homeland.

By 1970, over twenty thousand southerners had emigrated to Beirut's "belt of misery" (term used commonly by correspondents to describe camps outside of the capital).³⁰ With so many Shi'ites living in or around Beirut, the racist tendencies of the Maronites were heightened. The following Phalange member's remark characterizes this biased point of view. "In Lebanon we have the same problem that you have in the United States with the blacks and Puerto Ricans--ignorant people,

²⁶ Ibid., p. 107.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 94.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 102.

³⁰ Stuart Colie, "A Perspective on the Shi'ites and the Lebanese Tragedy," *Middle East Review* (Fall 1976): 21.

coming to a beautiful country that we have built up and destroying it."³¹
With attitudes like this being published in Beirut's newspapers, it
should not be any surprise that Lebanon was about to have serious pro-
blems.

³¹*Palestine*, (New York: Palestine Solidarity Committee, February 1977), p. 3.

CHAPTER IV

Of all animals, camels have the hardest delivery and the greatest need for warmth in connection with it. (camel nomads) are therefore forced to make excursions deep (into the desert). Frequently, too, they are driven from the hills by the militia and they penetrate farther into the desert because they do not want the militia to mete out justice to them or to punish them for their hostile acts. As a result they are the most savage human beings that exist.

The Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldun

I, 223

CHAPTER IV

EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE 1975-1976 WAR

Maronite Christian: "Hey, Mohammed, are you a friend of Arafat?"

Palestinian: "No."

Maronite: "You in Fateh?"

Palestinian: "No."

Maronite: "You in P.F.L.P.?"

Palestinian: "No."

Maronite: "You must be in the General Command?"

Palestinian: "NO"!!

Maronite: "Well, then, I suppose it would be all right to ask you to get your heel off my toe."

When studying the factors contributing to the war, it is rather difficult not to be disturbed by endless contradictions. The Christians in Beirut, for example, were at first happy to see the growth of the Shi'ite element in the "belt of misery," believing that they would be natural allies against the Sunnites and Palestinian refugees. In some ways the Christians were justified in their belief, given that Emile Iddi and Camille Sham'un did enjoy a considerable Shi'ite following. All parties, though, incorrectly judged the extent to which the Shi'ites resented the Israeli reprisal raids, feeling that their government should protect them. An increasing number of Shi'ites began to believe that their government had failed in its duty and that the "only real purpose of the

Lebanese state and Army was to maintain Christian domination over Muslims."¹ Erroneously, the Israelis pursued a policy which was designed to force the linkage or merger of the Shi'ite and Christian populations. Instead of creating a union between the before-mentioned groups, it built up the friction, so that the Christian leadership was held accountable for their helplessness in defending Lebanese territory.

The Lebanese leadership was hindered from taking action against the Palestinians, because they recognized that their legitimacy was fragile and, in part, dependent on the Arab nations's support. The Christian proponents of isolationism seeking to keep Lebanon uninvolved in Arab national causes found their task impossible,² given that the Palestinians were fighting desperately to keep a base of operations on the Israeli frontier. "To lose our base in Lebanon would be a major setback for the resistance movement because Lebanon represents the looking glass of the progressive forces in the Arab world. It is a small state," continued Yusif al-Haythan, a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, "but the facilities it has are important. It has newspapers and political parties from all over the world. But more important, there are certain areas of Lebanon where the state has no authority over us. The term 'liberated territory' would be applied in a limited sense to the whole western part of Beirut because there is no state authority of state power in that area."³ The average Lebanese citizen was shocked and puzzled about how they had lost control of their

¹Link, p. 4.

²Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War*, p. 127.

³Middle East Research and Information Project, p. 9.

nation to outside parties. What they failed to see, in early 1971 was that the Palestinian refugees were rapidly becoming associated with the discriminated bodies of Lebanese society, mainly the Shi'ite and Druze populations. As I have already mentioned, the Lebanese polity was structured in a manner that favored the Christian element of the nation. This can be documented by almost all indexes;⁴ for example, concerning wealth-distribution, one commonly hears that the Christians represent the "haves" of Lebanese society while the Muslims represent the "have-nots." The great majority of land is owned by Christian proprietors, and this explains in part, a statement made by a high ranking P.L.O. officer justifying a raid where the pharmacy owned by Pierre Jumayyil was totally demolished. "They kill our people and rocket our refugee camps. But if they want a showdown we can destroy their property--which is what hurts the Phalangists the most."⁵ Regarding equal employment, Muslims have continually been treated as second class citizens; for example, only "ten per cent of the 140 Lebanese nationals at the Chase Manhattan Bank of Beirut are Muslims, and most of these are coffee boys--none are of leading-officer status."⁶ Along these same lines the Muslim Palestinian refugees are forced to find employment in the refugee camps while their Christian counterparts find themselves favored by the Christians. It is quite easy for a Christian Palestinian to acquire work papers, but the situation for a Muslim is next to impossible. This, of course, aggravated the tension already existing between the two groups. The

⁴See Michael Suleiman's *Political Parties in Lebanon*, Ch. 1.

⁵*New York Times* 18, April 1975, p. 3.

⁶*Ibid.*, 30 October 1975, p. 38.

Lebanese Christians rightly feel that they should have authority over crimes committed by Palestinians against them, but the Resistance insisted on the right to do this.⁷

It should not be overlooked that Prime Minister Karami, at first felt that it "was the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to struggle for the liberation of their homeland," as long as their quest did not interfere with Lebanon's sovereign rights. Nevertheless in his ministerial address, the Prime Minister added that the Lebanese Army was in need of strengthening.⁸

The focus of the Lebanese government's inability to control the situation stemmed from the fact that the blame was often hard to place. Hisham Sharabi, professor of history at Georgetown University, believes that with two or more organizations claiming credit for an operation that the Lebanese leadership was really tied down.⁹ Ambassador Edouard Ghorra, Chief of the Lebanese Delegation at the United Nations, emphasized what I find to be the most serious mistake of the entire confrontation. "In the maze of analyses and theories, a good deal of emphasis was wrongly placed on the internal character of the conflict, particularly in the first phase of events."¹⁰ The Ambassador, however, erred, for in the following statement he fails to admit that Lebanon's confessional system could be at the root of the conflict. "We

⁷Link, p. 4.

⁸Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War*, p. 39.

⁹Sharabi, *Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness*, p. 2.

¹⁰Link, p. 6.

believe that they (reasons for the war) are to be found in the web of Middle Eastern contradictions and complexities--that is, the establishment of Israel, the displacement of the Palestinians, the Arab-Israeli wars, the failures of the U.N. to implement its resolutions regarding the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab lands and the recognition and restoration of Palestinian rights, the Arab rivalries, and the assaults against the sovereignty of Lebanon and the security of its people."¹¹ Yet, as Dr. Habash explained in an interview in Beirut, "This new dialectical equation is a dynamic one. The struggle of the masses will continue until a progressive nationalist government is established in Lebanon."¹²

The preceding statement brings up the reason why the Palestine Liberation Organization has been unable to take a unified stance. Arafat, leading the P.L.O. moderates, saw at least in the early stages of the confrontation, Lebanon as only a base for his political and military operations. An official spokesman for the P.L.O. told a group of Americans in 1975, that, "We (Palestinians) are involved; but we do not want to fight, because we do not feel that it is our duty to change Lebanon."¹³

From the very first tremors of unrest, Arafat was concerned that the violence would undermine the Palestinian struggle. To mediate the conflict, he reportedly negotiated a meeting between Karami and the leftist leaders in hopes that their discussions would take the pressure off the P.L.O.¹⁴ Dr. Habash, however, viewed Lebanon as representing the

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Brown, "Lebanon--A Mission of Conciliation," p. 5.

¹³Sha'ath, "P.L.O. Planning Report," p. 8.

¹⁴Howard, "Upheaval in Lebanon," p. 7.

focal point for his Marxist-Leninist doctrine which he wished to see carried throughout the Middle East.

Some scholars suspect that if Arafat had not been forced to contend with Habash that perhaps the Resistance Movement would have had more support among the principal negotiating powers. For the indoctrination of the refugees living in the camps, the P.F.L.P. has supported political libraries that emphasize Maoist and Leninist ideology as well as books on Islamic conquests.¹⁵ Arafat's moderates are certainly less offensive to the Arab nations disturbed and frightened by rising Palestinian hegemony. Fateh, Sha'ath claims, directs ninety five per cent of its operations towards "purely military progress."¹⁶ The Arab nations, including Lebanon, were willing to support a Palestinian movement as long as it was aimed at the liberation of Palestine and not inter-Arab disputes. The Israelis faced with the daily commando raids were put in an awkward situation, since under international law they did not have any right to react against a particular state. To circumvent this restriction, they decided to try to force the Palestinians out of Lebanon by acting against their weak, defenseless northern neighbor. Again, if the Palestinians had kept a lower profile, then, maybe, the Christian elements would have, thinking of their economic interests, been tempted to join more fully the Arab cause. But the P.L.O. made three crucial mistakes with regard to Lebanese affairs. First, they left the camps to live in large cities, therefore giving the impression that they were

¹⁵Sharabi, *Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness*, p. 22.

¹⁶Sha'ath, "PLO Planning Report," p. 59.

more interested in power and luxury rather than the refugee problem; secondly, they so exaggerated their accomplishments that many asked whether or not they had been spoiled by the extensive, unwarranted publicity; finally, their presence jeopardized the lives of civilians, thus placing an enormous strain on Lebanon's domestic policies.

Lebanon tried to bring world attention to this grave matter threatening its sovereignty by lodging numerous formal complaints with the United Nations' Security Council, but these efforts went unnoticed. They were even ignored by the United States¹⁷ who was afraid to act out of the fear of angering the Jewish lobby.

The divisions within the Palestine Liberation Organization allowed the Christian opposition the opportunity to publicize the link between the progressive forces and Fateh. Yet, they were not alone in doing this, for it was to the Progressive Forces' advantage to encourage people to associate the Progressive and Moderate wings of the P.L.O. A spokesman for the P.F.L.P. explained that the Lebanese war "is an attempt to debilitate the Palestinian resistance movement and its most immediate supporters, the progressive forces of Lebanon."¹⁸ Arafat soon found that he too was fighting for survival. To remain active and legitimate, he had little choice but to offer support to the leftist groups. If he had refused their demands, the popular support of the refugees would have quickly disappeared to join what was believed to be the path of salvation, the Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

Throughout the text, we have seen that the Arab nations differed

¹⁷Abusalik, "A Delicate Balance," p. 19.

¹⁸Middle East Research and Information Project, (February 1976): 3.

in the degree of support, whether political or economic, offered to the Palestine Liberation Organization. Nevertheless a trend can be defined by examining the concern showed by some conservative Arab leaders who fear the radical movements, especially those with increasing Soviet and communist backing. After the War of 1967, the position upheld by the Palestinians became a source of embarrassment to leaders such as Hafiz al-Asad and Anwar al-Sadat who could not go along with the idea that the whole of Palestine should be liberated from Zionist control.¹⁹ It was at this point that the Palestinian's worst fears of liquidation reached their climax.²⁰ After the October War of 1973, the Palestinian and National movements began to coordinate closely their focus. This was first considered to be necessary since the P.L.O. had developed very strong feelings of insecurity faced with Arab moderation towards their struggle. By 1974, these movements had so overpowered the traditional Muslim leadership in Lebanon, that the Shi'ite and Sunnite chiefs saw that they had little alternative but to fall in line with the more radical elements growing steadily within the Lebanese territory.

This national movement alliance had profound ramifications for Lebanese politics. Two Sunnite leaders, Sa'ib Salam in Beirut and Rashid Karami in Tripoli, put aside their ancient rivalry to concentrate on the growing popularity of the radical, leftist groups.²¹ The principal Shi'ite leader, Iman Musa al-Sadr, asked 75,000 of his followers at a mass meeting in Baalbek to break away from the Lebanese government to

¹⁹Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War*, p. 31.

²⁰Ibid., p. 76.

²¹Ibid., p. 77.

join the training camps throughout the region. This "movement of the Deprived," as it came to be called, also attracted a large number of supporters in Beirut and Tyre.²² The P.L.O. looked upon these developments with favor, believing that the unrest among Lebanese Muslims would give them a better chance of remaining in Lebanon.

The Palestine Liberation Organization, once firmly settled in Lebanon, could still never be completely mobile. Their movements were always carefully monitored by the Lebanese government's secret service, the Deuxieme Bureau. Yet, as we have seen, even with this surveillance the commandos could not be adequately controlled.²³ Norman Cousins was able in 1975 to meet with Yasir Arafat. His description gives proof that the Palestinian commandos were forced to be cautious. "On this particular night, the headquarters were located in a low-cost housing project still under construction. The streets were unlit--as we turned into the block, we had to be cleared at a checkpoint manned by armed guards. Nearby was an armored jeep with a mounted anti-aircraft gun of a new lightweight type." Cousins continues to say that during the entire meeting Arafat held nervously a modern automatic weapon.²⁴

In 1972, the rumors were particularly strong that Jordan, not Israel, was behind the mysterious explosions suffered during the winter. It was argued that Jordan having just recently expelled commandos from its own territory was anxious to create confusion in Lebanon, thus hope-

²²Ibid.

²³W. F. Abboushi, *The Angry Arabs*, (Philadelphia: The Westminster press, 1974), p. 216.

²⁴Cousins, "Last Chance for Peace in the Middle East," p. 13.

fully annihilating all of the Palestinian movement.²⁵ Primarily, however, the early explosions and periods of unrest in Lebanon were due to Israeli operations. The Israelis had an advantage not granted to the Arab commandos. Israeli guerrillas have been able to use hit-and-run tactics, while the Arabs forced to establish a sanctuary must attempt to hold territory. The Israeli commando operations are not designed militarily in the sense that they are planned around a territorial objective. Instead, they hope to terrorize the Lebanese authorities into forcing the Palestinians out. To accomplish their goal, the Israeli commandos have carried out numerous covert attacks in Beirut as well as flying fighter planes over the capital.^{26, 27} Also, the Israelis allowed some Druzes to join their army, therefore building up even more friction between the various parties.²⁸

Arafat's position during the initial phases of the civil war is noteworthy in that he gave the impression of having understood the precarious position of the Lebanese government. When asked whether or not he thought the Lebanese Army should offer more protection to the refugees, he responded, "That is not strictly true. The Lebanese have their own line to defend and we have our positions."²⁹ As the confrontation thickened Arafat found that he was unable to speak for the whole

²⁵Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War*, p. 60.

²⁶Middle East Research and Information Project, February 1976: 14.

²⁷According to *New York Times* 3 December 1975, fifty seven people were killed and one hundred and ten wounded at Nabateje camp after Israeli jets flew bombing missions.

²⁸*Deadline on World Affairs*, (Greenside): 62.

²⁹Cooley, *Green March: Black September*, p. 88.

Palestine Liberation Organization. A P.L.O. official statement published in the *Washington Post* stated "We (Palestinians) do not deny that the conspiracy is extensive and vicious, and aimed at completely liquidating the revolution and the aspirations of the Palestinian people."³⁰ The moderates appeared to be trapped by the radical element who had so successfully used the tools of propaganda to convince the refugees that "some governments oppose" them "and all the Arab governments oppose" them.³¹ It really should not be a surprise that statements like the preceding one encouraged most of the Arab states to take a harder line. Ironically, this in turn gave the Israelis the needed approval to challenge the commandos, bringing as a result more reprisal raids. The Christian Lebanese leaders realizing their impotence to control events, asked Karami and Jumblatt, who at the time was minister of interior, to crack down on the Palestinians and enforce the Cairo agreements. Unfortunately, so controlled were these two men by the obligation of solidarity to the Muslim populations that they were unable to do anything. It is also true that even if the army had been ordered to act in some way that in the absence of conscription they would have been helpless. The Lebanese Army is mainly composed of Muslim volunteers. Ambassador Seelye remarked after his missions in Lebanon that the Army also reflected the confessional structure with Christian officers holding most positions of importance.³² Obviously, the soldiers would have been largely unwilling to lift arms against their Arab brothers.

³⁰*Washington Post*, 3 November 1975.

³¹*Ibid.*

³²Seelye, 31 January 1977.

In 1973, shortly after President Franjiyya had returned from a summit meeting with Sadat, Israeli commando forces landed in Beirut and Sidon. The subsequent assassinations of three prominent P.L.O. leaders caused an uproar in Beirut. Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam resigned in protest over what he perceived as the army's negligence in controlling and protecting Lebanese territory.³³ The complexity of Lebanese politics can be well understood here where no Sunnite politician was willing to replace Salam, seeing the position of prime minister as being certainly detrimental to a political career. A parliamentary deputy of second rank, Amin al-Hafiz was finally convinced to take over, but he was generally found to be unacceptable because of his inability to come to the Muslim's side. He was only in office for a short while before he had to resign after Syria closed her borders charging that Lebanon was involved in an international plot to destroy the P.L.O. During the two years that followed, Lebanon was turned into a powder keg as it prepared for the inescapable war. The Christians bought their arms in Europe and unloaded them in port, and the Muslims mostly received theirs overland through Syrian channels. I feel that it is appropriate to comment on a question that is still being debated by the spokesmen for the various groups. Certain P.F.L.P. spokesmen have stated that the Christian parties received their munitions from the United States government.³⁴ In interviews with the President of the Middle East Institute, L. Dean Brown, and Ambassador T. Seelye, I asked whether or not the United States had provisioned arms to the Christians. Both men

³³Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War*, p. 61.

³⁴Middle East Research and Information Project, February 1976.

responded unequivocally that the United States had refrained from supporting any singular side.³⁵

The Lebanese government finding itself unable to isolate and control the commandos tried for a time to quell the Socialist Party's influence. In January 1973, the Lebanese leadership announced the arrest of fourteen members of the Socialist Revolutionary Organization. This, along with a demonstration by tobacco farmers for higher prices that eventually led to a clash with police in which two men were killed brought to Lebanon the realization that the war would not end quickly.

³⁵L. Dean Brown, 7 July 1976; T. Williams Seelye, 18 March 1977. Ambassador Seelye said that he had Secretary of State Kissinger's word of honor that the above was true.

CHAPTER V

When hope and the things it stimulates are gone through apathy and when group feeling has disappeared under the impact of defeat, civilization decreases and business and other activities stop. With their strength dwindling under the impact of defeat, people become unable to defend themselves. They become the victims of anyone who tries to dominate them, and a prey to anyone who has the appetite.

The Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldun

I, 269

CHAPTER V

THE P.L.O. AND SYRIA DURING THE CIVIL WAR

By now it should be obvious that the beginning of the war can not be pinned on any one event. In this study, instead of giving a day by day account of the role played by the Palestine Liberation Organization, I propose to discuss some of the events that brought with them major changes in the direction taken by P.L.O. policy makers.

At the beginning of the crisis in April 1975, the P.L.O.'s attitude was of a slightly militant nature for many of the reasons mentioned in the last chapter. After the slaying on April 27 of twenty seven Palestinians who were riding a bus from a rally organized by a guerrilla group celebrating the first anniversary of the attack on the Israeli border town of Qiryat Shemona, Yasir Arafat sent a message to all of the Arab chiefs accusing the Phalangist Party of being "used by imperialism and Zionism" to promote a political crisis between the Palestinian and Lebanese political forces.¹ Pierre Jumayyil believed that this attack was in response to what happened to him a week earlier. On April 13, 1975, the Phalangist leader's car was shot at while he attended the consecration of a church in Beirut's Christian sector. During the initial months of conflict, the commandos were under strict orders not to get involved. But this soon became impossible since the Muslim forces had become dependent on the Palestinian's special lines of supply

¹*New York Times*, 14 May 1975, p. 6.

from Syria. At first, some radical Christians supported the commando movement as seen in the following account. When the first Lebanese commando was killed, he was given a full public funeral in which the Palestinians were allowed to wear their full battle dress. This, however, was immediately followed by mass demonstrations carried out by radical parties who demanded complete freedom of movement to the Palestinian organization.²

One of the fundamental problems for Lebanon since its beginning has been the total lack of defined responsibility. Frequently, the Lebanese Army would take action against the commandos under the guise of political confusion. The same was equally true of the Palestinian and Muslim elements who often had splinter factions act without knowledge of their superiors.³

The Muslims were fortunate to have as their leader Rashid Karami, a man who had served in the position of prime minister on seven different occasions. With the intent of bringing the confrontation under control, he introduced a coalition designed to favor coordination between the Lebanese Army and the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command.⁴ It was hoped that this coalition, "Tansiq," would give the Palestine Liberation Organization's militia the representation and legitimacy needed to end the debacle. Unfortunately, for troubled Lebanon, the Prime Minister's efforts ceased as arguments pertaining to the union's organization became irreducible.

²Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War*, p. 34.

³Please see Table 12 for description of the various factions involved in the Lebanese civil war.

⁴Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War*, p. 41.

The Lebanon had deservedly received much acclaim for being the sole area in the MidEast where dissenting views could be aired openly. Nevertheless Lebanon's secret police, Le Deuxieme Bureau, was extremely careful and kept close surveillance on the Palestinian refugees and the radical Muslim movements. Following the confessional structure, the leadership of the secret police were for the most part Phalange. Their Christian inclinations caused some of the early disturbances. For instance, in March of 1975, ten commandos carrying a dead officer to a funeral were reportedly shot after being apprehended by Christians representing "Le Deuxieme Bureau." Events like the before-mentioned were quite common place, contributing to the realistic appraisal of many students of the area that the Christians have been the most cruel participants in the terror-ridden region.

It is also obvious that Christian tendency to lean on violence brought about the natural merger of the Palestinian and Muslim groups. Witnesses of the Lebanese Civil War all agree that the conflict eventually became a no-man's affair. This is to say that Lebanon had become a haven for anarchy. For example last August, a commando in civilian attire was killed by a Lebanese policeman near Sidon. In protest, armed Palestinians made a show of force in the city by setting off explosives.⁵ Another case is also rather unique; two men playing pinball in a small Christian town in the Biqa Valley got into an argument. One of the players who happened to be Syrian threw a bomb at the other and was either killed by a third party or when the bomb exploded in his own hand. Before it was over, the three men accompanying the Syrian were killed, two

⁵Ibid., p. 80.

Christians one of whom had shot the Syrian were arrested by the appropriate Lebanese authorities. Professor Sharabi believes that the above event can be considered as the catalyst that brought about the "Fourth Round," the stage that destroyed most of the important commercial areas separating East Beirut from West Beirut.⁶

Some political scientists have tended to center their attention on the Lebanese government's inability to control the Muslim and/or Palestinian populations during the conflict. It has been my belief that the Phalange and the Forces for the Protection of the Cedars were just as uncontrollable as the previously mentioned Muslims. Juan de Onis, reporting for the *New York Times* wrote that President Franjyya pleaded with Jumayyil to pull off his men so as to avoid a showdown. The P.L.O. was also involved in these proceedings being represented by Mr. Arafat's chief deputy, Salah Kholaf.⁷ The government's lack of jurisdiction increased the left's belief that the Lebanese leadership were pawns in face of Christian hegemony. It is interesting to note that once the bus carrying the Palestinians commandos was ambushed that the war quickly gathered momentum. An Arab ambassador correctly called the situation when he said, "There is a nation called Lebanon but there is not a state."⁸ With each faction taking a position, the Lebanese civil war had over thirty different militias.⁹ Perhaps, if the war had taken place three years earlier the Palestinians would have backed down

⁶Ibid., p. 122.

⁷*New York Times*, 17 April 1975, p. 3.

⁸Ibid., 20 April 1975, p. 2.

⁹Ibid., 1 May 1975, p. 6.

without much of a fight, but as one Arab diplomat explained, "The Palestinians showed ...that they had learned the lessons of Black September in Jordan."¹⁰ While there has always been much disagreement among the Palestine Liberation movements, all agreed they would refuse to back down under outside pressure. On May 15, Prime Minister Solh was forced to resign, citing Pierre Jumayyil's party as the reason for his resignation. "The Phalangist Party bears the full responsibility for the massacre and for the repercussions that followed; including the damage to the country."¹¹ The following statement made by an Armenian jeweler well represents the sadness of the Lebanese population. "There are three governments...the Palestinians, the Phalangists and what they call the Lebanese authority," he concludes, "nobody knows which is strongest."¹²

Arafat, according to most reports, found that his position was becoming seriously threatened in late May 1975. It was around this time that representatives of the Lebanese leftist organizations promised the P.L.O. their support. Also, the mercurial premier of Libya, Colonel Mummar al-Quaddafi offered, reported the pro-guerrilla press, "all of Libya's potential at the disposal of the commando movement in Lebanon." Syrian President Asad also let it be known that he was willing to pledge Syrian aid.¹³ The exact amount of aid supplied by Libya has never been officially disclosed but the *New York Times* has reported a claim by an United States official that Libya has sent "tens of millions of dollars"

¹⁰Ibid., 16 May 1975, p. 3.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., 24 May 1975, p. 1.

¹³Ibid., 13 September 1975, p. 1.

to Lebanon in support of leftist Muslim groups. One official noted, Quaddafi has a penchant for supporting disruptive movements in the Arab world." Another said that the Colonel had become bitterly disappointed with the self-indulgent habits of Palestinians "who spend this money on themselves or stash it in Switzerland instead of undertaking more attacks against Israel." "He is getting more action for his money from the Lebanese at this stage," noted one American analyst.¹⁴

When examining the Palestine Liberation Organization it must be understood that in signing the "non-recourse to force" clause in the Sinai agreements of September 1975, Egypt and Israel transferred the threat of military conflict in the Middle East from the Sinai region over to the Lebano-Israeli border. The Chairman of the P.L.O. voiced his concern on this point during a recent interview saying that, "the daily raids against our refugee camps in Lebanon are like an unending television serial.... It appears that Israel is interpreting the agreement as a license to strike freely in the North." In addition, the P.L.O. leadership strongly feels that their opposition to the Sinai Agreements should have carried more weight. It was during this period that relations between the P.L.O. and Egypt sank to their nadir, as evidenced by President Sadat ordering the expulsion of the Voice of Palestine from Cairo, for carrying a report of an attempt on his life.¹⁵

Throughout the conflict, P.L.O. chairman Yasir Arafat encouraged the warring parties to sit together and discuss their problems. These efforts have been misunderstood by some who considered Arafat's moves as being without purpose. Jumblatt, perhaps more than anyone else, was

¹⁴*Newsweek*, 15 September 1975, p. 35.

¹⁵*Christian Science Monitor*, 11 September 1975, p. 3.

influenced by Arafat who encouraged him to speak with the Phalange. The P.L.O. was also extremely active in enforcing the numerous cease fires. Reportedly in October 1975, the P.L.O. could place over ten thousand commandos under arms in Beirut alone.¹⁶ The fact that P.L.O. support was needed for a successful cease fire was recognized by Sham'un and Franjiyya, thus the main reason why Arafat was included in the negotiations, his presence having become necessary for a meeting to be considered legitimate. One of the anomalies in the MidEast was that the P.L.O. was the only faction able to guarantee the safety of the Americans during the evacuation from Beirut in July 1976.

In October 1975, the Palestinians released a "five-point memorandum." This paper "expressed willingness to discuss Palestinian-Lebanese relations and emphasized the organization's respect for Lebanese sovereignty," but is also said that the legality of an autonomous Palestinian movement had to be recognized.¹⁷ Unfortunately, this effort initiated by Arafat was largely ignored by almost every concerned party. Mr. Jumayyil proclaimed that "talk of Lebanon's sovereignty must come first with talk of reforms next." Perhaps if a compromise had been considered at this time, then the following year's bloodshed could have been avoided. By November, the Palestine Liberation Organization was actively involved in pursuing peace. On November 12, reports Juan de Onis, a group of Moslems armed with automatic weapons set up a barricade in a boulevard. Wearing green fatigues and an emblem of one of Lebanon's "Nasserite," groups began to stop cars with the intention of snatching Christian hostages in

¹⁶NEW YORK TIMES, 9 October 1975, p. 1.

¹⁷Ibid., 17 October 1975, p. 3.

retaliation for the kidnapping of Muslims. Quite soon after the Muslims had commenced their operation, a jeep with five or six Palestinians drove away the Nasserites.¹⁸

Karami's resignation in January '76, merits special attention since it so clearly points out the complexities of the situation. The Phalangist naively continued to blame the Palestinians for the conflict. For instance, as late as in January, Pierre Jumayyil said that the Palestinian behavior is the "main reason for the tragedy Lebanon is facing."¹⁹ Because of this prevailing opinion among the Phalanges, they decided that it was essential to disarm the Palestine refugee camps, using whatever means necessary to achieve their goal. During the second week of January, Lebanese Air Force jets bombed the camps under orders of Major General Hamen Saied. Aware of these plans, Karami ordered that the raids be curtailed, but he was disobeyed. "Some people said they wanted the army to be brought in and others did not want it. I always thought the use of force would not solve the problem and time will prove that I was correct," Karami said in the speech announcing his resignation.²⁰ Once Karami was out of the front line, Arafat became the natural leader for the Muslims who recognized that his well trained militia provided them with the necessary leverage needed to keep abreast with the Phalange offensive.

The Lebanese Civil War became of particular significance when

¹⁸Ibid., 19 October 1975, p. 12.

¹⁹Ibid., 13 November 1975, p. 2. See also *Times*, 14 October 1976, where Lebanon's UN representative blames the civil war on "the Palestine revolution" and its supporters.

²⁰Ibid., 1 January 1976, p. 3.

the intervention of Syria made the likelihood of another full scale Arab-Israeli war quite probable.²¹ The vicissitudes of P.L.O.-Syrian relations deserve some analysis especially since Syrian involvement brought an end to the fighting. When studying the Syrian connection, it is safe to say that the Asad government probably did not have any long term plans and that they were forced to be flexible by the changing events. The P.L.O. though realizing the necessity of Syria resented their involvement. "We love the Syrians--up at their border, not down here," said a leading P.L.O. officer.²² Their relations became of interest in the mid-1960's when Damascus endorsed the nascent Fateh, and from that time on their relations have ranged from cooperation to outright hostility.²³ An example of the Syrian brutality can be seen in the manner by which "some of the (commando) squads were reportedly captured and executed quietly."²⁴ The Syrians viewed the Lebanese leftist group's cooperation with the Iraqi Baathists with a great amount of trepidation since it was thought that their ideology could provide a desired alternative for some of the influential radical elements in Syria. Nevertheless Syria did back financially and politically the commando movements. "In fact," says Fuad Jabber, "the Syrian sponsored raids by Palestinian commandos into Northern Israel were the immediate cause for the crisis that triggered the Six-Day War."²⁵ Syria, looking at the Lebanese problem from

²¹Ibid., 20 January 1976, p. 3.

²²Ibid., 6 April 1976, p. 4.

²³*Middle East Intelligence Survey*, p. 91.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Fuad Jabber, "The Palestinian Resistance and Inter-Arab Politics, p. 1.

outside, appreciated the very real threat that the same precarious situation could easily come about in Syria. A Syrian official voiced this fear saying, We sympathize with the refugees and want to help them, but this type of Lebanese wants to take over Syria. We want them to go home before they make of Syria another Lebanon."²⁶ The Syrians led by a leader whom Henry Kissinger once described as being the brightest Middle Eastern statesman,²⁷ have never forgotten their loss of Palestine resulting from policies forced upon them by the European powers and the Zionists. This is one of the major reasons why Damascus was especially wary of European intervention during the civil war. The deterioration of the situation forced Syria to intervene because, more than anything else, they wanted to avoid partition.²⁸ At first, the Syrian government supported the P.L.O., but by 1970 as witnessed in this official statement they had become fearful of their intentions. "The involvement of the Palestinian resistance in an internal Lebanese conflict of a hateful confessional character, and engulfing the resistance in the problems of Lebanon prevent it from carrying out its duties with respect to the confrontation with the enemy, and in the end in order to liquidate the resistance."²⁹

Though the Syrians vacillated with regard to support provided to the Palestine Liberation Organization; ever since, March 1975, they have

²⁶Basson, Irene. "Syria's New Refugee Problem," *The Middle East International*: (October 1976): 21.

²⁷Seelye.

²⁸Koury, *The Crisis in the Lebanese System: Confessionalism and Chaos*, p. 78.

²⁹*Le Matin AN-Nahar Arab Report* (Beirut), Vol. 7 No. 10.

consistently tried to establish themselves as its leader. This blatant desire incited the war since Jumblatt, once having made it clear that his aim was to fight the Syrians, found that he had more support from al-Fateh and the rejectionists.³⁰ The Syrians major concern was the "fear of a radical, provocative government, under the direction of an intransigent Jumblatt."³¹ It was precisely this fear that pushed the Syrians to strive for an end to the war without supporting whole-heartedly any one side. Last summer the Syrians joined the Christians in bombing some of the Palestinian camps outside of Beirut. These attacks were designed by Asad to force the P.L.O. to encourage dialogues between the conflicting parties. This Syrian attempt to intimidate the P.L.O. was never really successful since she found herself in June 1976, in direct military conflict with the P.L.O. and in diplomatic conflict with the entire Arab world except Jordan who all too well remembered Black September.³²

Rather paradoxically the Alawite Asad regime was supportive of the Phalanges because they did not want to be the ONLY minority remaining in the Middle East. In addition, James Markham, of the New York reported that Rifat Asad, the president's brother, had numerous business deals with Tony Franjiyya, the president's son.³³ Finally, I would add that Asad realized that the Arab countries did not want another war they could not possibly hope to win.

³⁰ *Middle East Intelligence Survey* p. 194.

³¹ Howard, "Tragedy in Lebanon," p. 30.

³² *Link*, (Fall 1976): 5.

³³ Markham, "Lebanon: The Insane War," p. 61.

From the very beginning of this paper, we have seen that the Palestinians were for the most part concerned about their own quest for self-determination. If this is the case, how must we look at the following statement put forward by an Israeli diplomat, "He who wants to liberate Tripoli and Juniyya does not want to liberate Palestine."³⁴

The answer can be found in the study of Syria who only wanted to be sure that no Arab-Israeli settlement would be reached unless all parties were allowed to speak for their positions. There was then as there is now a fear among some factions in the Middle East that a variety of pressures would force an unfair settlement. For instance either Israel's recent political scandals or Egypt's domestic crisis could speed up the bringing about of a settlement that could only be successful in the short run. Yet, when President Asad became involved, he did not realize to just what extent the Lebanese left-wing parties and the Palestinian resistance movements were entangled. Without wanting to Syria found herself in war with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Nevertheless as Ambassador Brown said on his return from Beirut, "No matter what the Syrians do in the immediate future the Palestinians will still be in Lebanon."³⁵

³⁴*Middle East Intelligence Survey*, p. 61.

³⁵Brown, "Lebanon - A Mission of Conciliation," p. 11.

CONCLUSION

"...the Arabs are the least willing of nations to subordinate themselves to each other, as they are rude, proud, ambitious, and eager to be the leader. Their individual aspirations rarely coincide. But when there is a religion through prophecy or sainthood, then they have some restraining influence in themselves. The qualities of haughtiness and jealousy leave them. It is, then, easy for them to subordinate themselves and to unite.

The Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldun

I, 274

CONCLUSION

In analyzing the consequences of the Lebanese Civil War, we should look at the outcome from the Lebanese perspective as well as that of the Palestinian. But before we do this, I would like to express some thoughts I have on the study of the MidEast. Some of the inherent problems were discussed in the introduction to this paper, but besides these obvious difficulties there are also many conceptual problems. For the successful study of the MidEast, we must broaden our thinking to include the various ideological pressures on today's Arab and Israeli policy makers. Often, we tend to be too simplistic in our approach towards the developing nations, forgetting that they are indeed extremely young and in need of experimentation.¹

The media in the United States have lately begun to shift its attention away from the Lebanese dilemma and move back to the central issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In some ways this may be justified, but as I write there is still gunfire in South Lebanon among the Muslims, Israelis, and Palestinians. The Lebanese government under the very capable hands of a master technocrat, Elias Sarkis, is trying hard to bring back political and economic stability to the war torn nation. Yet, as writes Samih Farsoun, "Perhaps, as the Palestinians believe, the only solution to the Lebanese Civil War is a solution to outstanding Arab-Israeli

¹Ramazani.

territorial questions and the Palestinian problem."² "Without the Palestinians it is hard to imagine that there would ever have been a 'Lebanese left' capable of mounting a serious military challenge to the Maronite establishment," argues Ed. Mortimer of *The Times*.³ To some degree, I believe that the Palestinians seeking refuge in Lebanon aggravated the already tense situation, but it is also true that the Shi'ites and the communists in the country were rapidly increasing in membership and in organization. Eventually reform that was long over-due would have been sought after by the Muslim majority.

The Palestinians after the long, devastating war are still intact. The degree of political mobilization afforded to them is also greater, especially among the progressive groups with leftist orientation. It is, of course, a fact that the commandos lost a great number of their ranks, but with the dropping of limitations on conscription many new militants joined the P.L.O. Arafat has also gained prestige in that throughout the difficult campaign, he managed to safeguard his position as Chairman of the P.L.O. Many times during the war, it appeared that Habash's P.F.L.P. or a Syrian backed movement would take command, but Fateh proved too firmly entrenched to be easily uprooted. I believe that the Arab nations finally realized that Arafat's P.L.O. was not some fly by night organization that could be forced off the horizon. Though the Palestine Liberation Organization may not have the entire support of the involved Arab nations it is too well organized and much too powerful to

²*Middle East Research and Information Project*. (February 1976): 18.

³Edward Mortimer, "1976: Year of the Locust." *Middle East International* (January 1977): 10.

ever be ignored. Any settlement will have to allow the Palestinians their rightful representation. Norman Howard, writing for *Current History*, expresses an opinion held by many Arabists. "Outside powers had also contributed to the conflict by ignoring the plight of the Palestinians and their quest for a political community until it was too late. There were no winners in this civil war: the people of Lebanon had lost."⁴

The war in Lebanon made the existence of the Lebanese citizens in Hobbesian fashion, nasty, brutish and short. As of early 1976, the official government figures reported that fifteen to twenty per cent of Beirut's homes had been destroyed; furthermore, seventy four accredited banks had been damaged and forced to declare bankruptcy.⁵ No one really has any idea of how many lives were lost in the war, but estimates run as high as sixty thousand dead with fifty thousand permanently crippled.⁶ According to *Palestine*, a government committee speculated that the damage suffered to the economy could be put at a total figure of twelve billion dollars. The chairman of Beirut's Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mr. Kassar, recently announced that six thousand shops had been destroyed in Beirut alone.⁷ In any case, on an optimistic note, many of the businesses that had left Lebanon in the wake of the crisis have begun to return in hopes of reestablishing their organizations. The current Prime Minister, Salim al-Hoss, has put forward a reconstruction plan that will

⁴Howard, "Tragedy in Lebanon," p. 32.

⁵Ibid., p. 1.

⁶*Palestine* (February 1977): 12.

⁷Ibid.

channel foreign aid contributions from Western nations and the Arab League to businesses willing to return to Lebanon. Many people, on the other hand, have wondered why al-Hoss has not made any real effort to ameliorate the economic conditions in South Lebanon where the potential for another crisis is still extant.

Post-war Lebanon is being run by a Triumvirate consisting of Asad, Sadat and King Khalid of Saudi Arabia. Together these three leaders are working to keep Lebanon peaceful. This coalition is very significant, since it marks the first time in recent years that Syria and Egypt have showed any semblance of cooperation. Undoubtedly this *rapprochement* is due mainly to the fact that they are fearful of another war in the region: Deputy Premier Yigal Allon remarked a few months ago, "Israel cannot be indifferent to developments in Lebanon and will not stand by in case of change in the status quo of that country!"⁸ From this statement we see evidence that it is to the Arab nations' favor to guarantee tranquillity in Lebanon.

I would even go so far as to say that the civil war in Lebanon delayed the likelihood of another Middle Eastern conflict taking place in the near future. Events, of course, may prove me wrong, but I believe it is safe to speculate that a war is highly unlikely in the near future because too many of the necessary Arab materials were depleted during the Lebanese crisis. Also, the intervention of the Arab League sadly pointed out to the Arabs their lack of military skill. Thirdly, the Palestinians realize that 1977 is different from 1973 in that popular opinion is not on their side. Any conflict would almost certainly end with the

⁸*Deadline on World Affairs.*

rights of the Palestinians being only partially obtained. After losing a bit of momentum because of Lebanon the Palestinians need time to re-structure their effort.

Lebanese Christians must accept the fact that their well-being is tied to the defense and economic stability of the entire Middle East. Only with this realization can Beirut ever hope to recover its past stability and wealth. Concerning constitutional reform, great barriers have indeed been broken down; for example, the ratio of representation is now equal in the Lebanese Parliament and the prime minister now has guarantees that his jurisdiction in state matters will not be usurped. But, these are small steps and there is still a long way to go before we can be sure that the 1975-1976 War's lesson will not be forgotten by future generations.

If given the possibility of carrying out their policies, the Palestine Liberation Organization will do everything in its power to ensure Lebanon's stability. Granted, it is to the mutual interest of both Lebanese and Palestinian citizens to prove to the world that a state like Lebanon is possible. The Palestinians have, as of late, withdrawn from the territories occupied during the war; they have showed respect for Lebanese sovereignty; and, they have stood behind the Cairo Agreements.

Hopefully, statesmen in the developing nations have paid attention to the Lebanese tragedy. Currently in Kuwait, Palestinians are found in all sectors of the wealthy country's life, from business to government. Often, Palestinians are found in jobs that should be held for Kuwaiti citizens. Professor Alvin Z. Rubinstein, in a speech at the University of Virginia last month addressed this threat saying, "the

Lebanese perspective haunts chancellories of the Gulf." It would be a shame if the lesson was not learned, and a similar disruption took place in the Gulf. Here again, we are confronted with the dire need of a homeland for the Palestinian refugees. The Arabs, I have said, do not want another Arab-Israeli conflict, but the tradition of military force in the Middle East could foretell serious trouble if a settlement is not soon reached. The ancient concept of "jihad" or holy war has not disappeared and the Shi'ites of South Lebanon will not give up a struggle they consider just.

Should I be expected to provide a solution to the Lebanon's troubles, troubles that have raised havoc in the country since its inception? If so, I must excuse myself, because it is an extremely perplexing situation that at times seems almost unsolvable. As an initial measure, I could only propose that the Shi'ites and other underprivileged sects be given adequate assurance that their plight is not callously being ignored. The race issue is especially disheartening. The fighting in Lebanon is basically finished, though the battle continues in the minds of children. The hate and fear will not die quickly, only time and peace will prevent the wounds from becoming again infected.

Partition for Lebanon? I hope that this will not be Lebanon's sad fate. One could argue that Lebanon has already suffered partition. Perhaps this is true, but philosophically Lebanon is still a nation where seventeen radically different ethnic groups can live under one government, however weak it may be. The Middle Eastern nations need Lebanon and its open door to the West. Israel needs Lebanon as protection from being surrounded entirely by Islamic nations.

Finally, how do I see the situation evolving in the near future.

When discussing any topic pertaining to the MidEast, it is essential to remember that the only certainty in the region is that unpredictability is the rule. No one expected the Palestinians to form a viable state without a country; no one ever contemplated the possibility of an Arabic economic organization on the lines of O.A.P.E.C.; and, finally, who would have thought the Arabs would have marched together in Lebanon. As mentioned earlier, I do not see any immediate solution to the Lebanese dilemma, but the elimination of any sectarian allotment of positions in the civil service would be a start in the right direction. This, I do not believe, should frighten the Phalangists into thinking that their special Christian haven is being taken over. The natural sorting out through education and location would guarantee that the Christians need not lose all of their power. In looking at the future, we can be sure that what is happening in Lebanon today is really a struggle of a young nation searching for true democracy and for greater equality of opportunity. Fate has thrown the Palestinians among the descendants of the Phoenicians, for what President Bourguiba of Tunisia describes as a quest for the "dignity of independence."⁹

⁹Habib Bourguiba, "The Tunisian Way." *Foreign Affairs* (April 1966): 480.

TABLE 1

Lebanese Population by Sect, 1956

Sect	Estimated Population
Maronite	424,000
Sunnite	286,000
Shite	250,000
Greek Orthodox	149,000
Greek Catholic	91,000
Druze	88,000
Armenian Orthodox	64,000
Armenian Catholic	15,000
Protestant	14,000
Jewish	7,000
Syrian Catholic	6,000
Syrian Orthodox	5,000
Latins (Roman Catholic)	4,000
Nestorean Chaldeans	1,000
Others	7,000
Total	1,411,000

Hudson, Michael C. The Precarious Republic. (New York: Random House, 1968.), Originally found Sir Reader Bullard (ed.), *The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey* (3d ed.; London: published by Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1958), p. 22.

TABLE 2

Distribution of Religious Communities in Lebanon, 1950

Percentage of Population of District*

District	Maronite	Greek Orthodox	Greek Catholic	Armenian Orthodox	Sunnite	Shite	Druze
Akkar	18	2	1	0	52	0	0
Tripoli	5	10	0	1	78	0	0
Zaghartata	90	3	0	0	6	0	0
Batroun	76	18	2	0	1	3	0
Koura	28	63	0	0	8	4	0
Hermel	3	0	30	0	6	62	0
Baalbek	12	2	4	0	12	68	0
Zahleh	19	10	23	8	24	10	1
Kisrwan	85	2	1	2	1	8	0
Metn	51	9	5	19	0	0	30
Baabda	48	8	3	1	3	18	18
Aley	29	16	3	0	1	2	46
Chouf	34	0	9	0	22	2	31
Saida	8	0	8	0	18	62	0
Jezzine	63	0	16	0	3	5-20	1-5
Rachaya	4	25	2	0	28	0	37
Merjayoun	6	14	5	0	13	45	13
Tyre	6	0	6	2	4	80	0
Beirut	8	11	3	24	24	6	1-5

*Percentages by *caza* (district) are the same as those calculated after the evaluation of population on December 31, 1944. That is the most recent date for which there are figures on confessional distribution for *cazas* as well as *muhafazas* (provinces). Religious data for the entire populations of the *cazas* were not available; therefore the columns for districts do not total 100 percent. Several of the minor sects have been omitted.

Hudson, Michael C. The Precarious Republic. (New York: Random House, 1968.), Originally found Etienne de Vaumas, "La Repartition Confessionnelle au Liban et l'Equilibre de l'Etat Libanais," *Revue de Geographie Alpine*, 43 (1955), 27.

TABLE 3

Distribution of Parliamentary Seats
by Sect, 1947-1964

Sect	1947	1951	1953	1957	1960	1964
Maronite	18	23	13	20	30	30
Greek Orthodox	6	8	5	7	11	11
Greek Catholic	3	5	3	4	6	6
Armenian Orthodox	2	3	2	3	4	4
Minorities	1	3	1	2	3	3
Sunnite	11	16	9	14	20	20
Shiite	10	14	8	12	19	19
Druze	4	5	3	4	6	6
Totals						
Christian	30	42	24	36	54	54
Non-Christian	25	35	20	30	45	45
Grand Total	55	77	44	66	99	99

Ibid., p. 215.

TABLE 4

Balance of Sects in Administration

Office	Year	M*	Christian					Nonchristian				Grand Total	Percentage Christian	
			GC	GO	Lat.	Prot.	AC	Total	S	SH	D			Total
Directors-general and heads of services	1946	6	-	3	-	-	-	9	5	-	1	6	15	60
	1962	11	2	8	-	-	1	22	12	1	4	17	40	55
Administrators of districts	1946	1	1	1	-	-	-	3	1	-	1	2	5	60
	1962	1	1	1	-	-	-	3	1	-	1	2	5	60
High magistrate positions	1946	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	1	3	67
	1962	4	1	1	1	-	-	7	5	-	1	6	13	54
High diplomatic positions	1946	5	-	2	-	-	-	7	3	1	-	4	11	64
	1962	6	4	2	-	-	1	13	11	1	1	13	26	50
Total	1946	14	1	6	0	0	0	21	10	1	2	13	34	62
	1962	22	8	12	1	0	2	45	29	2	7	38	84	53

*Abbreviations: M = Maronite, GC = Greek Catholic, GO = Greek Orthodox, Lat. = Roman Catholic, Prot. = Protestant, AC = Armenian Catholic, S = Sunnite, SH = Shiite, D = Druze

TABLE 5

Structure of the Palestinian Liberation Organization

Palestine National Council
(115-120 members; all groups represented)

Palestine
Liberation Army

Executive Committee
(12 members; from 3 groups)

Palestine
Research Centre

Planning
Centre

Educational &
Cultural Affairs

Palestine
National Fund

Dept. of
Popular Organizations

Dept. of the
Occupied Homeland

Military Affairs

Political Affairs

Administrative Affairs

Higher Political Committee
for Palestinian Affairs
in Lebanon

TABLE 5-Continued

Structure of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (con't)

Palestine National Congress

Guerrilla Organizations
 Workers' Unions
 Student Organizations
 Womens' Organizations
 Independents

PLO Executive Committee

Palestine Liberation Army
 Popular Liberation Forces
 PLO Information Centre
 PLO Research Centre
 PLO Planning Centre

Palestine Armed Struggle Command

Fateh
 PLA
 PLF
 al-Sa'iqa
 PFLP
 PDFLP
 Jibril's Group

TABLE 6

PRINCIPAL MEMBERS OF PALESTINE

LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

PLO Executive Committee

Yasir Arafai (Fatah)
 Yasir Amr (pro-Saiqa)
 Kamal Nasser (Independent)
 Khalid al-Hassan (Fatah)
 Faruq al-Qadumi (Fatah)
 Hamid Abu Sittah (pro-Fatah)
 Muhammad Yusuf al-Najjar (Fatah)
 Yusuf al-Barji (Saiqa)
 Ahmad al-Shihabi (Saiqa)
 Bilal Al-Hassan (PDFLP)
 Husain al-Khatib (pro-Saiqa)
 Suhair al-Alami (Head of the Palestine National Fund)

Independents

Ibrahim Bakr
 Abd al-Khaliq Yaghmur
 Khalid al-Fahum

Chairman of the Palestine National Congress

Yahya Hammouda

Commander of the PLA

Abderrazak Yahya

Representatives of the Commando Groups

Salah Khalaf (Fatah)
 George Habash (PFLP)
 Dafi Jamani (Saiqa)
 Munif Razzaz (ALF)
 Nayif Hawatmah (PDFLP)
 Ahmed Jabril (PFLP-GC)
 Isam Sartawi (AOLP)
 Ahmed Za'rur (OAP)
 Bahjat Abu Garbiyya (PPSF)
 Abd al-Fattah Yasr (?) (POLP)

TABLE 7

MAJOR PALESTINIAN COMMANDO GROUPS:

Commando Groups	Major Source of Aid
I. LARGE GROUPS (5,000-10,000 armed men)	
1. Palestine National Liberation Movement--Fatah (Military Forces--Al-Asifa)	Diverse (Libya, Syria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Private Palestinian)
2. Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) Popular Liberation Forces (PLF)	Arab League through Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
3. Vanguard of the Popular Liberation War (Saiqa)	Syrian Baath Party
II. MIDDLE GROUPS (1,000-3,000 armed men, including militia)	
4. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	Iraq
5. Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP)	Syria
III. SMALL GROUPS (100-500 armed men)	
6. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--General Command (PFLP-GC)	Syria
7. Arab Liberation Front (ALF)	Iraq
8. Organization of Arab Palestine (OAP)	UAR
9. Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (AOLP)	UAR, Kuwait
10. Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF)	UAR, miscellaneous
11. Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (POLP)	Miscellaneous
12. Al-Ansar	Arab Communist Parties

TABLE 8

Support of Commandos, and Preferred
Solution of Palestine Problems

	AUB*	SJU*	LU*	Lebanese Students
	%	%	%	%
Support for Commandos				
Strong Support	40	23	35	28
Support	38	55	54	38
No support	22	22	11	35
Total %	100	100	100	100
Total number of respondents	206	299	212	109
Preferred solution				
Armed struggle	34	21	27	24
Peaceful solution	36	60	29	47
Other solutions	29	19	44	29
Total %	100	100	100	100
Total number of respondents	201	287	204	107

*AUB = American University of Beirut

SJU = Saint Joseph's University

LU = Lebanese University

Source: Barakat, Halim. "Social Factors Influencing Attitudes of University Students in Lebanon Towards the Palestinian Resistance." The Journal of Palestine Studies, (Autumn 1971), p. 91.

TABLE 8-Continued

View of Commandos According
to Student's Country of Origin

<u>Support for Commandos</u>	LN*	AUB		LN	SJU		LN	LU	
		SYN*	AN*		SYN	AN		SYN	AN
Strong support	15	50	67	13	40	44	02	68	52
Support	29	40	33	63	45	53	78	26	46
No support	50	10	00	24	15	02	20	05	02
Number of respondents	52	10	100	156	20	43	55	19	85
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<u>Preferred solutions</u>									
Armed struggle	11	30	54	10	29	40	06	56	35
Peaceful Solution	68	10	19	75	33	38	57	06	11
Other solutions	21	60	27	15	38	22	38	39	54
Number of respondents	53	10	67	146	21	42	31	18	82
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

*AN = Other nationalities
LN = Lebanese nationality
SYN = Syrian nationality

Ibid., p. 93.

TABLE 8-Continued

Religious Identification

	AUB		SJU		LU	
	Muslin/Christian	Muslin/Christian	Muslin/Christian	Muslin/Christian	Muslin/Christian	Muslin/Christian
Support for Commandos	%	%	%	%	%	%
Strong Support	59	23	42	19	52	19
Support	35	42	59	55	40	67
No Support	06	35	04	26	08	14
Number of respondents	95	107	48	246	98	108
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100
Preferred Solution						
Armed struggle	38	22	41	17	30	24
Peaceful solution	24	47	32	67	15	43
Other solutions	27	31	27	16	55	33
Number of respondents	95	102	47	236	96	102
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100

Ibid., p. 94.

TABLE 8-Continued

Social Class Identification

AUB			
Support for Commandos	Upper class	Middle	Lower
	%	%	%
Strong support	38	46	50
Support	40	32	17
No support	22	22	33
Total number	162	37	06
Preferred Solution			
Armed struggle	33	36	33
Peaceful solution	36	39	33
Other solutions	31	25	33
Total %	100	100	100
Number of respondents	159	36	06
SJU			
Support for Commandos	Upper class	Middle	Lower
	%	%	%
Strong support	20	21	33
Support	48	59	45
No support	32	21	22
Total number	25	188	73
Preferred Solution			
Armed struggle	22	18	31
Peaceful solution	61	63	43
Other solution	17	19	16
Total %	100	100	100
Number of respondent	23	179	73

TABLE 8-Continued

Support for Commandos	LU		
	Upper class	Middle	Lower
	%	%	%
Strong support	29	23	52
Support	55	59	35
No support	16	08	11
Number of respondents	55	129	27
Total %	100	100	100
Preferred solution			
Armed struggle	22	27	41
Peaceful solution	37	30	11
Other solutions	41	43	48
Number of respondents	51	124	27
Total %	100	100	100

Ibid. p. 104.

TABLE 9

Distribution of Total Registered Refugee Population
and of Camp Population (1952)

LEBANON	Total	65,900	13,220	22,522	100,642
BEIRUT AREA	Beirut	15,723	-	-	19,165
	Mar Elias	-	42	400	
MOUNTAIN AREA	Mountain	11,716	-	-	
	Bourj al-Barajneh	-	-	2,611	
	Shatila Camp	-	-	1,240	18,711
	Jisr al-Basha	-	-	673	
	Al-Dikwane	-	494	966	
	Dabaya	-	341	670	
SIDON	Sidon	13,979	-	-	
	Mieh-Mieh	-	1,390	901	24,194
	'Ain al-Hilweh	-	103	7,821	
TYRE	Tyre	17,078	-	-	
	Al-Rashidiya	-	757	1,231	21,529
	Al-Bus	-	2,552	11	
TRIPOLI	Tripoli	4,737	-	-	
	Nahr al-Bared	-	-	5,998	11,275
	Khan al-Askar	-	540	-	
AL-BIQA'A AREA	Al-Biqa'a	1,667	-	-	
	Anjar	-	1,838	-	8,668
	Wavell	-	1,488	-	
	Ghouran	-	2,675	-	

Source: Sahlan, A. B. "Palestine's Arab Population." Journal of Palestine Studies, (Summer 1974), p. 51. Taken from UNRWA documents of 25 November, 1952.

TABLE 10

Distribution of Total Registered Refugee Population and
of Camp Population (1972)

Area	Total	Established	Emergency	Number of persons officially registered in established camps	Number of persons in established camps	Actually living in emergency camps
East Jordan	551,612	4	6	76,626	110,448	112,834
West Bank	278,255	20	-	68,125	71,850	-
Gaza	324,567	8	-	198,662	205,734	-
LEBANON	184,043	15	-	87,586	95,372	-
Syria	168,163	6	4	26,641	31,275	15,820
Grand Total	1,506,640	53	10	457,640	514,679	128,654

Source: Report of the Commissioner-General of the UNRWA for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July, 1971-30 June, 1972., p. 76.

TABLE 11

The Cairo Agreements

The Cairo Agreements were signed 3 November, 1969 in Cairo by the Commander in Chief of the Lebanese Army, General Emile Boustanz and by Yassir Arafat, President of the PLO. The actual agreements have never been publicly released. The articles listed below have been gathered from various media reports.

- I.
 1. Recognition of the rights of work, residence, and movement of Palestinians currently residing in Lebanon.
 2. Establishment of local committees made up of Palestinians within the camps to look after the interests of the Palestinians living there, in cooperation with the local authorities and within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty.
 3. Presence of elements of the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command (PASC) within the camps, which in cooperation with the aforementioned committees, will be in charge of ensuring good relations with the local authorities.
 4. Recognition of the right of Palestinians residing in Lebanon to participate in the Palestinian revolution, and this within the framework of the principles of Lebanon's sovereignty and security.
- II. Commando Action:
 1. Cessation of information campaigns on the part of the two sides.
 2. An undertaking of a census of the number of fedayeen in Lebanon through the intermediary of their respective commands.
 3. The appointment of Resistance representatives to the Lebanese General Staff with a view towards smoothing out difficulties which may arrive.
 4. Regulating the entries, exits and circulation of commandos.
 5. The study of strategic positions which the Resistance would occupy in border zones, with the agreement of the Lebanese General Staff, and with the army agreeing to vacillitate the evacuation and supply operations for the commando action.

TABLE 11-Continued

III. Conclusion:

The Lebanese civil and military authorities will continue to exercise their full authority and responsibility" in all parts of Lebanese territory and under all circumstances. The two sides reaffirm that the Palestinian armed struggle contributes as much to the safeguard of Lebanon's interests as to those of the Palestinian Revolution and all the Arabs.

Source: Fiches du Monde Arab. (Beirut) 16 July, 1975. No. 327.

*Underscore mine.

TABLE 12

LEBANESE FACTIONS*Christian Rightists*

1. The Phalanges under the leadership of Pierre Jumayyil.
2. El-numour - the armed forces led by Kamil Sham'un.
3. The Liberation Army of Zgharta under the leadership of President Franjiyya.
4. The Cedar Guards Front - led by Dr. Fuad Shimaali.
5. Forces led by Colonel Antoine Barakat - this army works closely with Christian irregulars.
6. The Tashnaq Party - Armenian rightist organization that operates with the Phalanges.

Pro-Syrian Forces

1. Al-Saiqa, is under the leadership of Zuhair Muhsin who is also the head of the military department of the PLO and a rival to Chairman Yasir Arafat. Muhsin serves the Syrian Ba'ath Party as an executive member.
2. The Palestine Liberation Army led by General Misbaah Boudiri. Their military supplies are from the Syrian general staff.
3. The Lebanese Party led by Isam Kanza.

Pro-Arafat Forces

1. Fatah led by Yasir Arafat.
2. The Arab Liberation Front under the leadership of Abdel Wahhab Kayyali. Its supplies come from the Ba'ath Party in Iraq.
3. The PLA unit of Ain Jalut - largely controlled from Egypt.
4. The Popular Front factions
 - a) the Popular Front/General Command of Jebril,
 - b) the Popular Front of Wadi Haddad,
 - c) the Marxist Popular Democratic Front of Nayef Hawatmah,
 - d) the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine of Dr. George Habash.

TABLE 12-Continued

Moslem Leftists

1. Progressive Socialists led by Kamal Jumblatt (Druze, Moslem and Greek Orthodox).
2. National Socialist Party under the leadership of Inaam Raid. Supported by Libya.
3. Communist Party led by George Hawi and influenced by the Soviet Union.

Lebanese Armed Forces

1. Christian faction led by Colonel Antonine Barakat.
2. Moslem factions: a) The Lebanese Arab Army under the leadership of Lieutenant Ahmed Khatib. Lieutenant Khatib coordinates his activities with Jumblatt and Arafat. b) Army units of Brigadier General Aziz Ahdab in Beirut. Both Ahdab and Khatib are members of the Revolutionary Council which is led by Ahdab.

Source: See A. B. Zahlan, The Crisis in the Lebanese System: Confessionalism and Chaos (Washington, D. C. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976), for a more detailed examination of Lebanese factions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

- Abboushi, W. F. *The Angry Arabs*. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1974.
- Allen, Richard. *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Fertile Crescent*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974.
- Cohen, Aharon. *Israel and the Arab World*. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970.
- Cooley, John. *Green March: Black September*. London: Frank Cars, 1973.
- Dotson, Christopher. *Black September*. London: Sunday Telegraph, 1973.
- Ellis, Harry B. *The Dilemma of Israel*. 2nd printing. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973.
- Fawaz, Turki. *The Disinherited: Journal of a Palestinian Exile*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972.
- Furlonge, Geoffrey. *Palestine Is My Country*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969.
- Hasou, Tawfig Y. "Jordanian-American Relations: 1970-1974." Masters Thesis, University of Virginia, 1976.
- Herzog, Chaim. *The War of Atonement*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975.
- Hudson, Michael C. *The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon*. New York: Random House, 1968.
- Kader, Hatem, Abdel M. *Information and the Arab Cause*. London: Longman Group LTD, 1974.
- Kazzihor, Waled W. *Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975.
- Khadduri, Majdia D., ed. *The Arab-Israeli Impasse*. Washington: Robert B. Luce, Inc., 1968.
- Kiernan, Thomas. *Arafat: The Man and the Myth*. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1968.

- Koury, Enver M. *The Crisis in the Lebanese System: Confessionalism and Chaos*. Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976.
- Moore, John N. ed., *The Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Vol. II, Bol. III). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.
- Quandt, William B. *Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions*. Santa Monica: Rand, 1971.
- Quandt, William B.; Jabber, Fuad; and Lesch, Ann M. *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.
- Qubain, Fahim I. *Crisis in Lebanon*. Washington, D. C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961.
- Robinson, Jacob. *Palestine and the United Nations*. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1947.
- Salem, Elie A. *Modnerization Without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973.
- Salibi, Kamal S. *Crossroads to Civil War*. New York: Caravan, 1976.
- Sharabi, Hisham. *Palestine and Israel*. New York: Pegasus, 1969.
- Sharabi, Hisham. *Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness*. Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 1970.
- Suleiman, Michael W. *Political Parties in Lebanon*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967.
- U.S. *The Department of State Bulletin*. March 1975–October 1976.
- U.S. *The Department of State Background Notes*. (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan).
- U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on the Near East of the Committee on Foreign Relations. *Middle East 1971*. 92nd Congress 1st session 1971. Department of State.

JOURNALS

- Abusalik, Abbas S. "A Delicate Balance." *Middle East International*, May 1975, pp. 18-20.
- Arab Report and Record*. London: The Mendix Press. 1974, 1975, 1976.

- Barakat, Halim. "Social Factors Influencing Attitudes of University Students in Lebanon Towards the Palestinian Resistance." *The Journal of Palestine Studies*, (Autumn 1971): 87-113.
- Basson, Irene. "Syria's New Refugee Problem." *The Middle East International* (October 1976): 20-21.
- Bourguiba, Habib. "The Tunisian Way." *Foreign Affairs* 3 (April 1966): 480-489.
- Brown, Dean. "Lebanon-A Mission of Conciliation." (speech given at the Brookings Institute - June 22, 1976).
- Cars, Alain. "Thorny Questions for the PLO." *Middle East International* (March 1976): 9-10.
- Cass, Alain. "What Lessons from Lebanon." *The Middle East International* (September 1976): 8-10.
- Colie, Stuart E. "A Perspective on the Shiites and the Lebanese Tragedy." *Middle East Review* (Fall 1976): 16-24.
- Cousins, Norman. "Last Chance for Peace in the Middle East." *The Saturday Review*, March 22, 1975. pp. 10-19.
- Fiches du Monde Arab.* (Beirut) "Lebanon" and "The Palestinian Resistance."
- Glass, Charles. "Lebanon: The Spreading Tragedy." *The Middle East International.* (October 1976): 4-6.
- Hamid, Rashid. "What is the PLO." *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Summer 1975): 90-109.
- Heykal, Mohammed H. "Interview". *Journal of Palestine Studies* Autumn 1971): 3-21.
- Hoffmann, Stanley. "A New Policy for Israel." *Foreign Affairs* (April 1975): 405-432.
- Hooley, Frank. "The PLO Looks Ahead" *Middle East International* (March 1975): 5-7.
- Howard, Norman F. "Tragedy in Lebanon." *Current History* (January 1977): 1-6.
- Howard, Norman. "Upheaval in Lebanon." *Current History* (January 1976): 5-10.
- Hudson, Michael C. "A Case of Political Underdevelopment." *Journal of Politics* (November 1967): 821-837.

- Jabber, Frank. "The Arab Regimes and the Palestinian Revolution." *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Winter 1973): 79-86.
- Jabber, Fuad. "The Palestinian Resistance and Inter-Arab Politics." Paper given at the University of California at Los Angeles, May 1971.
- Johns, Richard. "Lebanon: Breaking the Cycle of Violence." *The Middle East International*. (December 1975): 4-7.
- Karnow, Stanley. "Would-be, Liberators of Palestine." *The Saturday Review*, March 1, 1975, pp. 19-22.
- LINK. Americans for Better Understanding of the Middle East. (Fall 1976).
- Markham, James M. "Lebanon: The Insane War." *New York Times Magazine* August 15, 1976. p. 6+.
- Middle East Research and Information Project. (Washington), February 1976.
- Mortimer, Edward. "All Eyes on Lebanon," *The Middle East International*. (November 1976): 4-6.
- Mortimer, Edward. "1976: Year of the Locust." *Middle East International*. (January 1977): 8-10.
- Musleh, Muhammed Y. "Moderates and Rejectionists Within the Palestine Liberation Organization." *The Middle East Journal* (Spring 1976): 127-141.
- Palestine* (February 1977) Published by the Palestine Solidarity Committee, New York. Vol. II, No. 1.
- Petiam, Tabitha. "The Trials of South Lebanon." *Middle East International*. (September 1975): 11-14.
- Roberts, Gordon. "The Druzes: A Community Apart." *The Middle East International* (August 1973): 23-25.
- Rouleau, Eric. "The Palestinian Quest." *Foreign Affairs* (January 1975): 264-284.
- Salibi, Kamal S. "The Lebanese Identity." *Middle East Review*. (Fall 1976): 7-13.
- Seale, Patrick. "Lebanon at the End of its Tether." *Middle East International* (November, 1975): 9-10.
- Sha'ath, Nabil. "PLO Planning Report." Speech given 29 June 1975 in Beirut.

- Sirhan, Bassem. "The Palestinian Refugee Camp Life in Lebanon." *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Winter 1975): 91-108.
- Suleiman, Michael W. "Crisis and Revolution in Lebanon." *The Middle East Journal* (Winter 1972): 11-24.
- Zahlan, A. B. "Palestine's Arab Population: The Demography of the Palestin." *Journal of Palestine Studies*. (Summer 1974) 37-73.


NEWSPAPERS

- Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), August 1974-October 1976.
- Deadline on World Affairs*. Greenside, Connecticut.
- Facts on File* (New York), August 1974-October 1976.
- Keesing's (London) August 1974-October 1976. Contemporary Archives.
- Le Matin AN-Nahar Arab Report* (Beirut), 8 December, 1975 - 12 January, 1976.
- Middle East Intelligence Survey*, published by MidEast information media, Tel Aviv: Israel Press LTD. (January 1, 1975-October 15, 1976).
- Middle East Monitor*, (Ridgewood, N.J.) April 1975-October 1976.
- Newsweek*, October 1974-October 1976.
- New York Times* (New York), October 1974-October 1976.
- Washington Post* (Washington), October 1974-October 1976.

INTERVIEWS

- Brown, Dean L. Middle East Institute, Washington, D. C. 7 July 1976, 18 March 1977, 21 April 1977.
- Franjeh, Muhammed. Minister to the Court of His Excellency King Hasan, Charlottesville, Virginia. Interview, 27 June 1976.
- Ramazani, Rouhollak K. Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, Charlottesville, Virginia. Course and interviews, June-July 1976.
- Seelye, Talcott Williams. United States Department of State. September-April 1976.

LEBANON



- ▬ - Province Boundary
- ▬ - District Boundary
- - Town or Village
- ▲ - Palestinian Refugee Camp

Source:
 Michael C. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, New York, Random House, p. 56.
 Kamal S. Salibi, New York, Caravan Books, p. 8
Cross Roads to Civil War.
 Map Drawn by Walter Kellley.