THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1932

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On March the fourth, 1933, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was formally inaugurated as the President of the United States. Hearing that they had "nothing to fear but fear itself," the American people were launched upon the era of the New Deal. Franklin Roosevelt had been elected in the presidential campaign of the previous year. This is the story of how he, whom Lippman had earlier described as "a pleasant man who, without any important qualifications for the office, would very much like to be President,"[1] gained his desires.

The period of the 1920's had been, for some, a decade of unprecedented prosperity. This Golden Age, however, came to an end on October 24, 1929. In a frenzy of selling which saw more than twelve million shares of stock unloaded at diminishing prices, the speculators had put an unofficial, but effective, close to the bull market boom. Out of this stock market crash was to grow what has come to be called the Great Depression. It was the overwhelming intensity of this economic disaster that was to make it the overriding consideration in the political conflict three years afterward. One might even be tempted to feel that the issue was decided long before the polls were opened.

There was, of course, some difference of opinion as to how to best meet the catastrophe. The Democratic public relations director felt that "the bewilderment of the White House was apparent almost from the day of the disaster."[2] The Republican campaign orators were to take another viewpoint. Initially, Hoover seemed to approach the problem as being basically an isolated phenomenon. Stating that the

recession "did not affect the business structure of the nation", the President commenced a long series of optimistic statements that were to return to haunt him during his campaign for reelection. "Prosperity is just around the corner" was but typical of the unfortunate statements in this series. In March of 1930, following the rally of a normal seasonal gain in business cycles, Hoover said, "All the evidences indicate that the worst effects of the crash will have been passed within the next sixty days."[3] Two months later no corner had been turned and the "evidences" proved to be false.

In meeting what he first considered to be a domestic problem, Hoover opened a four-pronged attack. He attempted to facilitate the work of the private relief agencies with governmental assistance. Economy in the expenditures of the Federal government was ordered. Business leaders were urged to maintain wages of their employees even though it would mean taking a loss until the economy was restored. Finally, Hoover established the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The R. F. C. was organized for the purpose of loaning money to banks and other institutions in hopes of revitalizing the processes of business. But nothing seemed to help. "Though the R. F. C. was useful in giving a measure of stability to financial institutions, the deepening course of the depression proved that it was inadequate. America demanded more heroic measures to bring back prosperity."[4]

Finally, Hoover was driven to the conclusion that his original approach to the situation was the incorrect one. Three weeks before the first anniversary of what Democratic orators were coming to call the "Hoover Slump", the President in his address before a Cleveland audience stated, "This depression is world wide." Conceding the origins and ramifications to be on this basis, he turned once more to an

optimistic vein by saying, "We are able... to free ourselves of world influences and make a large measure of independent recovery because we are so remarkably self-contained."[5] This idea failed to please the internationalistic crowd which had already been shocked, as had most of the nation's leading economists, with Hoover's acceptance of the Hawley-Smoot tariff. Hoover did overcome some of the charges of provincialism the following summer when, following the collapse of the Austrian banking system, he called for a year's moratorium on the European war debts. Nevertheless, the nation's picture of the Great Engineer had been damaged and criticism of his indecision began to grow.

Seldom had any President taken office previously with as great a feeling of confidence in his abilities among the voters than did Hoover when he had been installed in 1929. The landslide proportion of his victory the previous November had illustrated the reliance of the electorate upon the man, his party, and his policies. This would later turn to the bitterness of disappointment that would be felt throughout the campaign. Nevertheless, there had been some rumblings of discontent in the honeymoon of seven months prior to the crash. The enforcement of the Prohibition amendment proved to be a pernicious element and Hoover had it turned over to the Wickersham commission for study. When the commission's report called for either repeal of the statute or at least serious amendment, rather than adhering to the recommendations, the President rejected his board's report and ignored the consequences. Another persistent problem of the decade had been the economic depression the American farmer had been suffering. In setting up the farm board to reorganize the marketing system and initiate reforms to stabilize farm prices, the Republicans had failed because of an inability to control overproduction and, in the process, had managed

to offend Borah and other progressives in the party. The farm situation had led some to feel that a revision of the tariff would be of assistance to the rural districts. The Hawley-Smoot tariff, which was the result of this thinking, became the victim of Congressional log-rolling which saw 235 items revised downward in comparison with 890 upward revisions. The effect of this tariff on the international economy had been accurately predicted and as the tariff walls against American agricultural exports rose, the American farmer was less than satisfied.

Thus, in studying the actions of the Hoover administration, the public was able to mark up several notable failures. If they did not accept the notion that the Depression was Hoover's fault, they could feel that his remedies for the difficulty were inadequate. It seemed as if the traditional individualistic strain of American thinking was itself proving inadequate in this crisis and Hoover became the symbol of something that had outlived its usefulness. One analysis stated, "The depression that followed the crash of the stock market called for a collective philosophy and a collective plan of action."[6] Even if they weren't ready to go this far, the American people were seeking a dynamic force of experimentation AND were coming to believe that Herbert Hoover was not to be the fountainhead of any such program.

In the Republican pre-convention activities the chairman of the National Committee was Senator Simeon D. Fess of Ohio and he was assisted by the executive director, Robert H. Lucas of Kentucky. But these two men were "little more than dummy directors".[7] The real decision makers of the campaign would be the Postmaster-General, Walter Brown, and Ogden Mills who was the Secretary of the Treasury. Of course, the

true guiding genius of his campaign was the President himself. He had wanted Brown to take over the post as chairman of the National Committee, but Brown demurred, recalling the shortened careers of previous committee directors who had failed to live up to Hoover's demands. At any rate, Brown knew he could do yeoman work in swinging the patronage stick in lining up the delegates and party leaders behind Hoover.

Hoover's campaign for renomination was opened with Lucas's letter of January 13, 1931, which was sent to all Republican precinct chairmen. The general tone of the letter was to give a preview of the strategy of the Hoover candidacy in the November elections. It stated that the depression was world-wide and that no one man or nation was at fault. Hoover's experience in the business world was cited along with the idea that things would have been worse had not such a man been in office. The general negative approach that was to mark the entire Republican campaign of 1932 was summarized in the accusation that the President's unpopularity was due solely to the "smear Hoover" campaign of the Democrats.

Brown's work in rounding up the delegates for Hoover was an excellent one as could be seen in the near-unanimous first-ballot nomination. Any program of purging the corrupt state organizations of the party in the South was abandoned when it was realized that their support would be helpful. The patronage stick's manipulation can be seen in the address of the assistant postmaster-general, Glover, to the postmasters convention in Missouri. He said:

> Get out on the firing line in support of President Hoover. I'll be back in Washington Monday and I'll be glad at that time to take the resignation of any of you postmasters who don't want to do it. 8

Such oratory was effective. The states which selected their delegates by the convention method saw the pledging of their delegations to Hoover because of the strength of the state organizations and the manipulations of Brown. The preferential primaries turned up no worthy opposition and Hoover sailed through them with ease. He had little to fear as the time for the assemblage of the party at Chicago neared.

Theodore Joslin, publicity secretary of the President, and the director of the publicity for the national committee, West, were charged with the responsibility of presenting a more likable personality picture of Hoover to the public. The increasing dissatisfaction with Hoover policies and the work of the Democratic publicity bureau had combined to create an unfavorable impression of Hoover the man in public eyes. Joslin had to overcome the handicap of news pictures of Hoover which gave the impression that he was a hard-boiled and cold-blooded individual who appeared to be unmoved by the sufferings of the masses. Also to be considered was the consistently poor press relations Hoover had with the White House corps during his administration. These veteran correspondents came to distrust Joslin's attempts to "humanize" the President and the efforts were fairly unrewarding. West turned his attention to the national political scene in unleashing an attack on the Democratic leadership which had allowed the Democratic Congress elected in 1930 to get out of under the control of the Speaker of the House, Garner. An attempt was also made to portray Hoover as a President who, in time of crisis, was beset by unfair criticism by his political opponents. In this effort, parallels were drawn between Hoover and his fairly distinguished predecessors, Washington and Lincoln. Most of the efforts in this realm were preludes to the publicity activity of the Republicans which would develop once the national campaign commenced.

Those Republican leaders who had become dissatisfied with Hoover and saw the futility in renominating him began to look around for a more suitable candidate. They first settled on Senator Dwight Morrow of New Jersey whose work in Mexico had gained him a national reputation and whose son-in-law, Charles A. Lindbergh, would be of some use in a national election. However, Morrow died in October of 1931 and, even if he had lived, there is some doubt that he would have gone into the fray in '32 rather than waiting and building until 1936. Calvin Coolidge was suggested and encouraged by those opposed to Hoover's renomination and who felt "Silent Cal" could restore the nation's confidence in the Republican party. This might have been true but Coolidge was too much of a party man to risk a split in the ranks and too shrewd a politician to involve himself in a campaign with such dismal prospects for success. Any hope that Charles G. Dawes might be prevailed upon to campaign against Hoover ~~were~~ was nullified when that financial titan accepted Hoover's appointment to head the R. F. C. The old Progressive element in the party could not find a standard-bearer on whom they could unite. No one seemed willing to become a sacrificial goat in 1932. An ex-Senator from Maryland, Dr. Joseph I. France, did attempt to contest Hoover in some primaries but his success was less than meager. Thus, although opposition to Hoover did exist in the Republican party, it was disorganized and characterized by the defeatist attitude that prevaded even the party's rank and file.

Herbert Hoover wanted to be renominated by his party and that seemed to settle the matter as far as the Republican pre-convention campaigning was concerned. The incumbent is traditionally entitled to a second presidential nomination should he desire it, and Hoover did desire it. The party must run on its record and to have rejected Hoover would have been an admission of failure. Hoover, furthermore,

could wield the federal patronage machine and any effort to unseat him would have to be made with a prohibitive financial outlay and with little hope of success. Finally, any rough-and-tumble conflict with Hoover would have made the possibility of a split in the party a certainty and the leaders were not willing to run that risk. As a result, the Republican pre-convention activity was "very much a one-man affair."[9]

In contrast to the apathetic campaign of the Republicans, the victory-hungry Democrats began to see the golden opportunity that they had been presented with in the coming election, and candidates began to flood the arena. It looked as if the Democracy was going to have another one of her rip-snorting family squabbles.

The outstanding candidate in 1932 was from the first the Governor of New York, Franklin D. Roosevelt. He was by far leading the field and recognized universally as "the man to stop" by the other hopefuls. Roosevelt had been launched into national politics back in 1920 when he was the vice-presidential running-mate of the badly beaten Cox. Stricken shortly after the defeat with polio, he had recovered sufficiently to have placed Al Smith's name in nomination before the Democratic conventions of 1924 and 1928. In 1928, at the urging of his political friend, Smith, Roosevelt entered the lists as the Democratic gubernatorial candidate in his home state in the hope of strengthening the national ticket. In a year which saw Democracy and Smith crushed by Hoover and Prosperity, Roosevelt was able to carry New York by a slim majority as even Smith had failed to do in the presidential vote. Roosevelt ran for reelection and was elected by an unprecedented 750,000 majority in the 1930 campaign. His star was rising swiftly.

Roosevelt's vote-getting record was impressive to those who had

been supporting losers in the past three presidential elections. They were even further impressed by his ability to gain rural as well as some Republican support, and the consideration of New York's large block of electoral votes was not to be ignored. Those leaders who were searching for a true progressive to head the ticket, particularly in the West, recalled Roosevelt's work as Assistant-Secretary of the Navy in their hero's (Wilson) administration, his progressive administration as governor, and the connection with the name of the old Bull Mooser, Teddy, who was still fondly remembered by them. His record as governor also demonstrated a skill in handling an opposition legislature and an ability to divorce himself from Tammany influence in carrying out his program. On the issue of Repeal the East found him to be a "reasonable wet", while the South came to appreciate his Protestant affiliations. Over the years F. D. R. had been able to avoid alienating any factions of the party despite the bitter quarrels of internecine warfare that had often come close to splitting the party. The party leaders, also seeking a winner, knew of the effective "radio voice" Roosevelt had been blessed with and had been impressed with his carriage and demeanor in his nominations of Smith at the party conclaves. His coining of the phrase "the Happy Warrior" had given an indication of what was to be expected in his speeches in the years to come. Even Walter Lippmann, extremely critical of Roosevelt in this period, conceded the man's sectional popularity, his support by local politicos, and a hesitancy on the part of the opposition to enter the fray so early in the campaign.

While the assets attributed to Roosevelt were formidable, some were able to see possible chinks in his armor. The question of his health, in light of his polio attack, was sometimes raised. For some he appeared to be a wishy-washy politician whose record as governor indicated a

willingness to play politics on crucial issues. It was known that he would be opposed by most of the big city machines (Tammany, Nash-Kelly in Chicago, Hague in Jersey City), by the now conservative Wilsonian generation of the party, and by industrial areas as contrasted with his rural support. Lippmann noted his lack of popularity with the masses in the pivotal sections of the country, his lack of national appeal, and the lack of confidence in his abilities on the part of old warhorses of the party, as definite liabilities. It soon became apparent that those who felt Roosevelt was not to be their man would have to join a coalition to block the nomination.

The standard-bearer in 1928 had been Al Smith and he was not to be counted out for reconsideration in 1932. Denied the nomination after a bitter fight in 1924, he had gained it at the next convention only to be smothered in the Hoover landslide. The "Happy Warrior" had been rather unhappy for some time and the defeat rankled him and his supporters. Still the titular head of the party he was to be credited with the organization of the forces of the opposition party over the years following the defeat. His lovable character and magnetic personality were still appreciated by the urban masses and the loyalty and affection of his supporters would be tenacious. They had been attracted by his religious affiliations and plebian mannerisms in 1928 and these factors, although something of a drawback in many sections of the country, would bring them to the polls for their idol again in 1932.

Immediately after his defeat in the previous campaign Smith had stated he was eliminating himself from political consideration in the future. He had told many of his former supporters (e. g. Flynn and Lehman) that his financial indebtedness precluded any possibility of his return to the political scene and they, in turn, felt free to come to the

support of the Roosevelt candidacy. Indeed, when it became apparent that he was a candidate, these old supporters of his could only feel that he was a stalking-horse for the "Stop Roosevelt" movement. Progressives over the years had become increasingly disaffected with Smith as his basic conservatism became more apparent. Furthermore, there were long memories in the minds of party leaders who did not wish to see religious prejudice hurt their cause again, and in the minds of those party leaders who had been squeezed in the bitter intra-party squabbles of the past. While Smith's prospects might not have been as bright as Roosevelt's, many observers of the day felt that Smith's voice would be a deciding factor in the convention.

The career of John Nance Garner had been marked by a step-by-step rise through the political ladder until he had achieved what some believed "represented the pinnacle of his political ambitions,"[10] the post of Speaker of the House of Representatives. His candidacy was backed primarily by his fellow Texans and by the Hearst chain of newspapers whose vociferous director had been attracted by Garner's isolationistic voting record. His western background and his demand for strong measures in meeting the depression would earn him some support. On the other hand, the Eastern conservatives considered him to be something of a radical and his "dry" stand on the Prohibition issue would hurt him in that section of the country. Also, the support of William Randolph Hearst would not come as an unmixed blessing to the candidacy of "Cactus Jack" Garner.

Out of the progressive tradition of the reform mayors of Cleveland came Newton D. Baker, the former Secretary of War in Wilson's cabinet. Through the years he had become one of the nation's leading corporation lawyers and his continual adherence to American entrance

into the League of Nations had been a consistent thread in his public utterances. During the ensuing campaign he would follow a strategy of refraining from offending any other candidate by actively seeking the nomination in the hope that he might prove to be a suitable compromise in the event of a deadlocked convention.

Among Baker's other assets, besides his excellent administrative and progressive record, would be the support of the intellectuals and the Scripps-Howard newspapers. While Roy Howard had come out ostensibly for Smith's renomination, most realized that his true support would be for Baker. Lippmann considered Baker to be "an authentic example of a man who does not seek the office."[11] This was a rather naive observation, however, for in January of the election year he recanted on his former advocacy of the League. In calling for American entrance only if "an enlightened majority of the people favored the step,"[12] he failed to appease the obstinate Hearst opposition and only succeeded in alienating the support of the internationalists. His opponents, such as Louis Howe -- Roosevelt's guiding genius, cited his connections with the "financial crowd" and his role as a corporation lawyer would not win many friends among the progressives.

In discussing the Baker candidacy at the convention, Lippmann suggested that "...the party can unite on a man who is stronger than any of the leading contenders." Lippmann was impressed with the fact that "... he is the real first choice of more responsible Democrats than any other man, and that he is an acceptable second choice to almost every one." Noted also was the almost "universal confidence in his ability and in his character."[13] At any rate, many agree in retrospect with Moley's statement that Baker was "the man who probably would have been nominated had Roosevelt failed."[14]

Governor Albert C. Ritchie of Maryland was another logical compromise candidate. Indeed, Ed Flynn, the political boss of the Bronx who supported Roosevelt, differed with those who thought Baker would have received the nod in the event of a deadlock. Flynn felt that it would have worked to the advantage of Ritchie. There was little doubt that the handsome governor was a potentially strong nominee. He had won the gubernatorial contests in a doubtful state by increasing majorities four straight times and his excellent record, his aristocratic background, and his impressive bearing and voice, would speak well for him as a candidate. He was able to count on the support of Eastern business interests who appreciated his economic conservatism, of the big city machines, and of those who admired his uncompromising "wetness". The key to his philosophy of government was a Jeffersonian concept as to the role of government and the "failure of his candidacy ... may be laid to his earnest champion of this simple notion".[15] More likely, however, while a planned economy and a willingness to experiment were desired by the electorate, the strength of Roosevelt was directly responsible for Ritchie's defeat.

The rural areas of the nation had their candidates in the personages of Governor Murray of Oklahoma, Senator Robinson of Arkansas, and Missouri's ex-Senator Reed. "Alfalfa Bill" Murray was a colorful character who drew a great deal of publicity with his alliterative slogan of "Bread, Butter, Bacon, and Beans". Generally speaking, however, Murray proved to be more of a public curiosity than a serious contender. Joseph T. Robinson had been the party's vice-presidential nominee in 1928. The minority leader of the Senate since 1922, Robinson was known not to be an effective or brilliant leader and his gruff personality eliminated any possibility of popular appeal. Roosevelt was

able to gain his support when Robinson withdrew early in the race. James A. Reed was known for his intelligence, erratic nature, and powerful antipathies for Woodrow Wilson and any form of internationalism. He would expect the support of the Pendergast machine and Missouri's delegation, but little else. It is doubtful that any of these men would be considered even for the purposes of compromise and reconciliation.

The Illinois state delegation originally had hopes for the candidacy of Senator James Hamilton Lewis, her favorite son. Known to be a leading lawyer and a persuasive orator, as was evidenced in his excellent showing in the 1930 election on a "wet" platform in a Republican state, his eccentricities, which were capped by his pink-dyed whiskers that had earned him the nickname of "Aurora Borealis of Illinois", forced him to drop from the contest. Although favorable to F. D. R., Lewis saw his delegation transferred to another favorite-son, Melvin Traylor, because of Chicago's Mayor Cermak's manipulation of the delegation. Traylor, president of a Chicago bank, entered several primaries at the urgings of the anti-Roosevelt coalition but the picture of a " 'homespun multi-millionaire' ... had a false ring",[16] and his candidacy made slight progress. The president of General Electric and of R. C. A., Owen D. Young, was another business leader that was considered. His work with the reparations commission had shown him to be a serious student of foreign affairs. But, as with Traylor, he had little hopes of overcoming the voter's distrust of business leaders during the depression years.

Former presidential nominees of the party, James M. Cox and John W. Davis, were mentioned occasionally but they had pretty much suffered total political eclipse since their defeats. Former Governor Harry

Byrd, although assiduously courted by Roosevelt, was unable to resist the temptation and ran as a compromise candidate with the support of his Virginia delegation. Another favorite-son who was waiting for lightning to strike was Governor White of Ohio, but his main role was one of stalking-horse for his fellow Ohioan, Baker. Finally, there was Judge Samuel Seabury of New York. In the midst of his penetrating investigation of Tammany Hall, he was seen as a possible candidate along ~~with~~ the lines of another reformer, Woodrow Wilson. Seabury's colonial ancestry, his fight for social justice, and his brilliant career as a lawyer and judge, earned him a smattering of support.

Few could deny the variety and number of Democratic candidates. It would work to the advantage of the party in that a hotly contested nomination would draw the attention of the voters to the ultimate victor. The threat of a party split or a deadlocked convention was a natural consequence of this contest, but it was the hope that such a possibility would not be realized.

In the election of 1928, Hoover had carried forty states and a total of 444 electoral votes. The hopes for a prosperous future for the Democrats looked dim. Usually in the past the defeated party had closed shop after the returns were in and sat back to wait to make another effort four years later. On this occasion, however, Al Smith suggested the establishment and development of a party educational program that would coordinate the policies needed for a constructive strategy to be pursued by the minority party. Maryland's John J. Raskob as the chairman of the Democratic national committee adopted this idea and placed Jouett Shouse of Kansas at the head of a newly created permanent executive committee of the national committee. Charles Michelson,

a veteran Washington correspondent, was placed in charge of the party's publicity campaign.

Michelson felt his job to be to destroy the myths the nation held of Herbert Hoover in thinking that he "was still the infallible criterion for all that was expert, forthright, dignified in things great and small."[17] A secondary role the publicity was to play was in attempting to keep the public aware of the fact that the party of Jefferson was still alive. The Hoover landslide had convinced many that old man Democracy's demise was imminent.

The Republican reaction to Michelson's activity gave some indication of the effectiveness of his work. The G. O. P. leaders were disturbed by the flood of cartoons, ghost written speeches for Democratic leaders, and criticism that was directed toward Hoover and his party. Some said the net result of the Democratic publicity barrage was to "project Tammany Hall's techniques and morals to the national political scene."[18] Hoover said, "Michelson came out of the smear departments of yellow journalism" and fostered a "continuous campaign of misrepresentation."[19] He was also disturbed by what he termed "a flood of smear books."[20] Michelson wryly commented to the effect that the "'whispering campaign of 1928' had been succeeded by 'the whimpering campaign of 1930'," in a series of cartoons distributed throughout the country. At any rate, the work in those years between elections by the Raskob-Shouse-Michelson trio had the desired effect. "No president ever had had his every mistake so thoroughly advertised as Mr. Hoover".[21] The rewards of the efforts of these men would be gathered by the party's nominee in 1932. The Democratic sweep in the Congressional elections of 1930 were an indication of what was in store for the party of Prosperity.

A year preceding the convention the Democratic party became aware of a growing breach in its ranks. The political friendship of Roosevelt and Smith was being strained. There were fearful speculations as to what might be the ramifications if their friendship should turn into undying bitterness. Some felt it would spell the end of any hope of party unity in the national campaign and thus kill the chances of victory over Hoover.

Smith was reportedly dissatisfied with Roosevelt's actions as governor of New York. He resented his successor's seeming reticence to consult with Smith on the policies of administration. Roosevelt's disinclination to confide in Smith his plans for making a race for the presidential nomination disturbed Al and he particularly thought Roosevelt was dodging on Smith's favorite issue, repeal and prohibition. When a report, probably false, came to Al that Roosevelt had implied to some governors at the Governors' Conference that his predecessor had been a poor administrator, Smith, who was exceedingly proud of his record as governor, was more than displeased. On the other hand, F. D. R. had given cognizance to the rumor being spread that Smith had referred to him as a "crackpot". At any rate, each man saw in the other a formidable obstacle in his goal of nomination and the stage was set for the schism.

Al threw down the gauntlet to Roosevelt on the question of a reforestation bill then before the state legislature. In coming out against the measure, Al had chosen a poor tactical maneuver. The bill had the support of farmers, conservationists, progressives, some Republicans, and even Tammany Hall. The ensuing referendum was no contest. It resulted in a 220,000 vote majority in Roosevelt's favor.

Perhaps the pressure of political expediency had driven Smith to make this blunder of choosing this issue for a test of strength.

Partially for the purpose of gaining redemption for his defeat in the election of 1928, Al wished to make Prohibition the leading issue of the next campaign. Roosevelt, recognizing the leading issue before the nation to be an economic one, had realistically chosen recovery and depression as his theme. His choice also showed political acumen since he would be expecting support of the "dry" states of the South and West at the convention and he did not wish to alienate that support no matter how "reasonable" his "wetness". When Smith's ally, Raskob, attempted to commit the party to the issue of repeal at a meeting of the Democratic National Committee, he found his way blocked by the efforts of Roosevelt's campaign manager, Jim Farley.

In a radio address to the nation in April of 1932, Roosevelt made his famous "Forgotten Man" speech in which he said, "These unhappy times call for the building of plans that rest upon the forgotten, ...for plans like those of 1917 that build from the bottom up and not from the top down, that put their faith once more in the forgotten man at the bottom of the economic pyramid."[22]

Within the week Smith, at the Jefferson Day dinner in Washington, replied, "I will take off my coat and vest and fight to the end against any candidate who persists in any demagogic appeal to the masses of the working people of this country to destroy themselves by setting class against class and rich against poor."[23]

Smith's growing conservatism and his dislike for F. D. R. was increasingly evident. On January 23, 1932, Roosevelt in an open letter to the Secretary of the North Dakota State Democratic Committee stated, in a reply to the question as to his desire to have his name entered in

the state primary, "I willingly give my consent, with full appreciation of the honor that has been done me."[24] Two weeks later came Smith's formal announcement.

Some felt that Smith's announcement was most unexpected. The men around Roosevelt mistakenly concluded that he was to be used to sap the energy of their man in order for the anti-Roosevelt coalition to bring forth a compromise candidate at the strategic point in the campaign. Smith's decision to run again was based to a degree on his growing realization that any Democrat should win in 1932 and that it would afford him an opportunity to gain vindication on the repeal and religious questions that had halted him in 1928. The Roosevelt forces, feeling that Smith had been pressured into running by his friends, correctly interpreted the Smith statement that he would not "actively" seek the nomination as meaning his supporters would do the campaigning for him.

It soon became apparent to all the candidates that Roosevelt had to be stopped if anyone else was to have an opportunity to gain the nomination at Chicago. Smith felt that he could hold his own in the Northeast and was counting on Ritchie to draw from the Roosevelt strength in the South, and on Garner's reputation in taking delegates in the West. Strong supporters of Smith were Governor Ely of Massachusetts, Mayors Hague of New Jersey, Cermak of Chicago, and Walker of New York, and, of course, Raskob and Shouse.

The strategy of the Smith-led coalition was as follows: To make prohibition the big issue of the national campaign and to subordinate economic questions; to "resent" any talk about weakness in Smith's candidacy because of the religious question; to oppose Roosevelt to the

bitter end and attempt to have the party unite on Smith or a compromise candidate; create the impression that any Democrat was sure of victory in 1932; have the convention located in the friendly environs of Cermak's Chicago; and have the party stand four-square for a platform advocating the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment.

Back in March of 1931, Raskob had attempted to maneuver the party behind the movement for repeal. Those prohibitionists who wished to keep the question out of partisan politics and those who desired to kill off the Smith candidacy were, for the first time, forced to turn to Roosevelt for aid in the face of this Smith-Raskob action. Cordell Hull saw it as "the most important turning point which ultimately resulted in the defeat of Smith and the nomination of Roosevelt for President."[25]

Other actions had indicated the development of a "Stop-Roosevelt" movement. Shouse began to urge the state conventions to select uninstructed delegations or, at least, favorite-son nominees. This encouraged some favorite-sons to enter the race since it was now clear the Smith forces would be out to block Roosevelt's nomination even at the risk of a deadlocked convention. Failure of the other opposition candidates to realize that Smith was serious about his nomination-seeking was a mistake. When Michelson suggested to Raskob that Roosevelt, being a candidate for the nomination, be given some of the air-time held by the National Committee, he met with the only rebuff from his superior on a question of publicity. Finally, at the convention, Hague stated that it would be doubtful that Roosevelt could carry a state east of the Mississippi if he faced Hoover.

Smith, Baker, Garner, Ritchie, and the others presented "an alliance of resourceful men".[26] They were experienced in the art of politi-

cal timing, subtlety, daring, and flattery, and could always dangle the vice-presidential nomination before wavering delegations.

> They were strong men personally, powerful in their knowledge of politics, vigorous in their views, and fearless in advocating the policies and measures in which they believed. To defeat them, either singly or together, was a man-size task. [27]

However, while the Roosevelt opposition was willing to work for a deadlocked convention, they were most unwilling to defer to another candidate. This would prove to be a fatal weakness.

> While there were many reasons for their getting together, there were just as many reasons why too close an alliance might prove harmful. The fact was always uppermost during the subsequent meetings of the opposition in Chicago.[28]

Another flaw or weak point in the Roosevelt opponents' ~~program~~ PROGRAM, sometimes termed the "Allies", was in the personage of its major coordinator, the chairman of the National Committee, John J. Raskob. He was noted for his faithful allegiance to Smith and the work of this Maryland millionaire in rebuilding the party after 1928 was commendable. However, "On the issues of today he seems to have one profoundly sincere conviction, namely that prohibition is an evil, and on other matters a naivité which is simply appalling".[29] The opposition to Roosevelt had both its strengths and its weaknesses. Intelligent handling on the part of the Governor's supporters would call for the minimisation of the former and a capitalizing on the latter.

Two men were primarily in charge of the Rooseveltian forces in the campaign for the nomination in 1932. The first of these was Louis Howe, who had worked with his "Franklin" since the years preceding the polio attack and whose goal and life had become one of dedication to

the work of seeing his man becoming the President of the United States. Howe's work would mainly be behind the scenes while the public machinations were to be handled by that genial Irishman and the party's state chairman in New York, Jim Farley. Farley was the "real organizing genius"[30] of the men working for Roosevelt. "The network of detail surrounding a thousand potential convention delegates was Farley's forte."[31] Between these two men, working under the direction of the candidate himself, the major decisions of strategy were made.

Roosevelt was able to find assistance for his candidacy among many of the political bigwigs of the day. Eastern supporters included Mayor Curley of Boston, Jackson in New Hampshire, and Guffey of Pennsylvania. The South was represented by such men as Cordell Hull, James F. Byrnes, and Alben W. Barkley. Western progressives who felt akin with the Roosevelt cause were Wheeler and Walsh of Montana, Dill and Bullitt in Washington, and the Republican progressive from Nebraska, Senator Norris. Roosevelt was also able to find assistance, in this case more in the financial realm, through the donations of Lehman, the senior Morgenthau, and Joseph P. Kennedy. An early and welcome addition to the forces was Colonel House, Wilson's "prime minister". The strength and forcefulness of some of these men led Lippmann to comment, "It is evident that Governor Roosevelt is not the leader of the forces behind him. He is being used by them."[32]

At the convention Arthur Mullen worked as Roosevelt's floor manager but his inexperience necessitated his being given a pair of assistants, to this important post. Ed Flynn, another of the Roosevelt men, estimated that about ninety percent of the Governor's organization was made up of newcomers to the stage of national politics and also rank amateurs. With this in mind, and noting the tenacious hold of Howe on his friend's

confidence, and noting further the Roosevelt we know now as a strong willed person, it is doubtful that these men "used" him. Indeed, it was Roosevelt who made good use of the talents and influence of the old line politicians.

Roosevelt supporters were urged to stress and emphasize these strong points of his candidacy: his acceptable social background and religious affiliation as contrasted with Smith's, the importance of the economic questions as being the issue of the day, his appeal to the South on the "reasonableness" of his wetness, his early battles with Tammany, the Western appeal of his progressive record as governor, and his repudiation of the League which would appeal to the isolationists.

A basic appeal to the old party workers was the vote-getting record of Roosevelt and the assurance of victory his nomination would obtain. Following the smashing gubernatorial victory in 1930, Farley had issued the statement, "I do not see how Mr. Roosevelt can escape becoming the next presidential nominee of his party..."[33] This was the "first battle cry of the Roosevelt forces."[34] It was no accident that the victory had been such an overwhelming one. Farley had thrown his greatest effort into bringing in the unprecedented vote by exhorting his organization to make their greatest effort. Howe had envisioned the election of 1936 as the time for Roosevelt to make his move, but the huge plurality which would carry great weight with the electorate forced him to move the time schedule up by four years. This vote-getting ability of Roosevelt's was constantly stressed by his managers, when presenting their case before the delegates at Chicago.

Presidential preferential polls managed by Roosevelt's friend, financier Jesse I. Straus, all revealed a general tendency among all

classes of voters that was favorable to Roosevelt. The effect of these polls were devastating. The people like a winner and Roosevelt appeared to be one. The leaders of state delegations were naturally impressed as were rival candidates who were discouraged or even decided against making the race. "No piece of strategy in the preconvention period was more successful than these surveys. Furthermore, their use must be reckoned the most unique manuever of the campaign."[35] When Roosevelt began to pile up a large lead in the state conventions and primaries, the "bandwagon technique" was extended to encourage other delegations to join the rush.

Howe organized the "Friends of Roosevelt" after the 1930 returns had come in. Democratic leaders began to receive pamphlets relating the breakdown of those who had voted for Roosevelt. The organization, which was kept small and under tight control, seized the opportunity of drawing the "dryer" South into the fold as Raskob pressed the repeal issue. The Roosevelt name was played up as what the nation was seeking was another dynamic leader to pull them out of the hole. In order to gain the more cordial attitude of Hearst and his journalistic empire, Roosevelt recanted in his support of the League of Nations, implying that the League of 1932 was not the League Wilson had dreamed of in 1919. All of these small maneuvers were essential parts of the greater whole that was guiding Roosevelt to the nomination.

It was obvious that Roosevelt, with Smith fairly secure in his own baliwick of the Northeast, would have to rely on the delegations of the South and West to gain the needed convention votes. This necessitated his becoming a "national" candidate who would be unable to appeal to regional prejudices on an issue without offending another region from which his support would be drawn also. Quite naturally, this evolved

into a straddling of issues in an effort not to alienate any one segment of his support. The criticism of this avoidance of issues was torrential.

> Governor Roosevelt belongs to the new post-war school of politicians who do not believe in stating their views unless and until there is no avoiding it.[36]

> But this new game, which consists in gathering delegates first and adopting policies afterward to hold them together, is ignoble in itself, and from the point of view of party action deeply confusing.[37]

On one issue the Governor's straddling did not work. Throughout the campaign, Judge Seabury's investigation of the corruption in New York continued unabated. The Tammany braves, the key to the convention vote of the New York State delegation, were displeased with Roosevelt's allowing their favored mayor to suffer the indignities of having his weird financial holdings scrutinized. On the other hand, the moralists of the nation were disturbed not only by the revelations of the investigating commission, but also by Roosevelt's seeming reluctance to prosecute. Walker managed to stall the proceedings sufficiently so that Roosevelt would be forced to enter the convention with the Tammany "albatross" around his neck.

Back in the summer of 1931, it had been decided that it was time a Roosevelt man was sent out into the hustings to begin to boom his candidacy. At the French Lick Governors' Conference of that year Roosevelt had made some leading statements which indicated his interest in the nomination. However, it was felt that such action might be premature and that a little less direct method of wooing the delegates must be chosen. Jim Farley was the obvious choice for this role. Although inexperienced in national politics of the party, his geniality could

not be denied.

For many years Farley had been active in the Brotherhood of Elks, and at this time held the position of Exalted Ruler of the organization. The Elk's Convention was held on the West Coast, Seattle, this year and it was to afford him with an opportunity to visit with the local and state leaders of the party as he crossed the country to attend the convention. Roosevelt chose the key states that needed to be visited while Howe listed the leaders in these states that needed to be seen if victory was to be obtained. Setting out with his instructions, Farley covered over thirty thousand miles in nineteen days of his whirlwind tour through eighteen states during the month of July. His orders were to gain definite commitments to the Roosevelt candidacy whenever possible and, should this not prove feasible, to discourage the entrance of favorite-sons which would draw from the Roosevelt strength. Also, he was to learn what he could of local political conditions which might affect the national scene and he was to judge the reactions to the governor's race for the nomination.

Farley's glowing reports flowed in daily throughout the trip. He began to feel unduly optimistic about the chances of his man in the coming fight for delegates. A general reaction he noted was that of one of the old Midwestern party horses when he said, "Farley, I'm damned tired of backing losers. In my opinion, Roosevelt can sweep the country and I'm going to support him."[38] Such warm receptions often led Farley to overestimate his strength. "Farley's reports were generally far too enthusiastic and in some cases misleading."[39] He was later proved wrong in his estimation of what the situation was in Indiana and his report on the California expectations was so erroneous

as to nearly cost Roosevelt the nomination. A newcomer who was lost in some of the nuances of state factionalism, Farley was still more often right than wrong. His reports led to the development in the Roosevelt grand strategy of emphasizing the bandwagon aspects of the candidacy. This action of pushing the governor as a sure winner aided in solidifying the opposition and driving them to greater energy in attempting to keep delegations uninstructed.

While inexperience might hurt Roosevelt forces in their campaigning, they knew they could rely on a strong candidate whose own political sagacity was unquestioned and who might be just strong enough to carry them through to victory.

The general policy of all the major candidates was to enter only those states where they felt that victory was possible and in those states which they felt they could not win, they hoped to gain uninstructed delegations or, at least, not alienate the favorite-sons of those states who in the horse-trading at the convention would be decisive. They were aided in their efforts by the actions of the minor candidates who, hoping not to antagonize any faction of the front-runners, aimed to please in order that their selection as a compromise candidate would not be jeopardized over bitterness of a bloody primary battle.

The five states which observers of the day watched closely as indication as to which way the nomination would go were New Hampshire, New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and California. In the fight for the delegation from the Granite State Smith had been thought to be an easy winner. However, with the support of the state organization, Roosevelt carried the day by a 7 to 4 ratio while showing a great deal of strength in the rural areas. Smith showed some strength

in Manchester but his campaign had been poorly managed and the loss was a blow to his prestige.

In his home state Roosevelt nearly received a death blow to his candidacy. With Boss Curry of Tammany in opposition and the feeling still running strong for Smith, all that could be obtained from the ninety-four man delegation was an uninstructed slate. Roosevelt would be able to count on but a third of the delegates for support in the convention. It was thought by some that Curry hoped to be able to work a deal with Roosevelt with respect to the Governor's decision on the Walker case. One bright spot was the fact that now Roosevelt would be stamped in the minds of the delegations from other sections as not being a Tammany candidate.

The Massachusetts' primary was probably the biggest botch of the Roosevelt pre-convention campaign and a great boost to the hopes of the Allied opposition. Although Smith's popularity among the "wet" Irishmen of the state and the Straus Polls showed Roosevelt trailing, his name was, nevertheless, placed before the electorate. Colonel House had urged Roosevelt's entrance under the mistaken belief that he could manipulate the victory. Boss Curley of Boston, who had just recently been resoundingly defeated by the Ely-Walsh faction of the party in a contest for state control, saw in Roosevelt an opportunity of regaining some of his bruised prestige through a victory over his conquerors who were supporting Smith. Curley aligned himself with young James Roosevelt who at that time was entering the insurance field in Boston and had begun to dabble in politics. Of course, the elder Roosevelt was pleased with his son's interest and Burns feels he "may have allowed his family situation to spoil his good judgment".[40] Also, Roosevelt

reported to Farley that Smith had told him he had allowed his name to be entered only to appease those friends who wished to gain vindication for the '28 defeat on the religious issue. "There was no indication that they were to be used as a part of a 'Stop Roosevelt' movement, and I [Farley] got the impression that the Governor felt they might be found in his column eventually."[41]

This naive action was to lead, of course, to a sweeping victory for the Smith forces. The Ely-Walsh organization mustered a vote of three to one over the Roosevelt men. The rural districts refused to listen to the blandishments of Curley and when an eleventh-hour compromise was attempted by the Roosevelt forces, Curley threw a monkey wrench into the scheme which ended all hopes of a Roosevelt showing. All thirty-six Massachusetts delegates would be voting down the line for Al Smith when the convention rolled around.

The line-up in the Pennsylvania primary contest was somewhat the reversal of that in Massachusetts but the result had a painfully familiar ring to the Roosevelt supporters. In this instance it was the Governor who was favored to win easily while Smith was given but an outside chance since it was now his opponent who held the support of the state organization. However, Smith showed surprising strength in the "wet" and urban districts which, although Roosevelt was the choice of the preferential primary for the at-large delegates by a 20,000 vote plurality, resulted in his gaining two-fifths of the delegation and a moral victory. Coming two days after the Massachusetts results of April 26, the Allies began to see their hopes of stopping Roosevelt blossom.

It was in the California primary in early May that Roosevelt received what some believed at the time to be the death-blow to his can-

didacy. Encouraged by Farley's early reports and the fact that he held the support of the state organization, an easy victory for the Governor was predicted by his staff. They failed to take cognizance of Garner's strength with the Hearst papers, with McAdoo, and with the Texas Society of California which was more enthusiastic and better organized than the regular Democratic state organization.

An apparent weakness of Roosevelt's candidacy on a nation-wide basis of appeal had a telling effect in this primary. Unable to take a stand with but local appeal, his efforts suffered to some extent by the jibes of the Smith forces such as, "If you are Wet, vote for Smith -- if you are Dry, vote for Garner -- if you don't know what you are, vote for Roosevelt".[42] The low-ebb of Roosevelt's tide was reached in this primary as he ran a poor second to Garner and Smith ran a strong third with the support of "wet" San Francisco.

To offset the Garner strength in California and Texas, F. D. R. had to set out on a campaign of a winning of the West, and this he was able to do with the lone exception of Murray's Oklahoma. Support of the state organizations aided in Washington, Arizona, Wyoming, and Montana. In the latter case both the state's Senators, Walsh and Wheeler, were strong Roosevelt men, and in Wyoming O'Mahoney had latched his wagon to the Roosevelt star, while Eleanor's childhood friend, Mrs. John C. Greenway, carried Arizona into the Roosevelt column. Both the Colorado and Utah delegations pledged themselves to promote the Roosevelt cause and to a ticket which would have Governor Dern as a running mate. Their repsective state conventions gave the Nevada, Idaho, Minnesota, and Kansas delegations to Roosevelt. In the latter instance, with the unit rule in operation, Kansas would force Jouett Shouse to cast his

vote for his foe. The Minnesota delegation would be contested by a Smith slate of supporters at the Chicago convention which had been disaffected in a state party split. Smith supporters were also rebuffed in the Wisconsin primary when organizational support and Roosevelt's call for beer in "Thirsty Milwaukee" proved insurmountable obstacles. This primary saw a great number of Progressives leaving the Republican fold for the Democratic primary, thereby loosening Bob LaFollette's hold over the state G. O. P. organization.

Other primary contests in the West saw a Roosevelt sweep in Oregon, Nebraska, and North Dakota, over the efforts of "Alfalfa Bill". He had used the North Dakota filing procedure to announce his candidacy back in January (a primary was chosen since it would appear to be more "democratic".) and the state organization carried nine of the ten delegates for Roosevelt. Organization support in Nebraska had also made the difference as Roosevelt defeated both Murray and Garner. The Iowa convention, according to Farley, was a red-letter day in the Roosevelt pre-convention campaign which was considered to be a turning point in that campaign. Farley had journeyed to Des Moines to stave off a last-ditch, and nearly successful, effort on the part of the opposition to gain an uninstructed delegation. Both South Dakota and New Mexico chose to send uninstructed delegations to the convention but they were so obviously permeated by Roosevelt men that they were expected to stick with his candidacy. In Missouri, where Pendergast was on a peace-making campaign with the conservative faction, the delegation had been pledged to their favorite-son, ex-Senator Reed. However, it was well-known at the time that this was but nominal support and the delegation would come to Roosevelt's aid when needed.

Roosevelt's record in the winning of the West was neatly matched

with his efforts in the South. Losing only the twenty-four Virginia votes and the sixteen in Maryland to favorite-sons Byrd and Ritchie respectively, Roosevelt scored another impressive victory as a candidate with national appeal. Kentucky came into the Roosevelt column when her favorite-son, Barkley, withdrew in exchange for the nod of Roosevelt as the convention's keynoter. In Alabama, where a primary is optional, the state organization, knowing the Governor's popularity, called for a primary which resulted in the expected victory. In neighboring Georgia it was another primary sweep of Roosevelt over a man who stood as a proxy candidate for Garner. His polio resort center, Warm Springs, came out for their favorite patient by a 218 to 1 vote. The Mississippi convention endorsed Roosevelt but the endorsement was not binding and this delegation would be the source of much worry for Howe, Farley, and Flynn at the convention. With Huey Long calling the tune, the Louisiana delegation would be Roosevelt supporters. Although he had pledged his support to several other men on various occasions, Huey knew that Roosevelt had the votes to make or break the contesting delegation at the convention. Shouse attempted to pressure the party's state central committee into foregoing a primary and to send an uninstructed delegation from Florida. The pressure failed, however, and Roosevelt swept to another victory in the last primary before the convention. Both Tennessee and North Carolina pledged their support to Roosevelt, the support of the Tarheels being somewhat of a surprise. The uninstructed delegations from South Carolina and Arkansas had strong leaders (in the personages of Byrnes and Robinson) with Roosevelt leanings which would prove reliable for support.

The "Happy Warrior" was not idle, of course, and his expected

strength in the East and New England vindicated his hopes. Boss Hague lined up the thirty-two votes of New Jersey and organization support brought the anticipated victories in Rhode Island and Connecticut. Roosevelt carried Vermont and Delaware into the convention and his victory in Maine was used as an illustration to counteract the propaganda that the Massachusetts victory of Smith had shown unanimous sentiment for him in New England.

It was in the Middle States along the Ohio River that the decision could have been resolved before the convention ever met. Organization support in West Virginia carried Roosevelt over Murray with ease in the primary and Governor Murphy's assistance, along with that of the "radio priest", Father Coughlin, gave Michigan's thirty-eight votes to the Governor. Ohio's fifty-two, Illinois' fifty-eight, or Indiana's thirty votes, could, had they come to Roosevelt at the crucial moment, wrapped up the nomination. In Indiana, Paul V. McNutt, whom Farley had relied on, decided to give most of his uninstructed delegation to Baker or another opposition candidate, in exchange for the support of the Scripps-Howard papers in the state campaigns. The Roosevelt forces lost an opportunity in Illinois when Senator Lewis released his delegation before the convention and the announcement came too early for them to capitalize on it. Cermak was given time to negotiate the switch to the second favorite-son, Traylor, before Roosevelt was able to capture the delegation. Finally, in Ohio Governor White was the unopposed favorite-son in the primary but it was generally understood that the switch to Baker would materialize if White's candidacy should falter at the convention as expected.

While the territories for the most part have little but token representation in the conventions, their delegations are usually cited as indicative of bandwagon trends. In 1932, the first delegation pledged to Roosevelt came from the Territory of Alaska, [illegible]

ged to Roosevelt came from the Territory of Alaska. Of the thirty-eight delegates from the various territories, all were claimed by Roosevelt while Smith challenged his claims to sixteen of them. Smith's claims, however, proved valid only in the case of the six from the Philippines.

The pre-convention campaign for the Democratic nomination ended in a haze of doubts. Despite Farley's continued predictions of a "first-ballot victory" it was obvious that Roosevelt had not gained the necessary two-thirds for the nomination. Equally obvious was the fact that Smith had not been able to garner a third of the delegates which would be necessary for him to hold a veto power in the convention. The success of either the Roosevelt forces or of the Allies would depend, to a great extent, on the unpledged delegations or on those votes of the favorite-sons. One other important factor that all noted was the fact that Roosevelt had a clear majority of the delegates. At the convention he would have the moral weight of being the choice of a majority of the party and, probably more important, it would be his convention to organize and to staff with his men.

There would be 1,154 delegates casting their votes at the convention. It would take the vote of 769 1/3 to nominate under the Democratic two-thirds rule still in effect in 1932. The conflicting claims of the rival candidates showed some overlapping. A run-down of these claims went as follows: Garner (90), Lewis-Traylor (58), White (52), Reed (36), Murray (23), Byrd (24), Ritchie (16), uncertain (6), Smith (209), and Roosevelt (690). These claims came to a total of 1,204, or fifty more than was possible. The main conflicts in claims were between the Roosevelt and Smith camps which differed

over the estimated strength of their candidates in New York, Pennsylvania, and territorial delegations. It would be seen in the convantion which had been more accurate but all knew that each had overestimated their strength in an effort to attract the support of undecided delegations.

On Flag Day, June 14, 1932, the Republican convention convened in the city of Chicago. The central location of the city, its adequate hotel facilities, and the air-cooled convention hall, were all considerations that led the G. O. P. to choose the Windy City. While Atlantic City had matched Chicago's offer to chip into the party kitty, its eastern location and the fact that Illinois' electoral votes would be greater than those of New Jersey, could not be ignored.

Fess, the chairman of the National Committee, called the convention to order. The keynoter was to be Senator Lester J. Dickinson from Iowa and the permanent chairman was Representative Bertrand H. Snell of New York. Snell's address in accepting the gavel aroused some enthusiasm as he emphasized the Republican record on the tariff and other issues and drew a spontaneous demonstration of twelve minutes duration with the mention of Hoover's name.

Dickinson, nicknamed "Hell Raising Dick", had been chosen to give the keynote address as a sop to the agricultural interests of the Midwest. The presentation was poor and the delegates generally ignored his efforts. He ignored the controversial issue of prohibition and repeal and it was the first Republican keynote speech in over a decade that had not mentioned the glories of "Prosperity". He was at his best when assailing the Democrats and the delegates were able to give a demonstration of one-hundred and seventeen seconds at hearing the

President's name called forth.

> In the production of his speech Senator Dickinson obviously was determined that he would at all costs sound a triumphant keynote. This compelled him to omit all reference to the two-car garage and all explanations as to why after eleven years of Republican rule 'our nation is in the midst of its most perilous economic crisis'.[44]
>
> The historians admit that even Abraham Lincoln made a few mistakes, but if the Senator's story is to be believed Herbert Hoover has been invincibly right from start to finish.[45]

As is usual with keynote addresses, it was "not an intellectually honest performance"[46] but little else could have been, or should have been, expected.

The chairman of the Resolutions Committee was James R. Garfield of Ohio. It was he who presented the platform before the convention, but it was the Secretary of the Treasury, Ogden Mills, who had written it beforehand back in Washington. Writing with the directions of Hoover, Mills had performed the automatic task adequately but had eliminated, however, the framing of a plank on prohibition. This was nominally to be left to the convention, but in actuality it was written in a Chicago hotel room by men favorable to and inculcated with the views of the President.

The prohibition plank was, for all practical purposes, the only issue of the convention that the delegates were vitally interested in. The plank, when finally drafted, proposed that Congress should submit the question of repeal to the states and their conventions, and allow the states to decide the problem as they saw fit. While it did give some concessions to the Northeast, most observers regarded it rightfully as a "meaningless" plank. Connecticut Senator Hiram Bingham

moved that the Eighteenth Amendment be resubmitted to the states in an effort to make the plank more palatable to his section. This minority report on the plank was voted down 681 to 472, illustrating Hoover's control over the convention, which appeased no one and disappointed many.

> A straighforward, open and decisive policy, whether it was wet or dry, would have been ever so much better politics. Truly it is the timid who muddle the world.[47]

The plank had been purchased for party unity and it would plague the Republican orators throughout the campaign.

When time came for the nominations, the delegates well knew that there would be no doubt as to the outcome. From Hoover's home state "Plain Joe" Scott of Los Angeles rose to put the President's name in nomination. The conclusion of the nominating address was greeted with a synthetic demonstration of twenty-two minutes. A delegate by the name of Sandblast attempted to place before the convention the name of Dr. France of Maryland. The well-oiled Hoover convention rolled on as technical difficulties with the public-address system occurred at the critical moments of Sandblast's speech. When Dr. France attempted to withdraw his name in favor of that of Coolidge, the human machinery took over and the chair denied his right to address the convention since it felt he was not a duly selected delegate of the convention. The Hoover men were not risking the possibility of Coolidge's name stampeding the convention.

The roll call of the first and only ballot went as follows:

Total	1,154
Needed to nominate	578
Hoover	1,126 1/2
France	4
Coolidge	4 1/2

Dawes	1
Senator Blaine (Wisc.)	13
ex-Senator Wadsworth (N. Y.)	1
not voting	3
absent	1

While the nomination of Hoover was a foregone conclusion, the opposition to the renomination of vice-president Curtis was somewhat more persistent. In the pre-convention activities about twenty state delegations stated their dissatisfaction with a Vice-President who was fourteen years older than the President himself. His uncompromising "dryness" and his intellectual limitations were not in Curtis' favor, and the opposition made something of an attempt to draft Dawes. There was "little doubt that General Dawes could have had the nomination if he would have accepted it;"[48] but he rejected the offer and the opposition to Curtis collapsed for want of a candidate. Lippmann noted that this dissatisfaction prevailed at the convention among the delegates but noted that "they cannot think of anybody to put in his place."[49] He went on to say, "The great charm of Mr. Curtis is that by renominating him nobody's feelings will be hurt. If he is renominated that will be the reason why."[50] And Curtis was renominated.

Only one other candidate was placed in nomination to oppose Curtis. This was General John G. Harbord of New York. As the roll call began, it was noted that the California delegation cast its entire vote for the Vice-President. The delegates knew the significance of this action on the part of the President's home state. At the end of the first ballot Curtis was still shy 19 1/4 votes needed for the nomination. Under administration prodding, patronage-conscious Pennsylvania switched her vote so as to secure the renomination. The official ballot stood:

Total	1,154
Needed to nominate	578
Curtis	633 3/4
Governor Fuller (Mass.)	57
MacNider (former American Legion commander from Iowa)	178 3/4
Leonard Repogle (Fla.)	22 3/4
Snell (despite orders that he didn't desire the nomination)	55
General Harbord	161 3/4
Dawes	8 3/4
Judge Kenyon (Iowa)	2
Senator Bingham	1
Secretary Hurley	25
Senator Couzens	2
David Ingalls (Ohio)	2
absent	1

The motion to make the nomination unanimous that followed was adopted and Hoover would have the running-mate of his choice.

When the results came over the wires to the White House telling of his nomination, Hoover commented in a bit of an understatement, "Well, it was not wholly unexpected."[51] Indeed it was not, for "from beginning to end the meeting was firmly under the control of Mr. Hoover".[52] The delegates realized that Hoover's defeat would mean that they would lose their sinecures -- over four-hundred of them were federal office holders -- and they were perfectly willing to play ball. They were quite satisfied in doing this and their only vital interest was in the question of prohibition.

> The great puzzle here at Chicago is the total absence of any evidence of economic insurgency.[53]
>
> Surely it is astonishing that in the midst of such great economic distress there should be no rumbling of social discontent.[54]

Prior to the convention Arthur Krock had stated that the problem facing the Republican would be that "without admitting failure in anything, they must swallow many things they said in 1928 and imply the

promise of later achievement."[55] The apathy that pervaded the actions of the delegates at the convention indicated to many that the Republicans were beginning to see the handwriting on the wall. It was taken to mean that any Democrat could win in November and that the Republicans knew it. This conclusion, of course, would take some of the sheen off the need for a sure-winner as the Democratic standard-bearer. In this sense, Roosevelt's chances were hurt somewhat by the somnolent action of the Republican convention.

On June 27 the Democrats breezed into Chicago for their convention. Always a bit more boisterous than their staid brethren, the Republicans, the delegates were scenting victory in 1932 and the contrast was greater than ever.

A preview of the fireworks to come was given in the week before the convention. The Roosevelt forces, meeting early in Chicago, held a conference to organize the strategy of the convention campaigning. A great bugaboo of the Democratic conventions of the past had been the ancient two-thirds rule which had deadlocked many a convention, and had led to lasting bitterness between factions of the party. At the conference at which Farley was presiding the sentiment against this rule became manifest. Taking the floor in favor of abrogation of the two-thirds rule, Long of Louisiana let forth with a rip-snorting oration that "took his listeners by storm". It was Huey's first entry into the national scene, and he went over with a terrific bang."[56] With his large majority, Roosevelt would be able to force the abrogation of the rule through the convention and some of his leaders felt that such a move would be justified in light of the Smith's attempt to deadlock the convention.

"The tactic might have worked if it had been properly timed. But it was not."[57] Coming as it did three days before the opening session, it gave an opportunity for the Allies to unite against the move. Now, they felt, they would have the moral issue of accusing Roosevelt of attempting to change the rules after the game had started. Furthermore, the Allied propagandists now labeled the attempt as a confession of weakness which emphasized the fallacy of Farley's "first-ballot victory" boasts. Another weakness was to be found among Roosevelt's supporters. Southerners were not willing to abandon their veto-power over the nomination of the party. Roosevelt campaign managers began to realize that an attempt to press the issue would cause a large-scale defection in his ranks which would surely lose the nomination. Roosevelt did the only thing possible in a message to the press at the opening session of the convention when he stated that, rather than open his supporters to the "unfair" charge of "steamroller" tactics, he would not call for a vote on the issue. The anti-Roosevelt alliance was jubilant at the "victory", while the Roosevelt men comforted themselves with the thought that "he who fights and runs away lives to fight again another day". It was one of the first dents in the Roosevelt armour but it would prove not to be a costly one.

Who was responsible for the fiasco? Farley took his share of the blame in stating that "the blame was mine for letting the meeting get out of hand".[58] It was the first time that Farley's confidence in his own abilities was shaken as he failed to cut off the debate over Long's precipitous resolution. Gosnell calls it "Farley's bright idea",[59] but Flynn and Freidel differ with him. Freidel cites Long's action in itself as being at fault. Flynn, on the other hand, implies that Roose-

velt was well aware of the movement and did nothing to discourage it. While the strategy at the time was to make it appear that it was the inexperienced campaign managers who took the responsibility on their own hook, Flynn says Roosevelt, in a telephone conversation with Farley, put his stamp of approval on the move. Whatever be the case, the ultimate responsibility does lie with the man who had chosen his managers, whether he approved of this particular action or not.

A second opportunity for the Allied forces to charge Roosevelt and his men with steamroller tactics came with the selection of the permanent chairman of the convention. Back in April, at the meeting of the Arrangements Committee, Raskob had pressed for a declaration "recommending" Shouse for the post. Thinking that the post was a meaningless one, many of the Roosevelt supporters committed themselves in advance to accept this recommendation. They saw it as only a nominal honor which would afford the party the opportunity of recognizing the services that Shouse had rendered and would allow him to present the keynote address.

Roosevelt saw differently. He knew that the chair would be called on to make some srucial rulings and he did not wish to have a man unfavorable to his candidacy in it. Rather than openly defy his misguided workers, he suggested that since "to nominate a permanent chairman was not within its power" the arrangements committee should select Senator Barkley as the keynoter and pass a resolution "commending" Shouse for the post of permanent chairman. The Shouse-Raskob-Smith forces accepted the compromise and the issue looked to be resolved.

However, by the time of the convention, Roosevelt was convinced of Shouse's antagonism. F. D. R., therefore, decided to recant on the "commendation". It was decided that Montana's Senator Walsh would re-

ceive the Roosevelt support. Walsh had a good reputation for impartiality as had been evidenced in his extremely fair rulings in the imbroglio of the 1924 convention. His reputation for honesty had not been hurt by his pursuance of the Senatorial investigation of the Teapot Dome Scandals, either. Moreover, he was a Roosevelt supporter.

When the nominations were called for the position of permanent chairman, it became apparent that Roosevelt men would be behind Walsh's candidacy. The Allies let out screams of "foul" and "running out on a bargain". Dignified John W. Davis and the redoubtable Smith made pleas for the Shouse cause. The vote was to be a crucial one. Had the Roosevelt majority not appeared sufficient or as impressive as had been reported, the bandwagon would never have rolled. The vote went to Walsh with a 626 to 528 count and marked the closest a Roosevelt motion came to defeat. It was the "high-water mark of the opposition".[60] While at the time Lippmann felt the action taken to be symptomatic of the "belligerency" of the Roosevelt forces who were dead-set on unseating the Smith-Raskob forces of the party, years later Michelson commented "If the Roosevelt forces had not double-crossed Jouett Shouse in 1932, Jouett would have double-crossed Franklin Roosevelt."[61] It was only to be sometime afterward that the full significance of the Roosevelt victory was realized.

Senator Barkley, as had been decided long before in a bargain with Roosevelt, gave the Democratic keynote address. It was an oration of two hours which was particularly effective on the subjects of the tariff and prohibition, but less so on banking reform, economy, and the plight of the farmer. Its length disturbed some but as Will Rogers explained:

> It had to be a long speech for when you start enumerating the things that the Republican have got away with in the last twelve years you have cut yourself out a job.[62]

In the battle over the contested delegations of Louisiana and Minnesota the results were anti-climactic. The Roosevelt forces with their majority dominated again. The Minnesota delegation supporting the Governor was seated by a 658 1/4 to 492 3/4 vote. Huey Long, for kicks, had entered a third contesting delegation of his own in the Louisiana discussion. However, when the debate came he cut the horseplay and gave a reasoned and impressive presentation of his argument and the day was carried by a 638 3/4 to 514 1/4 count. Farley believed, or wished his readers to believe, that Roosevelt accepted Huey's cause because his cause was just. Flynn was a bit more candid in stating, "We decided to support Long's slate because he had pledged himself to the candidacy of Roosevelt."[63] At any rate, the Roosevelt support was significant in illustrating again the control he held over the convention which would impress those delegations that might have been wavering.

The party platform had been written by A. Mitchell Palmer, a dying man who wished to perform this last service for his party, under the guidance of such Roosevelt men as Hull.

As in the Republican convention, the delegates were more interested in the prohibition plank than in the economic planks. When Gilbert Hitchcock of Nebraska, the chairman of the Resolutions Committee, came to the prohibition plank he read, "We favor the repeal of the eighteenth amendment." The reaction was magnificent. A huge demonstration followed these words. Farley stated, "In view of the pussyfooting plank adopted by the Republicans, this bold action electrified the country."[64] At the moment, it "electrified" the convention. Hull proposed a minority report calling for the submission of the question to the states. This was defeated by a 934 to 213 3/4 vote of the parched convention as even Smith and Ritchie, despite the fact that they were candidates, spoke

before the convention for repeal. Although Roosevelt was not a "dripping wet" and the Allies were heartened by the spontaneous response to their favorite whipping-boy, it was not a defeat for the Governor's plans. When his supporters had asked him as to how they should vote, he gave them the instructions to vote as they pleased. He was not going to make repeal the paramount issue. Not only was Roosevelt secure in this action because it would not alienate any of his supporters, he was further aided by the fact that the commitment of the party to end prohibition eliminated one of the major reasons as to why Ritchie or Smith should be the nominee. No matter who was nominated now, "wet" delegates felt secure with such a plank.

On economic issues the "Democratic convention was at heart in favor of currency inflation."[65] Instead of coming out for the maintaining of the gold standard, the platform called for adherence to "sound currency". Hoover, in the campaign and afterward, was to term this a "weasel word".[66] The platform further called for a twenty-five percent reduction of Federal expenditures, opposition to the cancellation of the foreign debts, and advocated and pledged a balanced budget. These issues and pledges were not to be forgotten by Republican critics in the years of the New Deal that followed.

The platform was more accurate on its promise to aid agriculture, its pledge to regulate the marketing of securities, its advocacy of increased public works program by the Federal government, its call for relief to the unfortunate, its anti-lobbying legislation bent, in the field of foreign affairs, its adherence to the World Court, independence for the Philippines, and reciprocal trade agreements. Taking these into consideration, along with the pledge to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment, the platform was a better than average prognosticator.

The brevity of the platform, it was only fifteen-hundred words in length, appealed to many observers. Lippmann, who must not have realized what influence Roosevelt had had in its formulation, even had kind words for the document:

> The resolutions committee has done the best job in any national convention for at least twenty years.[67]

> ... it is more honest, more clear-headed and more courageous than the platform of any major party since the end of the war.[68]

But he added with accuracy, it

> should prove to be very popular with the voters and rather difficult to live up to.[69]

Lindley, a Roosevelt booster of long standing, notes that the platform "did not fully reflect Mr. Roosevelt."[70] It was, rather, "a reasonably conservative document which swung hardly farther to the left than Alfred E. Smith's program of 1928."[71] Whatever might be the analysis, Roosevelt would have a platform that he could stand with comfort on during the ensuing campaign, and this he did.

With the party platform out of the way, the convention turned to the major business at hand of choosing the party's presidential nominee. Roosevelt had his old friend, John E. Mack, give his nominating address in what proved to be "probably the worst"[72] of the series. It was followed by a forty-five minute demonstration with the organist constantly repeating the campaign song "Happy Days are Here Again". Massachusett's Governor Ely gave the "most effective"[73] nominating speech when he put Al Smith's name before the convention. The demonstration for Smith was the longest of the convention but observers noted that a great amount of this "spontaneous" support came from the galleries packed by Cermak's vociferous ruffians.

As the nominating and seconding speeches droned on Farley came to the question of whether or not to use his majority to press for the calling of the first ballot at their conclusion. It was getting late in the day and the delegates were naturally becoming restive and uncomfortable. When the last of the speeches ended at five in the morning of the third day, Mullen, Roosevelt's floor manager, under instruction of Farley moved for the roll call of the first ballot. The battle was now to reach its climax as the forces joined.

Needing 769 1/3 votes to nominate, Roosevelt polled 666 1/4 on the first ballot. It was an overwhelming majority and he was well ahead of his nearest competitor, Smith, who had but 201 3/4. Farley, after the vote had been announced, sat back confidently awaiting on the other delegations to rise and switch its votes to Roosevelt and begin the ride on the bandwagon to victory. No such switch was made.

Before Farley could get to Mullen to move for adjournment, the roll call on the second ballot commenced. It is traditionally true that the front-runner in the balloting must show an increase in each succeeding ballot for if any sign of a decrease appears, it is the signal for a general race of wholesale defection of vacillating delegations. On the second ballot Roosevelt rose to a total of 677 3/4 votes. The slightness of a 11 1/4 vote increase indicates how much Farley had relied on a first-ballot nomination in that he had mustered such support as he could.

During the calling of the roll of the second ballot, Huey Long did yeoman work in keeping the capricious Arkansas and Mississippi delegations in line. He alternately bullied, threatened and cajoled, the leaders of each of these states. "Without Long's work Roosevelt might not have been nominated."[74]

At the conclusion of the second ballot the Roosevelt forces moved for adjournment but were defeated in this effort. The Allies, thinking they had F. D. R. on the run, were aided in blocking the motion with the votes of those delegates who were angered at being kept to such a late hour. Smith and Raskob felt confident they would be able to crack Roosevelt on the final ballot of the day -- the third. Fortunately for Roosevelt, his lines remained strong and Pendergast was able to send him five of his Missouri votes so that an increase was shown for the third ballot.

The weary delegates gratefully accepted the move for adjournment after the third ballot ended at nine in the morning and they returned exhausted to their hotel rooms. The Allies were grateful and pleased that Roosevelt's victory was still not in sight but they were disturbed by and amazed with the tenacity with which the Roosevelt line had not crumpled. The official count on the first three ballots was:

	First	Second	Third
Roosevelt	666 1/4	677 1/4	682 3/4
Smith	201 3/4	194 1/4	190 1/4
Garner	90 1/4	90 1/4	101 1/4
Byrd	25	24	24
Traylor	42 1/2	40 1/4	40 1/4
Ritchie	21	23 1/2	23 1/2
Reed	24	18	27 1/2
Murray	23	---	---
White	52	50 1/2	52 1/2
Rogers (Will)	---	22	---
Baker	8 1/2	8	8 1/2

75

It would be in the hours before the convention reconvened in the evening that the issue would be decided. It was a time for horse-trading, flattery, promises, pledges, and frantic telephoning. The men who had been working with the campaign since its inception would receive no rest, now. The final vote of the convention for the nomination of

the convention's candidate would be taken that night on the fourth ballot.

In the evening session the fourth roll call began. Alabama yielded to California and the leader of the delegation, McAdoo, approached the podium. With his first words barely out, the convention realized what had occurred. Garner was throwing his votes to Roosevelt. The irony of the drama was heightened somewhat when it was recalled that it was Smith who had locked horns with McAdoo in the 1924 convention. McAdoo was now returning the favor. He was putting the coup de grace to Smith's hopes forever. The hooligans in the galleries were in an uproar. They did not accept the defeat gracefully and Mayor Cermak was forced to come up to the podium to quiet them before McAdoo was able to finish. At the conclusion of the roll call the vote stood:

Roosevelt	945
Smith	190 1/2
Traylor	3
Baker	5 1/2
Cox	1

Franklin Delano Roosevelt was to be the party's selection to lead them to certain victory in November.

In analyzing Garner's releasing his delegations to Roosevelt, there is a great deal of confusion among students as to just who was responsible for the crucial decision. William Randolph Hearst is often singled out as the man who made the nomination of Roosevelt possible. It is known that Farley and Howe had finally agreed that all hope of victory rested with the obtaining of the Garner votes in Texas and California. Flynn believed that Hearst controlled the California delegation and that he controlled enough of the Texas votes so that if they united with Roosevelt men in that delegation, a majority of Roosevelt supporters would bind the entire delegation under the unit rule. Peel and

Donnely say, "William Randolph Hearst was the man who proved to be the kingmaker on the victorious fourth ballot."[76] They feel that Hearst had created Garner's candidacy and that his fear of a deadlocked convention which might result in the compromise nomination of Baker, whom he considered to be a radical internationalist, was overpowering.

Those who disagree with the viewpoint that Hearst was responsible minimize his influence on the two key delegations. They point out that Hearst was never in contact with Garner in Washington throughout the proceedings. While Flynn says that "the real factor of the whole situation was Hearst,"[77] and that he chose to side with Roosevelt rather than accept one of the several greater evils, Smith or Baker, Michelson disagrees. He says:

> My postconvention information was that Mr. Hearst contended he had not agreed to go the whole way and was much put out about the deal, feeling that his representation had unduly committed him.[78]

Raymond Moley, another indider, felt that Rayburn, Garner's campaign manager, and a delegate from Santa Barbara, Tom Storke, played the key roles in initiating the switch. This is doubtful.

As nearly as I can determine "no one but Speaker Garner himself was in a position to release the Texas delegation or the California delegation."[79] "Thus it was Garner himself who played the really decisive role in guaranteeing the nomination to Roosevelt."[80] The evidence seems to point to this conclusion.

When Farley decided he "had to have the Texas delegation to ensure victory for the Roosevelt cause,"[81] he attempted to contact Hearst in California to gain his support. "But even Hearst could not swing California to Roosevelt. The delegation was pledged to Garner and Garner alone could release it."[82] It appears that Garner was more in-

terested in the success of the party rather than in his own personal ambitions. Personally opposed to the two-thirds rule, he thought little of a deadlocked convention, and even less of the possibilities of a successful campaign against Hoover on the part of a compromise nominee. Also, while the Speaker of the House was a serious candidate for the nomination, "The Garner candidacy never had any vitality and the Garner delegates had no good reason for separating themselves from the other Roosevelt states in the South and West."[83] All these reasons seem to indicate that it was Garner's decision and that he had strong motivation to agree to the switch.

When the convention came to nominate its candidate for the Vice-Presidency only Garner and General Matthew A. Tinley of Iowa were candidates. Garner was the choice on the first ballot and Tinley's motion to make the nomination unanimous was carried.

This would seem to substantiate the idea "that Speaker Garner had traded his ninety votes to Roosevelt for the vice-presidency,"[84] and that "the deal was clear to all. Garner had been persuaded to give up the speakership for the Vice-Presidency."[85] Nevertheless, it seems that it was not a "deal" in the traditional sense. When the Missourian, Senator Hawes, who has also been credited with being the mastermind of the switch, first suggested a Roosevelt-Garner ticket he received a tongue-lashing from the Speaker who "made it plain that he had no desire for the Vice-Presidency."[86] When Farley had conferred with Rayburn prior to the fourth ballot no mention of the Vice-Presidency had been made and Rayburn had only said, "We'll see what can be done."[87] It is evident that Garner's managers had consistently turned down the possibility of the Vice-Presidency since they knew that their man was more interested in retaining the Speakership rather than surrendering it for

the comparatively less important post. But the Texas delegation was not to be denied. They agreed only to vote for Roosevelt after Garner released them, and then only by a 54 to 51 vote, provided that Garner would be on the ticket. His interest in the welfare of the Democratic Party seems to have committed Garner to accept a nomination he did not desire also. Flynn bluntly states that the "nomination of Garner was decided by Roosevelt and Roosevelt alone".[87] In accepting Garner as a running-mate, Roosevelt offended some of his Western supporters who had been with him since the beginning, and who wished to see Governor Dern on the ticket. Furthermore, Garner came from a state that was sure to go Democratic in November and little advantage had been gained in this respect. Like the platform, the ticket was a result of numerous compromises that still needed to be worked out in the months and years to come.

Roosevelt, always willing to take an action that was flavored with the dramatic, broke several precedents in accepting the nomination of the convention. In previous years it had been the usual procedure for a delegation to be appointed by the convention to inform the party's nominee of his selection several weeks after the convention had closed shop. In 1932, Roosevelt became the first presidential candidate to appear before the convention that had nominated him and make his speech of acceptance. Immediately after hearing that he gained the nomination, Roosevelt boarded a plane in Albany and headed for Chicago. This flight, the first such taken by a presidential candidate, served the purpose of dramatizing to the nation that he was a man of action and that there should be no question as to the condition of his health during the campaign.

Roosevelt did not fail to emphasize the picture of change he wished

to bring before the electorate. "Let it be from now on the task of our Party to break foolish traditions...," he told the assembled delegates. He continued to appear in the role of the aggressive man of action as he said, "I pledge you, I pledge myself to a new deal for the American people." While the acceptance speech, in retrospect,[88] might not "stand out as one of the best of Roosevelt's," he did convey to the listeners a feeling of friendliness, confidence, compassion, and a willingness to experiment. While the speech could not have been considered anticipatory of the future of the New Deal, Raymond Moley was pleased to observe that, since it had been drafted by the candidate and Moley's group of advisors, "The philosophy developed by the little group that I had brought together was now, in substance, the official policy of the standard-bearer of the party."[89]

Burns says, "The story of Roosevelt's presidential nomination is the story of how a battle almost won in the early stages was almost lost by mistake after mistake during the last critical months of the contest."[90] He goes on to say that "the nomination fight had shown the essential strength of their candidate — a strength that could weather his and his lieutenant's errors. The real test lay ahead."[91] I do not feel that I can agree with Mr. Burns. The Roosevelt in 1931-32 was not the Roosevelt of 1936. His strength as a candidate was not seen by all and, as nearly as I can determine, his nomination never appeared to be a shoo-in at any time. As for the "test" he would face following the nomination, Farley notes, "Even at that early date there was a feeling upon the part of everyone present that the Democratic nominee would be carried to victory in the succeeding fall election."[92]

Flynn observes, "Roosevelt nominated himself." It was the candi-

date who "... supplied the essential political wisdom and direction."[93] Although there had been crucial moments in the drive for the nomination at Chicago, the fierce and spectacular fight had drawn the eyes of the nation to it and this contrasted well with the dreary spectacle the Republicans had put on earlier in the month.

The Democrats were, as usual, fearful that an inter-party fight would kill the chances in November. Al Smith must not have been listening when Will Rogers urged, "No matter who they nominate, a lot of you are going to be disappointed, but for the Lord's sake, for once in your life go home and don't act like Democrats."[94] Perhaps Father Coughlin's appeals for outside assistance softened the Happy Warrior's heart once the campaign began. The radio-priest asked the delegates to "Remember that we have had an engineer from Palo Alto in the White House. It is up to you to put the Carpenter of Nazareth in the White House."[95] At any rate, Al would eventually work with the party to put the Governor from Albany in the White House.

When Smith left the convention, refusing to await the arrival of the victorious Roosevelt or to release his delegates so that the nomination might be made unanimous, Republicans spread gleeful rumours of a party bolt by Al. Roosevelt took the initiative in his attempt to heal the breach by visiting with Smith in New England a few weeks after the convention. But the public healing of the breach came at the New York State Democratic Convention at which the successor to Roosevelt as governor was to be selected. Herbert Lehman, a Roosevelt supporter in the pre-convention campaign and a close personal friend of Smith, was unacceptable to the Tammany delegates and a firm coalition of Lehman supporters would be needed to carry him through. At the key point of the convention Al Smith strode down the aisle, approached Roosevelt, and

the two greeted one another with a hearty handshake as the rafters shook with the cheers of the delighted delegates. With Lehman nominated by his efforts, Smith then opened a speech-making tour for Roosevelt. He attempted to raise the religious question again at the address in Jersey City. (Boss Frank Hague had by this time also accepted the party's nominee) which caused some dissension. However, he was particularly effective in the New England area and is credited with winning away some of the states that had been expected to be found in the Hoover column. The Democrats' worst fears were never realized and the Republican rumors were squelched.

One piece of by-play occured at Chicago that analysts of the future would see but which no one could have predicted at the time.

> It was at this convention that the 'marriage' between certain conservative Southern Democrats and progressive Democrats in the North and West took place... The birth of the New Deal actually occurred during the many conferences in Chicago.[96]

Lippmann, naturally, was somewhat less that satisfied when he saw his governor receive the nomination. Ending the convention on a sour note, he wrote that he would "spend the next few months realizing that John Morley was right when he said that politics was the science of the second best."[97]

Hoover's choice for his campaign manager for the national campaign was Everett Sanders of Indiana. Sanders, Coolidge's personal friend, had the added appeal of being from the Midwest where the Republicans already knew that much of their trouble was to center. Also, the placing of the national Republican headquarters in Chicago was partly due to this unrest in the farm states. Washington might have been a more natural choice for the Republican center but, as his secretary points out, Hoover sincerely wished to be removed from the pressures of campaign decisions in order that the presidential duties could be attended to with a minimum of interference. "As the campaign progressed," however, "Mr. Hoover was forced to assume virtual direction as well as to engage in a more extensive speaking campaign than he had originally anticipated."[98] Indeed, the tight control Hoover had over the Republican convention was not relinquished in the subsequent national campaign. Although an executive committee of the party's National Committee was organized to carry the burden of the work, it became merely an extension of Hoover's decisions on campaign policy.

On the Democratic side of the fence, Farley was the natural choice to continue Roosevelt's campaign on the national level. A practical politician who was well-known and well-liked by the party rank and file, Farley had the temperament and energy to organize the campaign that would secure the victory. He also had impressed the wheelhorses of Democracy, for at the conclusion of the campaign they were near unanimity in singing his praises. He was called the "greatest political general of our times,"[99] "the greatest campaign manager of them all,"[100] and "win or lose,... a magnificent leader."[101]

Of course, Louis Howe, Roosevelt's long-time confidante, was to play his role in the background of the drive for votes. Michelson said, "I believe that Louie Howe's advice influenced Franklin Roosevelt more than that of any other individual."[102] Michelson, who had been laboring for the Raskob-Shouse forces, came over to the Roosevelt camp after the nomination,

He and his number two man on publicity, Norman Baxter, proved to be an effective team which, due to his confidence in their abilities, Roosevelt allowed to work unhampered with freedom of action. Frank Walker held the position of treasurer on the general staff and came to the rescue with sufficient funds on many an occasion, and Bob Jackson organized the party's Speaker's Bureau. Farley was able to draw on the experience and knowledge of O'Mahoney and he particularly relied on the political sagacity of Virginia's Senator Claude Swanson when a truly ticklish problem of policy arose.

The Democratic campaign staff was located in New York City and numbered from 500 to 600 workers. In deciding to have but the central office, Roosevelt chose to avoid regional headquarters in an effort to minimize duplication of procedure, expenses, and disappointments in appointments to party jobs; and he felt a closer contact with the state organizations could be maintained by the centralized headquarters. In expanding the women's division of the campaign headquarters, the Democrats were able to execute what was "perhaps the most effective inovation of the 1932 campaign."[103]

Roosevelt was fortunate in inheriting from the Raskob organization a staff with experience and which was relatively smooth-running. In his gubernatorial race in 1930, Roosevelt and his men had learned the importance of keeping in close contact with the party's precinct workers. Farley and company attempted to keep in direct personal contact with over 140,000 local party workers across the nation. This called for direct distribution of campaign material and "personal" letters of appreciation to the precinct leaders which assisted them and encouraged them to continue the labor at the grass roots. Nor were the higher-ups of party leadership to be neglected.

> Every state chairman went back feeling he was a person of real importance, of real responsibility, and determined

> to work as he had never worked before for the success of the Democratic party.[104]

During his term as New York's governor, Roosevelt had not been afraid to draw on the talents of men in the academic world in dealing with problems of state. When he began his campaign for the nomination, he soon realized the need for a fact-finding board which could educate him on national policies and work with him on his speeches, and so he turned again to college professors for assistance. In doing this he would be getting some of the most advanced theories of government needed, and the professors would have the opportunity to extend their classroom to a national scale.

Roosevelt first called on Raymond Moley, a political scientist from Columbia, to organize the group of advisors which would come to be nicknamed first "the privy council" (Moley was suspicious of what unfriendly newspapers could do with this), then "the brains trust," and finally, in the early days of the New Deal, "the Brain Trust." Moley, basically a conservative, proved to be an exceptional organizer of men and ideas with a great capacity for the endless work that the position entailed.

In the pre-convention campaign, Moley drew mainly from his colleagues on the Columbia faculty. Adolf Berle was an expert in the field of credit and corporations while Rex Tugwell, a voluble and brilliant idea man, specialized on agricultural problems and economics. There were several others on the periphery of the "Big Three," (Moley, Berle, Tugwell), and men such as Judge Rosenman and Felix Frankfurter made serious contributions to the cause. After the nomination had been secured, Bernard Baruch brought Hugh Johnson into the workings of the Brain Trust. Old "Ironpants" Johnson was as useful as he was belligerent in his ideas.

The membership of the Brain Trust was not the only thing to expand

after Chicago. Its duties and responsibilities increased. "From a research group, the brains trust developed into a board of economic strategy for the campaign."[105] Also, Moley and his men were put in charge of the campaign speeches and their development for Roosevelt's use as a basis for his own. Roosevelt was an "indefatigable gatherer of ideas and impressions,"[106] and he would digest the statements of his "perfessers," blend with his own politcal know-how, and arrive at a policy to take into the campaign. The Brain Trust attempted to bring together men of varying shades of opinion. Roosevelt would listen to their advice and points of view, blend the conflicts into one policy, and draw his own conclusions. The work of the Brain Trust was kept separate from the political organization of Farley. Moley was in charge of the issues, Farley would take care of getting the votes. As Moley said, "There was never the slightest suggestion of interference on policy matters from Jim Farley and I never meddled in matters relating to political organization."[107] One dissenting voice from the glory of the work of the Brain Trust was that of Mr. Hoover. He condemned the "multitude of ghost-written speeches" of his opponent which, according to Hoover, "mostly revolved around personal attacks."[108] But then, Mr. Hoover did have a vested interest in the matter.

With 1932 being a depression year, the party coffers of both the Democrats and Republicans were far from overflowing. After the crash of the stock market the Democrats had been bailed out of their pressing debts by their millionaire chairman, Raskob. Other contributors to the Democratic cause were such men as Baruch, Astor, and Hearst. The Democrats relied primarily on the big contributors and the smaller contributions, while the Republican support came mainly form the middle brackets of contributions. Some of the old reliables of the G.O.P. became discouraged

at the increasing likelihood of defeat and were less free with their donations than they had been in the past. However, both parties were "adequately financed and evenly matched financially,"[109] the Republicans having a slight edge. All in all, the depression brought a fewer number of contributors and a greater reliance on the small contribution was necessary. The main area of the nation for contribution was the Northeast with the Republicans able to draw on the Wall Street crowd to a greater extent than the Democrats and Raskob could.

The depression, in cutting down on the financial backing, also led to a minimizing of extravagance in the campaign. The greatest single bill for both parties was for radio time. Organization workers of the Republicans found that their salaries were lower than they had been in years past, but that was true of most jobs across the nation. The cost per vote in 1932 was thirteen cents each which was the lowest it had been in years. Although Frank Walker spent $500,000 less than the Republicans, the net result was that the party with the smaller war treasury for the first time since 1916 won the election. It is doubtful that the Republicans, no matter how much they spent, could have overcome the country's desire for a change.

Neither party showed much originality in their conduct of the campaign of 1932. The Democratic organization was primarily concerned with making as few mistakes as possible. The Republican organization was marked by the apathy borne of looming defeat.

Wherever a candidate went in 1932 there was one dominating issue. This was The Great Depression. The electorate wanted to know what was responsible for their plight but, even more so, they wanted to know what the candidates were going to do about it. The Republicans answered, as

expected, with the belief that the depression was due to foreign causes and that Mr. Hoover had done everything possible to mitigate its effect and to put the nation back on the road to recovery. They cited the work of the R.F.C. as a credit to the Republican party and pointed to Garner's "pork-barrel" recommendations as an example of what to expect from the Democrats.

The Democrats differed to quite a degree on the causes of the depression. The Brain Trust "proceeded on the assumption that the causes of our ills were domestic, internal, and that the remedies would have to be internal too."[110] Roosevelt charged Hoover with the failure of not checking a stock market boom based on dangerous speculation. He said that Hoover, as Secretary of Commerce, had been responsible for an overbuilding of industry and had encouraged poor loans to foreign nations which, when they could not meet their debts, deepened the depression by defaulting. Hoover's signing of the Hawley-Smoot tariff was said to have weakened the foreign markets, led to the abandoning of the gold standard on the part of Great Britain and others, and brought reprisals from other nations which naturally raised their tariff walls also. Finally, Roosevelt appeared shocked at the deficit spending of the Federal government and attacked what he considered to be extravagances in its operation.

In the early stages of the campaign both candidates were pretty much in agreement on some aspects of meeting the problem. Both opposed the use of relief direct from the Federal government and desired to put most of the burden on state and private agencies. Both parties called for the establishment of public work programs but the Republicans qualified their stand by advocating only "productive" projects. Roosevelt's most concrete proposal was on the plans for a reforestation project which he had come to learn the value of in his relief activities as governor in his home state.

The issue of unemployment was closely tied with that of the depression. Again both parties agreed in recognizing the need for federal assistance with this problem, the Democrats appearing to be willing to go farther. Roosevelt was particularly naive in realizing how much such a program would cost. Roosevelt did, in his Boston speech, come out with a philosophy of government which few could take issue with when he said that "the national government has a positive duty to see that no citizen shall starve."[111] The unemployment statistics showed a rise in employed personnel during the month of October, but when it was pointed out that it was still lower than that of October of the previous year, the Republicans gained little support. Besides being disgusted with the proceedings of the Hoover administration, the electorate felt that they saw in Roosevelt a man of action who would not be afraid to carry out the basic proposals that both he and his more timid opponent agreed upon.

"The G.O.P. leaders very kindly prepared the way for the rebirth of the Democratic Party when they neglected the farm problem."[112] It was to be in the rural districts of the nation that Roosevelt was to find some of his strongest support. The farm leaders felt that they could expect no assistance from Hoover and his policies and were forced to accept as their candidate the gentleman-farmer, Roosevelt, whose record as governor indicated an awareness of the problem. The Midwest was ripe for insurgency. Riots and boycotts marked the summer of the campaign, particularly in and around Iowa. Under Tugwell's guidance, such farm leaders as M. L. Wilson, Peek, and Henry Wallace were drawn under the Roosevelt banner.

The key to the Roosevelt agricultural program was given in his address to the farmers at Topeka. "It won the Midwest without waking up the dogs of the East."[113] With over twenty-five persons drafting the

Roosevelt speech, many of them the farm leaders who appreciated his willingness to confer with them, it was a masterpiece of glittering generalities which, although satisfied no one completely, failed to alienate any of his backers. Citing the fact that "This Nation cannot endure half 'boom' and half 'broke'", Roosevelt advocated a reorganization of the Department of Agriculture, "planned use of the land," lower taxes for the farmers, and freer credit restrictions for refinancing mortgages. The "planned use of the land" referred to his belief in the necessity of a domestic allotment plan, but couched in these terms, the Eastern conservatives would not be aware of what he was coming out in favor of. The Topeka audience heard what he had to say, went home and pondered it in their hearts, and then went out in November to cast their ballots for Roosevelt.

Roosevelt was more interested in garnering the farm vote than he was in abiding by the principles of such low-tariff supporters as Hull. "He was, in theory, a low-tariff man,"[114] but when he found that some of his farm support desired continued protection of agricultural commodities, Roosevelt began to stray from his original position. Hoover continued to pound him again and again on his inconsistencies. Roosevelt saw the need for a new conception of the American tariff system and had hoped to resolve the conflict through reciprocal trade agreements when he called for "negotiated tariffs with benefit to each nation."[114] The Hawley-Smoot tariff was excoriated by the Democratic orators, Roosevelt included, but their position was weakened somewhat by the fact that it had been passed with the assistance of many Democratic votes. "The forgotten man was completely forgotten by every Senator whose constituients desired a special privilege."[115] It was the opinion of some observers that Hoover had signed the Hawley-Smoot bill in an effort to appease the Republican

leadership. No one seemed particularly happy with the tariff issue, the positions of the two parties were never too far apart, and finally at Boston, near the end of the campaign, Roosevelt said that he wanted to make it clear that "I favor...continued protection for American agriculture as well as American industry." The tariff was not a deciding issue in November.

On the issue of the reduction of the Federal budget the politicians of both parties were all for the idea, while the more objective economists took a dim view of it. With the party platform pledged to a 25% reduction of governmental expenditures, Roosevelt was forced by his advisors, particularly Howe and Johnson, to make a costly commitment to uphold the pledge in his Pittsburgh speech. It must be kept in mind that Roosevelt had balanced the budget of New York when he was governor and probably sincerely believed it could be done on a national scale. At any rate, this position did appeal to conservatives and it did win votes. Hoover was only left with his record of reducing the expenditures in some agencies.

Hoover and Roosevelt had already clashed earlier on the issue of public utilities. Joslin feels that the interplay over the Roosevelt telegram to Hoover suggesting a conference on the St. Lawrence Seaway project was a standoff. Both men were able to go on record as champions of lower rates, closer regulation of private companies, while Roosevelt showed his interest in extended public ownership and operation, and Hoover could cite his past record of interest and support of the ideas. For those to whom the issue was a critical one, they probably took their cue from the old Republican progressive, Senator Norris, who was a Roosevelt man from the convention onward. At his Portland address Roosevelt came out in favor of many of Norris's favorite ideas. He suggested the development of the "Yardstick" system, the increased regulation

of holding companies, the regulation of the issue of stocks and bonds (The Insull Empire had only recently tottered), all to be handled by regulatory commisions working in the interest of the consumers.

> Here was a subject to which Roosevelt had given more painstaking study than he had to any other single one. His power policy was, in a sense, part of a larger policy which included the conservation of both land and water.[116]

Hoover spoke on the subject of foreign policies on eight different occassions while Roosevelt, feeling that Hoover was adequate on this issue and that the voters weren't particularly interested in it, generally ignored it. Both parties , if their platforms were to be believed, were in favor of the American paricipation in the World Court, and both parties generally ignored the idea of entering the League of Nations or recognizing Communist Russia. Hoover was able to point to the London Conference as an example of his interest in world peace but the repudiation of the foreign debts did hurt his cause. "The humiliation was an essential step toward the ultimate triumph."[117] Roosevelt had belabored Hoover on the foreign debt question, although he agreed to the wisdom of the moratorium, when he had recanted on the League in deference to Hearst back in February. In foreign relations and the issues concerning it, Roosevelt again seemed to be more moved by the necessity of winning the election rather than of making his position clear.

> He was already sure of the West and Middle West, where his views on foreign affairs would be immensely popular. There was no advantage in alienating those Eastern elements which would shy at his policies.[118]

The issue of Repeal was fairly well overshadowed in the campaign. Hoover seemed to be ready to admit the failure of the Noble Experiment and expressed only a desire to protect those states which still desired to remain dry. Roosevelt appeared to be an "Honest Wet" which he could do easily in the East without offending the West. The West was mainly

interested in the economic questions and would not allow their "dryness" prevent their supporting Roosevelt. Poor Hoover, even after he had "said the Amendment should be repealed,"[119] found a dissenter in the person of his running-mate. Curtis was unable to forget his "dryness" and in mid-campaign came out against the movement for Repeal. There was nothing the President could do about this blunder but he knew it wouldn't help enough in the dry states and would damage him even more in the thirsty Eastern states. Hoover, for some reason, considered it to be "an important issue in the campaign,"[120] but did recognize the superiority of the Democratic plank on the issue. In his "Apology" he stated, "This idea of urging the states to prevent the saloon, instead of requiring it, was the only essential difference from the Republican formula - except that the Democratic plank was clear-cut."[121] At any rate, the nation was not ready to go into turmoil over the issue and, except for the brief rally at the conventions, Old Man Prohibition was pretty well forgotten.

On the subject of "sound currency" versus the Gold Standard, Hoover was able to back Roosevelt into the hole of his Pittsburgh Speech. Roosevelt needed the support of the inflation-minded farmers of the West, but he could not afford to completely alienate the conservative businessmen of the East. In his Seattle address he went so far as to say, "there are many ways of producing the results desired without disturbing the currency of the United States." But this was not far enough to the right for Hoover, and Howe began to become fearful of the effect of the continual hammering on the issue. Roosevelt wisely avoided the issue as much as possible, except for stating he would stand by the gold clause in the government bonds, until as late in the campaign as the Pittsburgh speech. Moley says that "he was wholly aware of its implications when

he made it," and that it "represented Roosevelt's wholehearted views on government finance."[122] But Roosevelt would rue the day that he came out in defiance against those who intimated that, if elected, he might tamper with the Gold Standard.

The hearings on the Seabury investigation of Tammany mayor Walker had been postponed until after the Democratic convention. When the hearings did open in mid-August, Roosevelt knew that the liberal intelligentsia, and much of the nation, would be following his actions closely. If he prosecuted Walker ruthlessly the charge of political expediency on the national scale would be raised and he could well lose Tammany support in the national election which would mean the loss of New York State. On the other hand, if he showed leniency, the Republicans would have raised the hue and cry of his tainted association with the Sons of St. Tammany. Assisted by his legal aide, Martin Conboy, Roosevelt commenced the hearings and worked with scrupulous fairness toward the popular Mayor of Gotham. As the hearing continued his national reputation grew for he illustrated both a fairness and objectivity as well as a keen analysis of the situation. After three weeks of hearings, Walker, knowing that his hopes were dim, settled the issue by resigning. Boss Curry of Tammany, although not pleased with the situation, was not prepared to bolt the party at this time. Roosevelt had "stripped the Republicans of a national issue without losing Tammany."[123]

Labor leaders, as did the farm leaders, had little place to go in the campaign except to Roosevelt. All that they desired from the candidates were commitments to higher wages, fewer hours, and extended unemployment insurance for their workers. Both Roosevelt and Hoover were willing to make these commitments, Roosevelt being willing to go farther on job insurance. There were no speeches directed specifically to labor's voting power. The depression years were not happy times for organized

labor and they felt their best hope lay with Roosevelt who "was, as Woodrow Wilson said of Jefferson, A 'patron' of labor."[124]

Other minor issues dealt with the railroads, Supreme Court, and the Bonus Army riot. Roosevelt impressed the railroading magnates with his sincerety and they found nothing objectionable in his proposed reforms. When Roosevelt implied that the Supreme Court was a political wing of the Republican party, something of a hullabaloo was raised by the Republicans, but little came of it. Finally, although the origin and leadership of the men on the Anacostia Flats were questionable in the minds of Hoover and Douglas MacArthur, the Democrats attempted to picture Hoover's unsympathetic action in the Bonus Riots in its poorest light. Such work undoubtedly cost him many veteran votes and did not endear him to people who already considered him to be pretty much of a cold fish.

However, as in most elections, the "clear-cut issue [was] whether we should not be peevish and put the present national administration out of office."[125] In the minds of most voters, they had a great deal to be "peevish" about. The Hoover administration had been discredited long before Roosevelt came into the spotlight. Issues of the day were overshadowed by the firm conviction that a change to anything would be better than what they had undergone under Hoover's regime.

The newspapers of the nation generally continued their conservative way. But they were less vocal in their support of Republican men and measures than they had been in the past. Roosevelt "received generally either outright support or only mild opposition."[126] "Time" magazine stuck with Hoover, while the Scripps-Howard chain became Roosevelt sup orters.

The radio's use in the campaign was the "most striking departure from old methods."[127] The Democrats needed the radio to overcome the edge the Republicans held on the mass media through the newspapers. While the Republicans might have had the greater amount of radio time (seventy hours to fifty hours for the Democrats), the Democratic candidate was blessed with what was called a "radio personality." His warm voice was transmitted over the airways in an appealing manner to the voters which gave a preview of its effectiveness in the "Fireside Chats" of the future.

The Democrats were further blessed with a candidate who was "a better phrase maker than anybody he ever had around him."[128] Roosevelt was able to catch the country's fancy with such coinings as "the forgotten man," charging the Republicans with their "Four Horseman - Destruction, Delay, Despair, and Deceit," and finally, using the term - the "New Deal." The Republicans countered with charges of "stacked cards," referred to a sly "shuffle," and spoke of "dealing from the bottom." Hoover's bitterness is shown in his labeling of his opponent as a "chameleon on plaid."

Both parties made strong appeals to the minority voters. The foreign language press, which was usually Republican, split in half in their endorsements. Mrs. Nellie Tayloe Ross and Mary D. Dewson worked for Roosevelt's benefit with the women voters, while the Republicans cited their appointment of Miss Mary Woolley as indicative of their respect for American womanhood. R. H. Child was the leading Republican persuader with the businessmen while the Democrats had Owen Young, Baruch, Straus, and David H. Morris working in their behalf. "On the whole, the churches were of no consequence in the campaign,"[129] which was quite a contrast from the role they had played in the preceding presidential election. Cermak and Morgenthau worked on the Czechs, Jews, and Italians in America

while Republican ambassador Sackett appealed to the Germans. The Democrats, on the whole, gave more attention to the Negro vote than did their opponents by devoting an entire campaign unit to bring the colored influence to bear at the polls.

Roosevelt had made good use of the preferential polls of Straus in the pre-convention fight. He continued to be the nation's favorite in the mythical run-offs against Hoover. The Republicans denied their efficacy when they showed the G.O.P. faltering, as the polls usually did, but swore by them when a bright spot could be noted. The polls proved to be extraordinarily accurate in their predictions. Hoover's winning of Pennsylvania seemed to be the major action that all of the polls called wrongly. Strangely enough, although their polls showed Roosevelt to be the overwhelming choice, the Literary Digest still considered the election to be a toss-up within a month of the election day.

The campaign managers attempted to dissuade Roosevelt from making a "swing around the circle" as he desired. They cited the failures of Bryan, Hughes, and Cox, and urged a front-porch campaign. But the Governor wanted to carry the attack to the President, wished to dispel completely the question of his health, and enjoyed the role of an active campaigner too much to pass up the opportunity. With these ideas in mind, Roosevelt began his tour to the Pacific Coast and back. He made twenty-seven major addresses and thirty-two minor ones along with countless whistlestops. Columbus, Portland, Seattle, San Francisco, Topeka, Sioux City, and Pittsburgh were among the sites of his major addresses. Roosevelt educated himself on the local conditions and demands of the citizens. The people wanted to hear what was wrong with Hoover and Roosevelt obliged on that point. The people also wanted to tell Roosevelt

what was wrong with Hoover, and he proved to be a mighty good listener.

Hoover, after being forced to cast aside his original intentions of making only a series of speeches from the White House, gave ten major addresses. Rather than doing as Roosevelt did by devoting each speech to a major issue, he covered all issues in each speech in an "omnibus" fashion. He opened his counter attack in his home state by speaking at Des Moines. Although the reception was not as friendly a one as desired, the town being stirred up by a series of farmer "strikes" and boycotts, he began to feel that there was some hope of winning. In Detroit he ran up against a hostile, communist-inspired, demonstration which marked the first time that radicals had ever publicly defied the President of the United States to his face. Hoover was in constant need of rest throughout his tour. The burdens of the Presidency bore on him and he continued to drive himself to write his speeches on his own. As a result, after reaching the high point of his campaign in the Indianapolis address, he was near exhaustion and faltered several times in giving his talk before a St. Paul crowd. Finally, winding up the campaign in the New York Madison Square Garden, where a supreme effort was needed if any hope of victory could be maintained, the President delivered his least effective speech.

In the month of October, realizing victory was all but assured, Roosevelt took a vacation and delivered a series of campaign addresses through the Solid South. This action, the first such of a presidential candidate in several decades, pleased the Southerners and strengthened an already growing alliance.

When the Republicans came to total up their assets and deficits, it was not a bright picture to be seen. The Depression was too great

and too many people were suffering. With it had come extreme unemployment, business and bank failures, despair and disgust in the ranks of the farmers, and even isolated cases of starvation. As Hoover noted, "General prosperity had been a great ally in the election of 1928 and General Depression was a major enemy in 1932."[129] Unfortunately, the Republicans had overplayed their hands in '28 when they harped upon the theme: "Hoover and Happiness or Smith and Soup Houses? Which Shall it Be?" They had not been aware of the possibility of the connection four years later between Hoover and "Hoovervilles." In the middle of the election Hoover made what was probably the best analysis of the condition when he said, "I'll tell you what our trouble is. We are opposed by 6,000,000 unemployed, 10,000 bonus marchers, and ten-cent corn."[130]

The failure of foreign trade led many to feel that the Republican tariff policy was directly responsible. Many complained of the taxes collected by, and the expenditures made by, the Federal government. The veterans, even those who had not been among the bonus marchers, were disappointed in their not receiving an advance on the bonuses which they considered their due reward for service to their country. Some came to question the ability of Hoover's appointees when they saw policies failing to bring the predicted results, and some questioned the need of costly fact-finding boards particularly when the President on occasion refused to follow their advice. Finally, in periods of crisis people come to question the power of government in any form and the party in power bears the brunt of this distrust.

The political saw "As Maine goes, so goes the nation" backfired on the Republicans. Because of the mismanaged campaign of the Republican state organization, Maine went Democratic. Also, the Republicans found themselves hampered in getting a friendly reception of their ideas among

the White House press corps. Hoover, who was "always notoriously the thinnest-skinned executive in Washington,"[131] had not had the best of press relations during his administration. The correspondents had resented the limitations he had put on the press conferences and, as a result, they had not been overly enthusiastic in their reporting of Republican policies.

On the credit side of the ledger, the Republicans knew they would be able to rely to some extent on the traditionally Republican vote of the nation. They had the support of the rich industrialists and felt that a goodly amount of support would be found in the strong machines of the party and among the Federal office holders who would lose their jobs should the Democrats come into power in 1932. The Republicans realized that the strain of "rugged individualism," which they appeared to champion, would still be a strong influence in the nation no matter how much some thought it had been discredited with the Crash of 1929. While the public's picture of Hoover, the man, had been altered through the years, the Republicans could emphasize his dignity, his dedication to the principles of science and education, and his undoubted patriotism.

Taking the offensive, Hoover and company hammered consistently at Roosevelt's "radicalism" and "collectivism." They were able to force Roosevelt from many positions that he had considered to be worthy of elaboration and consideration. Hoover, in retrospect, felt that he made telling points on the issues of the currency, the tariff, the Supreme Court, and the charge that Roosevelt represented the choice for a collectivist planned economy.[132] Nevertheless, as election day showed, the balance found the Republicans running well into the red.

Naturally, where the Republicans were weak the Democrats were proportionately strong. They would find a voter in almost every case where a Republican policy had hurt a man. The unemployed and their

families, the small businessmen who had suffered bankruptcy, those who had lost their savings in bank failures, the farmers, and those who had seen their wages cut to subsistence levels, would furnish many a Democratic voter in 1932. With the falling off in foreign trade, exporters and manufacturers who relied on the world's markets to sell their products became Democrats. Investors who had lost on the stock market because of unchecked speculation, real estate owners who watched their holdings decrease in value, veterans and their sympathizers, and those who personally admired Roosevelt for overcoming his physical handicap, would be found in the Deomoratic ranks. And the Democrats had their machines with their job-hungry supporters needing a Democratic victory. Finally, the times were turning in the favor of Democratic "ideals." Public opinion had seen the failure of prohibition and admired the candidate who was speaking in Jeffersonian terms with respect to centralized government.

All was not bright in the Democratic picture, however. Some voters were suspicious of Roosevelt's connection with the Jewish and Catholic elements in the party and an identification with Tammany could not be totally eradicated. Many considered Roosevelt to be unstable, erratic, ultra-liberal, or "weak." Lippmann seemed to be the leader of the "weak" school of thought and considered Roosevelt the dangerous enemy of nothing. The Democrats lived in fear of a party split and were particularly watchful of the Catholic vote which might have been offended when Smith was denied the nomination. There was also the possibility that those who were dissatisfied with Hoover and his policies, and their numbers were legion, might go so far as to vote for the Socialist candidate, Norman Thomas, or, being dissatisfied with Roosevelt as a candidate, refuse to vote on election day, giving Hoover the election. Fortunately for the Democrats,

the bad taste that Hoover left in the mouth of the electorate would be too strong for them to give him any chance at victory.

In the campaigning some attention was given to the secondary support of the candidates themselves. Hoover was backed by industrialists like Rand and Schwab, and such famous widows as Mrs. Thomas A. Edison and Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, along with football Coaches Stagg and Warner. Such support, dubious at best, was more than offset by the refusal of such progressives as Hiram Johnson to carry the banner for Hoover. On the campaign trail Coolidge proved to be an effective vote-getter and Ogden Mills, who followed after Roosevelt's tours giving the needed replies, was helpful to the cause. Many orators in the Republican camp, However, appeared to be behind the times in their appeal and the nation was not ready to abide by the word of such men as Henry Ford and Charles Lindbergh at this time.

Roosevelt's support varied in membership and effectiveness. From Father Coughlin to "Dutch" Schultz, from Tammany and Huey Long to Baruch and Vincent Astor, and from Boss Hague to Bob Lafollette, Roosevelt gained assistance. Farley believes that Long, who had demanded a special campaign train, was underrated by the managers. Perhaps Long, with his special mode of appeal, could have been a deciding factor in winning Pennsylvania which Hoover took by such a small margin.

Roosevelt seldom bothered by answering his critics directly in his campaign speeches. He chose, rather, to leave that work to men like Farley, Morgenthau, and Curley. He was able to count on the effective secondary campaigning of Norris, Glass, Baker, and McAdoo, while the work of Josephus Daniels, his old Navy department chief, and heavyweight champion Gene Tunney proved to be inadequate. All in all the Roosevelt campaign orators were aided by the fact that their audiences were more

receptive than those of the Republicans in their desire to hear proposals on the way to take them out of the crisis.

Hoover's image in the public mind continued to diminish as the campaign progressed. The Republican attempt to replace the picture of the "Great Engineer" with that of "The Great Humanitarian" failed as the economic situation of the nation worsened. Hinshaw makes the statement that his "campaign speeches were among the most effective he ever delivered,"[133] but this is doubtful. The man was physically exhausted and to the public he increasingly appeared as a man who was "depressed, sour, timid, uncertain, and distant in his social relationships."[134] It was not a happy nor a confident man who was running on the Republican ticket and the voters recognized that fact.

While Roosevelt was "no great popular idol during the presidential campaign of 1932,"[135] he "gave the country the picture of a confident man who knew what he intended to do when the reins of government were passed into his hands."[136] Lippmann disagreed:

> The art of carrying water on both shoulders is highly developed in American politics, and Mr. Roosevelt has learned it.[137]
>
> ... Roosevelt is a highly impressionable person, without a firm grasp of public affairs and without very strong convictions.[138]
>
> [He does not have] the disinterestedness or the resolution that a President must have in time of great emergency.[139]

But the people were listening to a man who wished to appear as a professional politician with a Harvard background who held liberal views. The audiences came to view a Messiah or a Moses to lead them out of the wilderness. Roosevelt refused to promise them glorious utopias, however, as he "spread his ideas by gentle persuasion rather than by shock."[140] "In all arts of political communication, Roosevelt was definitely superior to his opponent."[141] He has been described, as the voters saw

him, as being "buoyant, joyous, confident, calm, courageous, and charming."[142] It was his charm that offended the more cynical of observers but the crowds loved it no matter how thick he spread it. They saw in Roosevelt a man of action, and the people were getting tired of what they believed to be the heart of conservative inaction - the Hoover administration.

Compared with the presidential campaign of 1928, that of '32 was an amazingly clean one as far as underhanded tactics were concerned. There were no "roorbacks" (eleventh hour charges) in this campaign and except for Smith's feeble attempt in his Newark address, the religious question was not raised. What skullduggery there was on the part of the Republicans was two-fold. A whispering campaign as to the state of Roosevelt's health was somewhat mitigated by the well-publicized action of the Governor taking out a million dollars worth of insurance with several reputable insurance companies. In connection with the health question, the Republicans concentrated much of their fire on Garner, saying a vote for Roosevelt was a vote for Garner. They charged the Speaker with "intemperate rantings" and hinted that his ~~pork~~ Pork-barrel measures were indication of communist leanings. The Democrats handled this situation by keeping "Cactus Jack" out of the picture as much as possible and assigned a publicity agent to be with him continually to edit his public statements. Also, the Republicans charged Raskob with stock manipulation in an effort to cause panic on the Exchange but this was easily refuted when the Democrats brought out a statement of Raskob's business transactions.

Hoover and his biographers weep what I consider to be "crocodile tears" over the Democratic attacks against the Republicans and their nominee. The Democratic "New York World" came out with an article on

the sale of some oil shales which they considered another "Teapot Dome." When the shales proved to be valueless, a retraction was made. Attempts to connect Hoover with the work of the sugar lobby, and to charge the President with misuse of funds in his war work were both proved false by Democratic Senators Walsh and Glass. Also a faked photograph was circulated that depicted a sign on a California ranch of Hoover's which read "No White Men Wanted." Michelson, who may be somewhat less than objective, noted that seldom were these charges released by the National Committee and that he, the Democratic publicity chairman, could find little evidence of a personal attack directed against Hoover. No matter what the case may be, I am unable to feel any great amount of sympathy for a man and a party which had marched to victory in the whispering campaign of 1928.

Originally the Republicans plan of attack was to be executed along the lines of what Hoover had said early in the campaign:

> I have informed Republican leaders that except for a few major addresses expounding policies of the Administration, I will not take part in the forthcoming campaign, as my undivided attention must be given to the duties of my office. The campaign will be conducted and managed entirely by Chairman Sanders and the Republican organization.[143]

As has been stated above, this plan of execution was later changed. Hoover sincerely believed in his policies and felt that they were proving to be effective. He knew that they would be scrapped should Roosevelt be elected and he feared the results of what he termed, "wild experimentation." Although he did enter the campaign on a highly active basis, his public relations man felt that at no time did the campaigning take precedence over the presidential duties.

The Republican strategy, for the most part, was already outlined before the national campaigning had begun. They had to accept the depression as an existing crisis but continued to state that it was

European in origin. A major theme of Hoover's speeches was "the depression could be worse, and if Roosevelt were elected, it would be."[144] The Republicans also hinted at a series of new and complex plans which would be inaugurated following the election should Hoover be reelected.

Prophets of doom were rife in the Republican ranks when they considered the possibility of a Democratic victory. Industrialists and bankers were threatened with the prospect of losing preferential treatement in a Democratic controlled administration. And should the Democrats win and the tariff be experimented with, the people were told that "grass would grow in the streets of a hundred cities." Finally, the Republicans asked the electorate the question: "Why Change?" and the parable of the horses in midstream ~~were~~ was cited.

In answer to the question of "Why Change" the Democrats asked another: "Why not?" When the issues of collectivism and communist leanings were raised, the Democratic nominee would raise up and bring in moral sanction in suggesting the Republicans not "play politics with human misery." In the name of fair play, the Democrats called for the preservation of the two-party system. Otherwise, the Democratic plan of attack was but an expansion of their pre-convention and convention modes of operation. The "Hoover Depression" and "Hoover Slump" were ever in the public utterances of the leaders of the Democracy.

Farley ran a tightly controlled campaign. His organization ran smoothly. He refused to concede a single state in public, although they knew well that ~~they~~ they had no hope for victory in Maine, Vermont, or Connecticut. Conceding any state would have weakened the local tickets in those areas. Farley was not to work for anything less than total victory.

> The 1932 Democratic Presidential campaign has been recognized by practical politicians as the nearly perfect campaign... There were no errors in the major strategy.[145]

The Democratic theme was to play it safe. When Garner was asked what campaigning he contemplated, he said, that he was going to "Sit down-do nothing - and win the election."[146] The Democrats were out to win and, barring incomprehensible contingencies, they would do just that.

The man who had assumed the presidency in 1929 had been transformed from a "calm and collected candidate into a harassed and peevish executive."[147] Guided in the past by the "inner light" of a Quaker background, Hoover came to see many of his fondest beliefs, dreams and hopes fall in a period of crisis that he did not wholly understand at the time. His record through the years of service during the First World War, at Versailles, and in various Republican administrations had been unchallenged. His record as President of the United States was always being challenged.

Lippmann, in commenting on the failure of Republican administrations, said that they had "refused to admit that the war wrought fundamental change in American national interests, and that a failure to adapt government policies to this change would lead to grave trouble."[148] This was the picture of Hoover that the people saw as a man stuck fast. He was not ready to abandon his economic theory of government which he labeled the "American System." He suggested that the country's economic development be kept in the hands of the masters of industry and capital in terms that were reminiscent of the words the turn of the century coal-mine owner, George F. Baer. He might have been the representative man of American ideals in 1928, but Hoover was no such symbol in 1932.

His individualism in commerce had proven sufficient in times of prosperity. But in times of depression people were not ready to listen to any such "outmoded" ideals. The Crash proved to be too great a strain on the philosophy of the Republican party which had carried it to victory more times than not from the days of the Moguls to the era of post-war Normalcy.

The public picture of Hoover as a soured and inert executive was not too far from the picture of his private personality. The strain had proven great and he was unable to get along with the press, party leaders, machine bosses, or Congressional leaders. He was given to petty fits of temper and people were not warmed by his frigid self-sufficiency. What that public at first saw as dignity of character came to be recognized as intellectual timidity, inordinate vanity, lack of sympathy, and a fear of disorder. It is difficult to estimate how great a role his religion played in his life, Hinshaw thinks it was the deciding influnce, for Hoover never allowed his religious views to be bandied about for public consumption. He drank little, maintained his church membership, read in Dumas, Plutarch, Gibbons, and technical works, and said that "...my idea of heaven is a place where you do not have to make decisions."[149] The Democrats were quite willing to lift some of the burden of his decision-making duties beginning the following March.

In Hoover's opponent could be seen "an entirely different set of attitudes, traditions, and aspirations."[150] Roosevelt was an aristocrat who had been trained to be a gentleman with a sense of social responsibility which might be called "noblesse oblige. He considered himself a "politician" in the best sense of the word. Namely, he was working through the political system of the nation for the benefit of all.

His travel through the years had given him an understanding of the nation as a whole, and his physical labors had taught him compassion for his fellow man. He might not have been most the intelligent of men but he had a willingness to learn. Little indication of what sort of a president he would make was apparent in 1932 as can be seen in the above criticisms ~~of~~ by Lippmann. But he was a man that was still growing and this growth would become increasingly discernible with the passing years.

Roosevelt "had developed his political philosophy long before the depression began and long before he met any member of his brains trust."[151] He had long felt an affinity for the founder of his party, the country squire Jefferson. He adhered to the Jeffersonian ideals of faith in the good sense to be found in the masses and the necessity to protect the rights of men. Roosevelt was suspicious, at this time, of increased centralization of governmental power and he held the emotional attachment to an economic system which was based on the labors and desires of the small farmer. He trusted both himself and the people and he was willing to seek out the "larger good" as over and against vested interests and their institutions.

From Theodore Roosevelt he had gained some of his ideas of national interests being superior to those of regions and individuals. This progressivism of the Republican Roosevelt extended to the advocacy of conservation and ultimately blended with the New Freedom of Wilson which saw the need of a new social reorganization in a changing world.

The readiness to experiment was a crucial factor in Roosevelt's philosophy and the evidence is considerable to substantiate this view. In his Seattle address he said, "All my life I have been a doer, not a phrasemaker [cf. p. 69!], and I ask your help in support of liberal

views and liberal measures. I ask in the name of a stricken America and a stricken world." As a governor and a "doer" he had given the impetus to the Temporary Emergency Relief Administration of the state which had shown him to be more advanced in his methods than most of his fellow governors. "His work at Albany was a steadily expanding application of this twentieth-century liberalism."[152] Roosevelt once stated, "It is common sense to take a method and try it, if it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something."[153] It was his hope that experimentation would lead not only to recovery but to a more stable economic order. This history of the New Deal had been anticipated.

The discourse Roosevelt gave before the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco was termed "the fullest of his presentations of his economic philosophy" and "the most significant utterance made by any major candidate for the Presidency in a generation."[154] He said that one of man's rights to life was the right to make a comfortable living and that while government was to assist business in its development of an economic constitutional order, "the government should act as a regulator for the common good within the existing economic system." It was but an expansion on the general theme of social and economic planning for the general welfare.

> He believed that government not only could, but should, achieve the subordination of private interests to collective interests, substitute cooperation for the mad scramble of selfish individualism. He had a profound feeling for the underdog, a real sense of the critical unbalance of economic life, a very keen awareness that political democracy could not exist side by side with economic plutocracy.[155]

In his address to the Albany legislature the previous summer he had said, "To... unfortunate citizens aid must be extended by government

not as a matter of charity but as a matter of social duty."[156]

Even in his references to the Founding Fathers, Roosevelt praised them for their boldness of action but did not believe their specific policies to be sacrosanct. He knew the value of experimentation and he had "the type of mind to which little is impossible and nothing is inevitable."[157] He felt that "... the American spirit was undefeated. A way out of the economic morass would be found."[158] In this respect he became representative of the American ambitions in 1932 as the nation, not giving up hope, was ready to try a new path within the existing pattern to find their way back through recovery to redemption.

Roosevelt's unfailing optimism was reflected in his personal relations. Those around him were often struck by his cordiality, affability, and general good humor which were indications of a sense of proportion that allowed him to easily recover his good spirits in trying moments. Farley described him as "one of the most alive men I had ever met."[159] He had a genuine liking for people which encouraged loyalty in his immediate circle and his charm, manifested in his eternal smiling, was pleasing even to the voters who did not know him as well. Moley, who was in intimate contact with Roosevelt throughout the campaign made several observations:

> The man's energy and vitality are astonishing. I've been amazed with his interest in things. It skips and bounces through seemingly intricate subjects and...makes me feel that no one could possibly learn much in such a hit or miss fashion.
>
> The frightening aspect of his methods is F. D. R. 's great receptivity.[160]
>
> His mind, while it was capacious and while its windows were open on all sides to new impressions, facts, and knowledge, was neither exact nor orderly.[161]

Thus, where Hoover was weak in personal relationships, Roosevelt was strong. Roosevelt's self-confidence and poise would not be lost on the voters.

The United States, in working under the two-party system, allows for little opportunity of the development of third party strength. The election of 1932 was no exception to this tradition. Progressives, mainly Republicans, made two vain attempts to arouse interest in a third-party movement. Forming the Washington Conference on Progressive Political Action, old-line progressives, Borah and Norris, found their attempts to be inadequate. Throughout the campaign some of them Republican progressives vacillated between support of Roosevelt and the threat to "go fishing" on election day. The League for Independent Political Action numbered such liberal thinkers as John Dewey, Norman Thomas, and Paul Douglas among its membership. It too proved to be abortive but, as with the Borah movement, it was able to see some of its policies adopted by the Democrats.

The leading minor party in 1932 was the Socialist. It's candidate was again that "personification of sincere and intelligent protest,"[162] Norman Thomas. The Socialists needed to overcome the traditional American suspicion of foreign-imported politcal movements, the voter's faith in the two-party system, and the thinking that the Democrats would need every vote to insure the expulsion of Hoover from the White House. The Socialist convention in Milwaukee was marked by a shifting to the left on the part of some of the "Young Turks" of the party which wished to see a closer alliance with Russian ideology. The depression had seen a doubling in membership since the last election and the party felt it was to be bright year in American Socialism. One-hundred and

seventy-one candidates filed for the House of Representatives and sixteen for the Senate on the Socialist Party ticket. The party, which attracted a large body of college student support, directed ridicule toward the two major parties and urged the elimination of the economic system which had bred the depression. Social ownership and control of industry was the main theme in their platform. The election day results were disappointing to the Socialists. They polled less than a million votes (885,458) although some had predicted as much as three million Socialist votes would be cast in 1932. Thomas had been defeated by "the expropriation of his ideas by the liberal Democrats and the hopeless inertia of the masses."[162]

The Communists nominated William Z. Foster in 1932. His running mate was James W. Ford, a college-bred Alabama labor leader. Ford, a Negro, was the first member of his race ever to be nominated for the Vice-Presidency. Foster, having labored diligently during the four years of the Hoover administration, was broken in health and carried on a rather limited campaign. The Communists were hampered by little financial backing and by the fact that their candidates were arrested for disturbing the peace on several occasions. They made a direct appeal to the Negro vote and enlisted the support of workers and intellectuals. By implication they advocated a new system of government modeled after that of the Soviet Union. The Communist Party polled a little over 100,000 votes in 1932 and were, of course, never a threat to the cause of the major parties.

The oldest of the third parties was the Prohibition Party. It's nominee, William D. Upshaw of Georgia, labored against overwhelming odds. With public opinion now in favor of repeal, the Prohibitionists saw a further defection in their ranks as women voters succumbed to the

Roosevelt charm. The only salve, other than the 79,000 votes it received, was the fact that with Repeal there was the possiblity of breathing new life into the movement in later years.

Other minor parties in 1932 were the Socialist-Labor (34,000 votes), General Coxey's Farmer-Labor Party which, along with "Coin" Harvey's Liberal Party, held an appeal for those voters over seventy who could remember with fondness the Populist battles of 1896. The height of futility on the part of the third -parties was reached when Father James R. Cox, the nominee of the Jobless Party, was forced to give up his speaking tour when he was stranded in a town with insufficient funds to continue.

The crash of '29 had breathed new life into third-party movements. Although all received setbacks in the Congressional elections of 1930, they took pains to earn their protest votes in 1932. There were twenty-six third parties in the presidential election which was an indication of the economic situation of the nation. Each third-party reflected the politico-economic attitudes of its membership which is something that could not be said of the two major parties. The third-parties were, as usual, handicapped by weak organization, inadequate publicity, insufficient financial support, and restrictive legislation of the states which seek to protect the two-party system. All candidates were of old American stock, the major difference between the nominees of the major parties and those of the minor parties being that of comparative wealth. On election day the third-parties received less than three per cent of the total vote and none of the electoral votes. The two-party system was not seriously threatened in 1932.

The results that came over the wires on election day were anti-climactic. Hoover was able to carry only Connecticut, Delaware, Maine,

New Hampshire, Vermont, and Pennsylvania. Roosevelt carried the other forty-two states and a whopping 472 - 69 majority in the Electoral College. The popular vote was gave a more favorable light to Hoover's candidacy but here again it was an easy Roosevelt victory. Polling 22,800,000 votes, Roosevelt held slightly less than sixty percent of the total vote. Hoover was defeated by a plurality of 7,055, 609 and just under forty per cent of the popular vote. The official breakdown goes as follows:

Roosevelt	22,815,539
Hoover	15,759,930
Thomas	885,458
Foster	103,152
Prohibition	79,745
Socialist-Labor	34,435
other	64,177

Hoover conceded the election before 12:15 in the morning of November 9 and Roosevelt, in accepting the victory, generously credited the work of Louis Howe and Jim Farley as being the essential factors in the campaign. November 9, 1932, saw the dawn of a new day in America.

In 1932 "approximately 48 percent of the voters in the nation [were] Republican by allegiance, 42 per cent Democratic, and 10 per cent Independent."[163] But, in this election the voters "went to the polls on November 8 to record their protest against President Hoover and the depression."[164] The electorate ignored their traditional political affinity for the Grand Old Party and cast their lot with the hopes of a new leader at the head of a revitalized party. "It was a motley crew that went to the polls in November, 1932, and chose Roosevelt in preference to Hoover."[165] The depression lost the Republicans the support of the marginal voters and even many of the progressives in their own ranks. Except for the New England region, the nation as a whole was dissatisfied with Republican men

and policies. It was not a economically stratified vote as trade unionism in this period was at a low ebb and no rural-urban ~~kinds~~ LINES of differentiation could be observed. Roosevelt seemed to attract the support of the women, new voters, Negroes, and the hyphenates to a greater degree than previous Democratic candidates. It was a general victory for the entire Democratic Party as well in that large majorities were gained in both houses of Congress. But it was a personal victory for Roosevelt when one considers how far ahead of his ticket he ran in most of the areas.

There is some evidence that "...at the outset Roosevelt's election was by no means assured."[166] Hoover's secretary, Joslin, noted that even the President was optimistic about his chances as late as October, but did recognize that he would need every "break" to win. However, this optimism was not shared by most political analysts, both during and following the election.

As nearly as I can determine, the evidence is overwhelming in support of the contention of Farley's that Roosevelt "could have spent the entire fall and summer in Bermuda and been elected just the same."[167]

"Early in the campaign it was clear to seasoned observers that Roosevelt was going to win,"[168] As far back as the preceding February, in his discussion of Democratic hopes, Lippmann had said, "Certainly, if the elections were held this month they would need little more than a respectable candidate and a troupe of orators to remind the country how unhappy it is."[169] At the Democratic Convention humorist Will Rogers remarked, "I don't see how there could possibly be a weak enough man not to win. If he lives 'til next November he's in, that's all."[170] Peel and Donnely note that "The inability of Mr. Hoover to do anything to turn the tide of the recession caused the country to lose confidence in his leadership and the Republican Party."[171] In discussing party expenditures they go on to say:

> The determining factor in most presidential elections is the economic condition of the country... In 1932, the Democrats undoubtedly would have won regardless of how much the Republicans might have spent. The people wanted a change !...The only chance Mr. Hoover had to win the election was dependent upon the return of a measure of prosperity in the late summer or early fall months of 1932. He ardently hoped for this, as did all Republicans. But their hope was in vain. Conditions got worse instead of better.[172]

The Democrats had, for a change, the superior grand strategy and were willing to carry the fight to the Republicans. The parallel, that is-the reversal of roles, with the campaign of 1896 was often cited. In 1932 it was the Republicans who were being held responsible for a economic depression and, instead of having a politically astute Mark Hanna in the driver's seat, they now had Herbert Hoover. Moreover, Roosevelt was no William Jennings Bryan to strike fear in the hearts of the business interests of the East.

> All the Democrats had to do was to play safe, and to organize everything in sight while the Republicans floundered about. ...since prosperity did not return before the day of election, the Republicans could not possibly have won unless their rivals had displayed colossal stupidity...[173]

Roosevelt was prepared to be overly cautious in not allowing the committing of any such blunders that might have cost him the election. However, Hull, who was in the Roosevelt camp almost from the beginning, said, "No one had any uneasiness about the outcome of the election. It was a foregone conclusion."[174]

Hoover concedes that he "had little hope of reelection in 1932..."[175] In mid-September Stimson realized that his boss was very dubious about the possibilities of victory. Hoover's recognition of the impending defeat led him to work on the job of at least making his position clear to the people. Toward the end of the campaign Hoover began to sound increasingly like a desperate contender while Roosevelt was taking on the role of a man

confident of victory and his public pronouncements were sounding more and more like those of a President.

In the course of the campaign some of the broader outlines of Roosevelt's policies and philosophies came to be outlined. "When it was over, with three exceptions [abandonment of a gold standard, "borrow and spend" policies, and the N. R. A. as a quick recovery measure], every important venture from 1933 to the summer of 1935 had been outlined."[176] In the development of this outline some of the changes in Roosevelt's attitudes which set the direction that the New Deal was to take were illustrated. Hoover was well aware of the fact that the election campaign was something more than a clash between personalities and parties. He recognized it for a conflict "between two philosophies of government."[177] Roosevelt had himself called for a "revolution" at the ballot box.

While with the keen eyes of twenty-twenty hindsight, later analysts were able to see in Roosevelt's addresses many indications of later developments, the public was by no means equally aware of what was in store for them at the time. "Mr. Roosevelt's campaign speeches did not prepare the public for the shock of the first months of the New Deal."[178] Even if they had seen the program clearly, it is doubtful that they would have voted any differently since their antipathy for Hoover was overwhelming.

Roosevelt appears to have had one paramount goal in mind. "He was trying to win an election, not log out a coherent philosophy of government."[179] With this inordinate desire to win, the candidate was quite willing to advocate policies that were inconsistent with each other or were repudiation of previous positions he had taken. Such was indicated in his willingness to assure the conservative voter that he would balance and reduce the Federal budget and that he would labor for the preservation of "sound" currency. The Pittsburgh speech is the prime example of this.

> it was not to Mr. Roosevelt's political advantage to disturb his comparatively smooth course toward victory by raising contentious issues to prominence with too much emphasis and detail.[180]
>
> he directed his man of war, now to the starboard, then to port, throughout the campaign. ...though he tacked occasionally to the right he customarily bore much harder to the left.[181]

The presidential election of 1932 was, for all practical purposes, decided before it began. The nation was indeed in search of a Moses to lead them out of the wilderness. Governor Roosevelt could have created this pose. He chose, instead, to be overly cautious in an attempt to appear to be all things to all men. The margin of his victory is but an indication of his success in this endeavor.

Footnotes

1. Walter Lippmann, Interpretations 1931-1932, p.262.
2. Charles Michelson, The Ghost Talks, p. 25.
3. Roy V. Peel and Thomas G. Donnelly, The 1932 Campaign An Analysis, p. 9.
4. Ibid., p. 14.
5. Ibid., p. 10.
6. Ibid., p. 15.
7. Ibid., p. 48.
8. Ibid., p. 58.
9. Ibid., p. 59.
10. Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt The Triumph, p. 245.
11. Lippmann, op. cit., p.305.
12. Freidel, op. cit.. p. 250.
13. Lippmann, op. cit., p. 304
14. Raymond Moley, After Seven Years, p. 46.
15. Peel and Donnelly, op. cit., p. 23.
16. Ibid., p. 42.
17. Michelson, op. cit., p.20.
18. David Hinshaw, Herbert Hoover: American Quaker, p. 222.
19. Herbert Hoover, Memoirs, p. 219
20. Ibid., p. 224.
21. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 112
22. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses, Vol. 1, p. 626.
23. Freidel, op. cit., p. 269.
24. Ibid., p. 241.
25. Cordell Hull, Memoirs, p. 145.

26. James A. Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 129.

27. Ibid., p. 92.

28. Ibid., p. 93.

29. Lippmann, op. cit., p. 257.

30. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 68.

31. James Macgregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, p. 131.

32. Lippmann, op. cit., p. 299.

33. Freidel, op. cit., p. 169.

34. Farley, op. cit., p. 62.

35. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 161.

36. Lippmann, op. cit., p. 258.

37. Ibid., p. 259.

38. Farley, op. cit., p. 83.

39. Burns, op. cit., p. 127.

40. Ibid., p. 132.

41. Farley., op. cit. p. 96.

42. Freidel, op. cit. p. 287.

43. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 84.

44. Lippmann, op. cit. p. 291.

45. Ibid., p. 292.

46. Ibid., p. 292.

47. Ibid., p. 294.

48. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 89.

49. Lippmann, op. cit., p. 288.

50. Ibid., p. 289.

51. Theodore G. Joslin, Hoover off the Record, p. 245.

52. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 90.

53. Lippmann, op. cit., p. 286.

54. Ibid., p. 287.

55. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 83.

56. Farley, op. cit. p. 117.

57. Burns, op. cit., p. 135.

58. Farley, op. cit., p. 117.

59. Harold F. Gosnell, Champion Campaigner Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 118.

60. Farley, op. cit., p. 127.

61. Michelson, op. cit. p. 4.

62. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 94.

63. Edward J. Flynn, You're the Boss, p. 95.

64. Farley, op. cit., p. 128.

65. Earnest K. Lindley, The Roosevelt Revolution, p. 19.

66. Hoover, op. cit., p. 279.

67. Lippmann, op. cit., p. 308.

68. Ibid., p. 309.

69. Ibid., p. 310.

70. Lindley, op. cit., p. 17.

71. Ibid., p. 20.

72. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 101.

73. Ibid., p. 101.

74. Flynn, op. cit., p. 101.

75. The data gathered for the balloting at the National Convention came from Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., and were usually verified in the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, 1932.

76. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 102.

77. Flynn, op. cit., p. 103.

78. Michelson, op. cit., p. 9.

79. Farley, op. cit., p. 149.

80. Freidel, op. cit., p. 309.

81. Farley, op. cit., p. 145.

82. Freidel, op. cit., p. 308.

83. Lippmann, op. cit., p. 312.

84. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 101-102

85. Gosnell, op. cit., p. 120.

86. Farley, op. cit., p. 133.

87. Flynn, op. cit., p. 104.

88. Freidel, op. cit., p. 121.

89. Moley, op. cit., p. 34.

90. Burns, op. cit., p. 125.

91. Ibid., p. 138.

92. Farley, op. cit., p. 128.

93. Flynn, op. cit., p. 83.

94. Proceedings, op. cit., p. 616.

95. Ibid., p. 621.

96. Flynn, op. cit., p. 93.

97. Lippmann, op. cit., p. 314.

98. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 109.

99. Hiram Johnson in Farley, op. cit., p. 184.

100. Carter Glass in Farley, op. cit., p. 188.

101. James M. Cox in Farley, op. cit., p. 189.

102. Michelson, op. cit., p. 11.

103. Farley, op. cit., p. 160.

104. Howe in Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 113.

105. Lindley, op. cit., p. 26.

106. Ibid., p. 32.

107. Moley, op. cit., p. 37.

108. Hoover, op. cit., p. 234.

109. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 120.

110. Moley, op. cit., p. 23.

111. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 127.

112. Farley, op. cit., p. 61.

113. Moley, op. cit., p. 45.

114. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 131.

115. Lippmann, op. cit., p. 281.

116. Moley, op. cit., p. 12.

117. Freidel, op. cit., p. 254.

118. Moley, op. cit., p. 62.

119. Hoover, op. cit., p. 318.

120. Ibid., p. 318.

121. Ibid., p. 321.

122. Moley., op. cit., p. 62.

123. Burns, op. cit., p. 141.

124. Moley, op. cit., p. 3.

125. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 123.

126. Michelson, op. cit., p. 4..

127. Pell & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 145.

128. Moley, op. cit., p. 13.

129. Hoover, op. cit., p. 218.

130. Joslin, op. cit., p. 315.

131. Michelson, op. cit., p. 31.

132. Hoover, op. cit., p. 205.

133. Hinshaw. op. cit., p. 272.

134. Gosnell, op. cit., p. 124.

135. Lindley, op. cit., p. 3.

136. Farley, op. cit., p. 185.

137. Lippmann, op. cit., p. 260.

138. Ibid., p. 261.

139. Ibid., p. 273.

140. Lindley, op. cit., p. 37.

141. Gosnell, op. cit., p. 126.

142. Ibid., p. 124.

143. Joslin, op. cit., p. 246.

144. Freidel, op. cit., p. 366.

145. Flynn, op. cit., p. 122.

146. Freidel, op. cit., p. 329.

147. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 180.

148. Lippmann, op. cit., p. 265.

149. Michelson, op. cit., p. 30.

150. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 185.

151. Lindley, op. cit., p. 7.

152. Ibid., p. 11.

153. Ibid., pp. 16-17

154. Ibid., p. 35.

155. Michelson, op. cit., p. 14.

156. Freidel, op. cit., p. 217.

157. Londley, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

158. Gosnell, op. cit., p. 129.

159. Farley, op. cit. p. 65.

160. Moley, op. cit., p. 11.

161. Ibid., p. 56.

162. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 194.

163. Ibid., p. 107.

164. Freidel, op. cit., p. 369.

165. Gosnell, op. cit., p. 134.

166. Flynn, op. cit., p. 117.

167. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 158.

168. Gosnell, op. cit., p. 132.

169. Lippmann, op. cit., p.264.

170. Proceedings, op. cit., p. 616.

171. Peel & Donnelly, op. cit., p. 45.

172. Ibid., p. 122.

173. Ibid., p. 179.

174. Hull, op. cit., p. 154.

175. Hoover, op. cit., p. 218.

176. Moley, op. cit., p. 63.

177. Lindley, op. cit., p. 5.

178. Ibid., p. 34.

179. Burns, op. cit., p. 144.

180. Lindley, op. cit., p. 36.

181. Freidel, op. cit., p. 337.

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