

History
Hurt
1864

THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN, 1864

Library of
Washington and Lee University
Lexington, Va.

By Charles D. Hurt, Jr.
Honors Paper in History
Washington and Lee University
April 6th, 1959.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Page</u>
I. Joseph E. Johnston and The Army of Tennessee	1.
II. Federal Plans and Preparations	9.
III. The Importance of Atlanta	12.
IV. "Old Joe knows what he's up to"	17.
V. From the Etowah Across the Chattahoochee	26.
VI. A Fatal Mistake	36.
VII. The Battle for Atlanta	50.
VIII. Sherman Achieves His Goal	70.
IX. Speculation	78.
<u>Maps</u>	After Pages
	11.
	25.
	33.
	54.
	66.
<u>Footnotes and Bibliography</u>	

Chapter I

Joseph E. Johnston and The Army of Tennessee

The Atlanta Campaign was initiated on May 4th, 1864, by General William Tecumseh Sherman's advance on the Confederate positions at Dalton, Georgia. Sherman had been placed in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi when General U. S. Grant was promoted to the newly-created grade of Lieutenant-General, turning over the western armies to Sherman in whom he had the utmost confidence. Grant visited General Meade, and then went to Nashville to visit with Sherman on March 18th, 1864. Setting down his plans and objectives in two letters to Sherman on April 4th and April 19th, Grant stated that the two main objectives of the Federal Army would be the Army of Tennessee under General Joseph E. Johnston and the Army of Northern Virginia behind the Rapidan River under General Robert E. Lee. Also, General Benjamin F. Butler was to move on Richmond from south of the James River while General Sigel was to move down the Valley of Virginia. This was the grand strategy of the last year of the war.¹

After the disastrous Chattanooga-Chickamauga-Lookout Mountain Campaign, the Army of Tennessee under General Braxton Bragg had managed to end its flight at Dalton, Georgia, on November 28th, 1863. The condition of this army was pitiful, and General Bragg resigned to become Commander-in-Chief and Military Advisor to President Jefferson Davis. Although General William J. Hardee was the Senior Corps Commander, he did not want the command of the entire army. After much discussion in Richmond, General Joseph E. Johnston was appointed to command

the Army of Tennessee, an appointment which proved most popular with the soldiers of the army. We must remember that, although often a story of frustration and might-have-beens, the Army of Tennessee had carried the Confederacy on its bayonets as the Army of Northern Virginia had done in the East. At Shiloh and Corinth, Murfreesboro, and until its defeat under the inept Bragg, this army had been a good one and a tough one. It was now Johnston's responsibility to restore it to excellent fighting condition.²

Joseph Eggleston Johnston was born at Cherry Grove near Farmville, Virginia. Following his father who had served with George Washington, Johnston attended West Point, graduating in 1829 as a Second Lieutenant in the Artillery. For a while he followed the profession of Civil Engineer; and he married Louisa McLane, daughter of Louis McLane who served as Secretary of the Treasury under President Andrew Jackson. In 1838 he returned to the army and served as topographical engineer under Winfield Scott in Mexico. On April 20th, 1861, Johnston resigned his commission as Brigadier General in the United States Army. Accepting a commission from the Confederate State of Virginia, he commanded the Army of Northern Virginia until he was wounded at Seven Pines. From the fall of Vicksburg until his call to Dalton, Johnston was busy supervising the defense of Mobile, and organizing the Army of the Mississippi. As Commander of the Army of Tennessee, Johnston was to perform the most important duties of his life.³

As we have seen, Dalton was simply a place where the army had stopped to rest and where Bragg had left it. We must consider the organization and morale of the army and the important services which Johnston performed in reconditioning

and training the army at Dalton. Johnston brought with him soldierly training, intuition and experience, proving him worthy of the confidence which he inspired in his men. Although he was opposed by overwhelming forces, suffered due to the folly and disobedience of subordinates and the interferences of Richmond, and was faced with a vast geographical territory to protect, Johnston was an excellent officer who husbanded his resources. Wary, prudent and poised, he was to show vigor and intelligence in the campaign. The first example of this is his overhauling of the army and his refusal to follow foolhardy plans.

Although Bragg claimed that he had left the army in good shape, that the morale was not impaired, and that stragglers were pouring in rather than deserters pouring out, an inspection showed the army to be in the worst condition imaginable.⁴ Despite the advice of Bragg, which was unfortunately heeded in most cases, the Richmond administration realized that the army needed to be strengthened and repaired. Instructions from President Davis and Secretary of War Seddon admitted that the army was disheartened and deprived of ordnance and material. They wrote to Johnston, "Your presence, it is hoped, will do much to re-establish hope and inspire confidence, and through such influence, as well as by the active exertions you are recommended to make, men who have straggled may be recalled to their standards, and others roused to the dangers."⁵ Besides admitting the deficiencies, the administration also admitted that there would be serious difficulties in providing the supplies required for the army's subsistence, as much material was simply not available. Yet they wrote, "It is desired that your early and vigorous efforts be directed to restoring the discipline, prestige, and confidence of the army, and to increasing its numbers; and that at the same time you leave no means unspared to restore and supply

its deficiencies in ordnance, munitions, and transportation.^{6.} "

Despite their recognition of the army's depleted condition, Davis and Seddon did not believe that the army was in as bad shape as Johnston's inspection showed. Seemingly, they thought that an army could be restored overnight. Thus, they instructed Johnston to assume the offensive.

Davis said that his information led him to believe that the condition and efficiency of the army were satisfactory, and that the men were anxious for an opportunity to retrieve the loss of prestige of Missionary Ridge. "I desired, therefore, that prompt and vigorous measures be taken to enable our troops to commence active operations against the enemy as soon as possible."^{7.} Planning to advance and draw the enemy into the open and defeat him, or, if he did not come out, to move against his line of communications, Davis did not want any inactivity which would ruin morale, give the supposedly scattered Federals a chance to consolidate, and allow them to send reinforcements to Virginia. According to the President, no effort was spared to enable Johnston to repulse the enemy and to assume the offensive, for Davis hoped for a quick and decisive victory.^{8.}

Upon receiving communications urging him to take the offensive, Johnston replied that the army was in no condition to resume the offensive, as it was sadly deficient in numbers, arms, subsistence stores and field transportation. This reply was followed by a letter from Davis which stated that all his reports said that the army's condition was not too bad, the reports being those of Braxton Bragg, for what they were worth. Johnston said, "I was unable then, as now, to imagine any military object for which this letter could have been written, especially by one whose time was supposed to be devoted to the most important concerns of government.

The President could not have thought that I was to be taught the moral and material condition of the army around me by him, by the observations of his aide-de-camp, who had never seen military service---⁹." Johnston then endeavored to depict the true conditions of the army. His effective total was 36,000 with 43,000 present while Sherman had more than 80,000.¹⁰ The artillery was insufficient, and the horses were in poor condition.¹¹

Meanwhile, General John B. Hood arrived to throw coals on the fire which was already burning between Johnston and Davis. Serving with Lee in Virginia, Hood had led the breakthrough at Second Manassas and at Gaines Mill. Rising from Lieutenant to Lieutenant-General in two years, Hood had led the famous Texas Brigade, although he, himself, was from Kentucky. After recovering from a wound received in the East, Hood had fought at Chickamauga where he lost a leg. Hood said that he took the job with the understanding that an offensive and aggressive campaign was to be initiated; and this burning zeal for offensive action was his prime goal, as he was little concerned with shoes, rifles, or horses. Actually, Hood was really sent to serve as Davis' mouthpiece, as he was to push Johnston forward while keeping the President informed. Violating military protocol, Hood, as a Corps Commander, reported directly to Davis and Bragg, although all reports should have gone through Johnston. As would be expected, Hood reported that the army was in excellent condition, since this was what Richmond wanted to hear.¹²

In his Advance and Retreat, Hood spends most of his time in attacking Johnston's tactics and bravery. Such petty arguments, however, are immaterial. Yet Hood does admit his duplicate roll as Corps Commander and Agent from Richmond.

He told Johnston that Bragg and Davis were desirous of taking the offensive and that everything would be subordinated to the Army of Tennessee. No amount of pressure, however, could sway Johnston; and on April 13th, Hood wrote to Bragg, "I am sorry to inform you that I have done all in my power to induce General Johnston to accept the proposition you made to move forward. He will not consent---- 13." It is ironic that Hood also wrote Davis that more men would be needed before the army could assume a strong offensive. 14.

Although he opposed the plans of Davis and Bragg to force the enemy into the open, separate Nashville and Chattanooga, isolate Knoxville, and reclaim the provision states of Tennessee and Kentucky, Johnston did so because those plans were not feasible with the army at hand. Although Bragg charged that Johnston declined to take the offensive, he was not entirely correct, as Johnston would have been willing to do so if he had been able. One of the officers sent to inform Johnston of Davis' wishes reported that Johnston was perfectly willing to be aggressive as soon as he had a sufficient number of men. 15. As to his plans, Johnston wrote Davis, "To assume the offense from this point, we must move into either middle or east Tennessee. To the first the obstacles are: Chattanooga, now a fortress, the Tennessee River, the rugged desert of the Cumberland Mountains, and an army outnumbering ours more than two to one. The second would leave the way open into Georgia. We have neither subsistence nor field transportation enough for either march. 16."

For better or worse, the Army of Tennessee was to be a defensive one from the very start of the Atlanta Campaign. This has been a much debated question, but I believe that Johnston followed the practical and wise course. Despite the

estimates of Bragg and Hood, Johnston was greatly outnumbered. He was a hundred miles from a base of supply with which he was connected by a single railroad. Sherman, on the other hand, had built up a strong base of supply in Chattanooga and, in addition, had enough men adequately to protect his railroad supply line to Nashville and Louisville. Also, Sherman's goal was the all important city of Atlanta and not Johnston's army, as we shall see. With his many advantages, Sherman could have easily swept down on Atlanta if Johnston had moved from his front. The controversy between Davis and Johnston, which started over the question of the offensive, was to have disastrous consequences later in the campaign. At any rate, Johnston had to fight on the defensive and did an excellent job.

Turning from the controversy over operations and plans, we must consider the excellent job of organization which Johnston accomplished in the depleted army. Giving a general pardon to all absent without leave if they would return, Johnston strengthened and reorganized the army, instituted a furlough system and procured supplies to remedy shortages.¹⁷ All the horses were sent to the Etowah Valley to feed, and Johnston tried unsuccessfully to get Colonel E. P. Alexander to command his artillery.¹⁸ The morale was improved, as the soldiers had faith in "Old Joe", who did everything to improve their lot. The army had been depleted by battles and desertions, with discipline disappearing. Then came Johnston with his pardons and furloughs, rations, whiskey and tobacco twice a week, and hard but fair punishments. The common soldier's viewpoint is given us by Sam Watkins, who says that Johnston was loved, respected, admired, and almost worshiped by his troops who would all have gladly died for him.¹⁹ A young officer wrote to his

wife, "General Johnston seems to have infused a new spirit into the whole mass, and out of chaos brought order and beauty. Our men are better clothed than at any previous time, while their food is better than one would have anticipated two months ago. ²⁰."

This was the situation of the army at Dalton. We must remember that Dalton had not been selected by Bragg for its value as a defensive position, but because the retreat had merely ceased there. Johnston said that he would have moved back to Calhoun, as Dalton had neither intrinsic strength nor strategic value, but that after the debate with Seddon and Davis, this might cause a bad effect on the Southern people. ²¹. As to the troops at Dalton, there were three corps after the arrival of Hood and of General Leonidas Polk during the battle of Dalton. Now we turn to a consideration of the Federal Army, which was undergoing similar preparations and plans.

Chapter II

Federal Plans and Preparations

The Spring of 1864 opened hopefully for the Union, as Vicksburg and Gettysburg had been great victories, the Mississippi River was under its control, Chattanooga was held, and the two Confederate Armies had been pushed back into Georgia and Virginia. With Grant's promotion to Commander-in-Chief, the way was now opened for the consolidated effort to end the war. The grand strategy of the last year of the war was to carry the Union to victory. As to this strategy in the West, Sherman was to destroy the army of Joseph E. Johnston at Dalton and move as far into the enemy's country as necessary to destroy the will to resist, as well as the means. Sherman, like Johnston, had to organize his army and formulate his plans.

Sherman, in addition to his numerical and logistical superiority, had another great advantage over Johnston: he enjoyed the full confidence of both Lincoln and Grant. As to the relations between Grant and Sherman, Pierson sums them up as "harmony and loyalty based upon mutual respect and confidence, the outgrowth of service together in so many campaigns, campaigns which tested resources and abilities thoroughly."¹ "As did Johnston, Sherman also enjoyed the confidence of his men, who affectionately styled him "Uncle Billy".²

After his meeting with Grant and the receipt of his instructions, Sherman began preparations for the consolidated push which was to begin in the Spring. Due to Johnston's decision to remain on the defensive, there was ample opportunity for Sherman leisurely and deliberately to make the fullest preparations. Sherman

said, "After my return to Nashville I addressed myself to the task of organization and preparations, which involved the general security of the vast region of the south already conquered, more especially the several routes of supply and communication with the active armies at the front, and to organize a large army to move into Georgia, coincident with the advance of the Eastern Armies against Richmond. ³" Despite differences in size, the three armies were put on equal footing as to the requisition of supplies and transportation. According to Sherman, the great question of the campaign was one of supply, so Sherman took all possible measures to protect his route of supply, which ran along the Western and Atlantic Railroad from Chattanooga to Nashville to Louisville. Sherman requisitioned all the railroads, placing all under army control and allowing no one to travel except by orders. Although the civilians protested greatly, Sherman wrote Lincoln that he could not and would not do otherwise. Before the opening of the campaign, the engineers prepared railroad bridges and trusses to be used during the advance. Constantly, Sherman was visiting his army commanders to assure that all would be ready. ⁴

Sherman's forces consisted of three armies: The Army of the Cumberland under General George H. Thomas (60,000 men); The Army of the Tennessee under General James B. McPherson (25,000 men); and The Army of the Ohio under General John M. Schofield (15,000 men). In addition, he had his cavalry under Generals George Stoneman and Kenner Garrard. Thus, Sherman had an army of 100,000 men opposing Johnston's army of 45,000 men. Also, Sherman had sufficient numbers to protect his vital route of supply. ⁵

Intending to open the campaign on May 1st, by moving Schofield from

Cleveland, Thomas from Chattanooga, and McPherson against the railroad below Resaca, Sherman stated, "I had no purpose to attack Johnston's position at Dalton in front, but to march from Chattanooga, to feign at his front and to make lodgement in Resaca, eighteen miles to his rear on his line of communication and supply.^{6.}" Sherman already realized that Johnston would be compelled to hang on to the railroad which was his only possible avenue of supply. This was to be the strategy of the campaign to Atlanta.

With his numerical superiority, Sherman would hold Johnston with a part of his force while sending the remainder in a flanking movement which would threaten Johnston's supply line and force him to fall back to his next line of entrenchments. Although entrenchments were heavily relied upon by both sides, this would be a war of movement with the railroad as the center of attraction for both sides. Only at Kennesaw did Sherman deviate from his basic plan. As General Cox said, "The days for brilliant detached campaigns, such as Jackson had made in Virginia, were over. Lee, as well as Johnston, settled down to patient defensive operations behind carefully constructed earthworks, watching for some slip in the strategy of the Federal commanders which might give hope of success to aggressive return blows by their smaller forces."^{7.}

This set the stage for the decisive campaign of 1864 in Georgia. Before considering the actual military occurrences of this campaign, we should examine Sherman's actual objective. Atlanta, although not the capital of the Confederacy, was perhaps its most important city.

MAP
ILLUSTRATING THE OPERATIONS
OF THE
ARMY UNDER COMMAND OF
GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,
IN
GEORGIA.

From May the 5th to September the 4th 1864.

Compiled and drawn under the direction of


BVT. BRIG. GEN. O.M. POE.

Corps of Engineers, Col. and ADC.

Late Chief Engineer, Military Division of the Mississippi

BY
J. V. GLUMER

Scale
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10



AUTHORITIES

Surveys made by J. Dodge and H. Rizer, Civil Engineers.
Map of the Atlanta Campaign compiled under the direction of
Captains O.M. Poe, U.S. Engineers.
Copied, consolidated Maps.
Maps of Georgia on file in the Office of the Chief of Engineers, U.S.A.
Geographical Positions furnished by the U.S. Coast Survey.

EXPLANATIONS

Lines of works erected by the United States Forces
Lines of works erected by the Confederate Forces
Triangulation points.

Chapter III

The Importance of Atlanta

Although the stated objective of both Sherman and Grant was the army of Joseph E. Johnston, actually the real objective, as viewed by both Federal and Confederate administrations, was the City of Atlanta. The fall of Vicksburg in 1863 and the control of the Mississippi River by the Federal gunboats had cut off the states west of the river. The possession of Atlanta by the Federals would give them Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi. They already had Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas and Texas; and if Atlanta were lost, nine states would thus be conquered and reduced, leaving only the two Carolinas and Virginia.¹ Therefore, the possession of Atlanta was a question of life and death to the Confederacy.

Also, Georgia was now the chief granary and main military workshop, with Atlanta as the center of a network of manufacturing cities and villages such as Rome, Roswell and Marietta. "Georgia was the keystone of the Confederate arch whose firm northern buttress was Virginia."² From these factories the Southern Armies were drawing all the paraphernalia of war: powder, shot, shells, caps, cannon, small arms, clothing and equipment, wagons, etc. The vast grain growing prairie in central Georgia was furnishing both Confederate Armies. Sherman was acutely aware of all this, as he had obtained and analyzed census and taxation returns to calculate the population and resources of every county in Georgia.³

Atlanta was the machine shop of the Confederacy, next in importance to the Tredegar works at Richmond; and it was the receiving and distributing center for supplies for both Confederate Armies. Machinery and goods of all kinds came through

the blockade to Atlanta, where the machinery was set up. Colonel Wright commanded the large and well-stocked arsenal which had to carry a bigger and bigger load as the war went on. The arsenal produced 25,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and about 150 rounds of field ammunition per day, as well as 20,000 pounds of lead per month.⁴ Besides supplying the Army of Tennessee, the arsenal was sending much material to Virginia immediately preceding the fall of Atlanta.⁵

In addition to the arsenal, Atlanta contained other important manufacturing works. In 1862, the Government placed a pistol factory in Atlanta in the block bounded by Piedmont Avenue, the Georgia Railroad, Butler and Hunter Streets. As no models were available, this factory made machines and pistols from drawings. J. H. Burr, an Englishman, and E. N. Spiller, a German expert in gun work, were in charge of this factory. The Novelty Iron Works, at Marietta and Bartow Streets, handled government contracts for work on ordnance supplies of all kinds. The Confederate Rolling Mill, located at the site of the present Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills, made cannon, armor plate, and rails. Reputedly, the Merrimac was sheathed in plate made at this mill.⁶ Manufacturing of railroad cars and bar iron was done by the Empire Manufacturing Company, while the foundry of Solomon and Company made the buttons, spurs, bridles, bits, and buckles for the army. Thus, we see that there were many factories in Atlanta in addition to the arsenal at Walton and Broad Streets. Also, there were important recruiting camps, remount depots, commissary supply depots, tanneries and other works. These many manufacturing and storage concerns made Atlanta the base for the Army of Tennessee and the secondary base for the Army of Northern Virginia.⁷

In addition, Atlanta was of the utmost importance as a railroad center which joined the Confederacy together. The story of the Confederate railroads is a story in itself--with the different gauges, poor time schedules, and the tragedy of the reluctant Government which too late tried to harness the railroads. We must, however, briefly consider the importance of the rail network entering Atlanta, for this was another reason why Atlanta was Sherman's primary objective.

This decisive campaign had a railroad background from the very beginning, as the Western and Atlantic became the supply line for both armies and remained so until the fall of Atlanta. Even before the initial movements, Southern pickets looked out over the tracks from their positions on Tunnel Hill. Actually, the railroad was all important to both armies, as Sherman advanced along it while Johnston was forced to fall back every time Sherman's flanking movements threatened this vital supply line. As Johnston retreated, he tore up the tracks which were quickly repaired by the Federal railroad crew. As General O. O. Howard stated, "The rapidity with which the badly broken railroad was repaired seemed miraculous."⁸ On reaching the vicinity of Atlanta, Sherman's prime objective became the destruction of the railroads, for this would force the evacuation of Atlanta. Besides the Western and Atlantic, there were three other main railroads which passed through Atlanta. The Georgia Railroad provided the best interior communication for the Confederacy, while the Atlanta, Montgomery and West Point Railroad provided a connection for bringing in the grain of Alabama and munitions from the factories at Selma. The Macon and Western Railroad provided communication to the grain and factories of south Georgia. Originally known as "Terminus", due to the convergence of its

railroads, Atlanta was the center of travel for men and equipment to all parts of the Confederacy. If Sherman could cut these lines of communication and supply, he would greatly weaken the ability of the South to resist.⁹

Finally, Atlanta was an important objective as it had become a symbol in the North just as had Richmond. Although the South had suffered disastrous defeats at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, she still had armies in the field with the will to win. Atlanta was important to both sides politically, as the election of 1864 was approaching in the North. The holding of Atlanta was almost a necessity for a Democratic victory in the North. Sherman realized this, and said after the capture of Atlanta that the victory had been very opportune for the politics and election of Lincoln, as the fall of Atlanta had become a political necessity.¹⁰ If this were true in the North, then the reverse would be even truer in the South, as the holding of Atlanta would, in addition to providing badly needed material, provide a stimulus for continued fighting. Sherman also realized this, as he said, "I knew that the people of the South would realize in this measure (the fall and resulting occupation and destruction of Atlanta) two important conclusions: one, that we were in earnest; and the other, if they were sincere in their common and popular clamor 'to die in the last ditch' that the opportunity would soon come."¹¹ Thus, Atlanta was a symbol to the South as Stalingrad was to Russia in World War Two.

The political importance of Atlanta in the North was reflected in Harpers Weekly, which stated editorially, "There is not a man who did not feel that McClellan's chances were diminished by the glad tidings from Atlanta; nor any one who does not

know that if Sherman had been defeated, the friends of the Chicago candidate would have felt surer of his success. ^{12.} " It went on to say that "Sherman has done more, in his capture of Atlanta, for a cessation of hostilities than Vallandigham and his convention could do in twelve months of abuse of the administration and of the war. ^{13.} " The capture of Atlanta assured Lincoln's election as it assured the North that the war could now be carried to a completion.

Thus, Atlanta was most important for the North to take and for the South to retain. The "Gate City of the South" was exactly that, as it was a railroad and communications center, a manufacturing and produce center, and an ideological focus for both sides. For these reasons, Atlanta, not the army of Joseph E. Johnston, was the primary objective of General Sherman. This can be clearly seen in his plans and military operations. On the other hand, although Johnston fully intended to defend Atlanta, his primary objective was the preservation of his army. We now turn to a consideration of the military occurrences which brought Sherman to the gates of the "Gate City".

Chapter IV

"Old Joe knows what he's up to"

The time had now come for Sherman to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to penetrate the interior of the country as far as possible in order to destroy its resources. More particularly, the time had come for Sherman to attempt to take the all important citadel of Atlanta. His tactics would be simple. He would move in three columns, using the center one to engage Johnston while either flanking column would be sent around Johnston at every opportunity to threaten the railroads. Occupying every ridge, mountain pass and ford, Johnston would always repulse the enemy in his front but would be forced to retreat to positions previously selected and prepared each time his flank was turned, as turned it must be. Johnston's principal aims, besides the defeat of Sherman, were to protect his railroad and to maintain an "army in being"¹. The events of the Atlanta Campaign from Dalton to Atlanta show that both commanders relied on these basic tactics, and that both of them did an excellent job in carrying out their respective plans.

The Union operations for the grand strategy of the last year of the war actually went into effect on May 2nd, 1864, when the Federal cavalry drove the Confederate pickets from Ringgold Gap back to Tunnel Hill. Firmly entrenched in the mountains, Johnston's main force was deployed along the crest of Rocky Face Ridge. At the opening of the campaign, the Army of Tennessee consisted of two corps: Hardee's Corps containing the divisions of Generals B. F. Cheatham, W. H. T. Walker, Pat R. Cleburne, and W. B. Bate; and Hood's Corps composed of the divisions of Generals

T. C. Hindman, C. L. Stevenson and A. P. Stewart.² General Joseph Wheeler's cavalry was posted along Tunnel Hill with pickets extending to the Cleveland road. Although only half the size of the Federal Army at this time, the Army of Tennessee opened its resistance as a well trained force, with high morale and excellent leadership in most instances.³ General Leonidas Polk, in anticipation of Sherman's advance and despite the orders of Bragg, had placed the divisions of S. G. French and W. W. Loring in North Alabama, ready to aid Johnston. These two divisions, along with that of General Canty and W. H. Jackson's cavalry, would form Polk's Corps.⁴

On May 5th, the Army of Tennessee was formed from Mill Creek Gap across Dalton to the Cleveland Road, while the Federal Army was formed in line of battle ready to advance. On May 7th, the Army of the Ohio under Schofield and the Army of the Cumberland under Thomas began their consolidated advance on the Confederate entrenchments. Enjoying the advantage of terrain and prepared positions, Johnston's army successfully repelled every attack on its front for the next five days. The most serious attack was that by General Hooker at Dug Gap on the 8th, but Hardee personally brought up reinforcements which halted the Federals.⁵

The key to the Battle of Dalton was Snake Creek Gap which runs between the mountain ridges, coming in on the Western and Atlantic below Resaca. As we have seen, Sherman had no intention of launching a full scale attack on Johnston's strong front. Before the opening of the campaign, General Thomas called Sherman's attention to this Gap which provided an excellent means for turning the position at Dalton; and Sherman had decided to send McPherson and the Army of the Tennessee

through the gap to seize Resaca while a still superior army pressed Johnston's front, ready to follow the moment Dalton was abandoned. Due to the lack of accurate maps and good staff work, Johnston was either ignorant of the possibilities of Snake Creek Gap or did not believe that a large army could successfully move through it. At any rate, McPherson found the gap unguarded, as Johnston believed himself secure at Dalton.⁶

Accompanied by Kilpatrick's cavalry division, McPherson marched through Snake Creek Gap on May 9th, arriving at Resaca without opposition. Defended by two brigades of Canty's Division, Resaca was strongly entrenched in a triangle formed by the Oostanaula and Connasauga Rivers and Camp Creek. Convinced by his reconnaissance that he could not carry the town by assault, McPherson retired to the mouth of the gap to keep the way open for the whole army, reporting the situation to Sherman. Feeling that McPherson had lost a great opportunity, Sherman believed that McPherson with 23,000 good men could have easily taken Resaca and that Johnston would probably have had to retreat eastward, losing half of his army and all of his artillery at the outset of the campaign. "Such an opportunity does not occur twice in a single life, but at the critical moment McPherson seems to have been a little timid."⁷ "Becoming aware of McPherson's presence on the 10th, Johnston sent Hood with Walker's, Hindman's and Cleburne's divisions to Resaca. "At night Brigadier-General Canty reported that he had been engaged at Resaca with the troops of the Army of the Tennessee and had held his ground. As intelligence of the arrival of that army in Snake Creek Gap had been received, Lt.-General Hood was ordered to move to Resaca immediately with three divisions."⁸

Hood and Hindman, however, were recalled the next day, as McPherson was not pressing the attack and as General Polk had arrived at Resaca with Loring's division.⁹

Sherman now planned to move his whole army through the gap, as Rocky Face Ridge provided an excellent shield and as Johnston's army was unassailable in its positions at Dalton. On the 11th, orders were issued for a general movement the next day, and on the 12th, Thomas and Schofield moved to join McPherson. Learning of the concentration at that place, Johnston evacuated Dalton during the night of the 12th and concentrated his forces in front of Sherman at Resaca. Flanked by Sherman's successful movement, Johnston was forced to abandon his impregnable lines about Dalton and to conduct the first of a series of strategic retreats.¹⁰

At Resaca, Johnston entrenched with Polk's Corps on the left resting on the Oostanaula, Hardee in the center, and Hood on the right with his right flank on the Connasauga. On the 13th, 14th and 15th the Battle of Resaca was fought with first one side, then the other making an attack. Again Johnston enjoyed the advantages of terrain and prepared positions which offset Sherman's numerical superiority. Although utilizing these positions, Johnston had a river at his back which would facilitate an investment by the enemy. Utilizing his strength, Sherman planned to contract his lines as much as possible in order to withdraw a sufficient force for another flanking movement beyond the Oostanaula. During the night of the 15th, Johnston was forced to retire south of the river, burning the railroad bridge behind him; and the next morning Sherman entered the town.¹¹ His numbers

swelled by Polk's arrival, Johnston had 67,000 men at Resaca while Sherman had about 104,000.¹² As to the losses in the bloody battle at Resaca, Sherman states that there were 2,800 Confederate losses and 2,747 Federal; but the consensus is that the Confederate losses were many less than Sherman reports.¹³

Johnston has been criticized for withdrawing from the strong positions at Dalton and Resaca, and for failing to notice and fortify Snake Creek Gap. As to the latter, Johnston suffered due to poor staff work and inadequate maps, thinking that any flanking movement by Sherman would involve a longer and more arduous detour. Also, Johnston states that he knew how long it would take a force to move through the gap and that the strength at Resaca shows that he was prepared to defend against such a move even though he was unaware of McPherson's presence of the 11th.¹⁴ Also, Johnston simply did not have the men to defend every gap and pass and at the same time maintain a strong front. Actually, the country of North Georgia around Dalton and Resaca is not as strong as Davis asserted; and the only real mountain is Rocky Face Ridge, which aided Sherman more than Johnston by providing a screen.¹⁵ Snake Creek Gap is not as narrow and easily defended as most writers have maintained. The slopes bounding the gap are gradual and open to a strong attack. Today a four lane superhighway is being constructed through the gap. If Johnston had tried to defend this area, Sherman with his superior force could have taken the gap and possibly could have routed Johnston. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Johnston was deceived as to Sherman's purpose, for he expected Sherman to attack with his whole force at Dalton.¹⁶ Sherman deceived Johnston by conducting a well-thought-out

operation of tactics rather than combat.

As to the retreat from Dalton and Resaca, Johnston had no choice, as in both instances he was in danger of being surrounded and of losing the army. Sherman commented, "That Johnston deliberately designed in advance to give up such strong positions at Dalton and Resaca, for the purpose of drawing us farther south, is simply absurd. Had he remained in Dalton another hour, it would have been his total defeat, and he only evacuated Resaca because his safety demanded it. ¹⁷." Sherman also states that his army was double the size of Johnston's, and that the movement through the gap had been a complete surprise. The danger which threatened Johnston's line of communication and supply made the continued occupation of both Dalton and Resaca hazardous. In his Narrative of Military Operations, Johnston says that he was dislodged from his first position in front of Dalton by Sherman's movement through Snake Creek Gap, threatening his line of communication at Resaca, and from his second position at Resaca by a similar Federal movement toward Calhoun, the second being covered by the river as the first had been by the mountain. In both cases, Sherman's numerical superiority enabled him, with little risk, to make use of the features of the terrain which favored such maneuvers. ¹⁸. "My own operations, then and subsequently, were determined by the relative forces of the armies, and a higher estimate of the Northern soldiers than our Southern editors and politicians were accustomed to express or even the administration seemed to entertain. ¹⁹." Thus, Johnston could do nothing else but abandon these two strong positions if he was to maintain his army and keep it between Sherman and Atlanta. Although the Army of Tennessee


had been forced to retreat, it inflicted many more casualties than it received.

Retreating south of Resaca, the Army of Tennessee entered more open country which forced Johnston to seek a narrow valley or some other strong position, as he was determined not to risk a general engagement in a field where Sherman could maneuver against his flanks. Hoping but failing to find a good position near Calhoun which would cover all roads leading southward, Johnston was forced to move on to Adairsville, and then to Cassville before finding a position suitable for defense against superior numbers. Johnston divided his forces at Adairsville, with Polk and Hood marching to Cassville while Hardee moved to Kingston, leaving Sherman the impression that the main force had moved to Kingston. By misleading Sherman and dividing the enemy forces, Johnston hoped to deliver a decisive blow on a part of Sherman's army, then move to defeat the other part. Following on Johnston's heels, Sherman was deceived, as he believed Johnston to be in Kingston, while Hardee had moved on through Kingston and back to Cassville to rejoin the rest of the army. Sherman wanted a fight, and Johnston was ready to give him one. Hood and Polk were ordered to advance on the 18th, to overwhelm Schofield before the center and right of Sherman's army arrived. The result of these well-conceived plans was another might-have-been for the Army of Tennessee, as General Hood moved out only to find enemy troops on the Canton Road where none were expected; and without notifying Johnston, Hood retreated instead of attacking. Actually, Hood had encountered a part of Butterfield's Division which had blundered onto the wrong road and was lost. Thus, the well-laid plans of men went astray. 20.

In his Advance and Retreat Hood states that Johnston refused to attack Sherman at Cassville, and that he himself requested to be allowed to attack, but that he was hit from an unexpected direction and that Johnston ordered him to rejoin Polk. He also states that he had been enfiladed by the column on the Canton Road, and that Johnston was incorrect in his statement that the report of the enemy was untrue.²¹ Definitely Hood had encountered the enemy, but he had encountered a confused and lost division which could have been swept back in an assault. Despite his defense of himself, Hood had blundered and had lost the advantage which Johnston had gained through strategic maneuvering.

Johnston has been accused of refusing to fight, but the failure on the 18th was Hood's, not Johnston's. Despite this failure, Johnston was determined to fight a decisive engagement at Cassville. On the 19th, he issued a general order that the retreat had gone as far as necessary for strategic purposes, and that the time had come to give battle. However, on holding a conference with Polk and Hood, Johnston learned that they could not hold their positions, as they were under enfilade fire from the artillery of the Federal Army. Although he did not believe this fire to be effective, and although General Hardee stated that he could hold his position, Johnston decided to take the advice of his subordinates and retreat.²² General Hood attempted to prove his reasons for retreat by citing the report of Captain Walter J. Morris, Chief Engineer of Polk's Corps, who had inspected the positions and found them untenable.²³ Johnston, on the other hand, thought that the proposed battle would have been successful, and that a retreat was not in order. On the morning of the 20th, Sherman found that the Confederate Army had crossed

the Etowah and had moved southward again. He found in Cassville every indication that Johnston had intended to make a stand, and he also found newspapers criticizing Johnston for retreating.²⁴ If the Southern papers were disappointed, Sherman was even more disappointed, as he was eager for a battle in comparatively open country. Cox sums up the events at Cassville appropriately. "The only thing that is certain in the matter is that their (Confederate leaders) dissensions prolonged the campaign by postponing the decisive engagement, as to the result of which Sherman was justly confident."²⁵ Both Sherman and Johnston wanted to fight, and both would have the opportunity soon.



Chapter V

From the Etowah Across the Chattahoochee

Allowing the army a brief rest in order for its supplies to catch up with it, Sherman was preparing to cross the Etowah River and continue the march for Atlanta. Having been over this country in 1844 as a young lieutenant, he knew that Allatoona Pass was too strong to assault; he planned, therefore, to move to Marietta via Dallas, a movement designed to make Johnston give up Allatoona so that Sherman could extend his lines back to the railroad which he would have to leave briefly in maneuvering toward Dallas.¹ Dallas, which lay south of Kingston and west of Marietta, was important in that it was the hub of all the main roads in the area. On May 22nd, Sherman ordered the move to begin. On the 23rd, Johnston ordered Hardee to Dallas via New Hope Church, while Polk was to move in the same direction but to the south of Dallas. However, Johnston was not sure of Sherman's move on the 23rd. On the 24th, Wheeler pushed into Cassville with his cavalry, capturing many prisoners and supply wagons, and learning of Sherman's march toward Dallas. Jackson's cavalry also reported Sherman to be moving on Dallas, so Hood was ordered to follow Hardee.²

Being forewarned of Sherman's movement, Johnston was able to reach the vicinity of Dallas and to prepare his usual strong defensive positions. His lines were admirably chosen, as they lay along a series of wooded ridges with open valleys in front of each ridge. Hood was on the right with his center at New Hope Church covering the road from Dallas to Ackworth. Polk was in the center giving close support to Hood, while Hardee was on the right, covering the Stilesboro,

Dallas and Atlanta Road. With the addition of Polk's complete corps (Quarles' Division) and the Georgia Militia, who were used to cover the railroad line, Johnston was stronger than at any time in the campaign. He had been constantly picking up detachments while Sherman had been sending out new ones, and his army was ready to beat the Yanks. Dallas, New Hope Church and Picketts Mill would give them ample opportunity.³

The Battle of New Hope Church was initiated on May 25th by Geary's Division of Hooker's Corps and Stewart's Division of Hood's Corps. Fighting so fiercely that Hooker believed he was opposed by the entire Confederate Army, Stewart's men succeeded in halting the Federal advance and in causing Hooker's entire corps to deploy. Again and again Hooker's columns assaulted Hood's position, only to be repulsed bloodily each time by the men in Gray behind log barricades protected by well posted artillery.⁴ So great was the slaughter that the place became known as Hooker's "Hell Hole".⁵ From 5:00 P. M. until 8:00 P. M. Stewart's Division whipped Hooker's entire corps; and, when asked if he needed reinforcements, Stewart replied, "My own troops will hold the position."⁶

From May 25th to June 4th, vigorous attacks and counterattacks occurred daily in the vicinity of Dallas and New Hope Church. On the morning of the 26th, Sherman began extending his lines to his left toward Ackworth, as skirmishing fights ranged along the entire line all day. On the 27th, General O. O. Howard tried to turn Hardee's flank only to be stopped by Cleburne. On the 28th, General Hood launched an attack, but he too was repulsed, much to Johnston's disgust. A typical attack in this area is depicted by W. R. Cambell, of the Fourth Louisiana

Regiment of Cleburne's Division. In speaking of an attack they made against part of Howard's Corps, Cambell writes, "We advanced across a field some three hundred yards, then into a thicket of undergrowth, and from that into a dense skirt of woods, when a perfect hailstorm of bullets cut through the limbs over our heads. Suddenly the firing ceased. We passed the cavalry pickets and very soon we struck the Yankee line which lay in ambush behind a hedgerow. They rose and poured a crashing volley into our faces at not more than fifteen paces; but, strange to say, they shot high and did very little damage. We returned the fire and charged, advancing with a yell up the hill."⁷ Cambell and his compatriots managed to take the hill they assaulted so bravely. In his account we see both the lay of the land and the seesawing attacks as both armies fought for advantageous positions.

Realizing that Johnston's positions were too strong to be taken by a direct assault, as was always the case, Sherman continued to extend to his left toward the all important railroad. For several days, Johnston was correspondingly able to extend his own lines; but soon he had to submit to Sherman's numerical advantage. Having extended beyond Johnston's right and having seized and secured Allatoona Creek from its mouth to Ackworth, Sherman was ready to push forward, with Allatoona as a new base, and strike a new and heavy blow. Much to his chagrin, however, he found that Johnston had abandoned his works on the night of June 4th, and had fallen back to a new and equally strong line along Mud Creek.⁸

One significant outcome of the fighting around New Hope Church was that both armies became convinced of the advantages of having breastworks. The numerous remains of breastworks around Atlanta today will attest that such works

were used extensively by both sides for the remainder of the campaign. "The Rebels must carry their breastworks with them while Sherman's men march with a rifle in one hand and a spade in the other.⁹" According to Howard, no regiment was long in front of Johnston's army without having almost as good fortifications as an engineer could plan and build.¹⁰ Johnston claims that Sherman exaggerated the idea of his field works and that Sherman's were actually better, as the Army of Tennessee had inadequate entrenching tools.¹¹ This does not hold true, however, as Johnston's works were prepared well ahead of time, before the army arrived, by the Georgia Militia and impressed Negroes.¹² To the North, besides the obvious protection offered, these entrenchments gave a supplementary advantage to the rifled arms which they possessed in numbers much superior to the South. Protected by entrenchments, the Yankees could deliver a devastating fire from a distance beyond the effective range of unrifled pieces. To the South, the entrenchments abetted the natural strength of the country as they helped to offset the deficiency in numbers.

On his withdrawal from New Hope Church on the night of the 4th, Johnston retreated to previously prepared entrenchments along Kenesaw Mountain, Pine Mountain and Lost Mountain. This retreat, like previous ones, had been necessitated by Sherman's usual flanking movement. Also, like previous retreats, it was carried out in good order without the loss of any equipment. As to the losses of men during the month of May, Sherman estimated his at 9,299 while Johnston placed his at 5,393, although Sherman placed them at 8,638, as he said Johnston did not count the prisoners taken. At any rate, Johnston inflicted more losses than he

suffered, but proportionally he lost more than he could afford. 13.

Although never a day passed without skirmishing and fighting, June 5th through June 9th was spent by Sherman in consolidating and bringing up supplies, while Johnston was doing likewise. A steady rain had been falling for several days, turning the roads to mud and mire and greatly hindering movement and observation. On June 10th, the whole Federal Army moved forward, feeling for the enemy who was believed to have moved back to the Chattahoochee River. Much to his surprise, McPherson found the Confederates occupying Brush Mountain in force, while Stoneman's cavalry discovered entrenchments around Lost Mountain. Observing the Federal movements, Johnston concentrated between Gilgal and Brush Mountain, with Hardee at Gilgal Church and Bate's Division atop Pine Mountain. By now the roads were impassable and the weather was cold, disappointing the Yanks who looked forward to entering the "sunny south". However, the weather cleared slightly on the 14th, and Sherman ordered the artillery to open fire and the skirmish lines to be advanced. 14.

At the suggestion of General Hardee, who feared that Bate's Division would be cut off, Johnston and Polk had joined Hardee in an inspection of the lines on the 14th. Although the men warned the generals not to expose themselves, they rode along the top of Pine Mountain which offered an excellent view of both lines. It was then that Sherman's artillery cut loose and caused the commanders to scatter. However, General Polk, who often exposed himself unnecessarily, walked slowly back in order to catch a last look at the field. A cannon ball passed completely through his body, and the brave spiritual and temporal leader fell.

According to one of his soldiers, "The fatal missile of death deprived us of a hero in whom the administration and country reposed entire confidence. In him the troops of Tennessee lost their best friend and the whole country one of its ablest commanders. ^{15.}" The brother of former President James Knox Polk, Leonidas Polk had been a Bishop in the Episcopal Church and had founded the University of the South. He had been with the Army of Tennessee from the first, and he was loved and respected by all--both officers and men. A good man and a good soldier, Polk had played peacemaker in the dispute between Johnston, Hood and Davis. This was indeed a severe loss to the South. ^{16.}

During the night of the 14th, Pine Mountain was abandoned and General Bate placed in reserve, and on the 15th Thomas extended his line beyond the mountain. Johnston was driven back to Gilgal Church and then to Mud Creek as Sherman continued to push his entire force forward and as Johnston was unable to spread his forces too thin. Continuous charging and countercharging pushed Johnston closer to his Kenesaw line. On the night of the 20th, Hood was shifted from the right to the left flank, and the next day he signified his presence by an assault against Hooker's Corps. Although unsuccessful because of the extended Federal lines, the attack was well planned and executed. Hooker reported to Sherman that he was attacked by three corps, and Sherman was forced to remind him that three corps constituted the entire opposing army. ^{17.}

Now Johnston had fallen back to his Kenesaw line with its retired and well-anchored flanks which discouraged envelopment. Believing that Johnston could not strongly fortify a ten mile line with 60,000 men, Sherman decided on a

frontal attack instead of the usual flanking movement. Sherman wrote Halleck, "The whole country is one vast fort, and Johnston must have full fifty miles of connected trenches, with abates and finished batteries.^{18.}" If this were even partly true, Sherman would have difficulty in flanking Johnston. Also, a flanking movement would require an accumulation of supplies; and the rain and guerrilla activity against the now extended supply line made this impossible at the time. Sometimes an impregnable position causes a careless security in defenders who feel safe, as Lookout Mountain had proved. Finally, Sherman felt that a sudden attack on Johnston's center might prove successful and catch Johnston napping, since he had become accustomed to flanking movements during the entire campaign.^{19.} Therefore, Sherman decided on a bold effort to break the lines in front of him. His only other choice was to wait, and that would prove demoralizing to his men and give Johnston a chance to build even stronger.^{20.}


Sherman fixed upon Monday morning, June 27th, as the day for the general advance against Kenesaw Mountain, which is some two and a half miles long, rising seven hundred feet above the surrounding country at its highest point. Thomas was to attack in the center, Schofield on the extreme right, and McPherson on the left against Little Kenesaw. Each commander was to pick a position to attack which would seem to offer the greatest possibility of success. Covered by a continuous artillery fire, the three separate columns made heroic assaults to no avail. Thomas' attack against Cleburne exemplifies the entire Battle of Kenesaw Mountain. The battle of "Dead Angle" was a bloody one for the Yanks. "Here the formation necessarily lost its order in struggling through and over the trunks and interlaced

branches of felled forest trees, and the concentrated fire of infantry and artillery became too hot for endurance. The advance was checked---and hundreds of brave men and valuable officers fell on every side.^{21.}" The slaughter of this engagement resulted in a heroic act of bravery. Colonel W. H. Martin of the First Arkansas Regiment of Cleburne's Division, disregarding the possibility of death, stopped the firing in order to allow the Yankees to remove their wounded from the burning woods. A Federal major presented him with a fine brace of pistols during the imposed lull.^{22.} At every point, the Federals were severely repulsed, and even Sherman admitted 3,000 men lost to only 650 Confederates.^{23.}

Kenesaw Mountain was not Missionary Ridge, and the Southern soldiers were fighting with a different spirit under Johnston than they had under Bragg. "Our losses in this assault were heavy indeed, and our gain was nothing^{24.} ", Sherman admitted. Obviously, well manned and prepared entrenchments could not be attacked head-on. Sherman gambled and lost by his own admission, but he was far from being out of the game.

Sherman resumed the plan for the flank operation and prepared to send McPherson by the right flank, as the rains were over and movement was becoming more practicable. Meanwhile, the observant Johnston was busy fortifying a line north of the Chattahoochee. Also, work was being done in Atlanta where the existing fortifications were strengthened and extended in case the Chattahoochee line should be broken.^{25.}

McPherson's flanking movement forced Johnston to fall back from Kenesaw on the night of July 2nd with Sherman hot on his heels. Sherman hoped to catch



Johnston in crossing the river and was surprised to find that he had prepared strong positions on the near bank.²⁶ Remembering the recent lesson he had been taught, Sherman paused when he saw the preparations to resist his crossing. However, he was not prepared to stop. "I knew that Johnston would not remain long on the west bank of the Chattahoochee, for I could easily practice on that ground to better advantage our famous tactics of intrenching in his front, and with the rest of the army, cross the river and threaten either his rear or the city of Atlanta itself, which city was of vital importance to the existence not only of his own army, but of the Confederacy itself."²⁷ On the 7th, Sherman sent General Schofield in person on a reconnaissance of the river between Paces Ferry and Roswell; and, as a result of Schofield's report, he decided to make a crossing near the mouth of Soap Creek. The ford was undefended and the crossing a complete surprise on July 9th. Sherman said, "I have always thought Johnston neglected his opportunity there, for he had lain comparatively idle while we got control of both banks of the river above him."²⁸ Johnston defended himself by saying that there were too many fords in the river to stop a crossing.²⁹ Although the river must have been swollen from the recent rains, this is true. Also, Sherman could have gone downstream as well as up in seeking a successful crossing. On the night of the 9th, Johnston withdrew across the river.

Sherman could continue his advance by one of two routes. The shortest would be to approach Atlanta from the southeast to seize the Macon and Montgomery Railroads near East Point. This, however, would leave his rear open to cavalry

attack. The surer although longer route would be to attack Atlanta on the northeast side in the vicinity of Decatur. On the 17th, the general movement on Atlanta began with Thomas crossing the Chattahoochee at Paces and Powers Ferry, Schofield moving toward Cross Keys, and McPherson toward Stone Mountain. Sherman knew that this movement would split his army, but he was confident that the unflinching Thomas, with nearly 50,000 in the Army of the Cumberland, could hold the entire Confederate Army at bay until the movement should be completed. The wily Johnston figured that Sherman would divide his forces, and he planned to attack with a superior force the moving and exposed column. However, he was not to deliver battle upon the ground he had selected.³⁰

Chapter VI

A Fatal Mistake

"Lieutenant-General J. B. Hood has been commissioned to the temporary rank of General under the late law of Congress. I am directed by the Secretary of War to inform you that, as you have failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta, far in the interior of Georgia, and express no confidence that you can defeat or repel him, you are hereby relieved from the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee, which you will immediately turn over to General Hood. S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General. ¹" At 10:00 P. M. on the night of July 17th, Johnston received this fateful telegram.

During the reorganization of the army before the opening of the campaign, we saw the beginning of the dispute between Johnston and the administration. Actually, the dispute between Johnston and Davis began before the war at West Point where the two men engaged in a fist fight over a young belle, a fight which Johnston won. Later Davis, as Secretary of War, held up Johnston's promotion. Even their wives got into the act, as Mrs. Davis resented the more prominent social position held by Mrs. Johnston in Washington. ² Both men were the sons of Revolutionary War soldiers, and both had been brought up as soldiers with fearless devotion to duty and self-sacrifice. As Quartermaster General in the United States Army, Johnston should have been the ranking General in the Confederate Army, but Davis considered him as a staff officer

and said that he had left the Union Army to join the Army of Virginia and that Lee outranked him in that army. Early in 1861, the two men differed on general policy, as Davis wanted to defend with fortified positions while Johnston wanted to move around with concentrated armies. Davis, who always considered himself more competent for military command than for civil administration, had his own ideas of what constituted a good military leader. Toward his friends, like Bragg, Davis maintained an unreasoning loyalty and, toward his enemies, a stubbornness to forgive. Although both Davis and Johnston had the good of the Confederacy at heart, they were estranged and separated from the first, even though they should have trusted each other and been in perfect accord.³

Davis realized the seriousness of changing commanders in the presence of the enemy, but he could not have confidence in one who had retreated from so many strong positions. Johnston's answers had been evasive concerning the defense of Atlanta whose fall would be most damaging to the Confederate cause, as it would involve the loss of valuable supplies, factories and morale.⁴ The pressure to remove Johnston had been growing since the Dalton retreat. Davis traced the movements of the retreat and said, "We had suffered a disastrous loss of territory."⁵ General Gorgas wrote on June 30th, "Johnston telegraphs he has repulsed a general attack of the enemy, but I have little confidence in the state of affairs in that quarter and expect to hear of retreat."⁶ Obviously, Gorgas is referring to the Battle of Kenesaw Mountain where Johnston did repulse the enemy in a great victory. As to the retreat from Kenesaw, Johnston had no other choice if Atlanta were to be saved.

Although Bragg had visited the army several days previous to the removal, Johnston had no idea of the real purpose of his visit. Being out to get Johnston, Bragg telegraphed Davis several times before he even saw Johnston, saying that all indications seemed to favor an entire evacuation of Atlanta. Although actually on an official visit with the purpose of selecting a new commander if Johnston seemed to be unable to defend Atlanta, Bragg never informed Johnston of this, leaving Johnston with the impression that he was just passing through. Bragg became upset because Johnston did not ask his advice. Johnston, however, like the vast majority of Confederate leaders, did not need or desire Bragg's advice. When Senator George G. Vest of Missouri, who was visiting the army, told Johnston that Davis, as a military man, would have delivered a crushing blow, Johnston replied, "Yes, I know that Mr. Davis thinks that he can do a great many things that other men would hesitate to attempt. For instance, he tried to do what God had failed to do. He tried to make a soldier of Braxton Bragg and you know the result. It couldn't be done.⁷" On July 15th, Bragg sent a detailed report to the President, stating that he had had several long visits with Johnston and that he did not propose any offensive operations. The positions, numbers and morale were all with the enemy, who should immediately be driven north of the Chattahoochee. Painting a picture of real danger, Bragg told of the equipment being removed from Atlanta. He concluded by saying that Hood had been in favor of giving battle all along (Hood had told him this), and that if there were to be any change, he thought that Hood would give unlimited satisfaction.⁸

This brings us to a much debated question: Should there have been a

change? If no one else thought so, General Sherman certainly did. "At this critical moment the Confederate Government rendered us a most valuable service. Being dissatisfied with the Fabian policy of General Johnston, it relieved him, and General Hood was substituted to command the Confederate Army. Hood was known to us to be a 'fighter', a graduate of West Point in the class of 1853, number forty-four, of which class two of my army commanders, McPherson and Schofield, were number one and number seven. The character of a leader is a large factor in the game of war, and I confess I was pleased at this change.^{9.}" Being far from his base and in enemy territory, Sherman would much rather meet the enemy in the open, not behind well-constructed parapets. Warning every division commander to be prepared for battle in any shape, Sherman was glad to learn that Hood was bold to recklessness and courageous to the extreme. "I inferred that the change of commanders meant 'fight'. This was just what we wanted, viz., to fight in open ground, on anything like equal terms, instead of being forced to run up against prepared intrenchments.^{10.}"

If Sherman's opinion of Hood was low, his opinion of Johnston was very high. "No officer or soldier who ever served under me will question the generalship of Joseph E. Johnston. His retreats were timely, in good order, and he left nothing behind.^{11.}" In fact, Sherman believed Johnston to be equal in all elements of generalship to Lee.^{12.} The rest of the Union Army shared Sherman's rejoicing. "Much to our comfort and to his surprise, Johnston was removed.^{13.}" stated General Howard, while General Hooker said that there was universal rejoicing by all the officers.^{14.}

In the Army of Tennessee and in the South we find a different opinion prevailing. The pressure for Johnston's removal which Davis referred to must have come from a small minority of people close to the President. The Richmond Whig said editorially, "It is true that, when General Johnston first began his retrograde movement, there was a disposition, not only among unmilitary critics, but in high official circles, to depreciate that commander's abilities, and to predict for him the most serious reverses," but the editor goes on to say that Johnston's reputation had "grown with every backward step".¹⁵ When Davis asked General Lee's opinion, Lee replied, "General Johnston is a patriot and an able soldier. He is upon the ground and knows his army better than any of us."¹⁶ Lee would not support Davis as the President had hoped. Instead, Davis was attacked by the Whig, "Our authorities are diseased in mind, and the craziest of their crazes is the fancied possession of an intuitive knowledge of men, especially military men."¹⁷

The whole Confederate Army was dissatisfied with the change. General Hardee threatened to resign; General Cleburne felt the change to be disastrous; and General Stewart thought that Johnston's removal would be the clinching blow in Confederate failure. The superiority of Johnston was recognized by all his generals, even Hood who wanted Johnston to remain in command and pocket the removal order. The feeling of the officers was summed up by General Kirby Smith, who had taught and commanded Hood and had served with Johnston. Smith wrote his mother, "Hood is a soldier, Johnston the General.---Hood is a man of ordinary intellect, Johnston's brain soars above all that surrounds him."¹⁸ The soldiers' letters home expressed the opinion that "Old Joe" had been grievously wronged, and that the loss of his

generalship would ruin them. The men loved their general. "It was very sad news when we received orders that General Joseph E. Johnston was relieved of command of the army and that General Hood, a junior Lieutenant-General, was placed in command. The War Department perhaps knows best, but the troops are dissatisfied with the change, for General Johnston was the idol of the army---. When the order relieving him of command was read the spectacle was touching to see; men who have borne the heat and burden of this war shed tears. 19."

Sam Watkins wrote, "The most terrible and disastrous blow that the South ever received was when Hon. Jefferson Davis placed General Hood in command of the Army of Tennessee. I saw, I will say, thousands of men cry like babies. 20." Even some of the privates tendered their resignations and went home, as they had fought gallantly for Johnston whom they loved and trusted.

On taking over the Army of Tennessee on July 18th, Hood claimed that Johnston's continuous retreats had completely ruined the morale of the army, and that the men no longer knew how to fight an offensive battle. "The troops of the Army of Tennessee had for such length of time been subjected to the ruinous policy pursued from Dalton to Atlanta that they were unfitted for united action in a pitched battle. 21." The timid defense policy of Johnston had made the troops scared of an offensive leader. Always sorry that he had ever left Lee, Hood compared the Army of Tennessee and the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee never used breastworks except to hold a part of the line with a small force while the main body assailed the enemy, and he always had his cavalry fight mounted. Johnston, however, used entrenchments so extensively that even the cavalry fought behind them. Hood

followed the Lee and Jackson school of fighting and thought that men trained in the Johnston school were almost useless. "I do assert that 50,000 men of the Lee and Jackson school will always prove equal to 80,000 of the Johnston school.^{22.}" The training of the Johnston school depressed and paralyzed instead of elevating and inspiring.^{23.}

General Hood was incorrect in his assertion that the Army of Tennessee had become demoralized and dispirited under the leadership of Joseph E. Johnston. This had been the case when Johnston assumed command, but it certainly was not the case when he relinquished it. These men were the same as those under Lee. They knew how to fight and did so even though behind breastworks. In fact, they enjoyed fighting for "Old Joe" in whom they had the utmost confidence and respect. Also, Johnston had the confidence and respect of his subordinate commanders.

Some of the letters of General Polk are an excellent source to see the condition, morale and spirit of the army and the relationship between the corps commanders and Johnston. On May 21st, he wrote his wife that the morale was high although there had been a tough campaign so far. No one knew when Johnston would attack, but all were ready to follow him. On May 27th near New Hope Church, Polk wrote that the relations between the four main general officers were very pleasant. Also, he wrote on June 1st that he had never seen troops in such fine spirit, and on June 11th that the troops and country had undiminished confidence in General Johnston who was managing things very prudently. A battle probably would not be expedient until the Chattahoochee was crossed, but the

troops were ready. ^{24.}

The soldiers were fighting, like their commander, for victory, not glory. Their spirit is seen in a letter of Thomas J. Stokes from New Hope Church dated May 27th. Hard pressed in a hot contest, the men would holler to the Yankees, "Come on, we are demoralized." When their major (Kennard) was wounded, he said, "Boys, I told them a lie and I believe that is the reason I got shot." ^{25.} This regiment (the Tenth Texas) later charged and easily drove the enemy off. At the battle of "Dead Angle" on Kenesaw Mountain, both the officers and men hurled rocks at the enemy, and every "gopher hole" was full of prisoners and dead Yanks. ^{26.} Instead of demoralizing the army, Johnston had built up an army of hardened veterans who enjoyed a good fight. General Hardee wrote Johnston in 1868, "I have the honor to say that, in my opinion, the organization, morale, and effectiveness of that army had not been impaired at its close.----Speaking for my own corps, I have no hesitancy in saying that I should have led them into action with more confidence at the close than at the beginning of the campaign. ^{27.}" General Stewart agrees that the morale was not impaired by the retreats and says that Johnston was the only army commander trusted and respected by officers and men. ^{28.} Yet, Johnston was removed just as he had maneuvered Sherman where he wanted him. We must now consider the actual grounds of removal and the justification of these grounds.

The removal of Joseph E. Johnston was a grave mistake, but the administration had its reasons in addition to personal animosities. The charges against Johnston were that he persistently disregarded the President's instructions, that he would not

fight the enemy, that he refused to defend Atlanta, that he refused to communicate with Bragg as to the operations of the army, and that he made gross exaggerations of the strength and losses of the army, disregarding all entreaties to attack the enemy. ²⁹.

Of these charges, only one was valid: Johnston did refuse to communicate with Bragg and the administration as to the operations of the army. This refusal to communicate actually was the cause of the other charges, for Johnston either refused or disdained to explain his policy. If Johnston had not remained so aloof and if he had tried to explain the situation to Davis and Bragg, his removal would probably not have occurred. For, as General Grant said, Johnston's tactics were right. ³⁰. Johnston understood from experience what the Richmond Administration never seemed to grasp. He understood that the Confederate Army confronted no slow-moving, inexperienced, incapably led army, but an army of intelligently directed, hardened veterans who had to be met on somewhat near equal terms if victory was to be assured. ³¹.

"It is not to be supposed that such troops under a sagacious and resolute leader, and covered by intrenchments, were to be beaten by greatly inferior numbers. I therefore thought it our policy to stand on the defensive, to spare the blood of our soldiers by fighting under cover habitually, and to attack only when bad position or division of the enemy's forces might give us advantages counter-balancing that of superior numbers. So we held every position occupied until our communications were strongly threatened; then fell back only far enough to secure them, watching for opportunities to attack, keeping near enough to the

Federal Army to assure the Confederate Administration that Sherman could not send reinforcements to Grant, and hoping to reduce the odds against us by partial engagements. 32. " This was the basic policy which Johnston followed, and it was a correct policy.

Being opposed by an army far superior in numbers and material, Johnston fought an excellent campaign from Dalton to Atlanta. In North Georgia an offensive campaign would have been either disastrous or indecisive. If Johnston had taken the offensive against Sherman's superior army, a victory would have been indecisive, as Sherman could have retreated to the fortress of Chattanooga and quickly rebuilt his army. However, a Confederate defeat in North Georgia would have been disastrous, as the Army of Tennessee was a hundred miles from its strong base in Atlanta with which the only connection was the Western and Atlantic Railroad. However, as the armies moved nearer to Atlanta, Johnston became stronger every day. Once they crossed the Chattahoochee River, the situation was reversed. A defeat of the Army of Tennessee near Atlanta would be indecisive, as Johnston could fall back into Atlanta which could easily be defended while the army was reorganized. Sherman, however, was now a hundred miles from Chattanooga with the Chattahoochee at his back; and a defeat for him could now prove disastrous. All this was recognized and understood by Johnston who was preparing to assume the offensive when he was relieved of command. In fact, Hood merely carried out the preconceived plans of Johnston when he attacked at Peachtree Creek.

In defense of himself, Johnston said, "---As to the alleged cause of my

removal, I assert that Sherman's army is much stronger compared with that of Tennessee than Grant's compared with that of Northern Virginia. Yet the enemy has been compelled to advance more slowly to the vicinity of Atlanta, than to that of Richmond and Petersburg; and penetrated much deeper into Virginia than Georgia.^{33.}" Johnston had fought his way down to Atlanta more brilliantly than Lee had to Richmond, performing the wonder of conducting an army in retreat through one hundred miles of intricate country with only negligible loss of men and material.^{34.}

As to the accusation that Johnston refused to fight the enemy, nothing could be more absurd. Not a single day of the campaign passed without continuous skirmishing and fighting somewhere along the line in addition to pitched battles at Dalton, Resaca, New Hope Church, Dallas, Pickett's Mill and Kenesaw. Johnston fought, and he fought skillfully and wisely, drawing the enemy as far as possible from his base while reducing his numbers and morale. As to ignoring instructions from the President, Johnston did not receive any detailed instructions after the campaign began except for a brief telegram early in July warning him not to fight with the Chattahoochee at his back.^{35.} The gross exaggerations of strengths and losses were not Johnston's, but Bragg's and Davis' exaggerations. Refusing to admit his terrible defeat at Chattanooga and Lookout Mountain, Bragg continually told Davis that the Army of Tennessee was much stronger than it actually was. Naturally, Hood backed up Bragg's claims. Finally, Johnston was accused of refusing to assume the offensive. Before the opening of the campaign this was true, as Johnston realized that an offensive was

not feasible near Chattanooga and far from Atlanta. The relative size and equipment of the armies and the importance of maintaining an army with which to defend Atlanta meant that Johnston had to stand primarily on the defensive. At Cassville, however, he had tried to assume the offensive when Sherman divided his forces as Johnston had foreseen, but he was foiled by Hood's failure to press the attack. Again at Peachtree Creek he had planned to attack Sherman's divided army only to be foiled by the administration. Like Lee in Virginia, Johnston retreated because he could not do otherwise if he were to have an army with which to defend the South. Had Johnston abandoned Atlanta without a struggle, his removal would have been justified, but Johnston was not planning to abandon Atlanta.

Thus, the removal of General Joseph E. Johnston was unjustified and was a great mistake on the part of the Confederate Government. However, Johnston himself was the basic cause of his removal. As he told a friend in Richmond after his wound at Seven Pines, "The shot that struck me down was the best ever fired for the Southern Confederacy, for I possessed in no degree the confidence of this government.³⁶" Johnston could have said the same thing after his removal in 1864. A man of Johnston's military capacity should have possessed confidence, and it was primarily his own fault that he did not, for he never tried to explain his plans and policies to the administration. "Confident language by a military commanding officer is not usually regarded as evidence of competence.³⁷" This view of Johnston is correct, but he should have realized the personalities of his superiors and should have sought to explain his policies to

Davis and Bragg. If he had only written Davis fully and frankly of what he was planning, Johnston would not have been removed. His strategy had been sound and his tactics brilliant; but he had been stubborn and secretive rather than tactful like Lee. ³⁸.

Acting upon the advice of Bragg and the correct opinion that Hood would fight, President Davis placed John B. Hood in command of the Army of Tennessee. Only thirty-three years old, Hood had been an excellent brigade and division commander under Lee and a good corps commander under Johnston. Winning his reputation in the Army of Northern Virginia, he had proved to be a bold, aggressive, and determined fighter although a little too sanguine. He had been crippled at Gettysburg and had lost a leg at Chickamauga. ³⁹. Although an excellent subordinate commander, Hood did not possess the necessary qualities to be an army commander. Thinking that General Hardee would make a better commander, General Lee said, "Hood is a bold fighter. I am doubtful as to other qualities necessary. ⁴⁰." Josiah Gorgas said later, "It is quite apparent that Hood, besides being out-numbered, is out-generated. The general judgment is that Hood has not the capacity for such a command. ⁴¹." Although brave and capable of fighting, Hood was rash, imprudent, and incompetent to direct. General Sherman said, "We agreed that we ought to be unusually cautious and prepared at all times for sallies and hard fighting, because Hood, though not deemed much of a scholar, or of great mental capacity, was undoubtedly a brave, determined, and rash man; and the change of commanders at that particular crisis argued the displeasure of the Confederate Government with the cautious

but prudent conduct of General Joseph Johnston.^{42.} " Such was the character of the man charged with the grave responsibility of defending Atlanta.

Chapter VII

The Battle for Atlanta

Realizing the grave responsibility which had been thrust upon him, General Hood went to Johnston's quarters on the night of the 17th of July and urged Johnston to pocket the dispatch and to leave Hood in charge of his corps. Generals Hardee and Stewart joined Hood in a telegram to the President requesting postponement of the removal, but Davis replied that the decision had been made and that he would not change it. Even after this reply, the three generals urged Johnston to remain, but he would not consent, as he would not disobey orders. However, Johnston did explain his plans to his successor before leaving for Macon. ¹.

First, Johnston had expected to engage the enemy while they were divided in crossing Peachtree Creek. If successful, he could easily follow and rout Sherman who would be pushed back into the Chattahoochee. If unsuccessful, he could fall back to the positions in Atlanta which could be held like those of New Hope Church. Manning the works of Atlanta and Peachtree Creek, he would secondly, if the first stage was unsuccessful, attack one of the Federal flanks as they approached the city, pushing the enemy to the east part of the Chattahoochee where there were few fords. If both these plans failed, he could still hold Atlanta and thus win the campaign. ².

On the 17th Sherman had begun his march on Atlanta with Thomas crossing the Chattahoochee at Paces and Powers Ferry, McPherson moving on

Atlanta by way of Decatur, and Schofield moving toward Buckhead. This movement divided the Union Army, as Johnston had expected. Hood had three alternatives: to fall back to Atlanta and undergo siege, to fall back to Atlanta and then swing on Sherman's line of communication, or to attack Sherman's divided forces.³ Being placed in command because he would fight, Hood could not and would not fall back to Atlanta without a fight. If he tried to swing on Sherman's line of supply and communication, he would be forced to abandon Atlanta. Therefore, he decided to follow Johnston's plan and attack at Peachtree Creek, as Sherman had blundered and had left his right open for assault. Hood planned to attack the right of Sherman's army under Thomas and then swing left to hit the flank of the rest of the Federal Army. Stewart was on the left, Hardee in the center, and Cheatham on the right supported by General Gustavus Smith with the Georgia Militia. Using Cheatham to hold back Sherman's left wing, Hood would attack Thomas with his other two corps, hoping to surprise Thomas in the act of crossing the Creek and before he could throw up breastworks.⁴

Sherman, instead of attacking Atlanta directly, planned to make a circuit and destroy all the railroads leading into the city.⁵ Feigning to his right, he moved to his left toward Decatur. "I intended to destroy utterly all parts of the Augusta Railroad to the east of Atlanta, then to withdraw from the left flank and add to the right."⁶ On the 18th and 19th, Sherman's forces were maneuvering into position. Unknown to Hood, McPherson reached the Augusta Railroad between Stone Mountain and Decatur on the afternoon of the

18th.⁷ Howard was at Buckhead and Palmer was at the junction of Peachtree and Nancy's Creek with Hooker between them. Schofield moved to the north fork of Peachtree Creek. On the 19th, the Army of the Cumberland, despite serious resistance, was able to establish several footholds on the south side of Peachtree Creek preparatory to crossing the next day. Howard was ordered to connect with Schofield, as Sherman realized that his army was divided, and Schofield and McPherson moved eastward toward Atlanta, opposed by Wheeler's cavalry. The morning of the 20th found Thomas pushing ahead as expected, but the gap between Thomas and Schofield remained. Hooker's corps and Newton's division were leading the advance across Peachtree Creek.⁸

Meeting with his corps commanders in order to assure close cooperation, Hood set the attack for 1:00 P. M. on July 20th. The attack would be by divisions in echelon from the right. However, General Cheatham was pressed hard that morning and had to extend a division front to his right, making it necessary for Hardee and Stewart to cover to the right. General Hardee delayed so, however, that the attack did not start until 4:00 P. M. Despite the delay, the attack still surprised the Federal Army as "without notice, the enemy came pouring out of their trenches down upon them (Hooker's men), they became mingled, and fought in many places hand to hand."⁹ ¹⁰.

Again and again the men in grey charged down the slopes with a noise and fury like Stonewall's men at Chancellorsville.¹¹ For four hours the battle raged as the Confederates sought to push the enemy back into Peachtree Creek. Trying for a decisive engagement as had been ordered, these men showed that


they knew how to attack despite Hood's accusations that they had been ruined by the policy followed from Dalton to Atlanta. Although fighting fiercely until sundown, the Confederate Army was finally forced to withdraw into its trenches as General Thomas brought up his artillery which swept the whole field. Also, the advance of Sherman's left flank was much more rapid than had been expected, forcing Hood to withdraw Cleburne's Division from the attack and to send it to reinforce Cheatham and Wheeler who were hard pressed to protect Atlanta. If this reinforcement had not been made, even though it weakened the assault, Cheatham would have been flanked, and McPherson would have followed Wheeler into the city. ^{12.}

Thus, the Confederate charge at Peachtree Creek failed. In fact, instead of flanking Sherman, Hood was almost flanked himself. Hardee and Stewart had led gallant charges to no avail, as they had been repulsed with severe losses. As Robert Selph Henry said, "The battle known as Peachtree Creek, whatever the cause, was a decided check with losses that could not be spared. ^{13.}" Hood lost 4,796 men while Sherman lost only 1,710 men. ^{14.} Nevertheless, Hood was not through, as he fell back to the main lines of Atlanta only to prepare another offensive movement.

The 21st of July was spent by Sherman in advancing and entrenching his lines in front of the enemy fortifications. Finding that his flanks were insecure, Hood fell back from his Peachtree Creek line to the lines of Atlanta, manning them with Cheatham's and Stewart's Corps and the Georgia troops of General Smith. Since he had failed on the 20th, since he had heard that

McPherson's flank was in the air, and since the roads were in good condition, Hood decided to send General Hardee with his four divisions on a Jacksonian-like movement around the Federal Army. Hardee was selected as his corps was fresher than the other two and as he was the most experienced corps commander. Hardee was ordered to get in the rear of McPherson's army and, aided by Wheeler's cavalry, to attack in the morning. Once Hardee commenced the attack, Cheatham would join in while Stewart held back Thomas. Guided by members of Wheeler's cavalry who were familiar with the area, Hardee moved to Decatur during the night, in the order of Bate, Walker, Cleburne, and Maney. Reaching the vicinity of Decatur undiscovered, Hardee rested his men preparatory to the attack the next morning. 15.

On the morning of the 22nd the Federal Army advanced, as it found that the entrenchments in front of Thomas and Schofield had been abandoned the previous night. Moving forward until stopped by the entrenchments of Atlanta, Schofield and Thomas began the siege. Meanwhile, McPherson was also ordered to close on Atlanta along the Augusta Railroad. Dodge's Corps, which had been in reserve since the 20th, was moving forward to join Blair's Corps near the city, when it was attacked by Walker's and Bate's Divisions of Hardee's Corps. Since they were marching by the flank, Dodge's men had only to halt and face left to be in line of battle. Fuller's Division received the brunt of the first attack which was repulsed, but the Confederates came on again with renewed determination. Meanwhile Blair's Corps, nearer Atlanta, also became engaged. On receiving this news, General McPherson left Dodge



and was riding toward Blair's line when he ran into Cleburne's line of skirmishers. Refusing to surrender and attempting to gallop away, McPherson was mortally wounded and died almost immediately, being replaced by General Logan. Cleburne's and Maney's Divisions pressed the attack against Blair who was cut off and forced to retreat. Although they paid dearly for the ground gained, Hardee's men pressed on, forcing the Federals to fight from the reverse side of their entrenchments as they had been flanked and surprised. Soon Dodge and Blair were able to form a defensive line aided by reinforcements from Schofield's army. 16.

Meanwhile, about 3:00 in the afternoon, Hood, who had been watching the struggle from an advantageous point in Atlanta, ordered Cheatham to advance in support of Hardee's left and Smith, with his militia, to attack the weakened lines of Schofield. Cheatham's attack broke the Federal line and forced the Federals to retreat until they could reform on high ground. Finally, Cheatham was checked by enfilade fire from Schofield's artillery which Sherman had ordered up. Also, Blair and Dodge took advantage of a lull in the battle to reform their lines and to throw up breastworks. The attack of the Georgia Militia was easily repulsed by Schofield while Thomas attempted to break through the lines of Atlanta. However, under cover of excellent fortifications, Stewart easily repulsed Thomas and forced him to withdraw. As night fell, Hardee withdrew to his left in order to connect with the Atlanta fortifications, entrenching and preparing to defend the Macon Railroad if Sherman continued to advance his left flank. 17.

The battle of July 22nd, commonly called the Battle of Atlanta, was, according to Sherman who set the losses at 8,499 Confederates and 3,641 Yankees, the hardest battle of the campaign. ¹⁸. Although fighting bravely and fiercely, the Confederates were unable to win the decisive victory hoped for; and they again lost more men than could be spared, as had been the case at Peachtree Creek. General Hood later blamed Hardee for the failure, saying, "It had rested in his power to rout McPherson's army by simply moving a little farther to the right; and attacking in rear and flank instead of assaulting an entrenched flank. ¹⁹." Hood, however, who needed a scapegoat for his own failure, is unfair as Hardee actually moved to where he was ordered and as he attacked moving columns which were not entrenched behind breastworks. Although Atlanta is only six miles from Decatur, Hardee had been forced to move fifteen miles in order to remain undiscovered and in order to reach McPherson's flank and rear. The facts show that the blame, if any, lies with Hood and not with Hardee, for General Hardee was entirely successful in his movement and was repulsed only by a superior force after a hard fight. ²⁰.

Not content to let Hardee bear the blame, Hood also stated, "My failure on the 20th and 22nd to bring about a general pitched battle arose from the unfortunate policy pursued from Dalton to Atlanta, which had wrought such demoralization amid rank and file as to render men unreliable in battle. ²¹." Hood believed that troops of the Lee-Jackson school would have been successful. However, these were the same type men as those of the Army of Northern Virginia, and their morale and fighting ability had not been damaged in any

way during the campaign to Atlanta. As the account of the battle shows, they had fought to the best of their ability against overwhelming odds. There need be no blame on the men, for they had tried, even though they had been unsuccessful. According to Hood, the battles had been partial successes as they had improved morale, arrested desertions, and stopped the advance of McPherson and Schofield.²² This may have been so, but the great losses were a heavy price to pay for improving morale and arresting desertion, while the entrenchments of Atlanta could have stopped Schofield and McPherson.

If any of the Southern troops are to be criticized, it must be the Georgia Militia who failed in their attack on Schofield's weak position. According to a veteran like Watkins, the militia beat a double-ringed circus with their shotguns, umbrellas, and walking sticks.²³ Nevertheless, some of them proved to be good fighters although largely unreliable.

When Johnston crossed the Etowah, Governor Joseph E. Brown ordered out the militia and civil officers of the State. They were instructed to organize into two brigades, and officers were elected. If they would not do this, they were no longer exempt. The militia was offered to Johnston on the basis that the men could be recalled if the interests of the State so required. Johnston accepted the offer, employing the militia to guard Atlanta and the Chattahoochee crossings, but not using them to supplement the regular troops. On July 9th, Governor Brown issued a proclamation calling out every man between the ages of seventeen and fifty-five able to bear arms. Never amounting

to more than 4,000 men, the militia was used by Hood to support Hardee's movement, but they were unsuccessful. Later they would be used to defend the lines of Atlanta. Although adding numbers, the militia never became an efficient fighting force which could be relied upon. In fact, they would have never been called out if Atlanta had not been threatened, for Governor Brown opposed conscription and refused to aid the general war effort, being concerned only with the State of Georgia. At any time the militia could be recalled, as they were in the early fall when the time for crop planting rolled around. Thus, Hood could rightly criticize the militia, but he had no basis for criticizing his army of veterans.²⁴

On July 22nd, the siege of Atlanta was initiated officially, as Hood had withdrawn into his fortifications while Sherman's army was entrenched in his front. Although Hooker was the senior officer, Sherman appointed General Howard to command the Army of the Tennessee. In the Army of Tennessee, General Stephan D. Lee was appointed Commander of Hood's old corps with Cheatham returning to his old division in Hardee's Corps. Walker's Division of Hardee's Corps was divided and reassigned, as General Walker had been killed and as Hardee's Corps was so depleted by the losses of the battle.

In moving on Atlanta by way of Decatur, Sherman's purpose had been the irreparable destruction of the Augusta Railroad, and this had been accomplished by McPherson. Hood expected Sherman to continue his move to

the left, but the question of supply and of ease in reaching the Southern railroads made Sherman decide otherwise. "My plan of action was to move the Army of the Tennessee to the right rapidly and boldly against the railroad below Atlanta, and at the same time to send all the cavalry by the right and left to make a lodgement on the Macon road about Jonesboro. 26."

On the morning of the 27th, both cavalry and infantry were in motion to the South. Although he had been disastrously repulsed twice, Hood was not ready to rely on the entrenchments of his Atlanta line. Determining to strike Howard's right flank while it was in motion, he withdrew the divisions of Loring and Walthall (Stewart's Corps) to support General S. D. Lee, who was ordered to move out on the Lickskillet road to attack and drive Howard from that road and from Ezra Church. Stewart was ordered to remain near the fortifications to support Lee, and to move the next morning (the 29th) beyond Lee in an attempt to turn Howard's flank and attack his rear. Hardee and the militia would occupy the works of Atlanta to hold off Schofield and Thomas. 27.

The Battle of Ezra Church on the 28th of July was a repeat of the tactics of the 22nd, only much less successful. Twice Lee's men advanced against Logan's Corps with their usual bravery, only to be repulsed easily. Stewart then moved his remaining two divisions to Lee's support while Blair and Dodge moved up to aid Logan who was wounded as was Stewart. Massing his artillery, Howard was successful in sweeping the field and in driving the enemy out of range. Although hoping to turn the Confederate repulse into a

rout by a counterattack on their flank, Sherman was unable to move his reserves up in time to launch the attack. During the Battle of Ezra Church, Sherman also hoped to break through into Atlanta. "I thought Hood had greatly weakened his main lines inside of Atlanta, and accordingly sent repeated orders to Schofield and Thomas to make an attempt to break in; but both reported they found the parapets very strong and full manned.^{28.}" Thus, as on the 20th and 22nd, Hood had tried to assume the offensive only to be severely repulsed. Hood skims over this battle in his memoirs, but Sherman estimates the Federal losses at 700 men and the Confederate losses at 4,632; and this estimate is nearly accurate.^{29.} Hood was now forced to withdraw again into Atlanta.^{30.}

Sustaining his reputation for gallantry and reckless courage, Hood had, for the third time in a week, tried to defeat Sherman's three armies by the useless charge of a single corps. These three battles had decimated his inferior army so that President Davis finally wrote him, "The loss consequent upon attacking him in his intrenchments requires you to avoid that, if possible.^{31.}" Convinced by his three sallies that General Johnston had not erred in standing on the defensive and conserving his forces, Hood now withdrew to the parapets of Atlanta while Sherman laid siege to the city. Both sides now dug in and faced each other from behind prepared breastworks. For more than a month the cannonade against Atlanta continued.

Meanwhile, Sherman's cavalry moved south of Atlanta as planned. With his flanks strongly anchored on the Chattahoochee, Sherman was able to

utilize all his cavalry in an attempt to tear up the Macon Railroad and to free the prisoners at Andersonville. Coincident with the troop movement of the 27th, Stoneman, Garrard and McCook moved south of Atlanta. Moving by the right flank, McCook succeeded in reaching Lovejoy's Station, which is on the Macon Road eight miles below Jonesboro and thirty miles below Atlanta. Unable to unite with Stoneman as planned, he destroyed a section of the railroad and captured some wagons and prisoners. However, he was surrounded at Newnan as he was returning and was badly defeated, losing his prisoners and some six hundred men to General Jackson. Moving by the left flank, Stoneman managed to destroy a part of the Macon and Augusta Railroad and to shell the city of Macon; but he, too, was soon surrounded, and defeated by General Wheeler. With the defeat of the Union cavalry complete, Hood decided to send General Wheeler with 4,000 men in a similar operation against Sherman's line of communication and supply. However, Wheeler, who moved north on August 10th, did not have a sufficient force to do any real damage, although he moved all the way up to Dalton. Earlier, General Johnston and Governor Brown had urged that Nathan Bedford Forrest be sent against Sherman's railroad, but President Davis and Bragg never understood what the cavalry might accomplish in North Georgia, and therefore would not order Forrest to operate in that area. Although Johnston had desired to initiate cavalry operations in Sherman's rear, he had realized that he could not spare his own cavalry for such an operation. In sending Wheeler north, Hood provided Sherman with an unexpected

opportunity, as he weakened his forces and lost his mobility.^{32.}

Both commanders admitted the failure of their cavalry operations in each other's rear. Hood said, "So vast were the facilities of the Federal Commander to reinforce his line of skirmishers, extending from Nashville to Atlanta, that we could not bring together a sufficient force of cavalry to accomplish the desired objective."^{33.} " Learning that his cavalry had been most unsuccessful around Jonesboro, Sherman still had his large army, while Hood no longer had the advantage of his superior cavalry. Sherman said, "I now became satisfied that cavalry could not, or would not, make a sufficient lodgement on the railroad below Atlanta, and that nothing would suffice but for us to reach it with the main army."^{34.} "

Since his cavalry operations had failed and since he was unable to take Atlanta by direct assault, Sherman now planned to move his army toward East Point and the Macon Railroad. Understanding the character of his Confederate counterpart, Sherman fully expected that such a movement would not be made without an attack from Hood. "I always expected to have a desperate fight to get possession of the Macon Road, which was then the vital objective of the campaign. Its possession by us would, in my judgment, result in the capture of Atlanta, and give us the fruits of victory."^{35.} " On the first of August, the Army of the Tennessee began the movement to the right, followed by the Army of the Ohio that night. Hindered by delays of all kinds, the movement of the Federal Army was much slower than Sherman desired. On August 5th, Schofield, opposed by Bate's Division of Hardee's Corps along

Cascade Road, was forced to throw up entrenchments. On the 6th, Schofield recharged in an attempt to gain control of the road, but Bate successfully repulsed the attack, although forced to withdraw to the main Confederate line that night. Schofield reported to Sherman, "I am compelled to acknowledge that I have totally failed to make any aggressive movement with the Fourteenth Corps. ³⁶." After the affair with Bate, Sherman decided to risk no more assaults. Continually moving southwest under cover of darkness toward the coveted railroads, he was content to shell the city while pushing his entrenchments as close to the fortifications as possible. Bringing up 4 1/2-inch rifled Parrott cannon to supplement his regular artillery, Sherman cannonaded the city while extending his lines, which were stretched as far as considered safe, slowly toward his right. On August 9th, the tempo of the bombardment was increased. ³⁷.

"If any one day of the siege was worse than all others, it was that red day in August, when all the fires of hell and all the thunders of the universe seemed to be blazing and roaring over Atlanta.---Shot and shell rained in every direction. Great volumes of sulphurous smoke rolled over the town, trailing down to the ground; and through this stifling gloom the sun glared down like a great red eye peering through a bronze colored cloud. It was on this day of horrors that the destruction of human life was greatest among the citizens. A shell crashed into a house on the corner of Elliot and Rhodes Streets. The explosion killed Mr. Warner, the superintendent of the gas company, and his

six-year-old daughter. Both were lying on a bed side by side at the time. Their bodies were frightfully mangled and they died instantly, perhaps without knowing what had killed them. A woman who was ironing some clothes in a house on Pryor Street between The Methodist Church and Wheat Street (Auburn Avenue) was struck by a shell and killed.---On Forsyth Street a Confederate officer was standing in the front yard, taking leave of the lady of the house, when a bursting shell mortally wounded him and the lady's little boy. The two victims were laid side by side on the grass under the trees, and in a few minutes they both bled to death." 38.

Thus, the City of Atlanta suffered and bled during the siege. Sherman said in a dispatch to Halleck, "One thing is certain, whether we get inside of Atlanta or not, it will be a used up community when we are done with it. 39." Even before Sherman laid siege to the city, Atlanta had been feeling the pinch of war and wondering what the outcome would be. Many people thought there was no danger, while others feared that Johnston's constant retreats would mean the loss of the city. Nevertheless, life went on, as the young ladies helped care for the wounded during the day and attended dances at night. 40. On June 18th, James R. Crew wrote his wife, "The situation is no better for us. One thousand sick soldiers in by the state train this P. M. This place is to be a great hospital. I have no doubt that all the churches and private residences will be taken before long for the sick. 41." Meanwhile, prices of food had risen so high (\$25 a pound for coffee, \$12 for butter, \$25 a bushel for sweet potatoes, etc.) that Atlantans concocted all


kinds of dishes known as "Blockade Pudding" or "Sherman Hash".^{42.}

Gradually the situation became more serious as the two armies neared the vicinity of Atlanta. Even from New Hope Church the guns were audible in the distance, and at Kenesaw the people felt they could almost follow the tide of battle. S. P. Richards wrote on July 10th, "This has been a sad day in our city for it has been quite evident for some days past that there is a great possibility of Atlanta falling into the hands of the enemy, and the city has been in a complete swarm all day and for several days."^{43.} On the same day the Federal spy in the city, J. C. Moore, reported that the populace was in a turmoil, that many of the citizenry were departing, and that vast amounts of machinery had been sent to Augusta.^{44.}

On July 20th, the first Yankee shell fell in Atlanta, killing a little girl at the corner of Ivy and Ellis Streets. The siege of Atlanta had begun. On July 23rd, Richards wrote, "We have had considerable taste of the beauties of bombardment today. The enemy have thrown a great many shells into the city and scared the women and children and some of the men pretty badly. This seems to me to be a very barbarous mode of carrying on war---."^{45.} During the siege, Hood protested the bombardment of the city, writing Sherman several letters in which he explained that the defensive lines were a mile outside of the city, that there were thousands of non-combatants in the city, and that the deliberate shelling was barbarous in the extreme. However, Sherman replied that war was the very science of barbarism and that Atlanta was not a peaceable community but a chief military and manufacturing depot which

must be devastated.⁴⁶ Thus, the bombardment would continue until Sherman began his movement to the south of Atlanta. Eventually, the people became used to the shelling and went about their every day business as well as possible. However, many tried to leave, and the trains were crowded with the lucky ones and the stations with the unlucky ones.⁴⁷ On August 1st, Richards wrote, "---There is nothing much to eat in Atlanta, though if we keep the railroad we will not starve, I trust.⁴⁸" For the rest of the month, the bombardment continued until finally, on August 25th, the shelling ceased as the enemy had deserted their camps around the city. Hood concluded that Sherman had withdrawn behind the Chattahoochee.⁴⁹ This was not the case, however, as the Federal Army had withdrawn to move south, not north toward the river.

While continuing to rain destruction on the city, Sherman decided to move the entire army on the Macon Railroad as had previously been planned. On the 15th, General Cox's Corps advanced to cover the crossing of the Campbelltown and East Point roads, forming the advance right of Sherman's army which would be the pivot for the move south of Atlanta. On the same day, Kilpatrick's cavalry was sent to attempt to destroy the railroads. Although Kilpatrick made an entire circuit around Atlanta, he was unable to do any lasting damage, as Jackson had been aware of the movement and had followed him. This movement re-emphasized the fact that the Federal cavalry was not strong enough to break the railroad. Sherman now decided to entrench Slocum's Twentieth Corps at the Chattahoochee bridge and swing the rest of the army



south. Ordering half the baggage to the rear and ten days rations for each army, Sherman began his movement on Thursday, August 25th. "On the 25th of August, pursuant to a plan of which The War Department had been fully advised, I left the 20th Corps at the Chattahoochee Bridge; and with the balance of the army I drew off from the siege, using some considerable artifice to mislead the enemy.^{50.}" Hood was indeed deceived, and the people of Atlanta believed the siege had been lifted; but Sherman was moving rapidly south, reaching the Atlanta-West Point Railroad on the 27th and breaking up twelve miles of it. Schofield remained before Atlanta until the 28th when he moved to follow the other two armies beyond East Point.^{51.}

At last realizing that Sherman was not withdrawing from Atlanta, but that he was moving his entire army on his line of communication, Hood ordered Hardee's and Lee's Corps to Jonesboro to attack on the morning of the 30th. "The Fate of Atlanta rested upon Hardee's ability, with two corps, to drive the Federals across the Flint River and Jonesboro.^{52.}" Hardee went by rail with half his troops while Cleburne brought up the rest. However, Cleburne was delayed by Howard's men who already occupied the roads he planned to take, forcing him to make a new road. It was nine o'clock on the morning of the 31st before Cleburne was in position, and Lee's Corps did not arrive until two hours later. Although Hardee telegraphed Hood to come to the front, he declined and decided to remain in Atlanta. Meanwhile, the delay had given the Federal Army a chance to entrench.^{53.}

At three o'clock in the afternoon, Hardee advanced against the Army of the

Tennessee, with his fiercest attack falling on Hazen's Division of Logan's Corps. Although a furious assault, this attack did not carry the weight of former efforts, largely due to a mix up in the signals between Lee and Cleburne, with the result that Cleburne took little part in the affair. During the afternoon, Schofield attacked and seized the railroad at Rough and Ready, immediately beginning to destroy the tracks. On hearing of the engagement at Rough and Ready and before receiving news of Hardee's attack, Hood ordered Lee's Corps to return to Atlanta while Hardee was ordered to cover the railway as best he could. Cleburne, who had evidently been forgotten, succeeded in reaching Lovejoy's Station, although almost having his whole corps captured. Indeed, confusion reigned in Atlanta, as Hood believed that the city could no longer be held. The failure at Jonesboro, according to Hood, gave to the Federal Army the control of the Macon Road and thus necessitated the evacuation of Atlanta at the earliest possible hour.⁵⁴ However, Hardee managed to entrench and hold his line against Howard, sending word to Hood that he could stop an advance for a while.⁵⁵

By the night of the 31st, Sherman had possession of the railroad from Rough and Ready to near Jonesboro; and he expected that the entire Confederate Army would attack him there the next day, so he sent word to Slocum to discover the conditions in Atlanta and to enter the city if possible. The next day, the Federal Army was engaged in breaking up the railroads when Sherman learned that Lee's Corps had been withdrawn during the night and that Hardee alone opposed him. Although he only wanted to force the evacuation of Atlanta

and to obtain complete possession of the railroads, Sherman now decided to call up Thomas with the Army of the Cumberland to make an effort to surround and capture Hardee's isolated corps. The attack was a vigorous one in which General Govan's whole brigade and two batteries of artillery were captured. However, Hardee's left and center held on while Granberry's brigade moved over to cover the gap. If night had not fallen, Hardee, despite his furious resistance, would probably have been cut off as Sherman had hoped. 56.

While Hardee was holding off Thomas on September 1st, Hood was preparing to abandon Atlanta. Lee's Corps turned and marched from Jonesboro toward Rough and Ready, protecting the movement of Stewart's and Smith's Corps from Atlanta. At five o'clock in the afternoon, the troops marched out of Atlanta on the McDonough Road toward Lovejoy Station, and during the night Hardee evacuated his lines and moved to join Hood. By midnight, only a few cavalymen remained in the city, and they left after blowing up seven locomotives and eighty-one cars full of ammunition and supplies. These explosions were a final signal to Sherman that Atlanta had been won, and the next day, September 2nd, the Federal Army entered the apprehensive city. 57.

Chapter VIII

Sherman Achieves His Goal

Although he followed Hood to Lovejoy Station, Sherman decided to return to Atlanta and rest his entire army while he laid his plans for the fall and winter. "I concluded to await the initiative of the enemy, supposing that he would be forced to resort to some desperate campaign by the clamor raised in the South on account of the great loss to them of the city of Atlanta. ¹" Meanwhile, Hood remained at Lovejoy Station, trying to gather together the remains of his defeated army.

The Atlanta Campaign was over, and Sherman had won. If his objective had been Johnston's (Hood's) army, he could not have claimed success. Because of the importance of Atlanta, however, Sherman could claim a great victory, as the capture of the City of Atlanta had been his real, though unstated, objective. In his memoirs Sherman wrote, "---Although the destruction of Hood's army was the real object to be desired, yet Atlanta was known as the 'Gate City of the South', was full of foundries, arsenals, and machine shops; and I knew that its capture would be the death-knell of the Southern Confederacy. ²" In reporting his success on September the 7th, Sherman wrote, "That same night, Hood in Atlanta, finding all his railroads broken and in our possession, blew up his ammunition, seven locomotives, and eighty cars, and evacuated Atlanta, which, on the next day, September 2nd, was occupied by the corps left for that purpose, Maj.-Gen.

Slocum commanding, we following the retreating rebel army to near Lovejoy's Station, thirty miles south of Atlanta, where, finding him strongly intrenched, I concluded it would not 'pay' to assault as we already had the great object of the campaign, viz., Atlanta.---If that is not success, I don't know what is.^{3.} " Sherman was correct; the capture of Atlanta was a success. If Atlanta were not the objective of the Federal Army, then there was no sound military reason for pulling the army from Hood's front backward into the city and permitting Hood to pursue whatever plans he had for rest and recruiting.^{4.} In Virginia, Lee's army had been and had remained Grant's objective; but in Georgia, Atlanta and not the Confederate Army had been Sherman's objective.

Sherman now took possession of the city with the Army of the Cumberland in Atlanta, the Army of the Ohio in Decatur, and the Army of the Tennessee at East Point.^{5.} Since Hood had not bothered officially to surrender the city to General Sherman, Mayor James M. Calhoun rode out with several of his councilmen to do so.^{6.} As General Sherman was south of Atlanta, Calhoun surrendered to General Slocum, who wired Secretary of War Stanton that Atlanta had officially capitulated.^{7.}

On September 7th, Hood received a letter from General Sherman saying that he was going to remove all non-combatants and make Atlanta a fortress. Providing food and transportation, Sherman would allow the people to go north or south, depending on their wishes, and he would allow slaves to go with their masters if they so desired. On September 9th, Hood replied that he had no other choice, but that he considered it an act of studied and ingenious cruelty

to take families from their firesides. Sherman replied that Hood had been the cruel one as he had had his lines so close to Atlanta. However, Hood argued that there had been only temporary works and that Atlanta was not a regularly fortified city.⁸ These letters were carried by James M. Ball and James R. Crew, who was later killed in 1865 in Atlanta by a Negro soldier.⁹ However, Sherman was determined to expel the people and burn the city, as he wrote Halleck, "If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will answer that war is war and not popularity seeking."¹⁰ And howl the people did, headed by Mayor Calhoun who repeatedly went to see Sherman to plead for the city, but Sherman refused to give in.¹¹

The army wagons carried the exiles to Rough and Ready, which was the designated place for the exchange of prisoners, and Hood's wagons carried them on to the Macon and Western Railroad at Lovejoy's Station. The condition of the people was sad while the slaves were sassy, but the story of Atlanta and its people after the capture and destruction of the city cannot be told here. Suffice it to say that the citizens returned to find Atlanta filled with thousands of ownerless and almost wild dogs and cats, with three-fourths of the buildings torn down or burned and nine-tenths of the property value destroyed.¹² In a letter to his wife written on December 1st, 1864, James R. Crew gave a list of the particular houses destroyed and of the persons who had returned, then said that "It would be impossible for me to give you a true description of matters in that once flourishing city."¹³

Sherman did not set fire to the city until he was ready to leave, for he and

the army settled in Atlanta for several weeks of rest. The city defenses were drawn in and strengthened while leaves and furloughs were granted. Sherman expected Hood to move on the Western and Atlantic Railroad, and he was not disappointed as Hood moved across the Chattahoochee on the 27th in an attempt to get Sherman to abandon Atlanta. Leaving Slocum's Twentieth Corps in the city, Sherman did abandon Atlanta, but he kept between the city and Hood's army. Hood was moving too fast to do any harm, and Sherman realized on October 26th that he could gain nothing by simply following; so he decided to return to Atlanta and march across Georgia to Savannah, leaving Thomas in charge of defending Tennessee. From November 12th through December 21st, Sherman's men marched through Georgia, destroying everything in their path. Meanwhile, Hood moved into Tennessee where he was badly beaten at the Battle of Franklin on November 30th. On December 15th and 16th he made a stand at Nashville but was again defeated, retreating to Tupelo, Mississippi, where General Beauregard took over the remnants of the beaten army. 14.

The campaign for Atlanta had begun on May 2nd when the Confederate pickets were driven back from Tunnel Hill preparatory to the general Union advance, and had ended on September 2nd when Slocum's Corps marched into Atlanta. The firing and skirmishing never ceased for one day of this campaign, even though there was not a pitched battle daily. The strategy and tactics of both Sherman and Johnston had been excellent. Johnston would occupy a strong

position and hold Sherman back until the Federal commander's superior numbers made it possible for him to initiate a flanking movement against Johnston's line of communication and supply. Yet none of these flanking movements caught Johnston by surprise, for he would wait until the last possible moment and then retreat under cover of darkness to his next prepared positions. Each of these retreats was a model, as nothing was ever left behind. In fact, four guns lost at Resaca because Hood had placed them far in advance of the Confederate lines (the positions and lines are still there today) represent the entire total of material lost between Dalton and Johnston's removal from command. Sherman also knew how to march, feed, and fight a large army; and his victories were his own, as he planned well, gave specific orders, and moved quickly and skillfully. Both generals thought highly of each other, and each sustained the other's opinion in the Atlanta Campaign.

Major Pierson wrote that the bloody campaign was one in which "Each new position was gained by the one, or lost by the other, only after persistent assaults, or by continuous pressure and struggle met by obstinate and brave defense.¹⁵" He could not be more correct in this statement, nor could he better sum up the feeling of the Federal Army on its capture of Atlanta. "For us it was a glorious morning.---It meant the end of the campaign of more than one hundred days of almost continuous fighting, upon each one of which, somewhere along the lines, could have been heard the sounds of war, the sharp crack of the rifle of the outpost, the rattle of the skirmish, or the roar of a full line of battle, the end of a campaign of more than one hundred miles of marching,

maneuvering, struggling, scarcely one of which was made unopposed---. 16. "

According to J. P. Dyer, there were two tragedies of the Atlanta Campaign: Johnston's refusal to explain his strategy, and his failure to win over Hood and Davis; and Hood's failure to realize that his strategy was wrong, and that he should have fallen back as Johnston had done and as Lee was doing. 17.

Johnston had brought to the Army of Tennessee soldierly intuition, training and experience; and he was an excellent commander who showed vigor and intelligence in the campaign. Not wanting to appoint Johnston in the first place, Davis had sullenly refrained from giving him any assistance whatsoever, and left him in entire ignorance as to the approval or condemnation of his plans until it was too late. "The United States have the means of collecting two great armies - here and in Virginia. Our government thinks they can raise but one, that of course in Virginia. 18. " Davis never recognized that a victory in Tennessee was improbable and, even if possible, would not have been decisive, while a defeat would mean utter destruction. Johnston had forced Sherman to consume seventy-two days in covering one hundred miles and was preparing to attack with an army stronger than that at Dalton when he was removed. 19.

The removal of Johnston and the promotion of Hood was the greatest mistake of the campaign. In one week Hood had so decimated the Confederate Army that Davis had to order him to resume the defensive. As to the end of the campaign, neither Hood nor Sherman could boast of their operations. After the 25th, Sherman was never as organized as he usually was. If Sherman were

unorganized, Hood was completely bewildered, as he first thought Sherman was retreating and then thought that he was advancing northward instead of to the south. Thus, Hood missed the opportunity to strike Sherman's rear and flank, an opportunity which afforded much more chance of success than had the movements of the 20th, 22nd, and 28th of July. Hood was brave, but he did not have the capacity for commanding a large army, or for combating an army such as that under Sherman.²⁰

The capture of Atlanta deprived the Confederacy of four major railroads which carried supplies to all parts of the South. It also deprived the Southern armies of the munitions and material which the factories and foundries of Atlanta had been turning out. Finally, it deprived the South of much of its remaining will to fight.

The Southern Recorder wrote on September 13th that "the possession of Atlanta by the enemy is a severe blow to Georgia and, we may say, to the military operations of the Confederate government."²¹ General Lee, in Virginia, could continue his brilliant movements and defense only so long as he could depend on the vital supplies brought by rail from Georgia, which had become the heartbeat of the Confederacy with its warehouses of meat and grain and its factories of clothing, vehicles, munitions, and weapons.²² The secondary base for Lee's army, Atlanta was the primary base for the Army of Tennessee. The fall of Atlanta also deprived the South of needed soldiers. "According to our Lieutenant-General's estimate the rebel desertions amount to one regiment per day. Every rebel reverse like the fall of Atlanta multiplies

in a continually increasing ratio the number of these desertions.^{23.} " In addition to the desertions, there were the losses of the Atlanta Campaign which amounted to 34,979 Confederates and 31,687 Federals.^{24.} The Union armies could replenish these losses, but the Confederate armies could no longer be reinforced.

The fall of Atlanta also had a great effect on the elections in the North. According to Robert Selph Henry, there are always considerations of politics in war, and this was especially so with Atlanta as she was to be victory for the re-election of Abraham Lincoln.^{25.} The midsummer of 1864 had been a dark period in the North which had been full of high expectations in May. Although opposed by much weaker forces, both Sherman and Grant had bogged down before Atlanta and Petersburg. In Virginia the Federal losses at Spottsylvania, the Wilderness, Cold Harbor and Petersburg, totalled more than for the rest of the war combined in that area. The Federal Government was hearing rumbles of dissatisfaction, while the Peace Party was gaining strength daily. "In such an hour, Sherman's bugle note of victory came strong and clear from out of the depths of Georgia.^{26.} " For the remainder of the war there was great rejoicing and elation as the North now held the "Gate City". Thus, the morale influence of Atlanta was terrific.^{27.}

With the loss of Atlanta, it would be only a matter of time before the Confederacy would be completely beaten. In Georgia, the grand strategy of the last year of the war had been successful.

Chapter IX

Speculation

The campaign is over, but the speculation and second-guessing continue even today. The loss of Atlanta was a terrible blow to the Confederacy and a great boost to the North. One of the accusations against Johnston had been that he would have abandoned Atlanta without a fight. If this were true, Johnston should have been removed; but General Johnston had fully planned to defend Atlanta, for he realized the great importance of the city to both sides. This raises an interesting, though purely speculative question. Could Atlanta have been held if the change in commanders had not occurred?

Hood, Bragg and Davis all said that Johnston planned to abandon Atlanta without a fight, but the evidence does not support their contention. Atlanta had been strongly fortified even before the campaign opened, and it is not to be supposed that a general of Johnston's capacity and defensive ability would not take full advantage of the breastworks of Atlanta as he had done of the breastworks of New Hope Church, Kenesaw, and other places. Johnston wrote, "Everything seen about Atlanta proved that it was to be defended. We had been strengthening it a month, and had made it, under the circumstances, impregnable. We had defended Marietta, which had not a tenth of its strength, twenty-six days. General Sherman appreciated its strength, for he made no attack. I assert that had one of the other Lieutenant-Generals of the army (Hardee or Stewart) succeeded me, Atlanta would have been held by the Army of Tennessee. 1."

Everything about Atlanta did prove that it was to be defended.

With the fall of Vicksburg on July 4th, 1863, the Confederate Government became apprehensive for the safety of the cities to the southeast, especially Atlanta. On July 15th, Colonel J. F. Gilmer wrote to Colonel L. P. Grant, Chief Engineer of the Department of Georgia, in regard to fortifying the city of Atlanta; and Colonel Grant replied that he and Colonel H. M. Wright, Commander of the garrison, would have maps and surveys made of Atlanta and of the Chattahoochee crossings. Colonel Grant also requested one hundred spades or shovels, one hundred picks, and fifty axes for work on the local defenses. On August 4th, he reported that the defensive works had been commenced at the Chattahoochee ferries, and that the fortifications of the city would be a problem second only to the fortifications of Richmond, with a cordon of enclosed breastworks within supporting distance of each other. The line would be ten to twelve miles in extent, with ten to fifteen centers of resistance at strategic points. In order to facilitate this work, John W. Hunt was authorized to hire Negroes from their owners at \$25 per month or one dollar per working day, to be paid to the owners. Each county was levied for its quota of slaves which were sent to Atlanta to work on the fortifications. By October 30th, 1863, Colonel Grant was able to report that he had nearly completed a line of defenses consisting of seventeen redoubts on prominent eminences connected by rifle pits. The redoubts had five faces, the angles varying with the contours of the hills, and each was to contain five guns. On the way from Mississippi to North Georgia to assume command of the Army of

Tennessee, General Johnston noted the improved facilities in Atlanta.² The work on the fortifications continued, with Colonel Grant requesting more laborers on March 8th, 1864. Atlanta was being made an admirable base for the Army of Tennessee.³

The strengthening of the defenses continued as Sherman's army approached closer to Atlanta. During the entire campaign, General Johnston had made sure that breastworks would be prepared in his rear before he was ready to use them. Certainly, he would not ignore the breastworks of Atlanta. "Captain Grant had been employing a large body of laborers in strengthening them, by my direction, since the beginning of June."⁴ Just after his removal, Johnston said to Hood, in explaining his plans, "---We could take refuge in Atlanta which we could hold indefinitely for it is too strong to be taken by assault and too extensive to be invested. This would win the campaign, the object of which the country supposed Atlanta to be."⁵ 55,000 troops, however, would be needed to man fully the lines of Atlanta. Johnston realized this, and had considered it in his campaign strategy. The defense of Atlanta was his primary reason for maintaining his "army in being". "In the course condemned by the President, our troops always fighting under cover, had losses very trifling compared with those they inflicted; so it was not unreasonable to suppose the numerical superiority of the Federals was reduced daily, nor to hope that we might be able to cope with it on equal ground beyond the Chattahoochee, where defeat would be its destruction."⁶ When he reached Atlanta, Johnston had the numbers to defend Atlanta and also enough men to leave his entire cavalry free

to move on Sherman's route of supply.

The facts show that Johnston definitely planned to defend Atlanta, although Hood, for one, does not agree. According to Hood, Johnston had built strong breastworks before, only to abandon them, as in the mountains of North Georgia at Dalton and Resaca. Also, Hood says that Johnston would have abandoned Richmond in 1862, and that he would have abandoned Atlanta if he had been left in command.⁷ Johnston, however, agreed with Governor Brown, who wrote Davis on June 28th, "I need not call your attention to the fact that this place is to the Confederacy almost as important as the heart is to the human body. We must hold it."⁸ Besides the strengthening of the defenses under his orders and his communication to General Hood, Johnston showed in other ways that he planned to defend Atlanta. He brought up heavy rifled cannon from Mobile, and he requested that General Forrest be assigned to him to aid his organic cavalry in striking Sherman's rear. If Sherman's supply line were ruined, he would be forced either to retreat or to fight against the entrenchment of Atlanta. Sherman would have little chance of success in assaulting Atlanta, a fact which he well recognized. General Howard said that "Atlanta appeared to us like a well-fortified citadel with outer and inner works."⁹ Sherman tried to break into the city on several occasions, but found the works too strong. "While this battle was in progress, Schofield in the center and Thomas on the right made efforts to break through intrenchments at their fronts, but found them too strong to assault."¹⁰ This occurred during the battle of the 22nd of July when Atlanta was held by only half the Confederate

force.

Also, Johnston's family remained in the city. On July 10th, the Federal spy, J. C. Moore, reported that he had been at Johnston's headquarters in Atlanta, and that he had seen Mrs. Johnston and other ladies having a "jollification".¹¹ If Johnston were planning to abandon Atlanta, or if he doubted his success in defending the city, he certainly would not have left his family there, but would have moved them south to Macon, as he did after his removal. According to Pollard, the situation in Georgia was better than in Virginia, as Johnston, who had never lost an army nor impaired the prospects of the Confederacy in any way, held Atlanta more securely than Lee did Richmond.¹² Due to the growing criticism of Johnston, two Alabamians, Representative Francis S. Lyon and Senator Richard M. Walker, stopped in for a personal investigation. They discovered, as did Senator B. H. Hill of Georgia, who was a close supporter of Davis, that the universal opinion was that Johnston's policy was judicious and necessary, and that the army and the people had full confidence in his ability to defend Atlanta.¹³

Thus, all indications point to the fact that Johnston was planning to defend Atlanta. If he had only made Bragg and Davis aware of that fact, he might never have been removed. Fort Walker in Grant Park still stands as a monument to the hard labor and engineering genius of Colonel Grant, showing the possibilities of works which were never fully tested nor used,¹⁴ for General John B. Hood was not a man to rely on entrenchments.

According to Hood, "The 'reckless' attacks around Atlanta - so designated

by General Johnston - enabled us to hold that city forty-six days; whereas, he abandoned, in sixty-six days, one hundred miles of territory, and demoralized the army. We had maintained a defense, during forty-six days, of an untenable position, and had battled almost incessantly, day and night, with a force of about 45,000 against an army of 106,000 effectives, flushed with victory upon victory from Dalton to Atlanta." 15. This statement of Hood's is an obvious attempt to justify his defense of Atlanta, placing the blame for his failure on Johnston. We have seen that Johnston had lost nothing but real estate from Dalton to Atlanta, that the army was far from demoralized, and that Atlanta was a tenable position which Johnston planned to defend. It is significant that Hood, who always underestimated the Federal Army and overestimated the Confederate Army while Johnston was in command, is now overestimating Sherman's army and underestimating his own. When he took over the army, Hood had over 60,000 men plus the Georgia Militia. His disastrous attacks decimated the Army of Tennessee and forced the evacuation of Atlanta.

According to Hood, Atlanta was an untenable position. If Sherman had displaced differently, he could have taken Atlanta in a third of the time he actually required. By using the Chattahoochee and Peachtree Creek as a screen, Sherman could have moved south of Atlanta, and avoided being assaulted by approaching initially from East Point, while sending McPherson to Decatur. The siege of Atlanta did not hinder the destruction of the railroads which could not be rebuilt, once destroyed. Sherman had only to leave a small

force opposing Hood and to entrench south of Atlanta while Hood was still on Peachtree Creek, thus completely investing Atlanta. Johnston, then, could no more have held Atlanta "forever" than Lee could have held Richmond. 16.

"Give us back Old Joe - we don't want a speech, we want Old Joe. 17." Thus spoke the soldiers of the Army of Tennessee in reply to President Davis' speech to them on September 25th. If "Old Joe" had not been taken away from them, Atlanta would have been held. Despite Hood's contention that Atlanta was untenable, the army under Joseph E. Johnston could have held out for a long period of time, as Sherman simply did not have the forces to take Atlanta. At least, he did not have sufficient numbers until Hood, in one week, did what Sherman had been unable to do in three months; he destroyed the Army of Tennessee. Johnston had refused to stand in the open in a pitched battle, in order to conserve his forces for the defense of Atlanta. It is a tragedy that he had to fight not only the Federal Army, but also the Confederate administration. If he had been left in command, and if he had been supported by Richmond, Johnston could have and would have defended Atlanta. Of course, he could not have held it "forever", but he did not need to hold it forever. The North was in great unrest, as the Peace Party was growing daily in the midst of draft riots and criticisms of President Lincoln, who was determined to press the war to a successful conclusion.

Recognizing the political as well as military aspects of the war, Johnston was playing for time when he was removed. If left in command, he would

probably have attacked at Peachtree Creek, as the division of the Federal Army afforded a chance of success. If he had been unsuccessful, however, he would have fallen back to the previously prepared strong lines of Atlanta, maintaining the army necessary for the defense of Atlanta. If Atlanta had been held through the fall of 1864, the war might have taken a different turn, as McClellan and the Peace Party might have been victorious. By 1864, the South did not need tremendous and brilliant offensive victories; it needed only negative results. Johnston would have held Atlanta long enough to provide negative results, but Hood gave the North positive victory by failing to maintain the army to utilize the fortifications around Atlanta. With the fall of Atlanta, the campaign was finished and the hopes of the South ended.

FOOTNOTES

AND

BIBLIOGRAPHY

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

1. W. T. Sherman, "The Grand Strategy of the Last Year of the War", Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, IV, 252-253. (Hereafter all references from Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, IV, will be cited as Battles and Leaders).
2. S. F. Horn, The Army of Tennessee, 305-308.
3. B. T. Johnson, A Memoir of the Life and Public Service of Joseph E. Johnston, 1-16, 112.
4. D. C. Seitz, Braxton Bragg, General of the Confederacy, 408.
5. J. E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations, 262. (Hereafter to be cited as Johnston's Narrative).
6. Ibid, 263.
7. Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, II, 548.
8. Ibid, 548-551.
9. Johnston's Narrative, 269.
10. As to the numerical situation of both armies, there are wide and varying opinions at each stage of the campaign. However, Johnston's figures here are fairly accurate although both armies would grow before the official opening of the campaign.
11. Johnston's Narrative, 265-275.
12. J. P. Dyer, The Gallant Hood, 223-231; Richard O'Conner, Hood; Cavalier General, 183-184.
13. J. B. Hood, Advance and Retreat, 94.
14. Ibid., 89-94.

15. Seitz, Op. Cit., 427-429.
16. Govan and Livingood, A Different Valor, 242.
17. Ibid., 244.
18. Johnston's Narrative, 288.
19. S. R. Watkins, "Co. Aytch", 131-133.
20. Horn, Op Cit., 312.
21. Johnston's Narrative, 277.

Chapter II

1. Stephen Pierson, From Chattanooga to Atlanta in 1864 - A Personal Reminiscence, 4.
2. Ibid., 4.
3. W. T. Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman, II, 6. (Hereafter called Sherman's Memoirs).
4. Ibid., 1-24; J. D. Cox, Atlanta, 19-24.
5. Cox, Op Cit., 25.
6. Sherman, "The Grand Strategy of the Last Year of the War", Battles and Leaders, 252.
7. Cox, Op Cit., 24.

Chapter III

1. B. T. Johnson, Op Cit., 114.
2. W. Swinton, The Twelve Decisive Battles of the Civil War, 386.
3. B. H. Liddell Hart, Sherman, 233.
4. F. E. Vandiver, Ploughshares into Swords, 148.

5. Ibid., 239-241.
6. Pioneer Citizens Society, History of Atlanta and its Pioneers, 116.
7. S. Mitchell, "Atlanta: The Industrial Heart of The Confederacy", The Atlanta Historical Bulletin, III, May, 1930, 21-26.
8. R. C. Black, Railroads of The Confederacy, 249.
9. Ibid., 248-252.
10. Sherman's Memoirs, 110.
11. Ibid., 112.
12. "The Effect of the News from Sherman", Harpers Weekly, September 17, 1864, 594.
13. Ibid., 594.

Chapter IV

1. A. H. Burne, Lee, Grant and Sherman, 98.
2. Cox, Op Cit., 250-251.
3. Dyer, The Gallant Hood, 233.
4. W. M. Polk, Leonidas Polk, Bishop and General, II, 348.
5. Johnston's Narrative, 307.
6. Cox, Op Cit., 31-32.
7. Sherman's Memoirs, 34.
8. Johnston's Narrative, 307.
9. Cox, Op Cit., 33-39.
10. Ibid., 39-41.
11. Ibid., 42-48.

12. E. C. Dawes, "Confederate Strength in the Atlanta Campaign", Battles and Leaders.
13. Ibid., 253.
14. Johnston's Narrative, 316.
15. Johnston, "Opposing Sherman's Advance to Atlanta", Battles and Leaders, 267.
16. Johnston's Narrative, 317.
17. Sherman's Memoirs, 36.
18. Johnston's Narrative, 315.
19. Ibid., 317.
20. Cox, Op Cit., 49-55; Johnston's Narrative, 320.
21. Hood, Advance and Retreat, 100-108.
22. Johnston's Narrative, 323-324.
23. Hood, Advance and Retreat, 111.
24. Sherman's Memoirs, 39-40.
25. Cox, Op Cit., 56.

Chapter V

1. Sherman's Memoirs, 43.
2. Cox, Op Cit., 59-68.
3. Ibid., 63, 68-69.
4. O. O. Howard, "The Struggle for Atlanta", Battles and Leaders, 306.
5. Sherman's Memoirs, 45; Johnston's Narrative, 326-328.
6. The Confederate Veteran, V, 459-460.

7. Ibid., IX, 166.
8. Howard, Battles and Leaders, 309.
9. Horn, Op Cit., 331.
10. Howard, Op Cit., 307.
11. Johnston, Battles and Leaders, 266.
12. Cox, Op Cit., 83.
13. Sherman's Memoirs, 47-49.
14. Cox, Op Cit., 89-97.
15. The Confederate Veteran, V, 520.
16. W. M. Polk, Op Cit., 373-375; Cox, Op Cit., 98.
17. Cox, Op Cit., 89-115.
18. Govan and Livingood, Op Cit., 291.
19. Horn, Op Cit., 325.
20. Cox, Op Cit., 116-118.
21. Ibid., 125.
22. "Incident at Kenesaw", The Confederate Veteran, IX, 543.
23. Sherman, Battles and Leaders, 252.
24. Howard, Battles and Leaders, 311.
25. Cox, Op Cit., 133.
26. Sherman's Memoirs, 65.
27. Ibid., 67.
28. Ibid., 70.
29. Johnston's Narrative, 347.

30. Cox, Op Cit., 144-147; Sherman's Memoirs, 71; Official Records, XXXVIII, part 5, 142-143.

Chapter VI

1. Johnston's Narrative, 349.
2. E. Elliot, West Point in The Confederacy, 81.
3. F. E. Vandiver, Rebel Brass, The Confederate Command System, 28-30; B. T. Johnson, Op Cit., 251-257.
4. J. Davis, Op Cit., 557.
5. Ibid., 556.
6. J. Gorgas, The Civil War Diary of Josiah Gorgas, 122.
7. Seltz, Op Cit., 445.
8. Ibid., 448-449; Official Records, XXXVIII, 878-881.
9. Sherman, Battles and Leaders, 253.
10. Sherman's Memoirs, 72.
11. Sherman, Battles and Leaders, 253.
12. Ibid., 252.
13. Howard, Battles and Leaders, 313.
14. Govan and Livingood, Op Cit., 322.
15. Ibid., 309.
16. Ibid., 314.
17. Ibid., 325.
18. Ibid., 321.
19. Wyatt, The Confederate Veteran, V, 521.

20. Sam Watkins, Op Cit., 174.
21. Hood, "The Defense of Atlanta", Battles and Leaders, 336.
22. Hood, Advance and Retreat, 136.
23. Ibid., 129-136.
24. Polk, Op Cit., 362-370.
25. Mary Gay, Life in Dixie During the War, 77.
26. Watkins, Op Cit., 154-157.
27. Johnston's Narrative, 366.
28. Ibid., 368.
29. Ibid., 355-356.
30. Horn, Op Cit., 326.
31. Govan and Livingood, Op Cit., 296.
32. Johnston's Narrative, 318.
33. Ibid., 349.
34. E. A. Pollard, Life of Jefferson Davis, 366.
35. Johnston's Narrative, 356.
36. B. T. Johnson, Op Cit., 305.
37. Johnston's Narrative, 349.
38. Dyer, The Gallant Hood, 238.
39. Ibid., 239-252.
40. Horn, Op Cit., 344.
41. Gorgas, Op Cit., 140.
42. Sherman's Memoirs, 75.

Chapter VII

1. Hood, Advance and Retreat, 126-128.
2. Johnston's Narrative, 350.
3. Dyer, The Gallant Hood, 252.
4. Hood, Advance and Retreat, 165-166; Hood, Battles and Leaders, 336.
5. Sherman's Memoirs, 68.
6. Ibid., 74.
7. Hood, Advance and Retreat, 165.
8. Cox, Op Cit., 149-155.
9. Sherman's Memoirs, 73.
10. Hood, Advance and Retreat, 165-168.
11. Howard, Battles and Leaders, 314.
12. Cox, Op Cit., 156-162.
13. R. S. Henry, The Story of The Confederacy, 392.
14. Sherman, Battles and Leaders, 253.
15. Hood, Advance and Retreat, 173-178; Hood, Battles and Leaders, 339-340.
16. Cox, Op Cit., 163-170.
17. Ibid., 171-174.
18. Sherman, Battles and Leaders, 253.
19. Hood, Advance and Retreat, 180.
20. Horn, Op Cit., 353-355; Cox, Op Cit., 176.
21. Hood, Advance and Retreat, 183.

22. Hood, Battles and Leaders, 341.
23. Watkins, Op Cit., 189.
24. Smith, "The Georgia Militia about Atlanta", Battles and Leaders, 331-335; L. B. Hill, Joseph E. Brown and The Confederacy, 183.
25. Cox, Op Cit., 181.
26. Sherman's Memoirs, 87.
27. Cox, Op Cit., 183-184; Hood, Battles and Leaders, 341.
28. Sherman's Memoirs, 91.
29. Sherman, Battles and Leaders, 254.
30. Cox, Op Cit., 184-185.
31. Ibid., 187.
32. J. P. Dyer, Fighting Joe Wheeler, 173-188.
33. Hood, Advance and Retreat, 200.
34. Sherman's Memoirs, 98.
35. Ibid., 99,
36. Cox, Op Cit., 192.
37. Ibid., 188-196; Franklin Garrett, Atlanta and Environs, II, 625-626.
38. Garrett, Op Cit., 627-628.
39. Sherman's Memoirs, 101.
40. William Key, The Battle of Atlanta and the Georgia Campaign, 19.
41. Letters and Papers of James R. Crew, June 18th, 1864.
42. Key, Op Cit., 600.
43. Diary of Samuel P. Richards, Sunday, July 10th, 1864. (Hereafter cited as Richard's Diary).

44. Garrett, Op Cit., 600.
45. Richard's Diary, Monday, August 1st, 1864.
46. Garrett, Op Cit., 629-630.
47. Mary Gay, Op Cit., 110.
48. Richard's Diary, Monday, August 1st, 1864.
49. Garrett, Op Cit., 632.
50. Harpers Weekly, September 24th, 1864, 611.
51. Cox, Op Cit., 195-198.
52. Hood, Advance and Retreat, 205.
53. Sherman's Memoirs, 105-106; Cox, Op Cit., 199; Hood, Advance and Retreat, 205.
54. Hood, Battles and Leaders, 343.
55. Cox, Op Cit., 199-204; Hood, Advance and Retreat, 206.
56. Cox, Op Cit., 204-207.
57. Hood, Battles and Leaders, 344; Garrett, Op Cit., 633; Official Records, XXXVIII, part 5, 778.

Chapter VIII

1. Sherman's Memoirs, 129.
2. Ibid., 99.
3. Harpers Weekly, September 24th, 1864, 611.
4. Horn, Op Cit., 367.
5. Sherman's Memoirs, 110.
6. Garrett, Op Cit., 634-635.

7. Official Records, part 5, 778.
8. Hood, Advance and Retreat, 229-242.
9. The Letters and Papers of James R. Crew; T. D. Killian, "James R. Crew", Atlanta Historical Bulletin, VI, February, 1932, 5-15.
10. Horn, Op Cit., 369.
11. P. H. Calhoun, "Reminiscences of Patrick H. Calhoun", Atlanta Historical Bulletin, VI, February, 1932, 41-47.
12. M. Barker, "Atlanta as Sherman left it", Atlanta Historical Bulletin, III, May, 1930, 15 and 20.
13. Letters and Papers of James R. Crew, December 1st, 1864.
14. Garrett, Op Cit., 644; Cox, Op Cit., 218-239.
15. Pierson, From Chattanooga to Atlanta in 1864 - A Personal Reminiscence, 28.
16. Ibid., 38.
17. Dyer, The Gallant Hood, 253.
18. Govan and Livingood, Op Cit., 257.
19. Irwin and Bowman, Sherman and his Campaigns, 197.
20. Horn, Op Cit., 368.
21. Black, Op Cit., 256.
22. Key, Op Cit., 13.
23. Harpers Weekly, September 24th, 1864, 611.
24. Sherman's Memoirs, 132. (Johnston's estimate of the Confederate losses is 21,996, but he fails to include the prisoners the Federal Army captured. Sherman's estimate is accepted as the most nearly correct).
25. R. S. Henry, Op Cit., 375.
26. Swinton, Op Cit., 417.

27. Ibid., 414-418.

Chapter IX

1. Johnston, Battles and Leaders, 277.
2. Govan and Livingood, Op Cit., 240.
3. Stephens Mitchell, "The L. P. Grant Papers and the Defenses of Atlanta", Atlanta Historical Bulletin, VI, February, 1932, 32-34.
4. Johnston's Narrative, 347.
5. E. H. McCallie, The Atlanta Campaign, 10.
6. Johnston's Narrative, 358-359.
7. Hood, Advance and Retreat, 152-154.
8. Johnston's Narrative, 360.
9. Howard, Battles and Leaders, 315.
10. Sherman, Battles and Leaders, 253.
11. Garrett, Op Cit., 600.
12. Pollard, Op Cit., 365-366.
13. Govan and Livingood, Op Cit., 297-301.
14. Mitchell, "The L. P. Grant Papers and the Defenses of Atlanta", Op Cit., 35.
15. Hood, Advance and Retreat, 140; Hood, Battles and Leaders, 344.
16. Hood, Advance and Retreat, 211-216, 141-149.
17. C. W. Hubner, "Some Recollections of Atlanta During 1864", Atlanta Historical Bulletin, II, January, 1928, 5.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Books

1. Alexander, E. P., Military Memoirs of a Confederate, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908.
2. Allen, Ivan E., Atlanta From the Ashes, Atlanta, Atlanta Ruralist Press, 1928.
3. Black, R. C., Railroads of the Confederacy, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1950.
4. Breckenridge, W. P. C., "The Opening of the Atlanta Campaign", Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, IV, New York, 1887.
5. Buck, Irving A., Cleburne and His Command, New York, Neale Publishing Company, 1908.
6. Burne, Alfred H., Lee, Grant and Sherman, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939.
7. Cox, Jacob D., Atlanta, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1882.
8. Davis, Jefferson, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, II, New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1881.
9. Dawes, E. C., "Confederate Strength in the Atlanta Campaign", Battles and Leaders of the Civil War.
10. Diary of Samuel P. Richards, Mustered into the Service of the Atlanta Press Guards for six months to defend Atlanta and Fulton County. Atlanta Historical Society.
11. Dubose, John Witherspoon, General Wheeler and the Army of Tennessee, New York, Neale Publishing Company, 1912.
12. Dyer, John P., The Gallant Hood, Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1950.
13. Dyer, John P., Fighting Joe Wheeler, University, Louisiana, Louisiana State University Press, 1941.
14. Eckenrode, H. J., Jefferson Davis, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1923.

15. Eliot, Ellsworth J., West Point in the Confederacy, New York, G. A. Baker and Company, 1941.
16. Garrett, Franklin M., Atlanta and Environs, I, New York, Lewis Historical Publishing Company, 1954.
17. Gay, Mary A. H., Life in Dixie During the War, Atlanta, The Foote and Davies Company, 1894.
18. Geer, Walter, Campaigns of the Civil War, New York, Brentano's, 1926.
19. Gorgas, Josiah, The Civil War Diary of Josiah Gorgas, edited by Frank E. Vandiver; Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 1947.
20. Govan, Gilbert E. and Livingood, James W., A Different Valor, New York, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1956.
21. Hart, B. H. Liddell, Sherman, New York, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1958.
22. Henry, Robert Selph, The Story of the Confederacy, New York, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1931.
23. Hill, Louise Biles, Joseph E. Brown and the Confederacy, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1939.
24. History of Atlanta and Its Pioneers, The Pioneer Citizens Society of Atlanta, Byrd Printing Company, 1902.
25. Hoehling, A. A., Last Train from Atlanta, New York, Thomas Yoseloff Publishers, 1958.
26. Hood, John B., Advance and Retreat, New Orleans, Published for the Hood Orphan Memorial Fund by P. G. T. Beauregard, 1880.
27. Hood, John B., "The Defense of Atlanta", Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, IV.
28. Horn, Stanley F., The Army of Tennessee, New York, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1941.
29. Howard, O. O., "The Struggle for Atlanta", Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, IV.

30. Howells, William Decatur, Extracts from a Soldier's Journal and Letters, compiled with an introduction and conclusion by Maud Morrow Brown, 1931.
31. Hughes, Robert M., General Johnston, New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1897.
32. Irwin, R. B. and Bowman, S. M., Sherman and his Campaigns, New York, Charles B. Richardson, 1865.
33. Johnson, Bradley T., A Memoir of the Life and Public Service of Joseph E. Johnston, Baltimore, R. H. Woodward and Company, 1941.
34. Johnson, R. U., "Opposing Forces in the Atlanta Campaign", Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, IV.
35. Johnston, Joseph E., Narrative of Military Operations, New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1874.
36. Johnston, Joseph E., "Opposing Sherman's Advance to Atlanta", Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, IV.
37. Key, William, The Battle of Atlanta and the Georgia Campaign, New York, Twayne Publishers, 1958.
38. Knight, Lucian Lamar, History of Fulton County, Georgia, Atlanta, A. H. Cawston Publisher, 1930.
39. Lewis, Lloyd, Sherman the Fighting Prophet, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1932.
40. McCallie, Elizabeth Hanleiter, The Atlanta Campaign, Read at the meeting of the Atlanta Historical Society, February 26th, 1938.
41. O'Conner, Richard, Hood: Cavalier General, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1949.
42. Official Records of the War of Rebellion, Government Printing Office, 1880.
43. Pierson, Major Stephen, From Chattanooga to Atlanta in 1864 - A Personal Reminiscence; Published by the New Jersey Historical Society in 1931 and presented to the Margaret Mitchell Memorial Library, Atlanta Historical Society.
44. Polk, William M., Leonidas Polk, Bishop and General, II, New York, Longmans, Green and Company, 1915.

45. Pollard, Edward A., Life of Jefferson Davis, Philadelphia, National Publishing Company, 1869.
46. Seitz, Don C., Braxton Bragg, General of the Confederacy, Columbia, South Carolina, The State Company, 1924.
47. Sherman, W. T., Memoirs of William T. Sherman, II, New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1875.
48. Sherman, W. T., "The Grand Strategy of the Last Year of the War", Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, IV.
49. Smith, Gustavus W., "Georgia Militia Around Atlanta", Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, IV.
50. Swinton, William, The Twelve Decisive Battles of the War, New York, Dick and Fitzgerald Publishers, 1867.
51. Vandiver, Frank E., Ploughshares Into Swords, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1952.
52. Vandiver, Frank E., Rebel Brass, the Confederate Command System, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1956.
53. Watkins, Sam R., "Co. Aytch", Jackson, Tennessee, McCowart-Mercer Press, 1952.

B. Periodicals

1. The Atlanta Constitution.
2. Barker, Meta, "Atlanta as Sherman Left It", The Atlanta Historical Bulletin, III, May, 1930.
3. Bell, Piromis H., "The Calico House", Atlanta Historical Bulletin, III, May, 1930.
4. Calhoun, Patrick H., "Reminiscences of Patrick H. Calhoun", Atlanta Historical Bulletin, VI, February, 1932.
5. The Confederate Veteran, 1891-1932.
6. Harpers Weekly, September, 1864.

7. Hay, T. R., "The Atlanta Campaign", Georgia Historical Quarterly, VII.
8. Hay, T. R., "Davis-Hood-Johnston Controversy of 1864", The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XI.
9. Hubner, Major Charles W., "Some Recollections of Atlanta During 1864", Atlanta Historical Bulletin, II, January, 1928.
10. Killian, T. D., "James R. Crew", Atlanta Historical Bulletin, VI, February, 1932.
11. Kurtz, Wilbur G., "Persons Removed from Atlanta by General W. T. Sherman", Atlanta Historical Bulletin, VI, September, 1864.
12. Mitchell, Stephens, "The L. P. Grant Papers and the Defense of Atlanta", Atlanta Historical Bulletin, VI, February, 1932.
13. Mitchell, Stephens, "Atlanta, The Industrial Heart of The Confederacy", The Atlanta Historical Bulletin, III, May, 1930.

C. Manuscripts

1. Letters and Papers of James R. Crew in the Margaret Mitchell Library of The Atlanta Historical Society.

D. Maps

1. The Civil War Atlas to accompany the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies; Washington, Government Printing Office, 1891-1895.
2. Matthew Forney Steele, American Campaigns, II, Washington, Bryon S. Adams, 1909.