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dc.rights.licenseIn Copyrighten_US
dc.creatorFleenor, Benjamin James
dc.date.accessioned2019-04-16T17:03:35Z
dc.date.available2019-04-16T17:03:35Z
dc.date.created2019
dc.identifierWLURG38_Fleenor_PHIL_POV_2019
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11021/34348
dc.descriptionThesis and Capstone; [FULL-TEXT RESTRICTED TO WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY LOGIN]en_US
dc.descriptionBenjamin James Fleenor is a member of the Class of 2019 of Washington and Lee University.en_US
dc.description.abstractI will be arguing that the concept of an ultimately free agent who takes final responsibility for his actions and desires is inherently incompatible with the dominant western paradigm of materialism and universal causation. I assume a Thesis of Universal Causation (TUC), which states that everything in the universe, the mental states of individuals included, is strictly determined by anterior causes. For any given constellation of causes, there can be but one outcome. There are a number of ways to react to this 'specter of determinism.' The position which I will call 'hard determinism' takes a pessimistic stance by defining freedom as the ability to make a real choice between actual alternative possibilities. Since the TUC can imagine only one possible future, the Hard Determinist sees freedom as an impossibility and despairs of assigning the predicate 'morally responsible' to any agent. An alternative response comes from the 'compatibilist,' represented in my paper by Daniel Dennett. The compatibilist seeks to reconcile moral responsibility and freedom with the TUC by redefining what it means to be free--freedom, on this view, is a matter of owning one's desires and utilizing causal knowledge to achieve them. I argue that there are merits to both of these views, but that each of them takes the concepts of freedom and responsibility too seriously. My own position is quasi-compatibilist in the sense that I recommend continued use of the terms 'freedom' and 'morally responsible,' but I turn to a Buddhist perspective to demonstrate that these terms are not absolutes. Their use, if not properly self-conscious, threatens to obscure the fact that human intention can never be the sole cause of human action. The Buddhist perspective dissolves the 'problem of free will' by treating persons as merely conventionally-existent entities. In doing so, it provides an ontology which both teaches us how to be more free and compels us to use our freedom for compassionate ends. Buddhist epistemology encourages us to take a bifurcated stance on freedom and responsibility: it is 'true' that other people are neither free nor responsible, but I must also believe that it is 'true' that I am both free and responsible. I will buttress my reading of Buddhist philosophy with examples from clinical psychology and conclude by reflecting on the consequences of my view for education and criminal justice. [From Introduction]en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityBen Fleenor
dc.format.extent61 pagesen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.rightsThis material is made available for use in research, teaching, and private study, pursuant to U.S. Copyright law. The user assumes full responsibility for any use of the materials, including but not limited to, infringement of copyright and publication rights of reproduced materials. Any materials used should be fully credited with the source.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en_US
dc.subject.otherWashington and Lee University -- Capstone in Shepherd Poverty Programen_US
dc.subject.otherWashington and Lee University -- Honors in Philosophyen_US
dc.titleFreedom and Moral Responsibility in a Deterministic Universe: Perspectives from Buddhism and Clinical Psychology (thesis)en_US
dc.typeTexten_US
dcterms.isPartOfRG38 - Student Papers
dc.rights.holderFleenor, Benjamin James
dc.subject.fastCausation (Buddhism)en_US
dc.subject.fastFree will and determinismen_US
dc.subject.fastIntentionality (Philosophy)en_US
local.departmentPhilosophyen_US
local.departmentShepherd Poverty Programen_US
local.scholarshiptypeHonors Thesisen_US


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