Public Involvement and the Formation of Public Policy: The Case of European Monetary Union

Abstract

European Monetary Union (EMU) represents a complex and technical issue which has been surrounded by controversy since its beginnings. Thus, disagreement on this issue has been widespread. This study examines the disagreement between policy-makers and the public to determine whether or not it was dealt with in a just and democratic manner, consistent with the principles of Gutmann and Thompson's democratic deliberation theory. Section I, Democratic Deliberation and EMU, outlines Gutmann and Thompson's deliberation theory and introduces some of the difficulties the EMU debate has encountered trying to fulfill Gutmann and Thompson's deliberative principles. Section II, The History Behind European Monetary Union, guides us through EMU's history and illustrates the importance of adhering to Gutmann and Thompson's deliberative theory. Section III, The Crucial Role of Institutional Design, reveals that Gutmann and Thompson's theory cannot be fully examined without investigating institutional design. Investigating institutional design is a crucial omission from Gutmann and Thompson's theory and the EMU case demonstrates its importance. Section IV, The Relationship Between Public Opinion and Adherence to Gutmann and Thompson's Deliberative Principles, analyzes public opinion by studying opinion polls and national elections, to see what it can tell us about Gutmann and Thompson's theory. My study concludes with the assertion that through increased dedication to Gutmann and Thompson's principles of publicity and accountability, EMU has earned its legitimacy. However, this study shows that the road to legitimacy was neither a short nor easy path. Instead, EMU has proven to be a long and difficult process in which progress occurred through learning from mistakes. [From Introduction]